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ABSTRACT
Relative Deprivation, Justice Perceptions and Forgiveness of
Victims in Poland and Uganda
by
KRYGIER Kamila Anna
Doctor of Philosophy
This study examines the question of how persisting economic and social inequalities
between perpetrators and victims affect victims’ perceptions of justice and forgiveness
in cross-cultural settings by applying the theory of relative deprivation. The hypothesis
of this study is that inequalities trigger relative deprivation in victims, which in turn
has a direct negative effect on forgiveness as well as an indirect effect via justice
perceptions. Relative deprivation is defined as a consequence of a disadvantageous
comparison with an outgroup. It includes the cognitive elements of comparing and
perceiving the own outcome as less than deserved, as well as the affective components
of anger and resentment. The comparison conditions applied in this study are economic
status and social acknowledgement.
In order to test the direct effect of relative deprivation on forgiveness, as well as the
indirect effect via justice perceptions, vignette experiments were employed. The same
causal relationships were tested with a survey to complement the experiment with a
real-life setting. The studies were conducted in two culturally and historically diverse
post-conflict settings, namely Poland and northern Uganda. To achieve a fuller picture
of the similarities and differences between those settings this study made use of
qualitative methods, such as open-ended questions and interviews.
The regression analysis revealed consistent negative effects of relative deprivation on
justice perceptions. The direct negative effects of relative deprivation on forgiveness
are mostly significant but vary across both countries with regard to its different
dimensions. As expected, a perception of justice contributes to forgiveness. Contrary
to the theoretical predictions, victims experience varying degrees of relative
deprivation in all experimental conditions except the one, where they are better off
than the perpetrator. The qualitative findings revealed that an improvement of
economic conditions is of utmost importance for the justice perceptions of most
victims in both countries, as are apologies and remorse for forgiveness.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background and problem statement
Many countries are faced with the legacy of human rights violations perpetrated during
times of conflict or by repressive regimes. When the regime collapses or the conflict
ends, the victims and perpetrators have to continue to live together, often side-by-side.
For this to be possible in the long run, forgiveness — understood in its most minimal
definition as ‘foregoing revenge’ — plays a vital role. Even though not without its
controversy, forgiveness has been lauded as the best response to past atrocities (Biggar
2003). It has also been described as a means for achieving national reconciliation
(Minow 1998; Tutu and Tutu 2014).
Some victims are able to forgive even crimes described as unforgivable. The desire to
let go of anger and hatred can have healing effects on those who succeed in doing so.
It has repeatedly been asserted that forgiveness has a beneficial effect on the mental
well-being of the forgiving person (American Psychological Association 2006; Exline
et al. 2003; Freedman and Enright 1996; Harris et al. 2006; Kira et al. 2009). In many
cases, however, and sometimes despite a variety of efforts undertaken by countries to
overcome the legacies of the past, victims continue to hold on to their grievances.
Apart from the detrimental effect this has on them as individuals, it can also reinforce
and exacerbate divisions existing in post-conflict societies, possibly even resulting in
renewed conflict if the wounds of the past do not heal. There are various measures that
contribute to forgiveness, such as for instance apologies, or remorse shown by the
perpetrators. Reparation granted by the state to the victims also contributes to their
ability to forgive their perpetrators. (Field and Chhim 2008; David and Choi 2005,
2006, 2009; Blatz, Schumann, and Ross 2009). But the question is: what are some of
the obstacles that restrain the achievement of forgiveness? In the same way as there
are factors contributing to forgiveness, there might also be characteristics of the postconflict setting that impede it. This is the focus of the present study: to find out what
the obstacles are that inhibit the process of forgiveness.
Forgiveness is one of the central concerns of transitional justice, as emphasized by
leading scholars (Gibson 2012). Transitional justice has been defined as a set of
judicial and nonjudicial measures adopted to address “past human rights violations by
providing truth, justice, redress, and reconciliation” (Stan and Nedelsky 2013). It can
1

be also broadly be described as the “pursuit of justice in periods of political flux”
(Teitel 2003, 69). Minow (1998, 9) calls justice one of the “two purposes animating
societal responses to collective violence”. On the micro-level this is related to
individual perception of justice, which some scholars perceive as one of the basic
human motivations, possibly with genetic predispositions (Lerner 1980; Wright 1995).
But does a perceived lack of justice represent an obstacle to forgiveness? When
investigating topics related to individual attitudes and perceptions the conceptual
apparatus of the scholarly field of transitional justice proves limited. The few studies
which do address these topics, as the ones mentioned above, mostly describe effects
and findings without providing explanations based on existing theories. These issues
are, on the other hand, very well placed within the field of social psychology, which
studies thoughts, feelings or behaviour in social contexts.
While justice and forgiveness are very broad topics the following chapters will outline
which aspects of both concepts will be at the centre of this study and why. A major
objective is to explore the role of economic and social inequalities in the perception
that victims have of justice and forgiveness. Economic concerns have been singled out
as particularly important for victims in post-conflict settings; yet it is often neglected
by transitional justice scholars and practitioners (Z. Miller 2008; Laplante 2008;
Ajetunmobi 2012; Robins 2012a; Gready and Robins 2014). This study endeavours to
narrow down those broad statements by focusing on the specific case of post-conflict
inequalities between victims and perpetrators. In order to do this the social
psychological theory of relative deprivation is applied.
Recognizing that the perspectives of different groups in a post-conflict setting differ,
this study adopts a victim-centred approach. As the group affected by the past injustice
more than any other, its perspective is regarded as crucial when addressing past human
rights violations (van Boven 1993, 2005; Bassiouni 2000). The “UN Declaration of
Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power” defines victims
as “persons who, individually or collectively, have suffered harm, including physical
or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their
fundamental rights, through acts or omissions that do not yet constitute violations of
national criminal laws but of internationally recognized norms relating to human
rights” (UN 1985).
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The term “victims” is being adopted here instead of the term “survivors”. This may
appear controversial due to the more positive connotation of the latter. However, this
choice does not imply any value judgment but is mostly guided by practical
considerations. Firstly, as pointed out by David (2017), the term “victims” is more
specific than the broader term “survivors”. Secondly, most of the studies, as well as
international documents such as the UN Declaration on which the present definition is
based, use the term “victims”.
1.2 Theoretical relevance
The study of justice and forgiveness after mass human rights violations is an
quintessential of transitional justice, the beginning of which is mostly considered to be
the Nuremberg trials after WWII (Teitel 2003). Now, many decades later, a vibrant and
multidisciplinary scientific field has developed alongside a growing number of
practical applications of the diverse measures that constitute transitional justice
(Dancy 2010; Hayner 1994; Teitel 2003; Stan and Nedelsky 2013). The most common
measures include, but are not limited to, trials, truth commissions, lustration,
reparations and various formal and informal reconciliatory approaches. The ambitions
or expectations attached to them are often enormous as evidenced by the United
Nations description of transitional justice as:
“incorporating the full range of judicial and non-judicial measures to ensure
accountability, serve justice, provide remedies to victims, promote healing and
reconciliation, establish independent oversight of the security system and restore
confidence in the institutions of the State and promote the rule of law” (UN n.d.)
While this definition appears to be all-embracing there are voices within the field who
seek to broaden the understanding of transitional justice even further. Some doubt the
“transition” element in transitional justice as the field includes the examination of
ongoing conflicts or memorialisation (Craigie and McAuliffe 2013). Attempting a
more holistic understanding of transitional justice, Weinstein and Fletcher (2002)
propose a comprehensive model of “social repair”, which has been described as “do
everything, engage everyone” (Gready 2005, 7). Finally, more and more authors
emphasize societal inequalities, in particular economic ones, as contributing to the
outbreak of conflicts, as well as posing a danger for renewed violence in the postconflict phase (Laplante 2008; Z. Miller 2008; Gready and Robins 2014; Schmid and
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Nolan 2014).
Thus, transitional justice appears to be torn between wanting too much (Waldorf 2012)
while others, pointing to its gaps and shortcomings, suggest that it settles for too little,
thereby risking failure.
This study does not attempt to add another voice to the debate on what transitional
justice should or should not be. The question of what works is always tied to the
envisioned goal. The focus on macro-level democratization processes requires studies
and assessments that differ from micro-level investigations into attitudes and
perceptions. The argument follows those of Minow (1998) and David (2017) stating
that the field is too complex to be comprehensively apprehended from the position of
one scientific discipline. The perspective applied here recognizes instead that
psychological processes involved in dealing with a violent past, such as grappling with
perceptions about justice and the role of forgiveness, are complex and resist being
forced into specific time periods or circumscribed by a predetermined set of tools. A
psychological point of view is difficult to reconcile with an assessment of the effects
of transitional justice measures on victims as each measure may carry a different
psychological meaning for each individual victim. Similarly, perceptions of justice and
willingness to forgive may encompass aspects that reach beyond the scope of the
measures and may, therefore, easily go unnoticed. By focusing on the psychological
consequences of particular attributes of the post-conflict context, and the potential
resulting impact on victims’ attitudes, this study contributes an additional perspective
to the assessment of transitions. The importance of an evaluation of the common
transitional justice measures and their effects on victims cannot be overestimated.
However, it is equally vital to keep in mind that post-conflict settings, including a
variety of residues from the past, are defined by more than transitional justice measures.
This point of view is reflected in some of the criticisms reiterated above; and is also
what the present study aims to address.
A victim-centred approach involves a particular challenge. While many empirical
studies and reviews speak of “the victims” as a homogenous group, it is not clear to
what extent general statements about them are justified, even though macro-level
decisions are often claimed to be based on their needs (David and Choi 2005). Many
of the leading scholars on transitional justice have focused on reviewing and assessing
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the most widespread measures such as trials, truth commissions, lustration or
reparations (Hayner 2010, 1994; Minow 1998; David 2011; Elster 2006; Orentlicher
1991; David 2014; Olsen, Payne, and Reiter 2010). Recently, however, a number of
small-scale qualitative studies have appeared criticizing most of these approaches as
“elitist” and arguing that many victims, especially in developing countries, have
concerns that are different from those attributed to them by transitional justice scholars
(Robins 2012a; Millar 2011; Ajetunmobi 2012). In his review of micro-level empirical
transitional justice studies David (2017) emphasizes this problem of generalizing
across diverse groups of victims.
How can the goal of making more generally applicable statements be reconciled with
the justified critique of those who advocate a more bottom-up and localized approach?
Above all, more empirical studies across different victim groups are needed. Research
on the macro-level has employed wide-ranging international comparisons (Olsen,
Payne, and Reiter 2010). This research, while crucial, does not advance knowledge on
the micro-level, which is the focus of this study. Most of the quantitative victimcentred studies, have, by comparison, been predominantly carried out in one country,
or historically and culturally similar regions (David and Choi 2006, 2005, 2009;
Gibson 2002, 2006; Backer 2010; Nussio, Rettberg, and Ugarriza 2015; Kaminer et al.
2001). As they focused on the specifics of those settings it might be difficult to apply
some of the findings to completely different contexts. Other previously-mentioned,
small-scale qualitative victim-centred studies did not even aim to produce more
general statements.
A few studies that compare diverse cultural groups with regard, for instance, to their
willingness to forgive or with regard to their understanding of forgiveness, do exist
(Azar and Mullet 2002; Kadiangandu et al. 2007). However, these studies are still very
limited. Furthermore, they either do not deal with victims — and are, therefore, not
situated within the scope of transitional justice (Kadiangandu et al. 2007). Or, even if
they do focus on culturally diverse victim groups, they were carried out within the
same post-conflict setting (Azar and Mullet 2002). As a consequence, the wideranging applicability might yet again be questioned. The cause of these challenges is
understandable, as finding an applicable theoretical framework to study very different
victim groups in diverse conflict contexts is problematic.
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Here, yet again, the social psychology perspective provides an advantage. The aim of
this scientific field is in itself to find general patterns of human attitudes and
behaviours. The theories describing these patterns are supposed to be widely
applicable, even though cross-cultural research to test many of the theoretical
assumptions is still limited. Nevertheless, the discipline of social psychology provides
a valuable theoretical framework that has the potential for generating general
statements and finding similarities between diverse groups. As such, the assumptions
are not based on the particularities of the conflict setting, but rather on theories relevant
for all people, victims or not, adapted for the transition context. To put it differently,
the application of social psychological theories in the field of transitional justice can
provide new answers and help to synthesize the universal with the local.
A few attempts to apply social psychology theories within the context of transitional
justice have been undertaken, most notably by Gibson (2009), who made use of the
construct of procedural justice to analyse the effectiveness of truth commissions in
South Africa. Other studies on perceptions and attitudes towards the International
Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia (ICTY) in former Yugoslavia applied psychological
theories as explanations (Ford 2012; Biro et al. 2004a). However, these attempts are
still largely limited. Mostly the theories were applied post hoc to explain existing
findings instead of being tested in a specifically developed research design. This is the
gap the present study aims to address by testing predictions based on the theory of
relative deprivation in culturally and historically different post-conflict settings.
Finally, when studying justice perceptions and forgiveness it is not easy to avoid the
issue of normative assessments. Ignoring them completely may seem forced and,
moreover, raise questions about the significance of these topics, especially since both
are complex and often controversial. Often scholars argue for certain measures based
on the field they are associated with, such as those attached to legal disciplines
advocating for the importance of trials and retribution (Orentlicher 1991). Decisions
taken by nations to forego retribution are justified by emphasizing the importance of
reconciliation and forgiveness, as was the case in South Africa (Tutu and Tutu 2014).
While much of this normative debate might be better placed within the scope of ethics
or philosophy, the question of whether forgiveness in particular is worth pursuing
should be, at least briefly, addressed. Psychological studies do offer some insight in
6

this regard, while the field of transitional justice also contributes debates and opinions
on the two issues. While not attempting to resolve any ambiguities with regard to the
value of justice and forgiveness, it is nevertheless important to understand them better.
Studies that contribute to the advancement of knowledge on what affects perceptions
of justice and the forgiveness of victims can provide valuable insights for different
scientific fields, such as social psychology or transitional justice. Moreover, findings
can help practitioners to make informed decisions during transition processes
regardless of the chosen normative perspective. The following section will focus in
more detail on the objectives of the present study, outlining the main aspects of the
applied theoretical framework.
1.3 Purpose of the study
The question addressed by the present study is which aspects of the post-conflict
setting may hinder forgiveness. Moreover, the study aims to assess similarities and
differences with regard to the victims’ perceptions of justice and their motivation for
forgiving in two different cultural and historical conflict settings. Narrowing down the
wide spectrum of potential empirical assessments, this study builds on the arguments
put forward by those who emphasize the importance of economic inequalities. By
applying the social psychological theory of relative deprivation to the post-conflict
context, the study endeavours to put those theoretical assumptions to test investigating
conditions, which might impact forgiveness and perception of justice. Various effects
of relative deprivation have been found in a variety of countries and among different
ethnic groups, suggesting its potential pervasiveness.1 This cross-cultural empirical
background makes it a suitable theoretical framework for a study conducted in two
culturally different post-conflict settings.
In order to determine equality versus inequality, it is imperative to draw comparisons.
There are a multiplicity of possible or available comparisons between different groups,
different individuals and over different time periods. From the perspective of victims,
however, perpetrators are mostly those who initially created an unequal situation and
therefore a comparison with them is likely to be particularly significant. More

1

See section 2.4.
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generally, the whole transition context as such can be interpreted as a struggle for the
restoration of balance or equality between victims and perpetrators (David and Choi
2009, 2006). A situation where perpetrators might still be benefiting from the roles
they occupied during the conflict or repressive regime, though not universal, is not
uncommon. A prominent example of a situation where, despite a much applauded
extensive transitional justice process and a change of regime, the former perpetrators
are still largely in a better economic situation, is South Africa (Goodman 2017;
Leibbrandt, Finn, and Woolard 2012). The fact that many victims actually do compare
themselves with former perpetrators when assessing their own conditions has been,
reported in qualitative interviews with victims in the Czech Republic (David and Choi
2009).
In order to test the effects of perceived inequalities on victims, resulting from
comparisons with perpetrators, the application of the theoretical framework of relative
deprivation is proposed. The theory of relative deprivation was first developed by
Samuel Stouffer (1949), who observed that the assessment of one’s own situation is
less dependent on objective criteria and more on the group one chooses to compare
oneself with. Later developments of the theory have found not only different
applications for the theory, but the theory itself has been refined to establish the criteria
which can be used for assessing the existence of relative deprivation. These criteria
are the cognitive components of a disadvantageous comparison; a belief that this worse
situation is undeserved; and the affective components of anger and resentment (H. J.
Smith and Pettigrew 2015, 2014; H. J. Smith et al. 2012).
In this study the negative effects that relative deprivation may have on victims’
perceptions of justice and forgiveness are postulated. Relative deprivation is
conceptualized as resulting from economic inequalities as well as inequalities
regarding social acknowledgement. Both aspects have been suggested by theoreticians
and empirically supported to be important for various victim groups (e.g. Gibson 2002;
David and Choi 2005, 2009; Robins 2012b; Minow 1998).
The association of relative deprivation and justice perceptions appears to be intuitive.
Not only is relative deprivation considered to be within the field of justice related
theories (Tyler et al. 1997); the symbol of justice itself is often portrayed as a pair of
scales, illustrating the close association of justice with equality or balance. Scales are
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an even more apt symbol of the connection between justice, inequality and comparison.
One side is always higher or lower only in relation to the other side.
An assumption that victims are likely to assess a disadvantageous comparison between
themselves and perpetrators as an injustice appears self-evident. This study, however,
goes a step further by suggesting that this assessment of individual injustice has a
negative effect on the assessment of justice in the whole post-conflict setting. This
postulation is based on theories related to justice heuristics, mental shortcuts applied
for justice assessments, particularly in situations of uncertainty (Proudfoot and Lind
2015; Tversky and Kahneman 1974).
The proposed negative effect of relative deprivation on forgiveness is more complex.
Various studies suggest diverse negative effects of relative deprivation on attitudes
towards the outgroup constituting the comparison target (e.g. Abrams and Grant 2012;
Pettigrew et al. 2008). Interestingly, however, the question of how relative deprivation
might impact on forgiveness has not been tested as far as could established for the
purpose of this study. Possibly, the reason is that to test such an assumption a specific
context is necessary. Comparisons with more privileged groups do not usually happen
in a context where forgiveness is likely to play a role. This is different in a post-conflict
situation between victims and perpetrators.
The assumption of the present study that relative deprivation might have negative
implications for forgiveness in a post-conflict settings is based on the following
theoretical claims: Firstly, as mentioned previously, several authors argue that
economic inequalities may lead to renewed violence. In the sense in which forgiveness
is conceptualized (as the opposite of revenge and, therefore, the opposite of violence)
it means that economic inequalities reduce the motivation to forgive. Secondly, the
findings of David and Choi (2009) support the assumption that reducing inequality
contributes to forgiveness. While relative deprivation cannot simply be equated with
inequality, as will be explained in the next chapter, its effects can be presumed to be
even more pronounced. Not every inequality results in negative attitudes. On the other
hand, and as pointed out above, the claims of negative effects of relative deprivation
on outgroup attitudes have received strong empirical support over time. So, even
though never directly tested, the assumption of the negative effects of relative
deprivation on forgiveness does have theoretical and empirical backing.
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Moreover, relative deprivation is assumed to have an indirect effect on forgiveness by
exacerbating the perception of injustice. The relationship between justice and
forgiveness is controversial. Yet again, there seem to be more theoretical assumptions
than empirical studies. Based on limited existing research (e.g. Wenzel and Okimoto
2014; Davis et al. 2015; Karremans and Van Lange 2005) this study assumes positive
effects of justice perceptions on forgiveness. However, none of those studies has been
conducted in a cross-cultural setting, or with victims of large-scale human rights
violations.
To sum up, the above deliberations narrow down the general research question about
which conditions of a post-conflict setting are likely to hinder forgiveness of victims.
Based on the adopted theoretical framework of relative deprivation, the study focuses
on how persisting economic and social inequalities between perpetrators and victims
might affect victims’ perceptions of justice and forgiveness in different cultural postconflict settings.
1.4 Research design
The research questions posed above as well as the assumptions regarding the effects
of relative deprivation on justice and forgiveness are best addressed with a mixedmethod design. A quantitative study is necessary in order to assess effects and impacts
of different variables upon each other. To find out if and what, and to what extent,
relative deprivation has a bearing on justice perceptions and forgiveness, an
explanatory approach with procedures allowing for hypotheses verification is needed.
At the same time, when conducting research in two different cultural settings, with the
purpose of investigating similarities and differences between justice perceptions and
forgiveness, a more exploratory and descriptive approach is needed. The definitions of
attitudes, beliefs or values across different cultural groups cannot be taken for granted.
The understanding of such complex constructs as justice and forgiveness might differ
widely even within one culture, but possibly even more so in different settings.
The design chosen for this research, based on the above considerations, can be
categorized, following Creswell's (2013) classification, as convergent parallel mixed
method design. The quantitative part consists of a vignette experiment and a survey of
victims’ perceptions and attitudes. The experimental approach is crucial in establishing
causality. The survey links the outcomes to real life conditions of victims,
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corroborating the experiment findings with evidence from personal experiences and
attitudes towards existing perpetrator groups.
The qualitative part includes open-ended questions and interviews exploring, among
others, the perceived preconditions as well as definitions of justice and forgiveness.
The research has been divided into two studies conducted in Poland and Uganda. The
choice of these two countries in particular included formal and practical reasons.
Firstly, testing how far-reaching the assumed effects of victims’ relative deprivation
on forgiveness and justice perceptions might be necessitates diverse post-conflict
settings. Secondly, this study, which focuses largely on outgroup attitudes such as
forgiveness, will not benefit from post-conflict contexts characterized by an ethnic
dimension. Ethnic divisions, which are often a pronounced and highly divisive element,
may obscure other effects of interest for this study. Consequently, forgiveness and
justice perceptions could be predominantly affected by the ethnicity of victims and
perpetrators (Biro et al. 2004a; Longman, Pham, and Weinstein 2004). The possibility
of this consequence leads to a preference for post-conflict settings which do not have
a major ethnic component. Thirdly, post-conflict settings have been selected where the
conflict or repressive regime came to an end years before. Relative deprivation might
need some time to develop as promises might be made in the wake of transitions but
not kept in the long run. Victims’ assessments of the post-conflict context often change
over time (Backer 2010; Duckitt and Mphuthing 2002). This may affect the existence
of relative deprivation. Furthermore, in both Uganda and Poland, the issue of favouring
former perpetrators has been a topic of debate. It has been, however, a controversial
topic allowing space for variation in points of view and responses. Finally, personal
experience of both countries facilitates practical considerations that service better
access and a deeper understanding of the contexts.
The present study takes place among vulnerable groups warranting particular ethical
considerations. While a specific section is dedicated to this topic it needs to be
highlighted at this point that all necessary ethical clearances, from Lingnan University
ethical commission as well as from the Ugandan National Council for Science and
Technology, have been obtained for the study.
1.5 Structure of the thesis
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This last section of the introduction presents a very short outline of the organization
and main contents of the present study.
The next chapter of the thesis gives a more detailed overview of the main concepts
that were briefly introduced above. In dealing with post-conflict victims, this study is
broadly situated within the scope of transitional justice research even though it
diverges from the more common approaches that focus on widely applied transitional
justice measures and their effects. Therefore, the first section provides an outline of
the main themes and dilemmas of the field which have led to the adoption of the
present approach.
The next sections of this chapter provide more detailed insights into the theoretical
concepts and existing studies about the topics of forgiveness, justice and relative
deprivation. Each section highlights to what extent studies exist outside the Western
cultures. The literature review chapter ends with the exposition of the hypotheses of
this study.
The next chapter introduces the settings of Poland and Uganda, providing some
background on the conflicts as well as transitional justice measures undertaken in both
countries.
The methodology chapter discusses the approach in more detail than it was when
introduced above and explains the strategy adopted in this study. Thereafter the
sampling method is described followed by the description of the various
methodologies employed, namely the vignette experiment, survey methodology and
qualitative methods. A separate section identifies some of the common challenges of
studies conducted in different cultural settings and explains how they have previously
been addressed.
The results section of the thesis consists of three chapters focusing on findings
achieved through each of the three methodologies. This is followed by a conclusion
chapter, which will also include a section on the limitations of the present study.
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
The research question introduced in this first chapter focuses on the factors that may
hinder forgiveness of victims. More specifically, by applying the theory of relative
deprivation, the research addresses the issue of how persistent economic and social
inequalities between perpetrators and victims are likely to affect victims’ perceptions
of justice and forgiveness.
By seeking answers to the question about what affects the attitudes of respondents at
an individual level in post-conflict contexts, the focus of the present study requires the
adoption of a micro-level victim-centred approach. Questions about the perception of
justice and forgiveness in the aftermath of human rights violations situate the present
study within the realm of transitional justice. At the same time the studies of attitudes
and behaviours in a social setting are the domain of the discipline of social psychology.
The literature review will, therefore, begin with a brief overview of victim-centred
empirical studies on justice and forgiveness from within the field of transitional justice.
This will be followed by an exploration of how social psychology can contribute
answers that provide for a better understanding of transition at the micro-level, and
emphasising how the two disciplines can complement each other.
Thereafter, the core concepts of the present study: forgiveness, justice perceptions and
relative deprivation, are introduced. A summary of the state of relevant current
research is given along with definitions of the concepts in the present study and their
significance for transitional justice. Each concept is examined with regard to its crosscultural applicability based on the existing research and theoretical assumptions.
At the end of this chapter the theoretical framework concludes with the specific
hypotheses of the present study.
2.1 Transitional justice
The next sections briefly introduce the field of transitional justice, its origin and
development as well as some of the criticisms about it. An overview of the studies
designed to address some of these criticisms is provided with a particular focus on
victim-centred approaches. Then some of the remaining gaps are pointed out, followed
by a suggestion as to how the application of theories from the field of social
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psychology may help to fill the gaps, thus introducing the theoretical background of
the present study.
2.1.1 Overview – development, criticism and empirical studies
The history of humanity is intertwined with histories of large-scale conflicts, wars and
regimes. In a globalised world the conflicts involved more and more countries to
culminate in two world wars and, in their aftermath, the first undertaking of
international justice at the Nuremberg trials. Those trials are frequently referred to as
the start of transitional justice (Teitel 2003), though some authors mention much earlier
examples of transitional justice cases2 (Elster 2004, 2006, 2).
Following the practical application of a variety of measures, which came to be known
as transitional justice, the scholarly discipline of the same name developed in recent
decades in an attempt to approach the task of dealing with the past from a theoretical
and empirical perspective. For some time transitional justice enjoyed a period of
approbation on both perspectives among practitioners and scholars alike. On the
practical level this resulted in the establishment of the International Criminal Court
after several ad-hoc tribunals had been held in the 1990s. The popularity of transitional
justice is also reflected in the increase in the number of truth commissions since that
time. Before 1990 only a handful countries had established truth commissions. By
2007 33 countries formed some sort of a truth commission (Dancy 2010, 357; Hayner
1994). The scholarly field of transitional justice contributed to the emergence of two
journals and an Encyclopedia of Transitional Justice (Stan and Nedelsky 2013), apart
from countless books and articles.
With the popularity, however, came the critical voices. The theories and hypotheses of
the field were described as “untested or inconclusive” (Duggan 2010). The statements
made about transitional justice were criticized as often “faith-based” rather than “factbased” (Thoms, Ron, and Paris 2010). The need for more empirical research has
repeatedly been reiterated. However, to gauge whether transitional justice produces
any results and if so, whether they are successful, it is necessary to understand what
the measures were intended to achieve in the first place (Duggan 2010). This is

2
Jon Elster mentions the overthrow of Athenian oligarchs in 411 and 403 B.C.. and the English and
French Restorations.
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especially so as the goals are diverse and situated on both the macro- and micro-levels
of society. On the macro-level, for instance, efforts have been undertaken to compare
various worldwide transitional justice measures with regard to their success in
achieving political and structural changes such as rule of law, democratization or
adherence to human rights principles (Olsen, Payne, and Reiter 2010). The value of
such studies for the field of transitional justice cannot be overestimated. At the same
time, however, the findings do not say anything about the perceptions and attitudes on
the micro-level. This is the purpose of the present study: to investigate justice
perceptions and forgiveness situated at an individual, victim-centred level of analysis.
The macro- and micro-level, while strongly intertwined in cases of mass human rights
violations, need to be examined separately. Often, the societal and individual levels
have been confused and conflated. For example, positive or “healing” effects on
victims have been inferred from measures on the societal level such as truth
commissions or trials (Landsman 1996; Chapman and Ball 2001; Minow 2010). This
is obviously problematic and can be almost, in some cases, described as an ecological
fallacy. The limited efforts to describe the effects of truth commissions or trials on
victims are mixed (Hayner 2010) or unambiguously negative (Brouneus 2010). Then
again, attempts have been made to compare the “healing” of nations with individual
psychological processes of dealing with trauma. The latter is equally problematic and
has been contested by psychologists (Hamber 2010). Various measures undertaken on
the societal level to address previous atrocities may have healing effects for some
and re-traumatizing effects for others (David 2017). Much depends on the meaning of
the measures and the interpretation of them by victims. These few examples show the
limitations of the conceptual apparatus of transitional justice in addressing questions
of attitudes, perceptions or emotions — topics originally situated within the scope of
various psychological disciplines.
A number of studies within the field have focused on victims’ perceptions directly.
Apart from a number of small-scale qualitative studies (Robins 2012a; Millar 2011),
some researchers have undertaken more systematic attempts to assess the perceptions
of victims (David and Choi 2006, 2009, 2005; Gibson 2002, 2006; Backer 2010; Field
and Chhim 2008; Stover and Weinstein 2004; David 2017). In particular, the new and
ground-breaking experimental methodology of vignette studies have provided some
valuable insights into victims’ opinions by exploring, for example, how punishment,
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compensation or apologies contribute to acceptance of the transitional justice measures
or to reducing a desire for retribution of victims (Gibson 2002; David 2011, 2014).
The above cited studies advance knowledge about post-conflict victims’ perceptions
substantially. However, some aspects have yet to be explored.
For example, while some cross-national comparisons at the macro-level do exist
(Olsen, Payne, and Reiter 2010; David 2006), as well as comprehensive descriptions
of specific measures such as truth commissions in particular countries (Hayner 2010),
micro-level studies on victims’ perceptions are mostly conducted in single countries,
or regions that share similar historical patterns. Clearly, there are cultural differences;
and from a perspective of relativism detailed studies in a specific context are important.
On the other hand, there might be some universal aspects that are applicable to very
different victim groups. Such insights are not obtainable from localized studies.
Moreover, the victim-centred studies have predominantly focused on the assessment
of the effects of transitional justice measures. While it is important to understand what
measures victims prefer, most of the studies do not offer satisfactory reasons for the
victims’ preferences. Some of the interesting explanations provided for the
mechanisms behind victims’ perceptions remain at a speculative level. For example
David and Choi (2009) assumed that the mechanism that explains why certain
measures contributed to reducing the retributive desires of victims is the need for
equality or balance. In other words, by bringing perpetrators down or victims up a
sense of balance, which had disintegrate during the regime or conflict, could be
restored. This very interesting assumption was, however, only tested indirectly.
Moreover, it was not supported by or linked to any theories, which might have
underpinned and explained the connection between retribution and inequality. Gibson
(2009) assumed that it is to a great degree the perception of legitimacy that makes truth
commissions successful in transforming societies and changing attitudes. This
postulation, however, was also not tested, but merely deduced.
In his overview of the existing body of research on effects of various transitional
justice measures on victims David (2017) points out that, as briefly mentioned above,
those effects differ. Some studies found that truth-telling had a positive effect and in
other cases it appears to have had negative implications for victims. Financial
compensation can have a meaning beyond economic considerations and punishment
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appears to be sometimes associated with forgiveness. These are just a few examples
of the various findings of the studies reviewed by David (2017). A measure such as
lustration for example, while mainly revelatory, can have retributive or reparatory
functions. In other words, the same measure can have different functions or
alternatively, different measures can have the same function. Most of the transitional
justice literature, however, does not provide a more detailed account of when and why
measures have the effects that they do.
While of utmost importance for the field of transitional justice, this perspective,
therefore, falls short when it attempts to explain the reasons and patterns behind
individual attitudes. The field of transitional justice does not have the necessary
theoretical or methodological underpinnings to fully examine or explain concepts such
as justice perceptions and forgiveness on an individual level. Without a foundation
based on a solid theoretical framework empirical studies in transitional justice may
continue to yield contradicting results without being able to satisfactorily explain the
reasons for the results. The problem of a limited body of existing theories within this
relatively young field has been acknowledged by scholars (Duggan 2010).
Moreover, transitional justice measures adopted in the aftermath of conflicts obviously
cannot claim to be the sole source of justice and forgiveness. On the contrary, as a
number of recent qualitative studies from a diverse range of developing countries have
demonstrated, transitional justice measures might not even be what many victims need
and want (Ajetunmobi 2012; Robins 2012a; Millar 2011; Waldman 2007). Advocates
of the inclusion of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights into the scope of transitional
justice approaches identify economic inequalities as highly important, yet neglected,
and in danger of exacerbating or renewing conflicts (Z. Miller 2008; Laplante 2008;
Gready and Robins 2014). The needs of the victims have often been seen as secondary
or sacrificed on behalf of the perceived needs of the country (Hamber 2002). This
oversight has resulted in victims “feeling let down” by transitional justice processes
(Hamber, Nageng, and O’Malley 2000). In other cases the needs of the victims were
instrumentalised for policy debates or served as arguments for proponents of different
transitional justice approaches (David 2017). Some authors have also argued that
including other topics within transitional justice makes the whole process too broad
and impractical (Waldorf 2012). Practicality, however, should not be an argument in a
process aimed at the restoration of justice and reconciliation in the aftermath of conflict.
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2.1.2 Transitional justice and social psychology
In the search for an appropriate theoretical framework to explain and possibly predict
victims' attitudes, such as justice perceptions and forgiveness, the field of social
psychology offers a wide range of relevant scholarship.
Though the related field of peace and conflict studies has been considerably influenced
by social psychology concepts (e.g., Bar-Tal 2011; Kelman 2010), they have only
played a limited role in the field of transitional justice, which has in turn been
dominated by legal and political perspectives. The literature that has focussed on the
psychological aspects of a transition process has in turn mainly been preoccupied with
mental health, trauma and the effects of transitional justice measures on the
psychological damage suffered by the victims (Brouneus 2010; Hamber 2010;
Kaminer et al. 2001).
Recently, there has been greater recognition of the role of social psychology in
understanding and assessing transitional justice processes (Bilali and Ross 2012; Biro
et al. 2004a; Fletcher and Weinstein 2002; Ford 2011). These contributions illustrate
how much of the post-conflict and transition context can be explained and
subsequently better understood through the prism of some of the classic theories of
social psychology. Bilali and Ross (2012) recount how processes described by the
social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1986) shape remembering and the
glorification or cleansing of history, and how this in turn can exacerbate conflicts.
Drawing on psychological theories Weinstein and Fletcher (2002) explain societal
breakdown, showing how neighbours can turn on neighbours. The authors build on
their theory of breakdown to develop a model of social repair.
Some authors have attempted to apply theories from the area of social psychology to
explain diverging reactions of different groups to transitional justice measures. Ford
(2011, pp. 426) applies Festinger’s cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger 1962) in
explaining the negative attitudes of Serbs towards the (ICTY) and their perceptions of
it as biased (Biro et al. 2004a). These are examples of how various internal processes
such as the need for positive self-perception or a positive perception of one’s group
can be much more beneficial to victims’ attitudes than the rather rational legitimacy
evaluations postulated by other transitional justice researchers (Burke-White 2003;
Dickinson 2003; Gibson 2009).
18

The same theories can potentially be used to understand the findings of Gibson (2004)
regarding the differences between the ethnic groups in South Africa. He found that
truth was linked to reconciliation for white South Africans but not for the black South
Africans. Social identity theory postulates that a considerable part of a person’s
identity stems from group belonging, which constitutes a source of self-esteem (Tajfel
and Turner 1986). Cognitive dissonance theory explains what happens when people
are faced with facts that contradict their beliefs (Festinger 1962). Conflicting values
or beliefs create a cognitive dissonance, which is an uncomfortable state that needs to
be resolved. South Africa’s white population can be seen as a group faced with the
problem of cognitive dissonance as members of that group. On the one hand there is a
need to perceive one’s own group in a positive light, as a source of pride. On the other
hand, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC — established by the new
government after the regime change) revealed facts about the crimes and atrocities
committed by the Apartheid regime. In order to resolve its cognitive dissonance the
white South Africans as a group is faced with two options. They can deny the facts in
order to retain their positive self-image. That would have a negative effect on
reconciliation as it would mean that they perceive black South Africans and the TRC
as untruthful. Alternatively, if they were to accept the facts they would be obliged to
do something to repair their groups’ tainted self-image; this would mean distancing
themselves from the crimes of the past and embracing reconciliation. Another
possibility for some, would be to see themselves as a distinct group of those white
South Africans, who engaged in the anti-Apartheid struggle and who would therefore
support reconciliation anyway. This group would not have a negative self-image of
their sub-group and the facts do not give rise to cognitive dissonance for them. All
these possible outcomes would not take place amongst black South Africans as a group
for whom the facts only revealed their suffering which did not lead to any
uncomfortable psychological states. Even in cases where the revelation of the truth
showed that violent acts and human rights abuses were committed by black South
Africans the acts could be interpreted as part of a justified struggle. The revelations
would not taint the positive self-image of the group of black South Africans as a whole.
The truth would, therefore, have no effect on attitudes towards the outgroup and its
willingness to reconcile would probably be dependent on other issues.

19

This alternative explanation is obviously speculative and studies would be needed to
see if it can be verified. It does provide, however, an illustrative example to
demonstrate the largely neglected potential of social psychology within transitional
justice, in particular, taking into account the limited theoretical body of the field. Only
by understanding patterns of attitudes and behaviour can it be successfully predicted.
The discipline of social psychology can complement transitional justice micro-level
studies by offering explanatory potential through existing theories about human
interaction.
In an attempt to put the deliberations about the mutually enriching relationship
between transitional justice and social psychology into practice this study will draw
on both fields in order to develop a number of predictions.
The field of transitional justice provides a number of theoretical assumptions as well
as empirical findings regarding economic and social inequalities and the potential
effects of those inequalities. Inequality, as described previously, has been the assumed
motivation for retributive desires of victims in the study conducted by David and Choi
(2009). To put it differently, a re-establishment of equality was suggested by the
authors to reduce those desires. Economic inequality has been postulated as a risk
factor for renewed violence (Laplante 2008). Financial compensation or economic
justice have repeatedly been found to be among the priorities for victims in diverse
settings (David and Choi 2005; Gibson 2002; Millar 2011; Robins 2012a; Gready and
Robins 2014). Backer (2010), in his longitudinal study of victims in South Africa,
linked the significant drop in approval of amnesty for perpetrators over the years to a
lack of anticipated improvement in the life conditions of victims. One of the major
findings of studies conducted in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda was that no direct link
has been found between trials and reconciliation, instead the authors emphasized the
need to pay more attention to economic and social factors (Stover and Weinstein 2004).
While economic factors can be perceived as linked to individual empowerment,
another dimension affecting forgiveness and the desire for retribution of victims is
social acknowledgment or recognition, which can be perceived as social empowerment
(David and Choi 2006, 2009). In his overview of victim-centred transitional justice
studies David (2017) concludes that forgiveness does appear to be linked to issues of
status and power. And finally, a study on the survivors of the Khmer Rouge regime
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found that current socioeconomic status was an important determinant of a desire for
revenge (Field and Chhim 2008).
While factors that constitute individual and social empowerment have been found in
surveys to be related to forgiveness or retribution, the specific element of inequality
was only assumed. The effects of economic and social inequality on forgiveness and
justice perceptions have not been empirically tested in a cross-cultural setting to my
knowledge.
In order to determine equality or lack thereof, a process of comparison is necessary. If
forgiveness is linked, as postulated, to status and power it would be plausible to assume
that the group chosen for comparison would be a group that benefitted from its status
and power at the expense of victims before the transition, namely the perpetrators. The
theory from the field of social psychology, which focuses on the effects of deprivation
as result of a comparison with an outgroup, is the theory of relative deprivation. While
various negative effects of relative deprivation on outgroup relations have been
established in the past3 the effect on forgiveness has not been studied. The scholarship
and theoretical assumptions from the field of transitional justice do, however, suggest
such a connection. By linking these two fields and testing the effects of relative
deprivation on justice perceptions and forgiveness, the present study will contribute to
an advancement of knowledge in both fields.
2.2 Relative deprivation and the context of political transition
The previous section reviewed a number of studies and theoretical assumptions which
postulate an important role of economic and social inequalities in influencing victims’
perceptions from within the field of transitional justice. This section introduces a
theory, which deals explicitly with inequality established as a result of comparisons,
namely relative deprivation. Much of the empirical research on relative deprivation
over the decades has focused on its consequences in terms of attitudes or behaviour.
By applying it to the field of transitional justice it might contribute to a better
understanding of victims’ perceptions providing an explanation and a connection
between some aspects of the post-conflict setting and victims’ attitudes.

3

See section 2.2.
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The concept, origin and definition of relative deprivation are presented followed by an
outline of the current state of research, in particular regarding its effects. Having
existed for many decades the theory of relative deprivation has attracted not only a
considerable amount of empirical research but also some criticism. The major
controversies are described as well as ways to overcome the problematic aspects of the
concept. Finally, bearing in mind the cross-cultural setting of this research, the
question is addressed of whether and to what extent the theory, and its postulated
effects, can be extended and applied beyond the scope of Western cultures, where it
was originally developed.
2.2.1 Relative deprivation – development, criticism and definition
The origins of the theory of relative deprivation stem from the research of Samuel
Stouffer on American Soldiers at the end of WWII (Pettigrew 2015; Stouffer 1949).
One of his most puzzling findings was that some groups of soldiers, such as the
military police or the African American soldiers in southern camps, were more
satisfied with their situation than objectively more privileged groups such as air
corpsmen, for whom promotion was much faster; or African American soldiers in
northern camps, where racism was less prevalent. Stouffer’s explanation of these
surprising results became the foundation of one of the most influential theories in
social psychology. He reasoned that the soldiers compared themselves with the group
immediately available. That means African American soldiers in the south had chosen
other African Americans in the region as their reference group and the military police
other military police members. Stouffer discovered that rather than relying on
objective criteria, satisfaction with one’s situation or the sense of deprivation is relative.
It depends on the comparison group subjectively chosen as the reference point
(Pettigrew 2015).

Though various subsequent researchers postulated other than

social comparison options, such as temporal comparison with own situation at
different points in time (Davies 1962; Walker and Smith 2002), comparisons with
internal standards (Helson 1964) or with an imagined more favourable alternative
(Folger 1986), much of the social psychological studies regarding relative deprivation
focused on comparisons with other people or groups (Tyler et al. 1997, 23; Walker and
Smith 2002).
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Over time the concept of relative deprivation developed. Specification and details
beyond the simple disadvantageous comparisons were added to improve the theory. A
crucial development was the distinction between egoistic and fraternal (or alternatively
individual and group) relative deprivation first introduced by Runciman (Runciman
1967). Egoistic relative deprivation means feeling disadvantaged as an individual; and
fraternal or group relative deprivation describes a situation in which a person feels
discriminated or disadvantaged as a member of a group. For example, a person might
feel his or her individual salary is unfair compared to the salaries of others, or a woman
might feel disadvantaged as a member of her gender group after learning that on
average women earn less than men. The two types of relative deprivation have been
found to be related to different emotional and behavioural responses. There is some
evidence suggesting that people are more likely to recognize group as opposed to
individual victimization (Major 1994) and that people are also more likely to engage
in political protests or other social movements in the case of fraternal relative
deprivation (Pettigrew 2015, 13; Tyler et al. 1997, 27).
However, after a period of time and inconsistent findings, many of which failed to
support the explanatory potential of relative deprivation (e.g. Gaskell and Smith 1984;
Thompson 1989), the theory has been largely abandoned (Pettigrew 2015). In recent
years a new wave of research has addressed some of the shortcomings of the previous
studies. For example, the disregard for the distinction between group and individual
relative deprivation has been found to be one of the problematic aspects of earlier
research (Pettigrew 2015; H. J. Smith and Ortiz 2002).
Another core part of the relative deprivation construct, which has been frequently
overlooked in the past, weakening the effects of this theory, is the affective dimension
(H. J. Smith et al. 2012; H. J. Smith and Pettigrew 2014; Walker and Pettigrew 1984).
In some of the earlier studies, for example, respondents were asked to place themselves
on a scale with regard to worst vs. best possible life, and then place another group on
the same scale. If the ingroup was placed below the outgroup, it was deduced that this
was an indicator of relative deprivation. But firstly, people may not necessarily
compare themselves with this particular group in real life (H. J. Smith and Ortiz 2002).
And secondly, even if they might, it does not mean they would feel entitled to what
the others have and feel angry and resentful about not having it themselves (Pettigrew
2015). An earlier, but very influential model by Crosby (1976) emphasized these
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aspects, even though Crosby’s model focused on individual or egoistic relative
deprivation instead of group relative deprivation. The preconditions for relative
deprivation identified in this model are:

wanting something, seeing that someone

else has it, lacking it, feeling entitled to it and believing that it is feasible to obtain. In
her later studies, she

demonstrated that these findings were also relevant on a group

level (Crosby 1976).
While anger and resentment have been found to represent a crucial affective dimension,
without which the theory is incomplete (Pettigrew 2015; H. J. Smith et al. 2012; H. J.
Smith and Pettigrew 2014), they are closely linked to the element of entitlement or
“deservingness”. It is the perception of deserving something or being entitled to it that
leads to those negative emotional reactions and not the comparison as such. Various
terms, such as deservingness, entitlement, legitimacy or feasibility, have been used by
different authors. Since this is an important concept in this theoretical framework of
relative deprivation, and consequently for this study, the theoretical differentiations
between these terms will be outlined.
Feasibility, which was used by Runciman, who first distinguished between fraternal
and egoistic relative deprivation, has been described by some scholars as vague or
ambiguous (Olson and Hazlewood 1986, 3). Crosby (1976) used the term “entitlement”
in her model of egoistic relative deprivation and described it as the most important
element in personal but also group relative deprivation. Finally, Feather (Feather 1999,
22; H. J. Smith 2002) in his book about deservingness, devotes considerable space to
the differentiation between some of these terms which, in particular entitlement and
deservingness, are often used interchangeably. The details of this comprehensive
debate as summarized by Feather would be beyond the scope of this chapter. The key
aspect on the conceptual level, and important for the current context, is, according to
Feather (1999, pp. 24), the difference between having a right to something based on
agreed-upon rules, that might have, for example, a legal status or represent a societal
norm, and a kind of moral claim based on actions, conduct or behaviour. The first
description refers to entitlement and the second to deservingness or desert. In other
words, a person might be entitled to something but not deserve it or deserve something
but not be entitled to it.
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In order to provide some examples the following situations can be considered: A highlevel bank manager might be entitled to his or her salary or bonus based on a contract
and the policies of the employer. At the same time the bonuses of various bank
managers during the latest financial crisis, which bankrupted many people, are
perceived by the majority in the society as highly undeserved. Another example might
be people living in extreme poverty who might not be entitled to anything according
to the laws of their country, but could be perceived as deserving a better life in a moral
sense.
As Feather (1999, pp. 24) points out, the perceptions of various scholars on the relation
between entitlement and deservingness differ. Some see deservingness as "a particular
instance of entitlement", while others prefer to differentiate between both and see them
rather as separate concepts. This study follows Feather's point of view of separating
the terms. His understanding of deservingness focuses on action and outcome related
situations, meaning that a positively valued action deserves a positively valued
outcome. Deservingness, however, can also be understood in the opposite context of
negative actions that need to be followed by negative outcomes. The just desert
impulse, or perspective, represents a crucial element in the wish for punishment or
retribution (Darley and Pittman 2003). In other words, in the same way as people are
seen as deserving a reward based on their achievements, work or other virtues they are
also seen as deserving punishment for negative actions they are responsible for. This
makes deservingness and "un-deservingness" two sides of the same coin. Anger might
follow a person’s awareness of not having something perceived as deserving, just as it
might follow an observation that someone else has something they do not deserve.
While the exact definitions of the concepts of deservingness, entitlement or feasibility
vary between different authors, a common denominator is the perception that the
actions of a person should be related in some way to the outcomes. This perception is
what is commonly subsumed under the term "justice" and it also represents the link to
and the reason why relative deprivation should be perceived as one of the justicerelated theories. Actions evaluated positively should be followed by positive outcomes
in the same way as negative actions "deserve" a negative outcome. If the personal
outcome or the outcome of the ingroup is less than what is regarded as being deserved,
based on comparisons with others, it leads to a feeling of relative deprivation.
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For the current study, the term "deservingness" is the most relevant, even though other
terms have also been used in relative deprivation studies in other contexts. The
expectations regarding social and economic statuses of victims should be seen as based
on moral claims rather than rules and regulations.
The connection between deservingness and moral assessments also contributes to an
explanation of the role of emotions within the construct of relative deprivation. Moral
outrage, a feeling arising out of a violation of moral beliefs, has been found to affect
justice reasoning (Darley and Pittman 2003; Mullen and Skitka 2006; Skitka et al.
2010). More specifically, anger at outcomes that contradict moral convictions has been
found to affect justice judgments, while it has been previously believed that it is justice
judgments that result in an emotional response (Mullen and Skitka 2006). Relative
deprivation is likely to supplement these findings as a construct involving outcome
assessments, deservingness (which includes a moral claim), and anger and resentment
as affective components. The assumption of the present study is that relative
deprivation affects justice perceptions. This assumption can be based, among others,
on the outcome of the studies of Mullen and Skitka (2006).
Regarding the specification of these emotional components, anger and resentment
have been found particularly fitting since resentment is a more publicly shared feeling
as opposed to envy or jealousy. It is, therefore, more suited for potential group action.
In addition, angry resentment is also more long-lasting compared to other anger
emotions. A temporary, even though intense effect, is less likely to have a long-term
impact on attitudes or behaviour (H. J. Smith and Pettigrew 2014).
To sum up, a comprehensive definition presented by recent scholars states that
“relative deprivation [can be defined] as a judgment that one or one’s ingroup is
disadvantaged compared to a relevant referent, and that this judgment invokes feelings
of anger, resentment and entitlement” (H. J. Smith and Pettigrew 2015, 2).
In other words, relative deprivation consists of a comparative element involving a
cognitive assessment to determine if the ingroup is disadvantaged and in the
conclusion that this disadvantage is undeserved. This, in turn arouses feelings of anger
and resentment. As pointed out by various researchers in the field, if either of these
elements is missing, the definition of relative deprivation is incomplete (H. J. Smith
and Pettigrew 2015; H. J. Smith et al. 2012).
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Addressing the above-mentioned criticism of the weak effect of relative deprivation, a
recent meta-analysis has tried to assess the value of the theory focusing on only those
studies that have included all the dimensions of relative deprivation as well as
differentiating between group and individual phenomena. The meta-analysis found
predominantly significant effects of relative deprivation and concluded that, if
measured correctly, the theory does have considerable explanatory potential of various
social and individual behavioural and attitudinal phenomena (H. J. Smith et al. 2012).
2.2.2 The effects of relative deprivation
After establishing and discussing in detail the core elements and antecedents of relative
deprivation the next question is: what are the consequences of the experience of
relative deprivation?
Relative deprivation is one of the fundamental concepts at the intersection of sociology,
political science and social psychology, and has attracted various waves of research
over the years. The importance of most theories in sociology and social psychology is
their potential of explanatory power with regard to human behaviour or attitudes.
Relative deprivation has drawn the attention of many scholars in the hope that it would
predict the trajectory of social protests.

Initially, as mentioned above, these promises

appeared unfulfilled, which led some scholars to discard the theory as having little
explanatory value (Gurney and Tierney 1982). Others argued that the theories apparent
failure was due to the fact that many of the studies did not apply the concept correctly
(Pettigrew 2015; H. J. Smith and Ortiz 2002; H. J. Smith et al. 2012).
Relative deprivation still inspires research linking it to a variety of social behaviours
such nationalism, separatism and voting behaviour (Abrams and Grant 2012),
intergroup prejudice (Pettigrew et al. 2008), grievance formation (Klandermans, Roefs,
and Olivier 2001), intergroup contact (Koschate, Hofmann, and Schmitt 2012) or even
susceptibility to terrorism (Moghaddam 2005), to name a few. With regard to the
resultant behaviour, the differentiation between group and individual relative
deprivation has been highlighted as crucial (e.g. Ellemers, 2002; Pettigrew, 2015;
Smith & Ortiz, 2002; Smith et al., 2012; Taylor, 2001). The behavioural consequences
are very different for both types of relative deprivation. Only group relative
deprivation has been linked to any kind of collective response; while individual
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relative deprivation has been associated with stress, depression or physical health
problems (Kawakami and Dion 1995; Pettigrew 2015; H. J. Smith and Ortiz 2002).
In the main, egoistic or individual relative deprivation is experienced in situations
when comparisons are drawn with other members of the ingroup. Conversely, group
relative deprivation arises from a comparison between the ingroup and the outgroup.
There is, however, another option, which is rather ambiguous in nature and that is an
individual comparison with an outgroup member. Some scholars have postulated that
in this case individual relative deprivation should shift towards group relative
deprivation. The explanation offered for this shift is that the perceived personal
disadvantage is interpreted in group terms. For example the discovery of her lower
salary by a woman employee as compared with her male colleague (interpersonal
comparison between ingroup “women” and outgroup “men” member) should,
according to the theory, trigger the interpretation of the situation in group terms. The
salary difference is attributed to the group membership (women versus men) rather
than explained in individual terms (H. J. Smith and Pettigrew 2014). Although this
explanation seems intuitively logical, the aspect of ingroup identification should be
considered as well. In other words, a woman for whom her female identity is important
and therefore salient, would be more inclined to shift from individual relative
deprivation to group relative deprivation than a woman who rarely considers herself
in gender categories.
Noor et al have suggested that victims, the group relevant to the present study, have
strong bonds as a result of their shared experience of previous suffering (Noor et al.
2012). Victimhood, the authors point out, might strengthen ingroup cohesiveness and
provide them with some moral and other benefits. When studying the effects of relative
deprivation it is, therefore, crucial to establish the type of deprivation under
investigation.
One possible consequence of relative deprivation, which has inspired considerable
research and is of particular interest in the context of this study, is the issue of attitudes
towards the outgroup. While some researchers have discovered that outgroup prejudice
arises as result of group relative deprivation (Pettigrew et al. 2008), the results were
not always consistent. Other scholars found increased contact or even admiration for
the outgroup (Koschate, Hofmann, and Schmitt 2012) and yet another study appeared
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to suggest that perceived hostility of the outgroup is the most relevant predictor of
outgroup attitudes, while relative deprivation mainly has a moderating effect. The
studies, which appeared to show inconsistent or even positive effects of relative
deprivation, however, all had a number of problems.
A study conducted in South Africa found that the perceptions of black South Africans
towards white Afrikaners were different than those towards English speaking Whites
although both outgroups were better off economically. The Afrikaners were seen in
more negative light, which the authors

have attributed

to the perception that

Afrikaners bear greater hostility towards the ingroup of the black South African
population (Duckitt and Mphuthing 2002). Moreover, measured relative deprivation
towards both groups declined between the pre- to post-election periods, while the
outgroup attitudes did not change. The conclusion is that it is perceived outgroup
hostility rather than relative deprivation that which predicts negative outgroup
attitudes.
While the strength of the South African study is its longitudinal design, it did take
place over a relatively short and turbulent period of time just before and after South
African elections. Meanwhile, the authors themselves acknowledged that the effects
of relative deprivation on inter-group attitudes might take a long time, possibly years,
to become apparent. It can therefore be argued that the authors prematurely
disregarded their own assumption that the time factor might play a role. They point
out themselves that in the short time period between the studies (four months) not
much would have shifted with regard to socioeconomic factors. That means the
reduced experience of relative deprivation can be attributed solely to belief (as the
authors acknowledge) and possibly expectations of improvement in future. In the event
that these expectations were to be disappointed the outcomes are likely to change.
The present study looks at relative deprivation among victims after a considerable
amount of time has passed since the transitions. Moreover, it focuses on attitudes
towards a group (the perpetrators), which is not only perceived as hostile due to a
generalization based on ethnic membership, but who actually behaved with hostility
towards the ingroup of victims. If the conclusions of Duckitt and Mphuting are true
and relative deprivation has no effect apart from the effect of outgroup hostility, then
the attitudes towards a group that is hostile should not depend on different levels of
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relative deprivation. In other words, there should be no connection between the level
of relative deprivation and attitudes toward the hostile outgroup.
The study, which found that relative deprivation led to increased intergroup contact
and admiration towards the outgroup was conducted in Germany between the lower
status ingroup (East Germans) and the higher status outgroup (West Germans)
(Koschate, Hofmann, and Schmitt 2012). This study, however, omitted the crucial
affective components of relative deprivation. Purely cognitive relative deprivation has
also been found to increase outgroup admiration in the South African study cited above
(Duckitt and Mphuthing 2002). The observation that the ingroup’s situation is worse
than the situation of an outgroup does not have much effect on its own. Indeed, it can
even lead to admiration of the successful outgroup. On the contrary, it is the perception
that the ingroup’s disadvantaged situation coupled with the outgroup’s more
advantaged situation are undeserved combined with anger and resentment, that really
constitutes relative deprivation and leads to negative perceptions about the outgroup.
Initially, after the reunification, the East Germans would not have had much reason to
blame the West Germans for their lower status. The status differences were a result of
outside political forces combined with chance, depending on which side of the border
people ended up after WWII. The lower status of the East Germans compared with the
status of West Germans was more likely to have served as an incitement or stimulus.
In a different study, investigating the relationship between relative deprivation and
prejudice towards ethnic minorities, the attribution of blame for the minorities’
difficult situation has been found to be a significant mediator (Pettigrew et al. 2008).
It can, therefore, be assumed that the attribution of responsibility by East Germans for
their lower economic status would also play a role in their outgroup perceptions. If the
West Germans are not seen as responsible the negative outgroup attitudes toward them
should reduce.
This shows that firstly, the context needs to be taken into consideration. Who is
perceived as responsible for the miserable conditions of the disadvantaged group?
Secondly, it is equally important to measure all the components of relative deprivation,
the cognitive and the affective ones.
Similar problems can be found in a study conducted in Malawi on the effects of relative
deprivation on life satisfaction and happiness (Lokshin and Ravallion 2005). The
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authors found negative effects of relative deprivation among slightly more affluent
groups only and not among the poorest part of the population. Subsequently, they
concluded that the higher income of a comparison group can have positive effects on
the poor in terms of social support, which trumps the negative implications of relative
deprivation. However, relative deprivation was again only inferred from the difference
between own economic status and the economic status of friends and neighbours. The
highly crucial element of "un-deservingness", as well as its affective component, had
been omitted. Obviously, friends and neighbours, especially those willing to help and
support their less well-off peers, might not be perceived as undeserving of their lot, or
engender anger and resentment.
The groups considered in the context of the present research are quite different. Not
only is it reasonable to assume that perpetrators, who enjoy high economic and social
status would be perceived as undeserving by the victims. In this context they are most
likely to be blamed for the disadvantageous situation of the victim ingroup. Why
victims might choose the former perpetrators as a comparison group and why and how
the outcome of this comparison would affect their justice estimation of the whole postconflict setting will be outlined in the following section dealing with justice4.
Mostly, the studies presented above suggest negative outgroup attitudes as a result of
relative deprivation. In a post-conflict context, however, some negative attitudes might
very likely already be present, taking into consideration the recent violence of the past.
The question in the aftermath of the atrocities is rather — to what extent are the victims
ready or willing to overcome their negative attitudes? Or, to put it differently, how
willing are they to forgive and what might affect their willingness to forgive?
As already stated, the connection between relative deprivation and forgiveness has not
been studied to date. The reason is probably that such a question would only become
relevant in a very particular setting. Such a setting would not only include social or
economic inequalities but also at least two groups, of which one has committed
transgressions that can or cannot be forgiven by the other group. This is exactly the
situation of some societies in transition, where perpetrators might continue to benefit
from their previous positions in the higher ranks of society. It is reasonable to assume

4

See section 2.4.1
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that if relative deprivation results in negative outgroup attitudes under less extreme
circumstances, in the post-conflict context it would have detrimental effects on
forgiveness, which effectively means an improvement of outgroup attitudes.
To sum up, among other effects relative deprivation, and in particular group relative
deprivation, has been found to be related to collective forms of action, especially in
the case of a strong identification with the ingroup (Ellemers 2002; Kawakami and
Dion 1995). Relative deprivation has more specifically been found to have an effect
on negative attitudes and prejudices towards the outgroup (Pettigrew et al. 2008).
The logical extension of this reasoning applied in a post-conflict setting would be that
relative deprivation is not likely to contribute to an improvement of inter-group
relations or, in other words, to the forgiveness of victims towards former perpetrators.
While not all findings have been consistent, some negating any effects of relative
deprivation or even suggesting positive attitudes towards the outgroup as a result, a
closer inspection of those studies shows that in many cases relative deprivation has not
been measured correctly.
2.2.3 Relative deprivation and culture
An aspect that needs to be addressed in a cross-cultural study like the present one is to
what extent the constructs explored can be generalized. Many sociological and
psychological concepts have been developed in Western cultural settings and it is a
continuous debate as to what extent they can be assumed to exist in other cultures. This
section will, therefore, briefly review the cross-cultural studies conducted on the topic
of relative deprivation to find out to what extent the concept is universally applicable
across different cultures.
The introduction to a recent publication focusing solely on relative deprivation
mentions that studies relating to the application of this construct have been conducted
in over 30 countries, including such diverse cultural settings and groups as the Dutch,
Maoris, Mongolians or Canadians (H. J. Smith and Pettigrew 2015).
In a cross-cultural study conducted in the Netherlands and Singapore and examining
how individualistic and collectivistic mindsets affect relative deprivation effects, some
differences have been discovered but more with regard to the degree of reactions than
to the quality. The experimental study manipulated individualistic and collectivistic
32

conditions in both countries by priming the respective mindsets. The findings showed
that in individualistic conditions participants respond more negatively to being
deprived as individuals, while in the collectivistic condition there was not much
difference between the effects of individual and group deprivation. More importantly,
they also found that cultural mindsets are fluid and depend on contexts, salience and
priming, even though divergent inclinations exist in different settings (Bos, Veldhuizen,
and Au 2015).
Negative attitudes towards an outgroup as an effect of relative deprivation, described
previously in studies conducted in Western cultures (e.g. Pettigrew et al. 2008), have
also been demonstrated among the Maori ethnic group in New Zealand (Osborne and
Sibley 2015). A cross-cultural study on temporal relative deprivation and its effects on
well-being conducted in Mongolia and South Africa found very similar results in both
groups further contributing to the assumed generalizability of relative deprivation as a
concept (de la Sablonnière et al. 2015).
Of course, the quantity of research on relative deprivation in non-Western countries is
still limited. Nevertheless, drawing on the examples presented above from a variety of
cultural groups in different parts of the world allows for the assumption that relative
deprivation is a phenomenon that can be perceived as having universal applicability.
It is less clear, however, if the effects of relative deprivation differ. Some studies point
to similar effects, while others describe some differences in the implications of relative
deprivation across cultures.
While not negating cultural differences, this study assumes that the identity and
experiences of being a victim will be more salient accentuating the similarities rather
than the cultural differences between the two participant groups.
2.3 Forgiveness
The topic of forgiveness gained prominence in the field of transitional justice in
particular in the context of truth commissions and forward-looking measures, which
focused on reconciliation, as opposed to backward-looking retribution and punishment.
Though not without controversy, which will be described later in this chapter,
forgiveness has been stressed by many as vital for peace and reconciliation after brutal
conflicts or regimes (Minow 1998; Cairns et al. 2005). Political forgiveness —also
described as “knowing forgetting”, which means remembering the past without being
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defined by it — has been singled out as probably the best response to past atrocities
(Biggar 2003). Archbishop Tutu, the head of the South African TRC, even goes as far
as to say that forgiveness is the only way to achieve personal healing and end the cycle
of violence (Tutu and Tutu 2014).
On an individual level, forgiveness has been the subject of study in particular in the
area of psychology. Advocates of forgiveness have highlighted its benefits for mental
health and psychological well-being (American Psychological Association 2006;
Exline et al. 2003; Freedman and Enright 1996; Harris et al. 2006; Kira et al. 2009).
The value of forgiveness is so highly esteemed that this has resulted in the development
of forgiveness training or forgiveness therapy (Freedman and Enright 1996; Reed and
Enright 2006). In the field of transitional justice a number of studies and surveys have
focused on the question of whether and how some of the implemented measures have
influenced the willingness of victims to forgive (Cárdenas et al. 2015; David and Choi
2009, 2006; OHCHR 2007; Samii 2013).
However, as important as some consider forgiveness to be in the aftermath of violence,
it is a complex construct and not without controversy. Some authors question the
potential benefits of forgiving “murderers and torturers” (Saunders 2011), while others
stress the dangers of unconditional forgiveness in encouraging perpetrators, thus
weakening the position of the victims and contributing to denial and complacency
(Griswold 2007).
This section begins by first describing the efforts and challenges of defining
forgiveness. It explains how these complexities can be addressed. Before giving the
definitions, some differentiations between concepts will be explained in order to
clarify the type of forgiveness that applies to this study. One of these differentiations
is the psychological differentiation between “state” forgiveness and “trait” forgiveness,
which is important for the present context and has implications for the type of effects
that are investigated in the study. Another differentiation is between interpersonal and
intergroup forgiveness. The context of mass human rights violations with many
victims as well as perpetrators has certain characteristics that need to be considered
and which differ from the characteristics of the cases of individual singular
transgressions.
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In addition, a few factors that may play a role in the context of the present study and
which may impact on forgiveness are described. One of these factors is the question
of religiosity and another is the issue of what forgiveness means in different cultures.
The underlying assumption of this study is that victims’ forgiveness is a goal worth
achieving in a post-conflict society. If not, why study it at all? This cannot be simply
stated without addressing one of the controversies of the field, namely, whether
forgiveness is actually positive and empowering or whether it has the effect of
weakening and demeaning the victims. The various arguments of advocates and critics
on the question of forgiveness are described, and followed with a presentation of the
position adopted about these questions in the present study.
The final part of the section presents a recent theoretical approach that endeavours to
synthesize the various empirical studies and elements constituting forgiveness into a
coherent framework. The purpose is to address the question of when and under what
conditions people do forgive. This typology of forgiveness is based on a meta-analysis
of over a hundred empirical studies. It presents a valuable framework for
understanding the similarities and differences in the concepts of forgiveness, in
particular in the context of a cross-cultural study, such as this one.
2.3.1 Conceptualization of forgiveness
In this section, challenges that relate to the definition of forgiveness are outlined and
different types of forgiveness are explained.
The section concludes with the definition that applies to the present study.
Definition and differentiation from other similar concepts
There are a number of terms and concepts that are related to forgiveness or frequently
even confused with it. Most authors, therefore, begin defining forgiveness by pointing
out what it is not. It is not defined as excusing, pardoning, condoning, forgetting or
restoring trust (Exline et al. 2003, 339). Forgiveness is also often distinguished from
reconciliation. Both are perceived to be closely related, though the nature of the link
is vague. Some authors perceive reconciliation as being a step further than forgiveness,
implying the rebuilding of broken relationships (Exline et al. 2003, 341; Freedman and
Enright 1996, 983; Kira et al. 2009, 388). Other scholars, conversely, see forgiveness
as the outcome of a reconciliation process (Bar-Tal and Cehajic-Clancy 2014, 132).
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This close relationship of forgiveness and reconciliation, the latter being commonly
understood as rebuilding a trusting relationship, has caused the most criticism,
especially with regard to forgiveness. Forgiveness understood in this way has been
described as unhealthy and potentially dangerous for victims in cases of serious
transgressions (Freedman and Enright 1996, 983). Similarly, some researchers stress
the abandonment of negative feelings, including avoidance, and an increase in positive
feelings towards the perpetrator as crucial elements of forgiveness (McCullough 2001,
194). One example of this notion of forgiveness is the following:
“[…] willingness to abandon one’s right to resentment, negative judgment and
indifferent behavior toward one who unjustly hurt us, while fostering the
undeserved qualities of compassion, generosity, and even love towards him or
her.” (Enright, Freedman, and Rique 1998, 46–47).
One commonly used measurement tool, the “Psychological Profile of Forgiveness
Scale”, does apply this definition by operationalising forgiveness as an absence of
negative and existence of positive emotions, judgements and behaviours (Freedman
and Enright 1996, 984).
Such a definition, however, is at the core of the controversy and raises some substantial
questions. Does forgiveness really have to mean that the offended party develops
positive feeling towards the perpetrator? Studies show that even though avoidance and
revenge motivation towards transgressors reduces overtime, increased benevolence is
not the typical pattern (McCullough, Fincham, and Tsang 2003). The question of
whether forgiveness goes beyond a reduction of negative attitudes is still unresolved
among scholars (Exline et al. 2003, 339). In the context of transition after mass human
rights violations, with crimes often described as “unforgivable”, the development of
positive emotions towards perpetrators may appear particularly questionable if applied
as a standard definition. Additionally, it might add to the confusion between the terms
of forgiveness and reconciliation.
Another definition proposed by McCullough and colleagues describes forgiveness as
an “intraindividual, prosocial change toward a perceived transgressor that is set within
a specific interpersonal context” (McCullough, Bono, and Root 2005, 396). This
definition is more general and does not necessarily imply compassion or generosity
towards the perpetrator.
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Meanwhile, even though theorists might agree to draw a line between the abovementioned terms such as condoning, forgetting, pardon and forgiveness, their meaning
is frequently blurred and confused with everyday usage of the word. In other words,
the definition that various scholars use is likely to be different from the common
language meaning of the term (Exline et al. 2003, 340; Saunders 2011, 121).
Yet another question in defining forgiveness is concerned with its nature. Is
forgiveness a conscious decision taken by the offended party, or is it a feeling
(Saunders 2011, 121)? Some scholars, acknowledging this difference, recently tried to
separate these aspects of forgiveness (Worthington et al. 2012)5. But this leads back to
the challenge mentioned above. The scientific and lay definitions might differ
considerably. Simply asking directly about forgiveness might not yield reliable and
valid outcomes. Obviously a definition of forgiveness as forswearing revenge is
drastically different from forgiveness leading to the restoration of a friendly
relationship. In measuring forgiveness as a variable or an outcome it should, therefore,
be clearly established that what is actually measured has the same meaning for the
people answering the questions.
This complexity of the concept has resulted in some difficulties in the limited research
on the topic in post-conflict contexts. In some studies single item responses were used
(David and Choi 2009, 2006). The problems with this approach have been outlined
above. Gibson (2004) uses the concept of reconciliation instead of forgiveness. While
he does use a scale, it has been developed for the purpose of his study and the items
appear to cover issues related to social distance and prejudices rather than forgiveness.
It is also questionable if the opposite of racial stereotyping automatically constitutes
respect, which he implies as being the basis for reconciliation. In any case, his study
can be only remotely considered as related to forgiveness. A different approach was
chosen in a study on survivors of the Khmer Rouge regime. The authors used a
shortened version of an established scale but decided to focus solely on the element of
revenge (Field and Chhim 2008).

5

In an attempt to grasp the concept of forgiveness in a more comprehensive way, Worthington et al
(2012) differentiated between decisional and emotional forgiveness. One is understood as the
cognitive resolve to behave in a less negative way towards the offender. Emotional forgiveness is
associated with the development of positive emotional attitudes to replace the negative ones. The
authors found that the measures of both types of forgiveness are psychometrically related but distinct.
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To sum up, forgiveness, even though pronounced to be important within the field of
transitional justice and widely debated by supporters and opponents has, nevertheless,
has rarely been empirically studied by transitional justice scholars. Additional in-depth
perspectives in terms of understanding and definitions are offered by the field of
psychology, demonstrating yet again the value of interdisciplinary approaches. Before
proceeding to the question of definition as applied in the present study there are some
additional characteristics that need to be considered when defining forgiveness.
Forgiveness as a trait and as a state
The distinction between “states” and “traits” in psychology has a long research history;
a detailed overview is beyond the scope of this chapter. This paragraph describes the
distinction briefly, and only insofar as it refers to the subject of forgiveness. In
psychology “traits” are understood as the characteristics or attributes of an individual
that are fairly stable over time and less responsive to situational factors. The term
“states” applies to psychological variables that are understood as context depended.
Forgiveness can be both.
Forgiveness as a state means the act of forgiveness in the situation of a specific
transgression. This has been the initial focus of forgiveness research and has resulted
in developing a number of scales with which to measure the readiness to forgive
particular transgressions;6 or to assess context factors that might facilitate or inhibit
forgiveness. The act of forgiveness has been described as a motivational change
towards the offender; and has been linked to empathy (McCullough, Worthington Jr.,
and Rachal 1997) and various situational factors such as perceived intent, apologies or
cancellation of negative consequences (Girard and Mullet 2012). In short, research on
forgiveness as a state attempts to determine the contextual prerequisites before, of and
after the transgression that contribute to forgiveness.
After their initial focus on studying the act of forgiveness in specific cases, the interest
of researchers turned to forgiveness as a trait. Forgiveness as a trait is the general
tendency of forgiving across different situations, times and contexts. It has been named

6

Some common scales to measure forgiveness as a state include Transgressions-Related
Interpersonal Motivation Scale (TRIM) (McCullough, Root, and Cohen 2006) or the Enright Forgiveness
Inventory (Subkoviak et al. 1995).
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“forgivingness”. The term was first introduced by Roberts (1995) but has subsequently
been picked up by other scholars, who have proceeded to develop scales to measure
this personal disposition. There seems to be no connection with gender but a positive
link with religious activity, whereby people who are more religiously active are also
more forgiving (Berry et al. 2001). There are also indications that a higher education
level might contribute to a higher self-declared willingness to forgive (Azar and Mullet
2002, 20). Measuring forgiveness as a trait, however, has some challenges. For
example, as has been pointed out, there is a difference between self-declared attitudes
towards forgiveness and an actual willingness to forgive (DeShea 2003). In other
words, people might have a positive attitude towards forgiveness and value it as a
virtue but that does not necessarily mean that they are always more willing to forgive
transgressions themselves. Even though a positive link might be assumed between
attitude and the act of forgiveness, they are not exactly the same.
While the distinction between trait and state forgiveness might seem rather technical,
it is important to point it out in order to specify what type of forgiveness is at the centre
of this study. In the context of transitional justice the focus on forgiveness as a “state”
is more pertinent. The issue as far as the present study is concerned, is not about
personal characteristics of participants — more applicable in the field of personality
psychology — but rather what contextual factors might influence forgiveness amongst
different individuals, and across different experiences and even cultural settings. This
differentiation is also crucial in the choice of the appropriate tool as questionnaires
measuring traits and states obviously differ.
Interpersonal and intergroup forgiveness
Another differentiation, which requires a brief clarification is between interpersonal
and intergroup forgiveness. In everyday circumstances, forgiveness is associated with
interpersonal forgiveness: e.g., when one person commits a transgression that harms
another the aggrieved is left with the choice of either to forgive or deny forgiveness.
In the context of transitional justice, however, interpersonal and intergroup forgiveness
are often difficult to separate. Though one victim can forgive one or several individual
perpetrators, which would be related to interpersonal forgiveness, still the victim is
one among many and the perpetrator is a member of a group and has probably
committed transgressions against many others. While the internal decision to forgive
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can still be individual, any public act of forgiveness by one victim does, to a certain
extent, involve or affect the whole group and can, therefore, easily become political.
Questions of the "right to forgive" come up, where many others have been harmed.
While the present study focuses on the individual attitudes of the victims, these
attitudes are directed towards a group, the group of perpetrators. This situation cannot
simply be equated with an ordinary interpersonal forgiveness scenario. It can be argued
that in a transitional context it is difficult, if not impossible, to perceive forgiveness as
a purely individual act and it is plausible to presume that victims are aware of and
affected by it.
A crucial aspect appears to be the motivation to forgive. Research suggests that in
interpersonal situations, victims may have a higher motivation to forgive and
experience the benefits of releasing their negative emotions (McCullough,
Worthington Jr., and Rachal 1997; Hornsey, Wohl, and Philpot 2015). Consequently,
the implications of forgiveness and un-forgiveness in close relationships differ from
those that arise from a context of violent conflict. In intergroup settings, the
cohesiveness of the victim group may provide greater benefits for the group members
than the benefits derived from letting go of the negative emotions by forgiving (Noor
et al. 2012). On the other hand, other scholars have also argued that un-forgiveness in
situations of mass human rights violations may be psychologically challenging and
result in suffering as it affects large portions of society and has implications for future
co-existence that may undermine solidarity or societal support (Kira et al. 2009).
Furthermore, in some group contexts victims may feel socially pressurized to forgive
(Govier 2002, 93). This pressure might even be more pronounced in particular cultural
settings with stricter or more collectivist norms.
As previously mentioned, the approach that has been adopted for the present study
relates to the forgiveness of individuals who were victims and as such participated in
the research. Intergroup forgiveness is a different field and not an issue that needs to
be addressed here in detail. Nevertheless, the transgressions to which the study relates
occurred in an intergroup context. They affected many victims and were committed by
many perpetrators. The possible effects of on the social environment cannot be
completely ignored when it comes to post-conflict settings, especially in the case of a
cross-cultural study. Despite all these differences, the scholarship on forgiveness
suggests that un-forgiveness in interpersonal situations as well as in post-conflict
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settings, where victims and perpetrators have to continue to live side-by-side, both
carry high psychological costs for those not able to forgive.
Definition of forgiveness in the present study
To sum up, forgiveness may be perceived as abandoning negative attitudes towards
the transgressor or, in addition, as developing positive feelings. Forgiveness can also
be measured as a personal disposition or as a function of situational factors. It can be
interpersonal or occur between groups of people.
As previously highlighted the type of forgiveness applied in the present study is
interpersonal “state” forgiveness, in other words, an individual act that is dependable
on context and not personal characteristics. The situational factors affecting
forgiveness are a subject of this study. A recent meta-analysis has shown that the
situational aspects appear to account for greater variance in forgiveness than the
individual disposition (Fehr, Gelfand, and Nag 2010). Nevertheless, some individual
factors, which might affect forgiveness such as religiosity or cultural aspects, will also
be considered. These topics are addressed in the following sections.
The definition applied for the present study is the more general understanding of an
“intraindividual prosocial change towards a transgressor” (McCullough, Bono, and
Root 2005, 396). While it implies a reduction in negative attitudes, this definition does
not include the development of positive feelings. To put it differently, this form of
forgiveness is defined by an abandoning of revenge or avoidance motivations. Such a
definition may raise two difficulties. It is likely to be perceived as too minimal and,
therefore, it may be open to criticism as to whether it constitutes forgiveness at all.
Albeit considered to be minimal, this definition has been chosen for a reason. While
in many cases of common or “everyday” transgressions the development of positive
feelings towards a transgressor might be quite realistic, suggesting this to victims of
human rights violations or crimes against humanity may be perceived as inappropriate.
Forgiveness in post-conflict settings is a highly sensitive topic and the very mention
of the term might be difficult for some victims (Cairns et al. 2005). It should, therefore,
be approached without the risk of including additional controversy. This is not to say
that there is no one capable of this kind of forgiveness. Nevertheless, it is not
something that can be expected from, and therefore suggested to, the majority of
victims without any difficulty. Even in interpersonal transgressions the development
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of benevolence has been found to be atypical rather than the usual pattern
(McCullough, Fincham, and Tsang 2003). It can also be questioned if benevolence is
really necessary. While it might be healing, empowering or a relief for many victims
to experience a more pronounced or deeper form of forgiveness, this is probably not
the case for all and, moreover, not a topic to be addressed within the scope of
transitional justice but more appropriately within psychology. For society as a whole,
if victims are able to abandon their revenge or avoidance motivation towards the
former perpetrators this may be perceived as sufficient. Suggesting that this is not
enough might put pressure on victims and turn out to be damaging and
counterproductive for individuals or the society as a whole. Finally, an
operationalisation of forgiveness as the opposite of revenge and avoidance motivation
is more straightforward and the resulting items might carry fewer ambiguities. This is
particularly important in a cross-cultural setting where forgiveness could possibly be
understood differently.
The second issue, as to whether the absence of revenge and avoidance really constitute
forgiveness is more complex. While such an interpretation of forgiveness might be
debated by some there is, however, not one universal definition of forgiveness
allowing for diverse interpretations of the concept, some broader and some more
specific. Moreover, the definition of forgiveness that describes what it is not is
common. Finally, the definition of forgiveness as the absence of revenge and
avoidance motivation has been applied in one of the most widely used scales
measuring forgiveness, the Transgression Related Interpersonal Inventory (TRIM-12)
(McCullough et al. 1998) 7 . Nevertheless, this study does not fully rely on this
definition by including an additional item that asks about forgiveness directly. This
will answer the question if forgiveness, as understood by the participants, is related to
revenge and avoidance motivation or not. And finally, in order to obtain a more
comprehensive picture, the victims will have the opportunity to include their own
understanding of forgiveness.

7
There is a TRIM-18 version, which includes benevolence items additionally to those measuring
revenge and avoidance, but the TRIM-12 is also commonly used.
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In other words, while a specific definition is necessary for operationalisation and
measurement this study acknowledges its limitations. The mixed-method approach
counterbalances these limitations by allowing for a more explorative approach and an
inclusion of the victims’ own point of view.
2.3.2 Forgiveness in context – culture and religion
Obviously, there are many factors — both, individual or social — which might
influence forgiveness. This section focuses on two factors that are particularly relevant
for the present study, namely culture and religion.
Forgiveness and Culture
If people in different cultural contexts speak about forgiveness, do they essentially
mean something similar? Despite a widespread and interdisciplinary interest in the
topic of forgiveness, there is little empirical cross-cultural research to answer this
question.
Much of the scholarship, which focuses on differences, follows the widespread
individualistic versus collectivistic paradigm first developed by Geert Hofstede in the
80’s (Hofstede 1984)8,9. For example, it has been suggested that individualistic and
collectivistic cultures are likely to pursue different goals when it comes to forgiveness
(Sandage and Williamson 2005). While the focus of forgiveness in most Western
cultures, characterized as predominantly individualistic, is on personal healing and
well-being, in collectivistic cultures it is rather a restoration of social harmony (Hook,
Worthington, and Utsey 2009). The methods and approaches consequently also differ.
While Western cultures often apply individual coping skills or psychotherapy, in many
collectivistic cultures the involvement of others is sought through rituals or narratives.
(Sandage and Wiens 2001; Sandage and Williamson 2005).

8
At that time Hofstede conducted the largest survey of IBM employees in different countries all
over the world. Based on this research he developed several types of cultural dimensions and
categorized different nationalities according to the average values on those dimensions. The
individualistic versus collectivistic dimension was one of them. See also https://www.hofstedeinsights.com/product/compare-countries/ for the different countries comparisons.
9
See for example (Paz, Neto, and Mullet 2008; Kadiangandu et al. 2007; Hook, Worthington, and
Utsey 2009)

43

It needs to be pointed out that the individualism-collectivism perspective, despite its
continuous widespread application, has attracted various criticisms over time. Some
authors describe it as trying to “pigeonhole whole cultures into dichotomous categories”
and pointed out that “subtle nuances” might get lost (Voronov and Singer 2002, 461).
More recent studies also negate the early conceptualization of individualism and
collectivism as opposites and argue that the categories should rather be perceived as
orthogonal (Coon and Kemmelmeier 2001). The present study does not endeavour to
join this debate, as testing the empirical value of these categories is not a focus of this
research. However, those categories’ still widespread application especially with
regard to forgiveness studies in a cross-cultural context, does mean that it is necessary
to mention them, especially since they can offer some additional explanatory potential
for the conceptualizations of forgiveness in different cultures, which might be relevant
to the present study.
For example, in a study comparing the French and Congolese it has been found that
the French perceive forgiveness more as an intrapersonal process, while the Congolese
view it as interpersonal (Kadiangandu et al. 2007). For the Congolese forgiveness is
more closely associated with reconciliation and replacing the negative emotions
towards the perpetrator with positive feelings. The Congolese are also more ready to
extend forgiveness to people with whom they have not interacted directly, including
institutions or groups,

instead of perceiving it as a process strictly between the

offended and offender. The authors explain their findings partly with the everyday
necessity in many collectivistic cultures to live together and co-exist even after crimes
and atrocities. According to the authors, forgiveness, in such a context might
“constitute a strategy that allows being relieved from resentment towards members of
the group” (p.436).
Such an interpretation may contribute to an explanation for some almost unbelievable
anecdotal stories of forgiveness from cultures classified as collectivistic. The
Forgiveness Project10 collects various such narratives and testimonies from victims.
One woman in Sierra Leone described how she forgave her rapist, who killed her child

10

See (The Forgiveness Project n.d.) http://theforgivenessproject.com/topics/war-and-conflict/
(accessed 20.01.2018)
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and who now lives in the neighbourhood; while another survivor of the genocide in
Rwanda tells the story of how he visited and forgave the man who killed his mother.
At the same time, a close reading of these testimonies indicates the complex
motivations for forgiveness in many of the victims. Some authors suggested that
forgiveness in collectivistic cultures may be more related to decisional than full
emotional forgiveness (Hook, Worthington, and Utsey 2009); or that it is often rather
viewed as a societal duty than a personal attitude. This view appears to have some
foundation in surveys done on the topic of dealing with the past in Northern Uganda,
where the formulation “we have to forgive” can be repeatedly found in victims’
narratives (OHCHR 2007, 29–30).
While theory and the limited existing empirical findings describe some cultural
differences with regard to forgiveness — with particular emphasis on the
differentiation between collectivistic and individualistic cultures — there is by no
means a consensus among scholars about this topic. Even though the existence of
cultural differences is generally acknowledged, at the same time various similarities
have also been pointed out and supported by research (Sandage and Williamson 2005).
A study conducted among various cultural groups in Lebanon by Azar and Mullet
(2002) confirms the previous findings, which suggest the universal role played by
apologies, perceived intentionality, and consequences of the committed transgression
in predicting forgiveness (Sandage and Williamson 2005). Others caution not to fall
into the trap of an excessive relativist perspective by assuming that the cultural
differences with regard to forgiveness are so great that we are unable to understand
each other (Gries and Peng 2002). Moreover, individualism and collectivism also vary
within groups and cannot simply be attributed to specific nations or ethnicities (Hook,
Worthington, and Utsey 2009).
This brief overview illustrates some challenges of cross-cultural studies. How can a
complex phenomenon like forgiveness be studied in different cultural settings? Or, to
put it differently, how can it be assumed that the subject of the study is the same across
the groups? A specific definition and the application of well-established measurement
tools that have ideally been tested in different cultural settings helps to counterbalance
some of the challenges. The definition applied in this study, i.e., of the reduction of
revenge and avoidance motivation provides a meaning that is specific and sufficiently
clear to avoid ambiguities that might arise if people were merely to declare their
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forgiveness or their lack thereof. While this predetermined definition circumvents
some problems, it can be argued that the individual or cultural significance of
forgiveness is ignored. This possibility is addressed through the qualitative elements
of the study. By including a single direct item about forgiveness, it can be established
if forgiveness is really perceived as the opposite of avoidance and revenge in both the
cultural settings of Poland and Uganda. This approach allows a twofold
accomplishment. By predefining forgiveness as abandoning negative attitudes, which
can be considered the minimalistic understanding of this concept, the explanatory
purpose of determining associations with other variables can be pursued. At the same
time, the exploratory qualitative approach enables a comparison of forgiveness with
regard to meaning and content in both countries.
Moreover, an additional aspect can be considered in the present study. Most of the
theoretical deliberations regarding the differences in the meaning of forgiveness
between collectivistic and individualistic cultures relate to common or “normal”
transgressions. The transitional justice context is an exceptional and extreme situation
with its specific and distinct characteristics.
Mass atrocities, human rights violations, the subsequent attempts at dealing with the
past and transitional justice measures occur and are performed in a group context.
Forgiveness or apologies in this context, as highlighted in the previous section about
inter-and intrapersonal forgiveness, can rarely be seen as purely individual acts. They
take place in settings with many stakeholders on the perpetrator- as well as on the
victim side and cannot be separated from the social context in which they occur. Acts
of forgiveness, as well as the rejection thereof, raise debates of either approval or
condemnation. While rituals as a means in the process of forgiveness have been mostly
associated with collectivistic cultures, the ritualistic nature and performance
characteristics of the many common transitional justice measures from truth
commissions to international tribunals have been pointed out by some (Celermajer
2013). On the other hand, even though the scope of the crimes committed and the
means of dealing with them are collective, the extent, nature and consequences of
atrocities are deeply personal. This is illustrated by the extreme levels of mental health
problems, such as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) or depression, experienced
in the aftermath of conflicts among people who belong to cultures mostly associated
with collectivism (Vinck et al. 2007).
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It can, therefore, be argued that even if a variety of differences with regard to
forgiveness in daily or individual transgressions might exist between cultures, this
extreme experience — both social and individual at the same time —negates some of
these differences. To put it differently, it is possible that the context of mass human
rights violations transcends, to a certain degree, the suggested cultural individualistic
and collectivistic dichotomy. By being, on the one hand, more collective but, on the
other hand, more harmful at an individual level than ordinary transgressions, it might
bring the victims from various points on the individualistic-collectivistic culture
spectrum closer together. Under normal circumstances the focus for victims of
transgressions in Western cultures is mostly on individual approaches such as therapy
or counselling. Forgiveness is an individual inner process, as exemplified, among
others, by the forgiveness therapy approach (e.g. Reed and Enright 2006; Freedman
and Enright 1996). In collectivistic cultures forgiveness often occurs as reconciliation
between groups, even if the transgression was individual. Rituals involve whole clans
and the focus is not on the inner healing of the individual but the restoration of social
peace and cooperation. It can be argued that in the context of mass atrocities all victims,
regardless of their cultural background, may need both. Those from individualistic
cultures need a social repair process apart from individual healing (Becker et al. 1990;
Fletcher and Weinstein 2002). In the same way the widespread prevalence of mental
illness in countries categorized as collectivistic might require individual approaches,
such as counselling beyond the social processes of reconciliation rituals (Vinck et al.
2007; OHCHR 2011; UN Peacebuilding Programme 2011). Therefore, in these
extreme situations the understanding and preconditions for forgiveness might be more
analogous between diverse victim groups than in other contexts.
Forgiveness and Religion
Forgiveness plays a major role in religions, and not only in the major world religions,
but also in animistic cultures, demonstrated by sacrifices to spirits that are supposed
to entice their forgiveness (McCullough, Bono, and Root 2005; Rye and McCabe
2014). Consistent with the intuitive assumption of a positive link between religiosity
and forgiveness most studies confirm the positive correlation (Azar and Mullet 2002;
David and Choi 2006; Davis et al. 2013; McCullough, Bono, and Root 2005). This
positive relationship, however, is not such a simple one. Though forgiveness might
generally be viewed positively from a religious perspective, the conditions under
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which forgiveness should be granted differ between and even, to a certain degree,
within belief systems. While Judaism is generally considered to perceive atonement as
a necessary condition, and Christianity is seen as maintaining a concept of
unconditional forgiveness (Exline et al. 2003, 338–39), the second statement is
questioned by other authors, who do not agree with the view of Christianity as a
“religion of unconditional forgiveness” (Garrard and McNaughton 2011).
Further, despite the fact that religious people attach greater value to forgiveness and
perceive themselves as forgiving, it seems that this is not necessarily always the case
when it comes to real transgressions (McCullough 2001, 195). This difference between
self-reported and actual forgiveness has been referred to as “the religion-forgiveness
discrepancy”. Later studies have shown that, although there might be a positive
correlation, it appears to be relatively small (McCullough, Bono, and Root 2005,
399). Moreover, although religions generally attach positive value to forgiveness most
of the major world religions also contain aspects that support revenge or retributive
justice. This has raised the question of whether religious people are likely to choose
between a more forgiving or a more revenge-oriented attitude, depending on the
situation and justifying their respective choices with their religious beliefs. A study
with Christian students supports the assumption that religious people do waiver
between forgiving or revengeful attitudes in response to different situations
(McCullough, Bono, and Root 2005, 399).
Summarizing, it appears that although religion does correlate with forgiveness in many
cases, this connection is not as straightforward as might be anticipated. It depends on
the situation. Even in cases of a positive correlation, the link might not be sufficiently
strong. On the negative side, religion might also be used to put pressure on religious
people, who might actually not be ready to forgive (Saunders 2011, 139). The positive
effects of forgiveness have also been shown to be lower for people who forgave
because of religious pressure as compared to people who forgave out of a sense of
compassion and love (Exline et al. 2003, 342–43). This aspect is related to the concepts
of decisional vs. emotional forgiveness (Worthington et al. 2012). While people might
make the decision “to forgive” because they see it as their “religious duty” this does
not mean that they genuinely feel a sense of forgiveness for the transgressor.
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Concluding, religion is clearly a relevant variable to be considered in the present study
as a possible influencing factor with regard to willingness to forgive. While there
appears to be a positive correlation between religion and forgiveness, the correlation
is not sufficiently convincing to indicate a clear relationship between the two.
2.3.3 The value of forgiveness - empowering vs. demeaning
The subject of this study is not to assess the value of forgiveness. However, at the core
there is a presumption of the positive contribution of forgiveness to the building of a
post-conflict society. If that was not the case forgiveness would have virtually no role
to play in transitional justice. The generally assumed positive impact of forgiveness is
not uncontested. Consequently, the question of whether the forgiveness by victims is
desirable in a post-conflict scenario needs to be addressed.
Many advocates of forgiveness point to the physical and mental health benefit that
can be gained by the forgiving party (e.g. American Psychological Association, 2006;
Harris et al., 2006). Forgiveness therapy, developed by Enright and colleagues, claims
to have proven the positive impact of forgiveness on the victims through its effect of
decreasing anxiety symptoms, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, at the same
time as increasing their self-esteem and hope, even in serious cases such as spousal
abuse or incest (Freedman and Enright 1996; Reed and Enright 2006). On the other
hand, it has been pointed out that much of the research was done on interpersonal
relationships. Simply translating these research findings it into the context of
transitional justice, in cases of atrocities and crimes against humanity, may perpetuate
the inequality and put pressure on victims to accept the injustice. This might favour
the perpetrators at the expense of the victims (Saunders 2011). As Saunders (2011) has
stressed, women or deeply religious people in particular might feel the pressure to
forgive put on them by the society or religious authorities. Victims might end up
feeling guilty or morally incapable of fulfilling the societal expectations that they
should forgive. This question might also arise in certain cultural settings, particularly
in African countries, which are characterized by collectivist and very religious
attributes.
These arguments are particularly pertinent in the context of unconditional forgiveness.
Some authors, emphasizing the interpersonal nature of forgiveness, argue that
unconditional forgiveness is not forgiveness at all (Griswold 2007). Unconditional
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forgiveness is also criticized as compromising the self-respect of the forgiving party
and, so the argument goes, should therefore not be perceived as a virtue (J. G. Murphy
and Hampton 1998). On the other hand, psychologists have found even unilateral
forgiveness to have healing effects on the mental health of victims (Freedman and
Enright 1996; Reed and Enright 2006). Archbishop Tutu brings forward the point that
by conditioning forgiveness on the actions of others, victims limit their freedom and
eventually depend on the offender with the decision to forgive or not (Tutu and Tutu
2014). Empirical findings from Rwanda also show positive effects of unconditional
forgiveness for the victims (Mukashema and Mullet 2013).
While the value of unconditional forgiveness is highly controversial, there is more
agreement regarding the situation of a repentant perpetrator and the context in which
a certain degree of justice has been achieved. Forgiveness under these conditions
appears less questionable. Even though many African traditions and cultures are often
associated with being more forgiving and this appears to be supported by the few
studies conducted on this topic and cited previously (Kadiangandu et al. 2007;
Mukashema and Mullet 2013), it does not mean that the nature of this forgiveness is
unconditional. On the contrary, compensation is often a part of reconciliation rituals.
It has also been argued that the form in which some of the rituals, like Mato Oput11 in
Northern Uganda, are conducted, encourages the offender to repent and resume
responsibility more than the Western justice system does, which facilitates denial
instead (Brock-Utne 2004). It can, therefore, by no means be considered a unilateral
or unconditional form of forgiveness; and also not one where justice is sacrificed in
the name of forgiveness.
Moreover, a study conducted in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein examined the
effects of forgiveness in the context of a political conflict (Kira et al. 2009). The
researchers found a positive association between forgiving the collaborators and
physical and mental health, especially when the collaborators are ingroup members.
In particular, forgiveness relieved PTSD symptoms contributing to reconciliation. This

11

Mato Oput means drinking the bitter herb. It is a reconciliation ritual performed in case of serious
transgressions, such as killings, between the clan of the victim and the clan of the perpetrator. At the
end of the ritual the victim and perpetrator drink the bitter herb together to remind them of the bitter
taste of conflict and strengthen their resolve to reconcile.
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conclusion is supported by another study, which found high levels of PTSD to be
linked to a preference of violent over non-violent conflict resolution (Vinck et al. 2007).
These studies appear to contradict the more critical view of forgiveness in the context
of transitional justice.
Summarizing the debate on the value of forgiveness, it appears that it is mainly
unconditional forgiveness that attracts the most controversy. The problem with the
criticism of forgiveness arises when the authors are not particular about the definition
of forgiveness they are referring to with their critique.
The issue of unconditional forgiveness is not pertinent to the topic at hand. While the
qualitative part of this study will allow for different perceptions of forgiveness, and
for an exploration of how forgiveness is understood, and what type of forgiveness is
preferred by various victims, the main question concerns the preconditions for
forgiveness. The value of unconditional forgiveness, therefore, does not play a
noteworthy role in this study.
Concluding, the question of whether forgiveness is either empowering or demeaning
depends on the context. In particular, in a post-conflict setting — and considering the
long-lasting devaluation of victims — this is a valid issue. It is therefore appropriate
to point out that the danger of forgiveness is that it is likely to perpetuate the demeaning
of victims, or enhance the existing imbalance between victims and perpetrators
(Saunders 2011; Staub 2006). So, while forgiveness can have healing effects on
individuals as well as positive implications for societies, it is crucial, in a post-conflict
setting particularly, that it takes place under the right circumstances. If forgiveness is
granted voluntarily from a position of strength there is little argument against it.
A position of strength implies that the imbalance, which existed over the course of the
regime or conflict and which led to the undermining of the victims, is rectified. And
this is precisely one of the assumptions on which this study is based. The importance
restoration of equality has for forgiveness, has been asserted in the context of empirical
studies as well as in theoretical deliberations on the effects of apologies and repentance,
which have been interpreted as having the effect of bringing the perpetrator down
(Azar and Mullet 2002; David and Choi 2006, 2009; Fehr and Gelfand 2010; Fehr,
Gelfand, and Nag 2010; Girard and Mullet 2012; Hornsey, Wohl, and Philpot 2015;
Griswold 2007; J. G. Murphy and Hampton 1998). However, as important as apologies
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are, they are transient and if they do not lead to a change in the circumstances of the
victims, their effects might not endure (Staub 2005). Even worse, such apologies may
have no effect at all if perceived as insincere. The restoration of balance between
victims and perpetrators constitutes a foundation not only for transitional justice but
also for forgiveness to be constructive, healing or even simply possible for victims.
2.3.4 Forgiveness – summary and synthesis
The purpose of this section is to present the many facets of forgiveness and to explain
why it is not easy to grasp or define. For a concept that has existed for millennia, since
the earliest days of humanity or even in our ancestors before the evolution of the
modern human (McCullough, 2008), scholars still seem to struggle with understanding
it. By demonstrating some of the challenges in forgiveness research this section has
aimed to emphasize why a clear definition is important and why it is not enough to
simply determine forgiveness by asking about it directly. In other words, the
difficulties of forgiveness scholarship at the same time suggest ways of overcoming
them.
This final part of the forgiveness section focuses on presenting the most
comprehensive attempt at systematization of the knowledge about this concept to date.
While it does not answer all the questions and controversies that forgiveness research
has to offer, and which have been outlined in the previous sections, it does contribute
to a better understanding of when and how people forgive. A theoretical forgiveness
framework provides guidelines in situating the variety of understandings and meanings
within an existing system. It is, therefore, helpful to explore the differences and
similarities between the two research sites of the present study. While the quantitative
part of the study does apply a predetermined and clear-cut definition, this classification
attempt is particularly significant for the explorative and qualitative component of this
study.
The findings are a result of a meta-analysis of 175 studies that addressed the question
of when people forgive (Fehr, Gelfand, and Nag 2010). The authors suggest a
forgiveness typology consisting of three parts, namely cognitions, affects, and
constraints. Cognitions involve a victim's attempt to make sense of the transgression
by answering the question "what happened?" The elements that play a role in this
context are, for example, intent or responsibility. The affective part consists of seeking
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an answer to the question "what do I feel?" Negative affects lead to less, and positive
affects to more, forgiveness. Finally, constraints deal with situational and internal
aspects that relate to the question "what happens if I do not forgive?" The issues
assumed to influence forgiveness are, for example, the victim’s relationship with the
offender, societal norms or internal beliefs such as moral convictions or religiosity.
Although this typology is just the beginning, and the authors emphasize various
limitations such as the inability in a meta-analytical approach to examine interactions,
it nevertheless seems very promising. The attempts of other authors to define when
and why people forgive are in agreement with this typology which discloses the same
cognitive or emotional elements or constraints (e.g. Berry et al. 2001; Exline et al.
2003; McCullough 2001). Moreover, many of the correlates described above can be
linked to this framework. For example, religiosity can play a role as a constraining
element if people feel compelled to forgive based on their beliefs. Cultural aspects can
be interpreted in the same way as societal limitations imposed upon victims. Aspects
related to justice fall partly in the cognitive and partly in the emotional category, since
justice incorporates both components.
This typology can be related to descriptions of comprehensive apologies that comprise
elements corresponding to each of the parts defined above. A comprehensive apology
is supposed to consist of remorse, acceptance of responsibility, acknowledgment of
wrongdoing, acknowledgment of harm and victim suffering, an undertaking to behave
better in future and offers of repair (Blatz, Schumann, and Ross 2009). Remorse is
linked to the emotional level of the victim. Acknowledgement of harm and wrong
doing and acceptance of responsibility answer the question "what happened" from the
perspective of a repentant offender. And finally, the promise to improve and
compensate tell the victims what happens if they do forgive and what they can expect
in future.
In a similar way, these elements can be found in transitional justice measures. While
perpetrators cannot be made to apologize the emotional element is addressed by trying
to create conditions conducive to remorse through truth and reconciliation
commissions. Even in legal justice, a remorseful perpetrator can expect a more lenient
sentence. In truth commissions and legal justice, uncovering the facts and assigning
responsibility, constitute central elements; while victim testimonies contribute to the
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general public’s acknowledgment of their suffering. Restorative measures address
repair for the harm done; and reforms and punishments are attempts to ensure nonrepetition. Finally, the predominant social discourse in the respective post-conflict
setting either facilitates or inhibits a process of forgiveness.
These elements describe the conditions under which people forgive, and which should
be present for an apology to be accepted. From this it can be assumed that
circumstances which violate some or all of these elements will be contrary to
forgiveness. Persistent inequalities, which result in relative deprivation, can be
expected to have negative implications, in particular for the cognitive and affective
components of the forgiveness typology.
2.4 Justice perceptions – social psychology perspective
Justice research constitutes an extremely wide and interdisciplinary field that can only
be reviewed in a limited way within the scope of this work. In order to narrow it down
and focus on the topics that are particularly pertinent to the present research the justice
scholarship in the field of social psychology is reviewed in the following section on
conceptualization. The concern of social psychology can be subsumed as
concentrating on what people perceive as justice and under what circumstances.
To begin, the common categorization of justice into different types is described and
explained. This is followed by linking the theoretical discourse on people’s justice
judgments with the field of transitional justice, which explores the question of which
assumptions can be deduced from existing scholarship on victims’ perception of justice.
Then the definition of justice as applied to the present study is presented. The
definition reflects the current state of justice research and is appropriate to the context
of a post-conflict setting. Finally, in the light of the cross-cultural background of this
study, the contemporary state of knowledge on justice across cultures is outlined.
2.4.1 Conceptualization of justice
There is widespread support for the theory that justice is a basic human motivation.
Describing his “belief in a just world” theory Lerner (Lerner 1980) argues that this
belief is fundamental for societies to function as it provides a necessary illusion of a
predictable and controllable world, which enables long-term planning and goal
achievement. Other scholars in the field of evolutionary psychology go even further
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suggesting there are genetic predispositions in humans for justice (Wright 1995). So
while a justice motive appears to be universally human, what does it mean exactly?
Mostly, when speaking of justice, and in particular within the transitional justice
setting, the legal meaning of the concept is apposite. Justice associated with rulebreaking is, however, only one type of justice. Generally, justice is divided into four
categories: retributive, restorative, distributive and procedural. The first two apply to
situations of rule-breaking and are directed either at the perpetrator or the victim. The
third type addresses situations of resource sharing and fair distribution. The final
category applies to the perception of procedures, and the question of when and why
they are seen as just and legitimate.
Justice, as applied in rule-breaking situations, has a long history. Its complexity derives
from the fact that it has both social and individual components, more so than
forgiveness, which, apart from some specific situations, is mostly an individual act.
Justice is dispensed by the society or through societal structures and is frequently
associated with objectivity, impartiality, and neutrality symbolized by a female figure,
often blindfolded, holding scales. At the same time, however, it is a subjective concept,
which all people individually strive to abide by (Tyler et al. 1997, 4).
Modern law is commonly equated with justice, although modern law does not always
seem to be just. The etymology of the word comes from the notion of paying back,
settling scores. According to Miller (2007, 197) justice was first a matter of paying
back, of buying back, of determining the amount of the obligation owed or the value
of the thing or the person to be redeemed". Miller emphasized the semantic
relationship between justice as paying back and peace, which originally comes from
the Latin “pacare” and developed from the concept of paying (p. 15). In this sense
peace was basically understood as settling the debts. The early concept of justice arose
from talionic cultures, as described by Miller (2007), who focused on the idea of
getting even, of an eye for an eye. He argues that even though these earlier concepts
are often today perceived as barbaric, they are often closer to people’s inner
understanding of justice than the modern legal procedures. The concept of “paying
back” can be divided into the person paying, who is the perpetrator, and the one
receiving, who is the victim. These elements are basically at the core of the two types
of justice: retribution and restoration.. Retribution refers to the perpetrator paying in
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different ways for the breaking of a rule. Restoration refers to the victim being
compensated for the harm done. Darley and Pittman (2003) in an attempt to establish
which type of justice is preferred under which circumstances proposed that the crucial
element is the perpetrator’s intention in committing the harm. This involves a cognitive
assessment and can lead to low or high moral outrage. This in turn affects the
determination of justice. Intentional crime results in high moral outrage and a desire
for punishment. Unintentional crime or, alternatively, circumstances providing an
excuse, lower the moral outrage and lessen the demand for retribution. In these cases
compensation is perceived as adequate, while in situations of premeditated and
intentional rule-breaking, compensation is seen as desirable but insufficient.
While retribution and restoration only refer to transgressions, the remaining two types
of justice, distributive and procedural, have more general applications. Distributive
justice developed from a rather rational understanding of justice based mostly on
equity theory. Equity theory assumes that people feel justice is being done when
outcomes match the inputs (Adams 1963). This idea of justice, also described as
resource-based models, and related to social exchange theory, postulates that people
want to maximize their gains (Tyler 1994). In other words, justice assessments depend
on how favourable the outcomes are.
This mostly economic perspective on human justice judgments was followed in the
1970s by research on procedural justice. Scholars discovered that sometimes people
care less about economic outcomes and more about being treated with respect. The
social context and the procedures often appear more important for justice assessments
than the actual revenues (Lind and Tyler 1988; Murphy and Tyler 2008; Skitka et al.
2010; Tyler 2006; Tyler et al. 1997).
The challenge, as put forward by Skitka et al. (2010) in their historical overview of
justice research, is to establish which type of justice is applied when. The authors, in
close agreement with the above categorization, describe the different waves of justice
research as related to the perception of human nature as “homo oeconomicus”, homo
socialis” and “homo moralis” or, in other words, influenced by economic, relational or
moral motives. Consequently, justice judgments are being made depending on the
favourability of the results, on respect and fair procedures or based on moral
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convictions. The question is, however, as highlighted above, which justice approach
prevails in which situation.
2.4.2 Victims’ justice perceptions in a post-conflict setting
The question what role justice plays for victims after conflicts, and what type of justice
might be the most important one for them is pertinent to transitional justice, and
reflected in much of the research in this field. Even though many transitional justice
scholars do not necessarily make use of the same psychological terms, they basically
address the same issues. In the following section the social psychological justice
scholarship is applied to the post-conflict context and the empirical studies from the
transitional justice field in search of some answers.
Drawing on the various schools of justice research presented above, diverse
conclusions could result for the post-conflict setting. The proponents of retributive
justice emphasize the fact that crimes have taken place. This suggests the triggering of
the moral motive and moral outrage, and should subsequently result in a demand for
“just desert” and punishment. The critics of this limited legal perspective point to the
importance of the economic needs and rights of the victims and condemn that they are
ignored and neglected by most transitional justice approaches. This suggests the
primacy of distributive justice. Others, finally, emphasize the needs of victims to be
acknowledged and respected in their suffering and their need to “have a voice” after
having been silenced for so long. This is related to the “homo socialis” or procedural
justice perspective. All these aspects are relevant and important. So does the existing
justice scholarship provide any indication of which type of justice — retributive,
restorative, distributive or procedural — is likely to be prioritised in which
circumstances?
Skitka et al. (2010) attempted to answer this question by, among others, drawing on
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (Maslow, Maslow, and Geiger 1993). 12 In their
contingency model, justice motivation depends on the circumstances and the salience

12

Maslow’s need hierarchy is a theory within motivational psychology. He assumed that people’s
motivations are hierarchical, often pictured as a pyramid. Once one level is fulfilled, the needs on the
next level up are those which motivate people. The groups of needs were originally divided into five
levels with physiological (basic) needs at the bottom, followed by safety, love or belonging, esteem
and self-actualization at the top.
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of a particular perspective. One important characteristic of a situation, activating the
respective justice perspectives, is related to the question which needs on Maslow’s
pyramid are satisfied. Basic needs at the bottom of the hierarchy are the most crucial.
The authors, therefore, argue that the “homo oeconomicus” justice perspective applies
in situations where basic needs have not been satisfied, or in situations of danger. When
these needs are satisfied to an acceptable degree, the needs on a higher level on the
pyramid come into play; these relate to the need to belong and the need for esteem,
referred to as the “homo socialis” justice motive. Only when both of these groups of
needs have been met, the “homo moralis” perspective applies
These assumptions are supported by various findings from the field of transitional
justice. The criticism of the “elitist perspective” prioritizing retributive and legal
justice as opposed to economic needs in various developing countries (Robins 2012a;
Millar 2011; Ajetunmobi 2012) directly corresponds to the predictions of this model.
Moreover, again in accordance with this model, justice priorities among victims can
differ even within one country. Research in Timor-Leste has shown that victims from
the more affluent region around the capital placeless emphasis on economic needs as
compared to victims from poorer areas (Robins 2012b).
The importance of apologies, remorse and acknowledgement have been repeatedly
proven in various studies (David and Choi 2006, 2009; David 2018).These actions and
attitudes can be related to the “homo socialis” perspective, the need for belonging and
respect, which in turn is an important aspect of procedural justice. In his
comprehensive overview of transitional justice interventions and their effects, David
(2017:171) has argued that the importance of apologies can be explained by a theory
of justice that depends on awareness of and satisfaction with the offender’s
transformation. He differentiates this theory from the theories of procedural justice,
and their focus on impartiality and fairness. This view of procedural justice is, however,
limited. Initially, the focus of procedural justice related to outcomes, which were
expected to be more satisfactory with increased control over procedure and decisionmaking itself (Thibaut and Walker 1976). Later developments of the theory added a
relational dimension to the concept of procedural justice as opposed to the self-interest
model (Lind and Tyler 1988; Tyler 1989). This interpretation of procedural justice
emphasized the need for respect, belonging, group membership and position within
this group. As such, it corresponds to the “homo socialis” perspective of justice.
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Apologies and remorse, instead of affecting justice assessments through the perceived
transformation of the offender, may tend to reinforce or re-affirm group membership
and the status of victims, which is very much within the realm of procedural justice as
interpreted by a group-value model. The meaning and importance of apologies as
“setting new moral standards for the society, that, ideally, will be conducive to equality
of membership” is similarly made in the Encyclopedia of Transitional Justice (Stan
and Nedelsky 2013, 17).
So, what assumptions can be drawn about the justice perceptions of victims? Based on
the review of the justice research and the scholarship on transitional justice, several
assumptions emerge. While victims clearly have different justice needs, which depend
on their situations, context and history, economic and relational motives do stand out
as the most important ones. Theories as well as empirical studies suggest that
retributive desires based on moral principles, though not insignificant, only become a
priority when other needs have been satisfied. Moreover, the economic or distributive
justice perception is often closely intertwined with the relational justice motive.
Findings of justice research support the assumption that distributive justice
assessments are influenced by relational judgments (Tyler 1994). If people trust in the
relational structures that dispense social and economic benefits, these outcomes are
perceived as more fair.
This is what happens under “normal” circumstances. Applying this reasoning to a postconflict setting this hierarchical order may, however, reasonably be reversed. Victims
find themselves in a new environment and do not have any basis, yet, for trust. On the
contrary, they have been accustomed to mistrusting social and political structures.
Many have economic needs, but even those who do not, are likely to have had their
needs for belonging and esteem violated over a long period of time. Instead of judging
the fairness of the outcomes based on trust they might, therefore, judge the justice of
the new environment based on the perceived fairness of outcomes. The distributive
justice, in this case, may convey two meanings. Apart from the purely economic aspect,
distributive justice can also communicate a message to the victims about their standing
in the group, their value and consequently the justice of the whole new post-conflict
setting. This supposition is supported by the findings of a study conducted within the
field of peace and conflict research. While considering the endurance of peace
agreements, the study found that the equality principle of distributive justice is a
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pivotal and mediating influence of procedural justice (Albin and Druckman 2012).
Even though this study did not deal with victims’ perceptions as such, it supported the
suggestion that in a volatile environment characterised by a history of mistrust, equal
shares contribute to trust and cooperation, which in turn has a positive impact on the
peace process.
This reasoning is also in accordance with the postulations of justice heuristics theory.
Heuristics are mental shortcuts used to form an opinion in complex or uncertain
situations, or when relevant information is missing (Proudfoot and Lind 2015; Tversky
and Kahneman 1974). A post-conflict context is a situation in which there is much
uncertainty immediately after the conflict has ended when it is not clear how the new
order will look. Many of the transitional justice measures are full of legal complexities,
difficult for an average person to grasp. As Ford (2011, p. 425) points out, many
citizens of transition countries as well as former victims have very limited information
or understanding about those mechanisms and processes. This corresponds with the
findings of a survey conducted in Northern Uganda, where people were asked, among
others, about their perceptions of the role of the International Criminal Court (ICC).
Even though their knowledge about the functioning of this international court was
limited, it did not prevent them from having opinions on the subject (Longman, Pham,
and Weinstein 2004; Pham and Vinck 2007, 38). So how can victims form opinions
about fairness or not, as the case may be, in this complex and confusing environment?
The theory of justice heuristics suggests that people use whatever information is
available to quickly pass judgement, which then shapes and influences any new
experiences they may have (Proudfoot and Lind 2015). To put it differently, victims
need to know if the new environment will be better and more just to adjust to the new
order and have a feeling of control and predictability (Lerner 1980). Getting
acquainted with the frequently complex transitional justice measures in order to form
these justice opinions is not practicable for most people without expert knowledge.
Justice heuristics theory suggests that they will, therefore, use more easily accessible
information to form these judgments, which will in turn reflect back on how they
assess the transitional justice measures and the whole new environment.
The fairness of the distribution of outcomes, whether it be in economic terms or
whether it relates to social acknowledgement — both requirements in which victims
have been previously disadvantaged — will provide this easily accessible information.
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This fairness of distribution is in particular relevant when compared to the group of
the former perpetrators who, at the same time, were often the beneficiaries of the past
conditions. The new economic and social status vis-à-vis the perpetrator group
symbolizes the value of the group membership of the former victims in the same sense
as their previous low status represented their low value. A justice judgment formed
based on those comparisons can, according to the existing theory, be far reaching and
stable over time.
Obviously, it can be argued that people do not always react negatively to
disadvantageous comparisons. System justification theory which developed out of
many studies and findings, contradicts these assumptions. The theory posits that the
motivation to justify the status quo might be in many cases equally important or even
more so than the justice motive. This results in people defending social and political
systems that are clearly disadvantageous to them (Jost, Banaji, and Nosek 2004).
People might have different aims in defending the existing system. One explanation
might be offered by the cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger 1962).13 Justice is a
value that most people hold. If they are consistently confronted with an environment
that contradicts this value, one way of dealing with this contradiction is to re-interpret
the context and justify the injustice. In the present context this would imply, that having
suffered for so long, the victims’ need for justice may manifest in a way that they want
the new environment to be better and fair at any cost. This might lead to interpreting
whatever happens during the transition process, even inequality with regard to
economic and social status, in a positive way by finding excuses in order to defend the
new system. While this is a possible psychological reaction, the various studies
conducted in the field of transitional justice suggest that victims do have a need for
equality, do compare themselves with former perpetrators; and do voice discontent if
their outcomes are unfavourable (David and Choi 2009). Victims are also not always
appreciative of the transition process, especially when promises, which might have
instigated their trust and prompted positive attitudes early on, are not met (Backer
2010).

13

For details on cognitive dissonance theory see section 2.1
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Summarizing, the assumptions made in the present study, based on comprehensive
interdisciplinary

justice

research,

place

the

economic

status

and

social

acknowledgement of the victims in the post-conflict setting at the centre. Comparisons
that victims make with the perpetrator group reveal whether the need for distributive
justice in the new environment — something clearly important for victims — has been
met, but also the relational dimension of procedural justice. The outcome of this
comparison reveals the value of the victims’ group membership and provides an
accessible tool for justice assessments of the whole post-conflict setting.
The justice definition, which best reflects these considerations is the injustice gap
(Davis et al. 2015). The injustice gap is defined by the authors as the gap between the
reality and the “ideal justice” as perceived by the victims. This is in particular fitting
for a post-conflict setting. Victims have various expectations, which in most cases
cannot be all met. In other words, there will always be an injustice gap. The question
is how big this gap turns out to be and what can be done to make it smaller. The
explanations provided above lead to the assumption that a comparison with
perpetrators in order to assess the extent of persisting economic and social inequalities
will have a considerable impact on the size of this gap.
2.4.3 Justice and culture
This section draws on the existing cross-cultural justice research to address a number
of questions relevant to the present study. These questions include the issue of the
universality of the justice motive as such, and if people across cultures use similar
principles for their justice assessments. Moreover, is the classification of the
previously described different justice types generally applicable?
The cross-cultural justice research is still rather limited and many studies focus either
on a comparison between Western countries or Asian with Western countries, most
notably China or Hong Kong and US. Nevertheless, theories as well as findings
suggest the universal existence of a justice motive (Lerner 1980; Tyler et al. 1997;
Wright 1995). Some scholars even describe it as basic human need (A. J. W. Taylor
2009).
The findings from 82 countries examining the generalizability of Schwartz's basic
value theory confirm that universalism, which in his definition encompasses norms
such as social justice and equality, is one of the values rated most highly across cultures
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(Schwartz 2012). A recent meta-analysis of organizational justice studies across
cultures also found various similarities such as the general preference for the equity
principle with regard to distributive justice, or the importance of relational concerns
within procedural justice research (Silva and Caetano 2016). In a study focusing on
preferences in dispute resolution methodologies comparing different ethnic groups in
the US, the researchers found overwhelming similarities in patterns and preferences
far outweighed the differences (Lind, Huo, and Tyler 1994).
On the other hand, despite the strong support for the assumption that a justice motive
as such is universal and that people across cultures use similar principles to make
justice assessments, differences do exist. A number of studies applied the Hofstede
model14 and the differentiation in individualistic and collectivistic cultures to explore
variations in the perception of justice. For example, the perceptions of justice related
to interactional justice have been shown to be affected by the collectivistic values of
cultures (Silva and Caetano 2016). Situational factors that persist over long periods of
time can affect cultural justice perceptions, such as resource scarcity in India, which
contributed to a preference for the need principle in distributive justice over equity
(Tyler et al. 1997, 236). Collectivistic cultures also appear to show more preference
for equality and need principles than individualistic cultures (Silva and Caetano 2016).
To sum up, there is strong support for the assumption that people find justice as a value
important across cultures. Also the previously described types of justice can be found
in different cultural settings even though the preferences might differ depending on the
degree of the prevalence of individualistic or collectivistic characteristics as well as
long lasting situational factors.
Similarly as with forgiveness, it is important not to overlook some core aspects of
justice perceptions by solely relying on established definitions. While definitions are
critical for quantitative measurements, room should be left for exploration of the
nuances of complex concepts such as justice, especially across different cultures. To
put it differently, while the comparison element described above is assumed to play a
crucial role in justice perceptions in both Poland and Uganda, there will be other
elements, which reduce or increase the injustice gap. A comprehensive understanding
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of these justice perceptions as well as differences and similarities between the two
countries, requires an additional exploration of these other aspects.
2.5 Hypotheses
The research questions of the present study endeavour to explore the role of economic
and social inequalities in justice perceptions and the motivation of victims to forgive
in both Poland and Uganda. In order to do this the theory of relative deprivation is
applied, which explains the consequences of disadvantageous comparisons.
The previous sections introduced the field of transitional justice, which provides the
background for this study situated in post-conflict settings, as well as the main
variables, namely relative deprivation, forgiveness and justice. This final section of the
literature review describes how and why these variables are assumed to influence each
other and in what way these assumptions are relevant at the proposed research sites.
Each sub-section ends by presenting a hypothesis derived from the presented theories
as well as observations about the research sites.
2.5.1 Relative deprivation and the motivation to forgive of victims
The search for relevant research material conducted for the purpose of this study has
shown that the question of whether relative deprivation makes an impact on
forgiveness has not been studied so far. This is surprising taking into account the long
history of relative deprivation and the various effects that have, according to
established research, resulted from it. Which theoretical deliberations and what
empirical evidence would, therefore, suggest that relative deprivation might affect
forgiveness? Why and how would that be important in a post-conflict setting?
While there are different types of relative deprivation, in that not all are based on social
comparisons, 15 this study focuses on relative deprivation that results from a
disadvantageous comparison with an outgroup, namely, the perpetrators. The first and
basic assumption in the present context is that such an ingroup-outgroup categorization
can be safely presumed. This needs to be, at least briefly, addressed as in both countries
the conflicts were not along pre-existing ethnic or religious lines. While it might appear
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technical, it is an important question, since studies suggest that comparisons with
ingroup members lead to outcomes that differ from the comparisons that are made with
outgroup individuals.16
The ingroup-outgroup categorization is one of the most basic assumptions of social
psychology and most theories beginning with the early scholars of intergroup relations
make use of this differentiation (Sherif 1966; Tajfel 1970; Tajfel and Turner 1986).
Tajfel (1970) revolutionized social psychology in discovering the minimal group
paradigm and showing the innate importance of this differentiation for human relations
and attitudes. He demonstrated that ingroup favouritism exists even in conditions
where people have never met and the only connecting element was the proclaimed
existence of a virtual “group”. Tajfel subsequently concluded that “socialization into
"groupness" is powerful and unavoidable; it has innumerable valuable functions. It
also has some odd side-effects that may — and do — reinforce acute intergroup
tensions whose roots lie elsewhere” (Tajfel 1970, 102). While ingroup-outgroup
categorization exists — surprisingly, even under the most minimal conditions, — its
existence in cases of conflict is more intuitive. The earlier Realistic Conflict Theory
(RCT) developed by Sherif (1966) and verified in empirical experiments, made use of
an existing conflict to demonstrate competition and antagonism between groups.
Based on this theoretical background it is reasonable to assume that even if conflict
lines do not run along pre-existing criteria, such as ethnicity or religious affiliation, the
mere fact of standing on opposing sides for a considerable amount of time is likely to
be more than enough to entrench group categorization in victims. This categorization,
so significant during and after the conflict, is likely to also make the perpetrators a
relevant and salient group for comparisons in order to assess the changes of the postconflict environment.
While the effect of relative deprivation on forgiveness has not been studied per se, the
predominant evidence of the literature on relative deprivation discussed above
suggests that it leads to negative outgroup attitudes. Even though a few selected studies
concluded that relative deprivation might lead to positive attitudes towards the
outgroup, it seems that in these cases relative deprivation was not correctly measured
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correctly.17 The study, which compares most closely with the context of the present
research, is the one conducted in South Africa where the authors disputed that relative
deprivation has a strong effect on negative attitudes towards the outgroup (Duckitt and
Mphuthing 2002). However, the reduction in relative deprivation described in this
study, was probably based solely on optimism and the anticipation of a better future
created by the change in the political system. This reduction was, therefore, intangible
and might not have produced any strong effects. What happens, however, if the initial
enthusiasm subsides and the victims find themselves after some time still with a lower
economic or social status compared to their perpetrators? This is a pertinent question
as such situations are not uncommon, especially in the context of negotiated conflict
resolutions, where the perpetrators often retain various benefits. Because they are
expected to give up political or military power, they may have been promised
amnesties and the retention of economic benefits instead.
The issue of beneficial treatment of former perpetrators has been at the centre of the
public debate in Poland for many years (e.g. Fakt.Pl 2015; Ferfecki 2013; Kostrzewski
2017). Some scholars describe how the former perpetrators in Poland became the new
capitalists (Los and Zybertowicz 2000; Staniszkis 1990, 2001). The support for former
perpetrators as opposed to many victims has also been a controversial topic in
Uganda18 (Borzello 2009). The anecdotal evidence from post-conflict settings with
such differential treatment suggests the realistic possibility of resentment on the side
of the victims.
The majority of relative deprivation research described in previous sections indicates
negative outgroup attitudes as a result. This is the case for people or groups that do not
necessarily share a prior history. In case of a post-conflict setting, there is already a
history of discrimination, probably expectations of improvement on the victims’ side
and predominantly negative attitudes towards perpetrators. Forgiveness would mean a
positive shift in those existing negative attitudes. If relative deprivation can exacerbate
intergroup relations under conditions were there is no conflict, it can reasonably be
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A critical debate on financial support given to Uganda’s former perpetrators by the Uganda
Amnesty Commission while victims receive nothing has been also observed by the author at the
National War Victims Conference, Kampala, May 2014
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expected that it will hamper a shift to more positive attitudes towards the perpetrators
where negative perceptions already exist.
Therefore, this study assumes that a disadvantageous comparison between victims and
perpetrators in Poland and Uganda is likely to result in relative deprivation, which in
turn is likely to lead to decrease in motivation to forgive. Taking into account the
inferred universal application of both concepts — relative deprivation and forgiveness
— it is proposed that the negative effect on forgiveness is likely to be present in both
countries.
Assuming that victims compare themselves with perpetrators, which comparison
domains would they most probably choose? Relative deprivation theory states that the
preconditions for the deprivation include wanting something, not having it and seeing
that someone else has it. In most conflict contexts victims are likely to have been
deprived with regard to their social and economic status. Often they are prevented from
pursuing their economic or career goals as a result of the oppression or because of the
circumstances created by the conflict. Certainly, this was the case with regard to the
victim groups in the present study, namely Poland and Uganda. Furthermore,
economic and social status are the categories mostly investigated in relative
deprivation research as they symbolize peoples' rank in society and represent tangible
categories for comparison. Therefore, social and economic status represent the most
identifiable social divisions for the purpose of comparison.
H1: Relative deprivation of victims increases revenge and avoidance motivation and
decreases their willingness to forgive
2.5.2 Relative deprivation and victims’ perceptions of justice
As mentioned in the previous section,19 a justice motive is considered to be generally
important for people but in particular it has been found to play a central role in a
situation of uncertainty. The uncertainty management model stipulates that people
engage in fairness assessments to reduce uncertainty, which is an unpleasant
experience (van den Bos and Lind 2002; Proudfoot and Lind 2015). A post-conflict
situation is a situation of high uncertainty in which it is not clear to what extent and in
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what ways the social and political structures have changed or improved. According to
this theory, victims are likely to be highly motivated to make justice assessments in
order to reduce the uncertainty associated with the new environment.
Most justice judgements require some kind of comparison. Distributive justice is
assessed when victims compare their own outcomes with those of others. The severity
of punishment is established by comparing it with other punishments. Even the fairness
of procedural justice is determined by a comparison with procedures applied to the
treatment of others. During conflict or in a repressive regime, victims suffer in various
ways while perpetrators have power over them, and often benefit from the existing
conditions. The extent to which this status quo is retained or changed provides one of
the simplest and most direct possibilities for assessing justice. This is in line with the
theory of thinking heuristics under conditions of uncertainty. One heuristic commonly
applied when only limited information is available is representativeness, which
depends on similarity (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Something is representative of
something else to the degree to which both are similar to each other. Consequently, a
post-conflict setting represents a truly new system to the degree to which it is
dissimilar to the old. A related idea is represented in victim’s statements “we are not
like them”,20 which is supposed to accentuate their dissimilarity to former perpetrators
in terms of values and attitudes. The easiest way to examine the similarity or
dissimilarity between the previous and the new systems is through assessing the
relative positions and conditions of the victims and perpetrators in the new context. As
pointed out previously, empirical findings support the assumption that victims do
compare their situations with those of the perpetrators and then draw conclusions from
the comparison (David and Choi 2009).
Of course, in the current study, the context is not completely new. In both countries
years have passed since the peace process and the transition. However, the primacy
effect of the fairness heuristics theory specifies that justice assessments made early on
in the new context carry more weight and affect the interpretation of later events
(Proudfoot and Lind 2015). This has important implications for post-conflict contexts
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that delay in addressing previous inequalities. The convictions formed early on that
the new system does not prioritize the rectification of past injustices is likely to be very
difficult to change. In fact, even positive attitudes that were initially based on beliefs,
promises or expectations change quickly if none of the expected changes materialize
(David and Choi 2009; David 2011; Backer 2010). As predicted by the primacy effect,
the disappointment might persist even if far-reaching transitional justice measures are
implemented later on, as was the case in the Czech Republic (David 2018).
Therefore, based on theoretical as well as empirical evidence, it can reasonably be
assumed that victims are likely to make comparisons between their own and the
perpetrators’ group, and that the outcome will impact on their justice assessment of the
new post-conflict environment. In the previous section it was established that the most
likely spheres of comparison would be economic and social status. The question is, if
both would be similarly relevant for justice judgments. The substitutability fairness
heuristic predicts that people use whatever information is available to make their
justice assessments (Proudfoot and Lind 2015). In other words, economic status or
social acknowledgment will be used depending on the availability of information in
order for victims to make decisions about whether justice has been achieved.
The assumptions of the present study that were based on relative deprivation theory
predict that economic or social relative deprivation will have a negative effect on the
assessment of justice in the post-conflict setting. However, this is by no means obvious
as other theories would predict different reactions. System justification theory and a
consistently growing amount of empirical evidence suggest that people often ignore
and justify inequalities and injustices done to them (Jost, Banaji, and Nosek 2004). As
already briefly explained in a previous section, their motivation is to justify the status
quo. This need can derive from cognitive dissonance created by the experience of
living surrounded by injustice. As justice does appear to be a universal need for people
this discomfort can be resolved by justifying the injustice. It could be argued that this
might be particularly pertinent in the case of victims. During a long period of war or
regime, the one thing that might help victims keep going is the anticipation of a better
future. When the future they have hoped or maybe even fought for arrives and they
realize that it is not what they imagined, it is possible that they will engage in system
justification by finding reasons or excuses or ignoring the injustices while focusing on
the positive changes. In such a case, the disadvantageous comparison and relative
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deprivation will not lead to the perception of injustice. Either the victims would not
experience relative deprivation at all or even if they do, it would not lead to an
assessment that the whole new system is unfair.
Therefore, based on theoretical assumptions, there are different possibilities. The
victims might merely compare their own situations before and after the conflict and
not engage in comparisons with perpetrators. In that case, there would only be a
significant effect of the victims' situation and the situations of the perpetrators would
be irrelevant. Secondly, it is possible that victims might engage in system justification.
In this case, the disadvantageous comparison would have no effect on the experience
of relative deprivation and/or there would be no effect of relative deprivation on justice
perceptions. For the reasons explained above, this study assumes that victims engage
in social comparisons with the perpetrator group above and beyond the trajectory of
their own situation before and after the conflict. Furthermore, it can be argued that
living through a conflict or under a repressive regime is likely to have made them more,
not less, sensitive to issues of injustice. This would be true for both economic as well
as social status comparisons, as victims are likely to use whatever information is
available to them to assess whether justice has been achieved in the post-conflict
environment.
H2: Relative deprivation increases injustice perceptions
2.5.3 Justice assessment and its impact on the motivation of victims to forgive
The previous sections explained the presumed relationship between relative
deprivation and forgiveness; as well as relative deprivation and the perception of
justice. So what, if anything, could the relationship between justice perceptions and
forgiveness be? This question resulted over time in a multitude of often completely
opposing suppositions.
In reviewing existing theory some authors have pointed out that in particular
forgiveness literature does suggest a negative relationship (Karremans and Van Lange
2005b). Justice and forgiveness are often seen as mutually exclusive choices insofar
as justice is presumed to imply “just deserts” and the suffering of the perpetrator,
whereas forgiveness is associated with forsaking the demands of punishment (Wenzel
and Okimoto 2014). In the transitional justice context forgiveness is frequently
emphasized as leading to peace and ending violence (Tutu and Tutu 2014), while
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justice is perceived as carrying with it the danger of the further division of fragile postconflict societies, possibly resulting in renewed fighting. This controversy is reflected
in the “peace versus justice” debate, particularly common in transition contexts in
Africa (Sriram and Pillay 2009). The Ugandan case is a good example, where this
debate was sparked by the ICC involvement and arrest warrants for leading rebel
leaders. A number of scholars became involved in subsequently trying to analyse a
diverse range of pro- and contra- arguments on both sides (Clark 2011; Gissel 2015;
Krzan 2016; Waddell 2008) accompanied by NGO and media voices (Kersten 2011;
McConnell 2006; Otim and Wierda 2010). While some argued against an emphasis on
justice for the benefit of peace others insisted that true peace cannot exist without
justice. In line with this argument, addressing the crimes of the past and reducing
victims’ perceived injustice could, therefore, also have the effect of exacerbating “unforgiveness” of victims. They could feel affirmed and supported by the society in their
condemnation of the perpetrators, instead of becoming more forgiving. Justice could
make the revenge motivation more salient reducing the motivation to forgive. In the
specific context of post-conflict transition a public debate about justice could remind
victims of all the injustices they have suffered, and make them less prone to grant
forgiveness, but more angry and vengeful instead.
Wenzel and Okimoto (2014) maintain, however, that this common perception of justice
and forgiveness as irreconcilable only represents one point of view. The two concepts
can also be seen as unrelated or, on the contrary, as positively related. As Miller (2007)
states, there is even a semantic relationship between “peace” and paying back as a
means of settling the scores as a core precondition for reconciliation.
Interestingly, even though both concepts are so common and important in various areas
of social life, there is little research focusing on the relationship between justice and
forgiveness (Karremans and Van Lange 2005b; Wenzel and Okimoto 2014). The lack
of certainty in the conjectures about the link between these two notions can be traced
back to the previously mentioned challenges with the definitions of both concepts.
Forgiveness, understood as an unconditional annulment of debts is in obvious
contradiction to justice, particularly if understood as retributive justice. However,
forgiveness does not have to be, and often is not, unconditional. At the same time,
retributive justice represents only one type of justice. Restorative justice, which
focuses on repairing the harm and addressing the needs of the victims and the
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obligations of the perpetrator (Zehr 2015) does not appear as contradictory to the
meaning of forgiveness. Others even describe the goal of restorative justice as
reaffirming joint values shared by both parties (Wenzel et al. 2008), an understanding
very related to the concept of forgiveness. Generally, therefore, there seems to be
strong support for the assumption that restorative justice has a positive effect on
forgiveness (Wenzel and Okimoto 2014).
Even the findings regarding retributive justice and forgiveness are, however, not as
obvious as it might seem. Studies among victims of the communist regime in the Czech
Republic suggest a positive relationship between punishment and forgiveness (David
and Choi 2006, 2009). This was consistent with the expectations of the researchers
who explained the outcome as "reduction in inequality" between the victims and the
perpetrators, which was in their opinion an important precondition for forgiveness.
This perception of justice and forgiveness is closely related to the concept of the
"injustice gap" described in the previous section (Davis et al. 2015). The authors argue
that any factor, which decreases the injustice gap is likely to contribute to forgiveness
(Exline et al. 2003; Wenzel and Okimoto 2014).

The empirical findings of Davis et

al. (2015) confirm these assumptions. Further, a neutral priming of justice, leaving the
interpretation of the concept to the participants, has also been found to have a positive
effect on forgiveness (Karremans and Van Lange 2005b). Finally, apart from the
inconclusiveness in theory or research on justice and forgiveness in conjunction with
the issue of the definitions, justice is, in many studies merely inferred from given
scenarios and not directly assessed (Witvliet et al. 2008).
To sum up, despite various debates and assumptions related to the relationship between
justice and forgiveness, the empirical studies are still rather limited (Wenzel and
Okimoto 2014). Based on the described existing theoretical assumptions both, a
negative and positive effect of justice on forgiveness could be argued. However, the
definition of justice perceptions in the present study as the “injustice gap”

postulates

that a positive relationship is more likely, and is thus in agreement with the findings of
Davis et al. (2015). Based on empirical findings, whatever the expectations of the
victims with regard to justice are, if there is a narrowing of the gap between their
expectations about the “ideal justice” and what they see happening in reality, this
should have a positive effect on forgiveness. Conversely, if the injustice gap widens
this should affect forgiveness negatively (David and Choi 2009; Davis et al. 2015;
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Karremans and Van Lange 2005a). Therefore, this study postulates that increased
perceptions of injustice result in increased avoidance and revenge motivation, and
reduced willingness to forgive.
H3: The perception of injustice reduces the motivation to forgive and increases
revenge and avoidance motivation
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CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH SITES – POLAND AND NORTHERN UGANDA
The research sites to test the hypotheses of the present study are northern Uganda and
Poland. Since this research is not historic, all this section needs to provide with regard
to the scope of this study is a brief overview of the conflicts, transitions and postconflict situations in both countries. A short historic background is deemed necessary
in order to be able to fully understand and interpret the findings.
Therefore the section below deals with a brief overview of the historic backgrounds of
the two countries; the nature of the conflict in both countries; and the type and scale
of transitional justice measures applied in the aftermath of these conflicts. In addition,
the section addresses the extent to which the topic of relative deprivation might play a
role in both Poland and northern Uganda.
3.1 Poland
This section is divided into a brief historical overview of communist rule and the
struggle against it in Poland. The second half of the section provides a description of
the transition and the main transitional justice measures undertaken.
3.1.1 Historical overview
As a result of the Yalta Peace Conference at the end of WWII, Poland became part of
the Eastern Bloc, and as such, has been within the sphere of influence of the Soviet
Union from 1945 until 1989.
The period, 1945-1989, is notorious as an epoch of imprisonment, torture, political
killings, expropriation and other human rights violations at all levels of intensity. The
Stalinist period, which had already begun during WWII in the territories occupied by
the Soviet Union, continued until 1956, a few years after Stalin’s death in 1953. These
years were the most repressive of the whole period (Nalepa 2013, 384). Widespread
persecution of the WWII resistance members of the Polish Home Army took place,
alongside show trials, judicial killings, political arrests and torture (Ash 1999, 10). The
Poles have been described as the nation in Eastern Europe least ready to accept another
domination of a foreign power21, this time by the Soviet-style socialism. According to
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Poland has been divided and occupied by Prussia, Russia and Austria and effectively ceased to
exist as an independent state for 123 years from 1795 until the end of WWI.
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historians, Stalin himself equated the introduction of communism to Poland to "putting
a saddle on a cow" (Ash 1999, 6). Consequently, the brutality and suppression used to
coerce the nation into submission was extreme. A series of events, starting with the
death of Stalin in March 1953, hurled the communist regime into crisis. Stalin’s death
was followed three years later by the death of Bolesław Bierut — a vicious and hardline Polish Communist leader. Later that year, 1956, mass strikes of workers
demanding "bread and freedom" broke out in Poznań, a city in central Poland. In
pacifying the workers the army caused the death and injury of many civilians. This
plunged the country into a crisis. The hard-liners in the party were weakened and the
attempts to cover up the protests of Poznań and present them as inspired by counterrevolutionary forces did not succeed. Calls for democratisation were met by the threat
of Soviet invasion similar to the invasions that had taken place in neighbouring Eastern
European countries. The Party, however, managed to assure the Soviet leadership that
they were still in control and the invasion was prevented (Prazmowska 2006, 202). A
certain relaxation of the severe suppression of the Stalinist period and a short period
described as “little stabilisation” or “Gomułka’s thaw” under Gomułka, leader of the
Polish United Worker’s Party (PZPR), followed. The hopes of a more substantial
change were, however, not fulfilled and the worsening economic situation, urgently in
need of reform and barely disguised by frozen staple food prices (Ash 1999,13).
Obviously, this could not continue indefinitely and the regime made a disastrous
decision to increase the food prizes without prior warning on 13 December 1970, only
two weeks before Christmas. Strikes and protests across the country were once again
brutally quashed with many workers of the Lenin shipyard in Gdańsk being shot dead
or injured. The Party, however, was shaken too and their leader Gomułka was toppled.
Leadership of the Party by the new leader, Edward Gierek, was promising to begin
with; but an attempt to secure a higher standard of living was financed by foreign debt,
which was also unsustainable and inevitably followed by price increases. Renewed
strikes followed (Prazmowska 2006, 209). The most prominent outburst of public
discontent was the strike in Radom in June 1976 triggered once more by increased
food prices. The strike was brutally crushed and many participants imprisoned and
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tortured during their walk between lines of ZOMO22 troops, cynically described as
"paths of health", where they were beaten with batons (IPN 2006). Later, the
communist regime tried to portray the protesters as hooligans and criminals (Morgan
1997).
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Robotników (Workers Defence Committee, KOR,) was formed by Polish intellectuals
to assist the workers arrested in 1976 (Prazmowska 2006, 210). At the same time, it
embarrassed the Party, which pretended to represent the working class (Morgan 1997).
Even though the strikes of 1956, 1970 and 1976 had been caused by economic issues
and rising prices, it has been disputed that those were the only reasons. Ash (1999)
argues that in accordance with Tocqueville's 23 observation the period of Gierek’s
leadership shows that revolutions develop during times of economic improvement.
The disappointed hopes together with a change in consciousness led to the start of the
next wave of strikes, which ultimately led to the final revolution in the 1980s (Ash
1999, 35). The development of this new consciousness was awakened by the election
of the Polish Pope, Karol Wojtyła, in 1978. This was a significant event, not only in
reinforcing the power of the Catholic Church, the traditional opposition of the
communist regime, (Prazmowska 2006, 211) but also due to the charismatic
personality of the new Pope himself, who captivated millions during his historic
pilgrimage to Poland in 1979, giving them a new sense of faith and pride (Ash 1999,
32).
A new wave of strikes broke out in the coastal towns and cities of Poland in the summer
of 1980 ushering in the final decade of the communist regime in Poland and the
establishment of the non-government trade union of Solidarność (known as the
Solidarity movement) with its leader, and later Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Lech
Wałęsa. Gierek was forced to leave and was followed for a short period of time by
Stanislaw Kania, while the Solidarność grew ever more powerful reaching around 10
million members at the height of its popularity (Stan and Nedelsky 2013, 385). As a
result of the strikes the party was forced to negotiate and legalized Solidarność in 1980.
This short time of apparently increased freedom and power of the new opposition came
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Zmotoryzowane Odwody Milicji Obywatelskiej (Motorized Reserves of the Citizens' Militia),
para-military riots troop and police formations during communist era in Poland
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to an abrupt end on December 13th 1981 with the new head of government general
Jaruzelski declaring martial law or literally “the state of war” 24 and rendering the
Solidarity movement illegal (Prazmowska 2006, 214). A wave of arrests of Solidarity
activists swept through Poland with 3.5 thousand detentions on the first day alone after
the declaration of the martial law (IPN n.d.). Later 9862 Solidarność leaders were
detained (Nalepa 2013, 385). Strikes that ensued all over Poland, were brutally crushed
by the ZOMO troops, when the generals decided not to test the loyalty of the official
conscripted troops by making them shoot their fellow citizens. They used the paramilitary, special police and security forces instead (Ash 1999, 278). The symbol of the
strike’s brutal “pacifications” was the mine “Wujek” were the riot troops massacred
nine workers and injured many more. Martial law continued until 22nd July 1983,
though it was suspended on 31st December 1982. During that time Poland was
governed by an interim executive body, the Military Council of National Salvation
(Wojskowa Rada Ocalenia Nardowego “WRON”). Many of the political prisoners
detained under martial law were, however, detained in prison until a general amnesty
in 1986 (Prazmowska 2006, 215).
The policy of suppressing all opposition continued through much of the 1980s until
changes started taking place in the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev. This
changing political situation, its anticipated impact on internal politics of the Soviet
Union’s satellite states, and the continued economic challenges —including huge
foreign debts — finally paved the way for negotiations with the opposition. The
roundtable negotiations between Solidarity, the communist-controlled trade union,
OPZZ,25 and the Polish communist government began on February 9th until April 6th
1989. One of the most significant results was the communist government’s agreement
to hold semi-free elections in June of the same year, thus potentially ending the
communist regime in Poland.
The number of victims and the extent of victimization over such a long period of over
four decades is difficult to estimate. Moreover, as highlighted above, the type and
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founded in 1984.
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extent of victimization differed over time with more and less excessive repression
periods. The most oppressive time was the Stalinist period, which lasted until mid
1950s, a few years after Stalin‘s death. It has been estimated that in 1948 there have
been around 173 000 political prisoners and in 1950-1952 slightly above 100 000. This
would mean every 140th or 260th Polish citizen has been a political prisoner in 1948
and 1950/52, respectively. The prisoners were beaten and tortured physically and
psychologically in various ways (Jarosz 2010). The number of death sentences until
1955 is estimated by historians to be no less than 5 000 (of which 2500) have been
carried out), while more than 20 000 people died in various prisons during this time
(IPN 2002). The second most repressive period was in the 1980s after the rise of the
opposition movement and began with the imposition of Martial Law on 13th December
1981. Within the first year around 10 500 people were detained. 11 500 were arrested
and 5 100 sentenced. The sentences were harsh, sometimes several years for carrying
a few copies of flyers. Any demonstrations and strikes were brutally quashed and 12
people were killed during strike pacifications. Around 56 000 are estimated to have
lost their jobs before August 1982 (Paczkowski 2010).
All through the existence of the communist regime in Poland one of its main tools of
control and oppression was the secret police. First called the Bureau of Public Security
(Urząd Bezpieczeństwa, UB) during the Stalinist period, and later renamed as the
Security Service (Służba Bezpieczeństwa, SB), it employed 15 000 – 25 000 people
per year from 1975–1989 (Nalepa 2013, 385).
3.1.2 Transitional justice in Poland
As was the case in other Eastern Europe post-communist countries, the main
transitional justice method in Poland was lustration. It comprises of variety of forms
for vetting people in public offices in order to discover their association with the
previous regime. The scope of the application of this method differed across the
Eastern Bloc region. In Poland the process has been largely described by scholars as
mild, reconciliatory or communist-forgiving (David 2006; Nalepa 2010; Szczerbiak
2015). The vetting process was voluntary and did not include higher level communist
party officials (Szczerbiak 2015, 52). In addition, it did not necessarily result in
dismissing the collaborator from public office. This only happened in situations where
the person in question was found to have lied on his or her affidavit; in which case he
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or she would be excluded from public office for ten years (David 2011, 86). Essentially,
the basic idea was to expose the truth about people who occupied official positions and
to meter out a certain amount of punishment. The punishment took the form of social
ostracism or “naming and shaming” since the contents of the affidavits, as well as
cases in which a person had lied were published in Monitor Polski, an official
government website. David (2011, 85) points out the irony of calling the system in
Poland reconciliatory, taking into account the low level of reconciliation that appears
to exist in Polish society 25 years after the end of the repressive regime. One of the
reasons might not only be the mild nature of the transitional justice mechanisms but
also the delay in implementing it (David 2003) and its inconsistent nature.
After the elections in 1989, the initial approach by the first non-communist Prime
Minister, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, was to draw a “thick line” between the present and the
past (Szczerbiak 2015, 54). Subsequently, the Lustration Act (Dziennik Ustaw 1997)
did not come into being until 1997, and was only implemented in 1999, a decade after
the first semi-free elections (David 2011, 84). As Nalepa (2010) points out, lustration
law appropriate for the level of security service infiltration was not put in place until
2007. Around that time lustration law was extended to include top government officials,
high level members of the judiciary, people in managing positions in public media or
companies, where the state was a main shareholder, headmasters in high schools and
administrative staff and faculty of universities, among others (Nalepa 2013, 386). This
lustration law has been amended several times, changing its scope and depending on
the current political party in power.
The reasons for the delayed and inconsistent pursuing of lustration have been
explained in different ways by different scholars. Factors such as characteristics of the
previous regime, the level of injustice or the instrumentalisation for political
competition between parties have been named (Szczerbiak 2015, 60). Another
explanation that has been offered by Nalepa (2010) is the high level of infiltration of
the opposition in Poland. In her account the reason the communists were promised
impunity and, moreover, those promises were kept, was that the opposition was afraid
of the “skeletons in their closets” possibly damaging their own reputations and
legitimacy. This contributed to the failure of some early attempts at lustration, such as
the list of collaborators prepared by the then Minister of the Interior, Antoni
Macierewicz. In 1992 he was tasked by the sejm, the lower house of the Polish
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Parliament, to come up with names of collaborators occupying senior public official
positions. After compiling it he handed the list of 66 names to the president Lech
Wałęsa, which led to the dismissal of the government. The list, subsequently leaked to
the press, included the name of Wałęsa himself (Szczerbiak 2015, 54). This “wild
lustration period” continued until the implementation of the Lustration Act in 1999
(David 2003). The delay and lack of regulation led to many accusations that files had
been destroyed by a few who had access during this time (Nalepa 2010, 2013).
Around the same time as the lustration law was enacted the Institute of National
Remembrance was established. Apart from prosecuting crimes against the Polish
nation (including the crimes of the communist regime), it was tasked with the custody
of the SB (security service) files. However, the slow pace at which the files were made
accessible to a wider number of people caused further leakages, such as the list of
240 000 names being made public by the journalist Wildstein in 2005 (Szczerbiak
2015, 57). The problem with this list was that it included anyone whose files existed
regardless of whether the person had been a collaborator or a victim.
These few examples show the continuous fight and struggle between different sides of
Polish society: those who wanted a more radical transitional justice approach and those
who were opposed to it for various reasons, including the most obvious one of having
too much to lose through a more drastic lustration process. It points to the continued
influence and power of the former communist elites, not only in the political, but also
in the economic sphere. The trading of political power for economic power and
influence of the former communists in Poland has been a topic of academic research
(Los and Zybertowicz 2000; Staniszkis 1990, 2001; Wasilewski 1999); of journalistic
investigation (Kania, Targalski, and Marosz 2014) and of public debate. This has been
described by Staniszkis (1990) as “political capitalism” symbolized by the slogan
“making owners of the nomenklatura” and widely used in particular in the 1990s.
Around half of the later post-communist economic elite occupied higher managerial
positions before 1989 (Wasilewski 1999, quoted in Staniszkis 2001). A recent
bestseller documents how the next generation of children of the former communist
elites still dominates positions of social influence (Kania, Targalski, and Marosz 2014).
David (2003) mentions that one of the objectives of the post-communist legislature
was to rectify the injustices of the past by giving opportunities to those who have been
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excluded for political reasons. This does not seem to have succeeded, at least not to a
satisfactory degree.
Further transitional justice approaches in Poland have only been implemented to a very
limited extent. Trials of communist leaders, who were in charge when the killings of
striking workers took place in Gdańsk in 1970, or in Katowice in 1981, dragged on
and were mostly terminated due to ill health of the defendants or lack of evidence. The
Reprivatisation Law was vetoed by President Aleksander Kwaśniewski in 2001.
Rehabilitation took place but without any meaningful financial consequences (Nalepa
2013, 390).
The struggle regarding compensation of former oppositionists, as well as the
instigation of some form of financial consequences for those who worked for the
communist regime, continues to this day. The Institute of National Remembrance has
issued information about compensation options and offered to provide advice for those
seeking some form of restitution (IPN 2014). Nevertheless, the economic situation of
many former oppositionists is dire while the political debates about compensation were
overdue and the proposed amounts small (Mańczak 2016; Wasilewska 2014). Until
very recently there has merely been some limited financial support for the poorest
oppositionist. An estimated tens of thousands of them live in poverty. The newest
amendment to the law targeting former anti-communist opposition members grants
402,72 zł (around 100 USD) per month regardless of their economic situations
(Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2017). Meanwhile, many of the former
perpetrators receive high pensions or benefit from the wealth amassed during the
privatization period of the former communist regime. While those on the highest level
of the former hierarchy receive several times the amount many of the poorest
oppositions have to live on (Fakt.Pl 2015), even the pensions of the average security
service agents were considerably higher until recently (Gazeta Prawna 2010;
WPROST 2016). The fact that the pensions of particularly former officials of the
security agencies were too high was, after years of debate, acknowledged by the
government in the new law targeting the pensions of this group and implemented from
October 2017 (Sejm RP 2016). The statement on the website of the Ministry of the
Interior reads that the pension reduction is not meant as punishment but rather as an
attempt to restore social justice by revoking undeserved privileges (MSWiA 2017). It
further states that those measures apply to 39 000 former security officials.
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For years there has been an ongoing public debate about the economic situation of
many oppositionists versus former perpetrators, with various NGOs and victim’s
associations at the forefront. One example is the campaign by the NGO
“Stowarzyszenie Wolnego Słowa“ (Free Word Association), which demanded that the
pensions of victims should be at least 1 Zł (roughly 25 Cents) higher than the pensions
of former security agents (PAP 2013). This symbolic amount highlights the
significance of the social comparison postulated before: social comparison and relative
deprivation are about more than just economic benefits. The level of salary, pension or
compensation people receive indicates how much their work, social contribution or
loss was worth in the eyes of the society. The higher economic or social wellbeing of
the former perpetrators signals to the victims that the transformation was meaningless
and the system largely remained the same, with the same people remaining on the same
rungs of the social hierarchy. Forgiveness under conditions of imbalance, when the
victim remains in a lower position, is difficult to achieve, and is the type of forgiveness
criticized as demeaning by scholars (Griswold 2007; J. G. Murphy and Hampton 1998).
3.2 Uganda
In line with the previous section about Poland, a brief overview of the Lord’s
Resistance Army (LRA) war in Northern Uganda will be followed by a description of
the transitional justice measures undertaken since the end of that war.
3.2.1 Historical overview of the LRA conflict
Before describing the LRA conflict in Northern Uganda it is necessary to briefly
outline the post-colonial history of the country and some of the factors that contributed
to the brutal 20-year long war.
The postcolonial period in Uganda has been seen by many in the West as an
embodiment of the “African disaster” that seemed to befall many countries on the
continent post-independence (Crowder 1987). Notorious internationally for the brutal
regime of the dictator Idi Amin, the country described as “the Pearl of Africa” never
experienced a peaceful change of government after independence. Apart from the very
brief tenures of Sir Edward Muteesa II as the first president of Uganda, and much later
of Yusuf Lule, Godfrey Binaisa and Tito Okello, Ugandan history and politics until
1986 have been dominated by the dictators Milton Obote, who was president twice
from 1966–1971 and 1980–1985, and the more notorious Idi Amin (1971-1979). Both,
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trying to assert their power, filled the army with members of their ethnic groups.
Originally, the army under Obote, himself a Langi, was dominated by the Lango and
Acholi people, both from Northern Uganda, and with a long history of rivalry but also
cooperation (Finnström 2008, 65). However, in his second term of office Obote started
to heavily favour his own Langi people at the expense of the Acholi by slowly
removing them from any positions of influence in the army (Tindigarukayo 1988). At
the same time, in 1981, Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Army started a
guerrilla war to remove Obote from power. The weakened government was finally
overthrown by Tito Okello, an Acholi general, in 1985. As the new president, Tito
Okello signed a peace agreement with Museveni during the Nairobi Peace talks in
1985. However, the latter continued fighting and in 1986, a few weeks after signing
the peace deal, he overthrew Okello’s government and became president, marking the
last change of power in Uganda to date. While many saw Museveni’s rule as an
improvement and a period characterized by the development of the country, the Acholi
people have not benefitted from the increase in prosperity (Finnström 2008, 63). They
felt betrayed by Museveni’s coup after they had signed the peace deal in Nairobi,
calling the peace talks the “peace jokes” (Green 2009). Instead of the peace talks
marking the end of continuous conflict, new ones began, this time in Northern Uganda,
the home of the Acholi people.
Within the two years after Museveni had assumed power around 27 rebel groups were
fighting his government (Bond and Vincent 2002, 354). Many of the rebel groups
consisted of former soldiers from the north, who fled to their home region. While most
of those rebel movements failed, the Holy Spirit Movement of Alice Lakwena turned
out surprisingly successful for a short period of time. It was finally defeated at Iganga,
a southern town in close proximity to the capital city of Kampala. Alice Lakwena's
initially non-violent and egalitarian movement enjoyed much popular support due to
the mounting grievances of the Acholi people who felt marginalized under the new
government (Finnström 2008, 75). After her defeat two new rebel groups emerged,
one belonging to her father, Severino Lukoya, and another to her alleged cousin,
Joseph Kony. When Lukoya finally surrendered, Kony’s rebel group, which later came
to be known as the Lord’s Resistance Army, absorbed his fighters together with those
of Alice Lakwena and other unsuccessful rebel groups who wanted to continue fighting
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(Finnström 2008, 77; Nannyonjo 2005). This marked the beginning of one of the
longest and most brutal civil wars on the continent. It lasted for two decades.
What initially started as a rebellion to overturn the government quickly turned against
the local population from the same ethnic group as the rebels, the Acholi (Nannyonjo
2005). While the government of Uganda, beginning in 1996, forcibly displaced the
majority of the population in the Acholi sub-region under the pretext of protection
(HRW 2005), the rebels began accusing the civilians of collaborating with the
government (Finnström 2008, 90). By 2005, 1.9 million people of northern Uganda,
of which 1.1 million were Acholi (95% of the Acholi population), had been forcefully
displaced (HRW 2005; OHCHR 2011). Though accurate data is difficult to obtain
according to some estimates up to 66 000 people have been abducted (Annan et al.
2008) of which, as of 2005, 20 000 were estimated to be abducted children (HRW
2005). Torture, killings, maiming, sexual violence and countless other atrocities
characterized the conflict, which was described in 2004 by the UN Undersecretary
General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Jan Egeland, as
the worst, but forgotten, humanitarian crisis in the world. Several surveys conducted
towards the end of war describe the exposure to violence as extremely high with, for
example, 40% of their respondents reporting abduction, 45% witnessing the death of
a family member and 23% physical mutilation (Phuong et al. 2005). The extent of
violence of the LRA was so prevalent that some authors described it as “auto-genocide”
(Jackson 2002).
After numerous failed peace talks, the Juba Peace Talks mediated by Riek Machar, at
the time the Vice President of autonomous South Sudan, began in 2006. This heralded
the end of the violence in northern Uganda. Sudan and South Sudan have been
involved in the conflict with the LRA, with the rebel group being partly based in South
Sudan, and allegedly supported by the government of Sudan (Finnström 2008, 84;
Nannyonjo 2005). Even though the final peace agreement was never signed, and the
fight between the government of Uganda and the LRA continued in later years, most
notably in 2008/2009 with the Operation Lightning Thunder in the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC), the location shifted outside the borders of Uganda. The
transition and post-conflict period began in 2006/2007 with various, sometimes
conflicting, attempts to come to terms with the violent past.
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It is important to note that while the LRA and their leader Joseph Kony often appeared,
and are described, especially by foreigners, as bizarre with their obscure spiritual
background, linking traditional beliefs in spirits with elements of Christian faith, the
reason they were able to develop is rooted in real existing grievances.
3.2.2 Transitional justice in Northern Uganda
Much of the transitional justice debate in Northern Uganda focused on the question of
retributive justice as represented by the International Criminal Court (ICC), traditional
reconciliation rituals and amnesty for the returning rebels, declared by the parliament
of Uganda in the Amnesty Act (Parliament of Uganda 2000).
After more than a decade of war, the failure of peace talks and as a result of persistent
advocacy by various groups, the Amnesty Act was enacted in 2000 for LRA fighters
who had abandoned the rebellion. The president was reported to be against amnesty
for the rebels and the operation “Iron Fist” in 2002 demonstrated that the military
option had not been abandoned (Allen 2006, 75). Nevertheless, it soon encouraged
thousands of rebels to flee, surrender and apply for amnesty (Allen 2006, 77).
Paradoxically, soon afterwards President Museveni referred the LRA case to the ICC,
which took it up issuing arrest warrants for the top five rebel commanders in 2005
(Office of the Prosecutor 2005).
Meanwhile, renewed negotiations began with the rebels raising issues about whether
the measures were contradictory in that they offered amnesty and peace negotiations,
on the one hand, while legal prosecutions were instituted, on the other (Allen 2006,
72). Since the top rebels were excluded from the amnesty provisions many wondered
what incentive they might have to sign a peace deal and whether the ICC does
constituted an impediment to the peace process (Apuuli 2006). Consequently, the final
peace agreement was never signed.
Currently, of the five indicted rebels three are dead or presumed dead, one is at The
Hague on trial and the leader, Joseph Kony, is still at large. The situation in Uganda
reflects one of the challenges, and also endorses criticisms, of international legal
transitional justice approaches. Of the thousands of rebels and millions of victims the
international justice measures only directly affect two commanders—in case Kony is
ever captured— and a small number of victims through the victims' fund, at a fraction
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of the cost of an international trial (The Trust Fund for Victims 2016).26 Meanwhile,
the general population has to come to terms with the considerable number of ex-rebels
who have returned home.
The extraordinary capacity of the Acholi people to forgive and welcome the returnees
home has been repeatedly acknowledged by traditional and religious leaders, NGO
workers, media and many others (Allen 2006, 129; Borzello 2009, 157). It has been
used to criticize the ICC involvement and to promote traditional ways of reconciliation
such as “mato oput” or “nyono tong gweno” rituals. “Mato oput” is a ritual performed
in cases of killings.27 In the ritual the perpetrator acknowledges his or her guilt and
responsibility, asks for forgiveness and offers compensation. At the end, the wrongdoer
and representative of the wronged family drink a bitter juice (the meaning of “mato
oput” in Acholi is drinking the bitter juice) as a symbolic gesture to show that they do
not want to taste such bitterness again. “Nyono tong gweno”, which means stepping
on the egg, is performed to welcome home clan members who have been away. The
purpose of the ritual is to cleanse them from anything that might have happened when
they were away. These rituals have been implemented in the context of the current
conflict and widely advocated as local forms of justice to be preferred instead of
foreign and Western systems of legal trials and imprisonment (Bangura 2008).
Other writers have, however, questioned whether such rituals are applicable or
appropriate in the case of mass atrocities and human rights violations (Allen 2008).
Another controversial issue with regard to the ICC involvement was its focus on the
LRA only, even though there had been various reports of the government army’s, the
Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF), atrocities. Although the president was the
person who approached the ICC in the first place, he subsequently tried to repudiate
his government’s involvement with the ICC (Bangura 2008). This has not been
successful and the trial of the first captured top rebel, Dominic Ongwen is currently
ongoing at The Hague.

26

According to the 2016 Annual Report of the victims trust there have been 42 827 direct
beneficiaries in Uganda. The focus of the programmess is on physical and psychological
rehabilitation. There are no reparations as of now, as none of those for whom arrest warrants were
issued have been convicted yet.

27

See also chapter 2.3.3.
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Most of the other former rebels have benefitted from the Amnesty Act, which is still
in place after several extensions and ongoing controversy. Apart from amnesty exrebels are entitled to receive resettlement packages to enable them to start a new life.
While this measure was put in place to help former rebels, some of whom have been
in the bush for years, to adjust to civilian life, the selective nature of this approach has
been criticized 28 (Borzello 2009, 157). Even more problematic appears to be the
treatment of high-ranking commanders as compared with the majority of returnees.
The complex nature of this conflict with blurred lines between victims and rebels,
many of whom have been abducted as minors, often contributes positively to
forgiveness and understanding. Many victims are aware that those who have been
abducted often had no choice and did not commit atrocities voluntarily or intentionally.
However, this applies less to senior LRA commanders. Ironically, those higher in the
ranks seem to benefit more while many abductees are excluded. For example, it has
been pointed out that abducted girls, forced into marriages with LRA commanders,
have been excluded from the amnesty law, while the provision of material benefits to
rebels and commanders was referred to some people as “aggression bonuses” (Hazan
2017). Some of the most senior commanders receive considerable salaries, have been
staying in best hotels in the region, or have even started NGOs to help rehabilitate
child soldiers (Borzello 2009, 158). Kenneth Banya, once the fourth most powerful
LRA commander, has been initially put in charge of the Labora Farm, a project funded
by international organizations and the Ugandan government to provide livelihoods for
former rebels. Not only has this replicated the hierarchies of the bush but it has
provided a living and power to the most brutal perpetrators, while other victims live in
poverty. Others have been absorbed into the army (Borzello 2009, 159), which means
not only that they have fairly secure employment, but they are also in positions of
power and authority.
The difference between the official treatment metered out to the majority of returnees
and the benefits afforded high-level commanders has been replicated during some of
the ceremonies and rituals carried out to integrate the ex-rebels back into communities.

28

At the national victims conference organized by Ayinet in May 2014 in Kampala, several victims
pointed out that even though they understood the reasoning behind the resettlement packages the fact
that victims did not receive anything would probably contribute to conflicts and be seen as rewarding
rebels.
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This was apparent at the “nyono tong gweno” ritual witnessed by the author in March
2015. The ritual was performed to welcome back a group of returnees and the high
ranking commander, Caesar Acellam. Acellam was treated like a guest of honour,
given time to speak and was seated among the most important guests of the celebration,
separate from the other returnees. Meanwhile the abductees huddled as a group on the
ground under a tree. Acellam received amnesty, while his subordinate, lower level exrebel Thomas Kwoyelo, is currently facing charges of crimes against humanity at the
Uganda’s special chamber of the International Crimes Division, established in 2008
(Hazan 2017; Okiror 2015).
More than a decade after the cessation of hostilities in Northern Uganda the issue of
transitional justice is still ongoing and continues to be controversial. Not only do the
various measures appear to contradict each other, but the government and the president
continue to change their support and opinion about the most appropriate way to deal
with the past. While the Justice, Law and Order Sector of Uganda appears to be
committed to implementing a transitional justice policy (Justice, Law and Order Sector
2014), the proposed Transitional Justice Bill has been shelved (Muto-Ono 2017).
Programmes designed to develop and reconcile northern Uganda, such as the Peace,
Recovery, and Development Plan have been marred by corruption and have suffered
from serious implementation challenges, reducing their potential benefits for the
victims. Meanwhile, it seems that those who are most responsible for harm done to
these victims, benefit the most, while the majority of the Northern Ugandan population
and former abductees still suffer the economic and psychological consequences of the
war.
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CHAPTER 4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This chapter describes in detail the methods used in carrying out the current study. The
chapter begins by describing the general approach, which involves an explanation of
the reason for choosing a mixed-method methodology. The second section of the
chapter explains the reasons for choosing Poland and northern Uganda as research sites.
Thereafter, the general research design is outlined, namely, the sampling and the three
main methods applied in the present study. These methods involve an experiment, a
survey and qualitative questions and interviews.
The general research question, addressing the effects of relative deprivation on justice
perceptions and forgiveness, is split into two sub-studies. One deals with the effects of
economic relative deprivation and the second with relative deprivation regarding
social acknowledgement. The term “social acknowledgment” has been chosen for the
variable as it encompasses a twofold definition of social recognition arising from the
knowledge of the past experiences of the victims. Though the methodologies and
variables are very similar, for purposes of clarity both studies are described here
separately.
In addition, the cross-cultural aspect of this research, including a description of the
challenges of such an approach and ways of dealing with them, is addressed. The final
section is concerned with the ethical considerations of a research that deals with a
vulnerable group of people.
4.1 Mixed-method approach
The present study applies a mixed-method approach to answer the research questions.
Mixed-method studies combine quantitative and qualitative approaches in order to
gain a deeper understanding of the research topic and balance out some of the
weaknesses of both methodologies. A brief description of mixed-method studies
including a categorization of the present study is followed by an explanation of the
reasons for choosing this particular approach.
After decades of debate and dispute between proponents of quantitative and qualitative
research, a third approach emerged that in some ways attempts to bridge the divide by
drawing on the strengths of both approaches (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004). As it
combines quantitative and qualitative elements, it has been called a mixed-method
approach. Since the approach is still relatively new there has been, and still is, some
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confusion with regard to the definition and typology of various possible mixed-method
designs. An attempt to bring some structure into this field has been undertaken by
Leech and Onwuegbuzie (Leech and Onwuegbuzie 2009). They propose a threedimensional typology based on the following decisions of the researcher: the degree
of mixing the qualitative and quantitative approaches (fully or partially mixed); the
chronology (sequential or concurrent); and the emphasis of the method (equal or
dominant status of the methods). Based on this typology this research can be
categorized as partially mixed, concurrent dominant status design.
Leech and Onwuegbuzie describe a research process in four stages: the research
objective, the type of data and operations, the type of analysis and the type of inference
(Leech and Onwuegbuzie 2009, 267). A fully mixed approach involves mixing
qualitative and quantitative approaches within or across one or all stages. A partially
mixed approach involves conducting each part separately, while the mixing occurs at
the interpretation stage.
The design applied in the present study includes the quantitative elements of a vignette
study and a survey; and the qualitative elements of a number of open-ended questions
and several in-depth interviews. Even though the open-ended questions were added to
the quantitative questionnaires, the interviews, as well as the analysis, were conducted
separately. While the focus is on the quantitative approach, the qualitative interviews
have been conducted for triangulation purposes, to increase the validity and strengthen
the interpretation of the obtained data.
Relative deprivation, as described in the previous chapters, is a concept that has existed
in social psychology and related disciplines for a long time; and has been studied
extensively. Although it has not been applied in the context of transitional justice, and
its effects on forgiveness of victims have not been studied, certain assumptions can be
developed based on the extensive literature. Therefore, a purely exploratory approach,
as applied in qualitative studies, is not necessary or appropriate to advance knowledge
in this field. Based on the existing research, hypotheses can be developed and tested
using a quantitative approach.
At the same time, motivation for forgiveness and justice perceptions are complex
concepts. Especially in a cross-cultural study, important elements of local
understanding about these concepts can unintentionally be omitted when providing the
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respondents with pre-existing answer options alone. To capture these meanings, the
motivations to forgive, to assess deservingness, the emotional aspects and justice
perceptions a qualitative approach is necessary for a fuller and more nuanced
comprehension and analysis of the results. In other words, because existing scales
apply a preset definition, qualitative data is indispensable in order to interpret the
similarities and differences between the samples. Gathering qualitative data will also
allow the respondents to express their own understanding of justice and forgiveness
without have had a definition imposed on them beforehand. This plays an even more
important role in case of cross-cultural studies. The interviews, moreover, give
interviewees the space to relate the study to their particular circumstances and context.
While the focus and aim of this research is to determine whether the assumed
mechanisms have common features and are possibly generalizable across various
contexts, the contexts themselves should, nevertheless, not be ignored. Therefore,
while the focus is on the quantitative data, which, according to the previous typology,
makes the study a dominant status design, the qualitative data has an important
supportive role. It adds context, meaning and facilitates validation and triangulation of
findings.
Triangulation and validation are further achieved through the employment of two
quantitative approaches, namely vignette experiment and survey. The experiment
facilitates an investigation of causality and enables a direct comparison between both
research sites by using the same vignette stories. The survey investigates the same
relationships between the variables in a real life context. In particular those who have
researched forgiveness have found that scenario and recall methodologies complement
each other as they tend to impact on cognitive versus emotional responses, respectively
(Fehr, Gelfand, and Nag 2010).
As pointed out, the data collection can be done concurrently or sequentially. A
sequential design can, for example, be used to explore a certain topic in order to test
hypotheses afterwards based on the previously conducted qualitative study.
Alternatively, a quantitative research study can be conducted and then certain aspects
can be explored more extensively through a subsequent qualitative study. Those two
approaches have been called “exploratory sequential” and “explanatory sequential
mixed method design”, respectively (Creswell 2013). The third possibility is to
conduct the data collection simultaneously in order to obtain a fuller picture of the
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research problem in question. This is referred to as

“concurrent” (Leech and

Onwuegbuzie 2009) or “a convergent parallel mixed method design” (Creswell 2013).
Since a mixed method approach was chosen for the purpose of triangulation and a
deeper understanding of the research question in the present case, the concurrent or
convergent design was deemed the most appropriate for this objective.
4.2 Choice of research sites
The study was conducted in two countries, Poland and Uganda. The major reason for
conducting a cross-cultural study was to assess the differences and similarities of the
effects of relative deprivation on forgiveness and justice perceptions in diverse
contexts. It was considered that this would add knowledge about important factors that
play a role in dealing with the past in various historical and cultural settings. While the
research sites have been described in detail in a previous chapter, this chapter explains
the reasons for choosing these two particular countries.
Places that belong to the same geographic region and share various historical features
with regard to conflict frequently also apply similar transitional justice mechanisms.
For example, while Eastern European countries predominantly chose the approach of
lustration, many African countries have favoured either some elements of truth and
reconciliation commissions or some methods derived from traditional ways of dealing
with conflict. Interestingly, the supposition of a universality of justice perceptions
formed the basis for the establishment of courts such as the ICC. Yet, apart from
theoretical debates, those assumptions have rarely been tested. Studies conducted in
one country or in a region within a country which shares similar historical or cultural
features cannot contribute to answering questions about universality or relativity of
justice perceptions or forgiveness. Meanwhile, in the globalized world, more and more
institutions addressing these issues, such as international courts or human rights
treaties, are supposed to be accepted, supported and internalized by all people,
regardless of their nationality. So, while the universality assumption is, and has been,
practically implemented for decades, in many ways the scientific study of crosscultural similarities in forgiveness or justice perceptions lags behind. By choosing two
completely distinct settings this study contributes to answering these questions.
While historically and culturally diverse, and with different conflict contexts, both
Poland and Uganda share some similar features that are important in the context of
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this study. The sites were chosen also because of the nature of some of these
similarities.
Firstly, in both countries, negotiations played an important role in ending the conflict,
and the majority of perpetrators were not punished. In Poland, negotiations formed the
basis of the gradual transfer of power from the communist regime to a democratically
elected government. In Uganda, though the peace talks were not concluded, they
nevertheless played a crucial role in ending the civil war. The topics of interest of this
study are the effects of economic and social inequalities between victims and
perpetrators. A situation where perpetrators retain some benefits at the end of the
conflict does rather happen in contexts of a negotiation than when the former
perpetrators are, for instance, defeated in war.
Secondly, in both countries the grant of amnesty to the majority of former perpetrators
represented a central characteristic and approach, since a more retributive approach
was seen as possibly endangering peace or the transition process. The context and the
circumstances in both countries led to a situation in which promises were made to the
former perpetrators. Apart from a few selected cases, these promises largely prevented
retributive justice from taking place. The prevention of punishment has been closely
linked to the perception that former perpetrators benefitted from the process in both
countries. While avoiding punishment, many former rebels in Uganda have been
integrated into the army, received resettlement packages to enable them to start a new
life and in particular higher ranking, ex-rebels were offered financial opportunities
which exceeded those of most victims. In Poland, the financial benefits of former
security agents remain a highly controversial topic to date. These circumstances, yet
again, can contribute to perceived inequality between perpetrators and victims and the
experience of relative deprivation of the latter group.
Thirdly, in both countries, though the measures applied were different, they were
nevertheless predominantly perpetrator-centred. The measures directed at victims
were rather limited. The lack of focus on the victims can let them feel left out,
exacerbate perceived inequality and contribute to relative deprivation.
Finally, in both countries, the church plays an important role and the majority of the
population belongs to the Christian faith, most of them being Catholics. Religion has
been repeatedly reported to have a positive effect on forgiveness (Azar and Mullet
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2002; Davis et al. 2013; McCullough, Bono, and Root 2005). As different religious
denominations are assumed to have different approaches to and facilitate different
attitudes toward forgiveness (Exline et al. 2003) it is considered advantageous for the
present study not to add another potentially confounding factor. While not at the focus
of the research questions of the present study, religiosity is added as a control variable.
Another critical reason for choosing those two settings is the fact that the conflict in
these countries was not driven by ethnicity per se. Ethnic conflicts have different
dynamics, which are not easily comparable with other contexts. For one, people are
automatically assigned to one side or the other. While they may choose to not actively
participate in the conflict, they are still always seen as belonging to either one side or
the other. In a non-ethnic conflict, the social psychological categories of victim and
perpetrators are chosen or develop in the course of the conflict. The ingroup-outgroup
categorization is based on actions and choices and not on pre-existing identities. The
fact if the conflict was based on pre-existing categories, such as ethnicity, or not, can
be presumed to have implications for forgiveness as well as justice perceptions (e.g.
Ford 2012; Biro et al. 2004). Therefore, two research sites were chosen were ethnicity
did not play a major role.
Finally, a rather pragmatic reason for the choice of the two countries was knowledge
and previous experience of both settings. This was considered significant in facilitating
preparation of the study, gaining access to with relative ease as well as enhancing
understanding and the interpretation of the results.
4.3 Research design and strategy
This section starts with an outline of the sampling in both countries. The second part
of the section describes the procedures and operationalization of the variables used in
the experiment, the survey and the qualitative research. Finally, the last part of this
section highlights some of the challenges of cross-cultural studies, potential sources of
bias and how they have been addressed in the present study.
The two studies are described separately even though most of the questions were very
similar. The first study addresses the effects of social comparison and relative
deprivation with regard to economic wellbeing and the second study focuses on social
acknowledgement.
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The tools consisted of a questionnaire with two parts. The first part was the vignette
experiment and the second part was the survey. The first page explained the content
and context of the study and informed the participants that it was anonymous,
voluntary and that it would take around 30-40 minutes to answer all questions. Both
parts included a few open-ended questions. The interviews were carried out separately
and roughly followed a semi-structured interview guide.
A small pilot study was carried out beforehand in both countries. Questionnaires were
sent to contact persons by email for printing and distribution by them. The pilot study
was done to ensure that the vignette’s story and the questions were understood in both
countries. Feedback from the contact persons provided an opportunity to improve the
questionnaire.
4.3.1 Sampling
The participants in both countries had been victims. In Poland they had been victims
of the communist regime and in Uganda they were victims of the LRA war in the
Acholi sub-region. The definition provided in the UN "Declaration of Basic Principles
of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power” was used to define victims.
According to this definition “victim” means:
“persons who, individually or collectively, have suffered harm, including
physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial
impairment of their fundamental rights, through acts or omissions that do not yet
constitute violations of national criminal laws but of internationally recognized
norms relating to human rights”. (UN 1985).
In line with this definition the victimization categories included in the study were
physical harm, economic loss, death of a close relative and arrest/detention or
abduction, in Poland and Uganda, respectively.
To locate the participants, formal victims’ associations and a few informal groups and
networks of victims in both countries were contacted. The lists of victims’
organisations were obtained online from platforms gathering these types of
associations. or from NGOs that work with victims or victim groups. The contact
persons for the respective groups were then contacted, either personally, by mail or
phone, to explain the content and purpose of the present study. In Uganda, personal
meetings then took place with group members, while in Poland mostly contact lists of
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members were provided by those associations or groups who agreed to participate. The
demographic detail of the participants in both countries and studies are summarized
below (table 1).
In Poland, seven in-depth interviews were conducted with five male and two female
interviewees. In Uganda, thirteen interviews with ten male and three female
interviewees took place.
The reason for the gender imbalance in Poland (visible in table 1) was that most of the
associations assembled people, who were political prisoners and the majority of
political prisoners were male. Another imbalance, visible in particular in study 2 as
well as in fewer interviews conducted in the Polish sample, was the smaller sample
size in Poland. This is due to the particularities of the sampled population. Victims are
in general not an easily accessible group.29 A study among this kind of population is,
perforce, accompanied by various challenges, participants are not easy to find and,
additionally, there are various time and financial constraints.
The difference between the two research sites is that the LRA war in Uganda was
focused on one particular region in the north of the country, while in Poland the victims
are spread all over the country. This difference has a number of implications for the
research exercise. In Uganda, it was possible to introduce the study personally. In fact,
it was generally necessary as often no other means of communication exists. In Poland
a considerable part of the communication with the participants was done by email or
mail. The time and cost implications made it impossible to meet the victim group in
person. Moreover, some of the groups do not even meet very regularly themselves.
The groups are often not founded based on the geographic proximity of the members
but, for instance, assemble former prisoners of particular prisons they have been
detained in decades ago.
In many cases it would have, therefore, meant meeting the individuals in person. This
was not possible within the scope of this research. While many victims in Poland did
use online communication to ask questions about the study, and there was some

29

Ethical considerations are addressed in section 4.4.
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personal contact, it was less frequent than in Uganda.30 Clearly, especially in the case
of such sensitive topics, many victims felt more comfortable to participate when they
had met the researchers in person. This made the sampling in Uganda easier in some
ways as compared to Poland, and in the light of time constraints impacted on sample
sizes in Poland.

30

The issues of different questionnaire administration and the ramifications are addressed in detail in
section 4.3.5.
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Table 1 Demographic details in both studies

Study 1
Age
Sex
Education

Marital
status

Uganda

Poland

n=131

n=116

Range

20-78

45-84

Mean

39.8.

65.5

Female

65

16

Male

66

100

No formal Ed.

22

Primary

74

7

Secondary

33

41

Tertiary

2

68

Single

25

11

Married

103

84

Divorced

1

12

Widowed

2

9

Uganda

Poland

n=126

n=74

Range

19-82

38-93

Mean

44.1

66.9

Female

80

9

Male

45

65

No formal Ed.

42

Primary

71

Secondary

11

Study 2
Age
Sex*
Education†

25

Tertiary
Marital
status††

48

Single

13

2

Married

79

61

Divorced

4

4

Widowed

29

7

* One participant in the Ugandan sample did not disclose his or her gender
† One participant in the Polish and two in the Ugandan sample did not disclose their education levels.
†† Two participants in the Ugandan sample did not disclose their marital status.
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4.3.2 Experiment
The experiments formed the central part of both studies. All participants were given
one short vignette story, out of four possible scenarios, about victim and perpetrator in
a fictitious country. This constituted a between-subject (BS) study.
In order to be able to give the victims in both countries the same vignettes the story
was situated in a fictitious post-conflict country. Some elements were similar to the
Polish context and some were similar to the Ugandan context in order to enable people
to relate to the victims. The qualitative responses indicated that the victims were able
to relate to the story. The other option would have been to design two different stories,
one for the Ugandan and one for the Polish context. This would have made the two
settings much less comparable.
The vignette describes a country that had been subjected to a military regime and a
civil war with rebels but had since undergone a democratic transformation after peace
negotiations and elections. The experiences of Daniel, a victim of the regime, were
briefly outlined followed by a description of his situation in the newly democratic
country. Another protagonist in the vignette, whose situation during and after the
conflict is depicted, was Robert, a high-ranking former perpetrator. The two chosen
names, Daniel and Robert, exist and are common in both countries making them
familiar names and the story therefore easier for the respondents to relate to.
The two studies focused on different aspects: one on relative deprivation regarding the
economic situation of the victim; and the other on social recognition. The two vignettes
as well as the variables used in both studies are described below.
Study 1 – Economic wellbeing
The first study focused on a comparison between the victim and the perpetrator with
regard to economic wellbeing. Daniel, the victim, suffered physical harm and
economic loss during the conflict. Robert, the perpetrator, was a high-ranking military
officer overseeing and ordering many of the human rights violations who had joined
the armed forces voluntarily for career reasons.
The experiment consisted of four versions of a vignette. In the first version, the victim
was financially well-off, having received compensation, he lived comfortably. The
perpetrator was similarly well-off. In the second version, the victim was well-off while
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the perpetrator lost all his benefits and was poor. In the third version the victim was
poor, while the perpetrator was well-off; and in the last fourth version both were poor31.
The four versions were distributed randomly (using the random.org randomizer) to the
participants so that each participant received one version of the vignette story. In the
first study there have been the following number of participants in each experimental
condition:
Vignette

V1

V2

V3

V4

Poland

37

27

29

23

Uganda

32

33

35

31

In the subsequent section, the participants were requested to imagine they were Daniel
(the victim) while answering the questions. The following variables formed the
experimental part of the questionnaire:
Relative deprivation
The operationalization of relative deprivation was twofold. One is the variable relative
deprivation consisting of four items related to the four components of relative
deprivation described in the literature review, namely: comparison, deservingness,
anger and resentment. The participants were asked to imagine they were Daniel (the
victim) and then compare their situation to the one of Robert, assess to what extent
they (as Daniel) deserve their conditions or not and finally state the level of anger and
resentment about it. This short scale functioned at the same time as a manipulation
check. The second way of operationalizing relative deprivation was to consider V3
(the victim is worse off than the perpetrator) as the “relative deprivation scenario”.
The reasons for this two-way operationalization are that the scenarios enable
experimental manipulation and capture the different levels of comparison, while the
variable “experienced relative deprivation” enables the inclusion of the other crucial
elements, which constitute the concept. As has been pointed out in detail before, 32 a
comparison

alone

does

not

guarantee

relative

deprivation.

Using

both

opreationalization methods provides for a more nuanced measurement that captures

31
32

See the appendix for the vignette versions and the questionnaire.
See chapter 2.2 for details.
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the effects of the particular aspect of a disadvantageous social comparison as well as
all the cognitive and affective elements of relative deprivation.
The challenge with relative deprivation is that it has been measured very differently
over the decades. Some of these measurements, as highlighted previously, led to
erroneous conclusions about the effects of relative deprivation. While this has
improved, there is still no consistent scale. Each author uses slightly different items
even though recently relative deprivation scholars have all focused on these core
components. For the present study, the items used by Huo, Osborne and Smith (study
in progress) have been adapted. Following the suggestion of one of the authors,33 and
based on the relative deprivation meta-analysis (H. J. Smith et al. 2012), they have
been combined into the “experienced relative deprivation measure”. Each of the four
items - comparison, deservingness, anger and resentment - consisted of a 5-point
Likert scale.
In order to examine the items more extensively, an exploratory factor analysis with the
principal component analysis as the extraction method and Varimax rotation with
Kaiser normalization was conducted. In both samples, the items loaded on two factors
(based on Eigenvalue > 1), which loading is consistent with the multidimensional
theoretical conceptualization of relative deprivation, which comprises cognitive and
emotional elements. The four items yielded a satisfactory reliability of α .83 in the
Polish and .77 in the Ugandan sample respectively.
Forgiveness
To measure forgiveness, the TRIM-12 (McCullough et al. 1998) with the revenge and
avoidance sub-scales was adapted for the purpose of this research. The scale measures
motivations for revenge and avoidance as opposites of forgiveness. It is one of the
most widely applied forgiveness measures and has been used in different cultural
contexts also with victims in a post-conflict setting (Field and Chhim 2008). For the
purpose of validity, and to add another forgiveness dimension, which is more direct
and not framed negatively, one item asking about forgiveness directly was added. The
item was used in the analysis as the variable “willingness to forgive”. As expected, the
item correlated highly negatively with revenge motivation in Uganda (r=-.60, p<.01)

33

Email communication with Prof Heather Smith, June 2017.
101

as well as Poland (r=-.38, p<.01). It was also highly negatively correlated with
avoidance motivation in Uganda (r=-.55, p<.01) but not in Poland, where there was no
significant correlation.
The TRIM-12 consists of 5-point Likert scale items, five in revenge and seven in the
avoidance sub-scale. The range of answer options was from 1 – “strongly disagree” to
5 “strongly agree”. The revenge sub-scale had satisfactory reliability in both countries,
namely α.82 in Poland and α.74 in Uganda. The same applied to the avoidance subscale with an α of .76 in Poland and α .86 in Uganda.
In the Polish sample, the translated version of the TRIM-12 (Kossakowska 2012) was
used and adapted. The version for the Ugandan sample was back-translated into Acholi.
Justice perceptions
To measure justice perceptions two different scales have been included in the
questionnaire to assess construct validity. The two scales adapted for this study were
first the Injustice Gap Scale (IGS) measuring the gap between the “ideal justice” as
perceived by the respondent and the real justice (Davis et al. 2015). The bigger the gap,
the more the situation is perceived as unjust. The answer options, in accordance with
the scale as developed by Davis et al ranged from “0= strongly disagree” to “100=
strongly agree”, which corresponds to visual analogue scales. The items included
statements such as “True justice was done” with one of the four items being reverse
coded. α in the Ugandan sample was α.77 and in the Polish sample α a .83
The second scale consisted of seven items measuring justice perceptions on a 7-point
Likert scale, adapted from items developed by Wenzel and Okimoto (2014). The items
included statements such as “I am very dissatisfied with the situation as it now stands”
or “I feel the situation as it now stands is totally unfair”, with most of the statements
phrased negatively and two reverse coded statements. The answer options ranged from
“1= strongly disagree” to “7= strongly agree”. The reliability in the Ugandan sample
was α .86 and in the Polish sample α .84. The scale was named the “Injustice
Perceptions Scale” (IPS) in the present study.
Both scales are based on the conceptualisation of justice perceptions as the “injustice
gap”. In the findings chapter, only the results of one of the two scales, the Injustice
Perceptions Scale, will be reported as it yielded higher reliability scores in both
samples. However, the outcomes of both scales have been checked to verify whether
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the effects are essentially the same. Both scales are highly correlated, thus supportive
of the construct validity claim and justifying the use of only one of them in the findings
section. In the Polish sample, the correlation coefficient was r-.57** and in the
Ugandan sample r-.67** respectively.
In the case of both scales, the justice perceptions were related to the assessment of the
general post-conflict setting from the point of view of the victim. So the questions do
not ask how just the economic situations of the victim and the perpetrator are. This
shows to what extent the comparison influences justice perceptions of the whole postconflict context.
Study 2 – Social acknowledgement
The procedure in the second study mirrored the one in the first study. Four vignette
scenarios were developed with the same background description of the fictitious
country and the same characters of Daniel (victim) and Robert (perpetrator). The
difference in the second study was that the post-conflict experiences of the victim and
perpetrator did not mention their economic situations, but their social recognition and
status instead. This was operationalized in the case of high recognition as having a
high esteem among neighbours, being invited to school or universities to give speeches
as well as at official religious or political events. In the case of low recognition, the
person in the story was shunned by neighbours who did not want much to do with him.
Social acknowledgment means respect, social status and recognition as arising from
the acknowledgment of past experiences. Daniel’s role and experiences as a victim are
source of the social recognition or alternatively Robert’s social recognition arises due
to his position in the society, present and past, while his crimes and role as perpetrator
remain “un-acknowledged”.
As previously, in one scenario both the victim and perpetrator enjoyed high recognition;
in the second the victim was highly recognised and the perpetrator not. In the third
version of the vignette the perpetrator enjoyed a great degree of recognition and the
victim did not. In the fourth, neither were socially recognized34
The following numbers of participants took part in each experimental condition:

34

See appendix for details.
103

Vignette

V1

V2

V3

V4

Poland

23

21

20

10

Uganda

31

32

32

31

As described in study 1, participants were asked to imagine they were Daniel (the
victim) and answer the questions from his point of view.
Relative deprivation
The relative deprivation variable was constructed in exactly the same way as described
in study 1. The factor analysis yielded similar results. In Uganda, all four items loaded
on one factor. In Poland, the items loaded on two factors (Varimax rotation with Kaiser
normalization) with the two factors consisting of the two cognitive and two emotional
elements. The 2-factor solution was, however, barely above the Eigenvalue > 1
threshold.
The reliability of the scale was satisfactory with α .74 in Poland and α.78 in Uganda
respectively.
Forgiveness
The same forgiveness measure was used as in study 1, namely the TRIM-12, with the
revenge and avoidance sub-scales and one added forgiveness item. The reliability of
the scales was good with α .81 in Poland and .90 in Ugandan for the avoidance subscale and α .87 in Poland and α.74 in Uganda for the revenge sub-scale respectively.
Justice Perceptions
Justice perceptions were measured with the same two scales described above, the IGS
and the Injustice Perceptions Scale. Both scales had good reliability with the Injustice
Perceptions Scale being slightly more reliable also in study 2. The IGS had an internal
reliability of α .72 in Poland and α.85 in Uganda, and the Injustice Perceptions scale α
a .85 and α.89 in Poland and Uganda, respectively. The two scales are highly intercorrelated, supporting the claim of construct validity as well as justifying the decision
of using only one of the two scales. The correlation coefficient was r -.70** in Uganda
and -.68** in Poland.
4.3.3 Survey
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The survey formed the second part of the questionnaire and was attached to the
experiment component described above.35 Vignette studies are usually combined with
classic surveys to reduce each other's weaknesses. Vignettes, being an experimental
design, have a stronger internal validity but a lesser external validity, as they can be
perceived as less representative and oversimplified. Surveys, on the other hand, have
a stronger external and lesser internal validity (Atzmüller and Steiner 2010). Moreover,
as mentioned before, scenario and recall methods have been found to have a stronger
influence on cognitive versus emotional responses, respectively (Fehr, Gelfand, and
Nag 2010).
The survey applied the same independent and dependent variables. The difference was
that instead of asking about forgiveness, revenge and avoidance of Robert (the
perpetrator in the vignette story) the questions were about real life perpetrators. In the
case of Poland, the security agents of the Służba Bezpieczeństwa (the security service
of the Ministry of Internal Affairs) were presented as representative of the perpetrator
group. This service was the main security organization in Poland until the end of the
communist regime. It was the group directly involved in ordering and carrying out the
majority of human rights violations. In Uganda, the situation was slightly more
complex, as pointed out in the previous chapter, since many of the rebels were
abducted and could have been perceived as unintentional perpetrators. However, it has
been emphasized in this study that the perpetrators in question are the high-ranking
rebel commanders, i.e., those ordering the human rights violations and atrocities and
not the average abductee who followed orders out of fear.
The first section established the demographics such as sex, age, marital status and
education. A question about their experiences as victims determined whether they fell
into the pre-defined categories. This was done in a similar way in a study of Colombian
victims, where the authors asked people about the type of victimization they had
experienced presented to them on a list. This ensured that the respondents who were
included in the survey all fell within the ambit of the legal definition used by the
authors for the study. This list was used even though perception-based indicators
(asking whether the participants considered themselves to be victims) appear to be just

35

See appendix.
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as robust (Nussio, Rettberg, and Ugarriza 2015). Moreover, the victimization
experience was included in the analysis as a control variable.
The other variables are described below, starting with the main independent and
dependent variables. This is followed by a number of control variables such as victim
identification, victimization experience or religiosity included in this study as they
might have an additional influence on the dependent variables beside or beyond the
impact of relative deprivation. While not of primary interest for the present study their
inclusion may provide additional insights that might prove useful for future research.
Study 1 – Economic wellbeing
The first study focused on relative deprivation regarding economic wellbeing. It was
attached to the vignette story where Daniel’s and Robert’s economic situations were
manipulated. Accordingly, the respondents were asked to assess their own economic
status and compare themselves with the perpetrator group on economic parameters.
Relative deprivation
As mentioned above, relative deprivation was measured in a similar way to the
“experienced relative deprivation” variable applied in the experiment. The first item
measured the comparison element by asking the respondents about their own
circumstances compared with those of the group of actual perpetrators. This was
followed by the three other items measuring deservingness, anger and resentment. The
four items together constituted the variable “relative deprivation” in the survey.
Moreover, another scale was added with the same items, only this time the subject was
not the individual respondent answering the survey but the whole ingroup of victims.
The theory is a little vague on the topic of whether individual comparison with an
outgroup member constitutes individual or group relative deprivation. The theory
states that it could constitute either (H. J. Smith and Pettigrew 2014). The two variables
turned out to yield very similar results supporting the conclusion that in this case an
individual comparison with outgroup members does indeed constitute group relative
deprivation. This is not surprising considering that the conceptualisation of this study
makes the group identity of being a victim salient. Both variables are also highly and
significantly correlated in Uganda (r=.64, p<.01) as well as in Poland (r=.50, p<.01).
Since the variable requiring an individual comparison with the outgroup yielded on
average considerably better reliability and more consistent results, only those results
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will be reported in the findings section. The better reliability is plausible, since it is
much easier to compare one’s own situation with that of an outgroup than to compare
the situation of one’s whole ingroup with that of an outgroup.
Another exploratory factor analysis using principal component analysis and Varimax
rotation with Kaiser normalization was performed in conjunction with the Relative
Deprivation Variable in the survey. The relative deprivation items in the Ugandan
sample loaded on the same two factors (emotional and cognitive) as they did in the
experiment. In the Polish sample, all items loaded on one factor. The reliability for
relative deprivation in the Polish sample was α .86 and in Uganda α.74.
Forgiveness
As in the experiment, the TRIM-12 was used with perpetrators defined as former
security agents in Poland and high-ranking LRA commanders in Uganda. The revenge
sub-scale had a reliability of α 86 in the Polish and α .81 in the Ugandan sample. The
avoidance scale has a reliability of α .83 in the Polish and α.90 in the Ugandan sample.
Justice perceptions
The same two scales were used as previously, namely the Injustice Gap Scale (IGS)
and the items adapted from Wenzel and Okitmoto (2014), which are referred to as the
Injustice Perceptions Scale (IPS). In assessing the reliability of the scales it turned out
that removing one item from the Injustice Perceptions Scale resulted in a considerably
improved reliability in the Ugandan sample, α.85 (with all items α .65). In the Polish
sample, the reliability did not change and was the same in both cases, namely α .84.
The IGS had a reliability of α .66 in the Polish and α .78 in the Ugandan sample. Also
in the survey section of the questionnaire, both scales were highly correlated at r-.71**
in the Ugandan and -.51** in the Polish sample.
Instead of the fictitious post-conflict context of the vignette story, the items of the
Injustice Perceptions Scale referred to the real post-conflict/post-regime settings in
Uganda and Poland. The IGS items are very general and therefore remained the same,
but the short explanation above the question clarified that the respondents were
supposed to assess the general situation after the transformation or peace process in
Poland and Uganda had taken place, respectively.
Economic wellbeing
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To establish the respondents’ individual assessment of their own economic situation
the adapted financial well-being scale (CFPB 2015) was used. The scale consists of
five items with questions like "I am just getting by financially" or "I am concerned that
the money I have or will save won't last". Respondents stated to what extent the
statements described them on a scale from "1= completely" to "5= not at all". The scale
consisted of two parts, one part of three items and the second of two items. The
reliability of the Ugandan sample of all five items was not satisfactory at α.42. When
only the first part of the scale consisting of three items was used for analysis purposes
the reliability improved to α.57. In the Polish sample, the reliability of the 5-item scale
versus the 3-item scale was α .88 and α.91, respectively. Therefore, the shortened 3item version was selected.
Religiosity
Religiosity has been theorised and also found to have effects in particular on
forgiveness. As mentioned above it has, therefore, been included as a control variable
in the present study. To measure religiosity three items from the European Social
Survey were adapted, including questions about the frequency of church visits or
prayers as well as an estimation of the degree of own religiosity (European Social
Survey 2014). The reliability of the brief scale was good with α .92 in Poland and α a
.77 in Uganda.
Victim identification
Ingroup identification was found to play a role in relative deprivation research as an
important factor determining social perceptions (Ellemers and Bos 1998) 36 . As it
might, therefore, influence justice perceptions or forgiveness it has been included in
the present analysis as a control variable.
The following items were adapted to measure victim group identification “How often
do you acknowledge or think about the fact that you are a victim?” (Karasawa 1991;
Tropp and Wright 2001) as well as “I feel a strong bond with other victims of (LRA
war/Communist regime)” (Ellemers and Bos 1998). To assess the construct validity
an additional two items were developed and checked for inter-correlation with the

36

See also 2.2.2
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adapted items. The developed items were: “I consider myself a victim” and “I meet
with other victims regularly”.
The exploratory factor analysis (Principal Component Analysis) confirmed that in both
countries all four items loaded on one factor. Of the two adapted items the item “I feel
a strong bond with other victims of (LRA war/Communist regime)” was found to have
the most consistent and highest inter-correlations with the other three items in both
samples. As this item captures the group identification most clearly (because it has the
best face validity), it was applied as the victim identification variable in the present
study.
Study 2 – Social acknowledgment
The survey part of study 2 consisted mostly of the same variables as study 1. The main
difference was that relative deprivation was not assessed with regard to economic
wellbeing but social acknowledgment. Consequently, economic wellbeing was not a
variable in the survey and instead the respondents were asked to assess their social
standing or recognition. Since the procedure was the same the characteristics of the
variables, such as reliability, are outlined only very briefly.
Relative deprivation
The same items were used as previously, only in this study the respondents were asked
to compare themselves with the group of perpetrators with regard to social recognition
or status.
The factor analysis confirmed that all four relative deprivation items in Poland and
Uganda load on the same one factor. The reliability was a .81 in Poland and a .80 in
Uganda.
Forgiveness
The reliability of both scales of the TRIM-12 was good, with a a of .85 (Poland) and a
.80 (Uganda) for the revenge sub-scale as well as a .88 (Poland) and a .85 (Uganda)
for the avoidance sub-scale. Here, as well, the single forgiveness item was added.
Justice Perceptions
As previously, the Injustice Perceptions Scale displayed better internal reliability with
the 6-item version at a .84 in both Poland and Uganda, compared to the 7-item version
of a .82 and a .68 for Poland and Uganda, respectively. The IGS had a reliability of a
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.73 (Poland) and a .86 (Uganda). The correlation of both scales was r -.58** in Uganda
and r-.67** in Poland.
Social acknowledgement
Social acknowledgement was measured using the MacArthur Scale of subjective
social status (Adler and Stewart 2007). The scale was designed in shape of a ladder
with ten rungs and respondents were asked to place themselves on one of the rungs
according to their perception of where they stood in their community.
Religiosity
The same scale consisting of three items was used. The reliability was good with a .88
in Poland and a .80 in Uganda.
Victim Identification
The Principal Component Factor analysis confirmed that in both samples all the items
loaded on one factor. As in study 1 the item “I feel a strong bond with other victims of
the (LRA war/Communist regime)” was significantly and positively correlated to the
three other items and was used as the victim identification variable.
4.3.4 Qualitative data
The qualitative data in the present study consists of open-ended questions, which were
part of the questionnaires and interviews conducted in both countries. This section
focuses briefly on the open-ended questions as they also serve to provide meaning and
understanding of the concepts of justice and forgiveness in the two countries.
Open- ended questions – justice and forgiveness
The open-ended questions fulfil a twofold role. While they will later inform parts of
the analysis, their role was also to capture the meanings people in northern Uganda
and Poland attach to forgiveness and justice. As the quantitative component answers
questions about whether relative deprivation has an effect on justice perceptions and
forgiveness it is crucial in a cross-cultural study to take some time to understand the
conceptualisation of these concepts in both countries and to explore what both victim
groups considered to be important for justice and forgiveness to take place.
As described in detail in the second chapter, even within the same cultural settings
these concepts have a multi-dimensional nature. For example, while some people may
see forgiveness as unconditional or may see it as resulting from their religious beliefs,
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others are likely to consider certain requirements to be necessary pre-conditions. The
same applies to justice. For some people, justice may be associated mainly with legal
understanding or punishment, while others may associate the term with social justice,
to name just a few examples. In contexts as different as those in the present study it is
imperative to gain a deeper understanding of the commonplace meaning of both
concepts. Therefore, the next few pages focus on the description and analysis of the
definitions of these notions in Poland and Uganda.
The open-ended questions used in both studies came after the vignette. They asked the
respondents to describe what would consider important to be able to forgive Robert
(the perpetrator) if they were Daniel (the victim). In addition, they were asked what
would need to happen for them to feel that justice had been done. The same two
questions were asked at the end of the survey component but on this occasion the
questions applied to the real-life context and actual perpetrators. The same procedure
was repeated in both studies.
Forgiveness
As mentioned before there is a theoretical debate about conditional and unconditional
forgiveness. Based on the responses drawn from this study in both countries only a
very small minority understands forgiveness as unconditional. In Poland, in the survey
component of the first study there were only four people (out of a total of 116) who
considered forgiveness to be unconditional; in Uganda there were two (out of 131). In
the second study there were three respondents in Poland (out of 74) and 15 (out of 126)
in Uganda.
Generally, the expectations and understanding of the conditions for forgiveness in both
countries were strikingly similar. The answers given could be generally categorized
into three groups. By far the biggest group expected an internal change of the
perpetrator in order to consider forgiveness. In both studies and in the hypothetical
questions regarding Daniel and Robert as well as the real-life settings, the majority in
both countries mentioned issues related to acknowledgment of wrongdoing, remorse
or apologies as important for forgiveness. Additionally, victims in both countries
expected some form of conduct to see that the attitude change was not merely
superficial. In both countries, respondents mentioned some form of redress by the
perpetrator. Sometimes it was directly pointed out that the perpetrator should
compensate the victims and sometimes the redress or atonement was left vague.
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Nevertheless, the responses showed an expectation of a sort of proof that the
perpetrator had genuinely changed. Other expectations falling into a similar category
were some form of truth-telling and embracing of peace or the democratic system.
Further, the question of intent played a role for some. If the perpetrator had not
intended to hurt the victims then he or she was less culpable. Consequently,
expectations regarding proof of a change of attitude were lower and forgiveness was
easier to achieve. Due to the nature of the conflict and the forced abductions, this
element came up more frequently in Uganda than in Poland. Some respondents in
Uganda also mentioned that the remaining rebels should return and bring the others
back with them.
Generally, the expectation of attitude change made up more than half of the
respondents’ expectations or requirements for forgiveness in both countries, in both
studies and in the fictional experiment part as well as in the survey. This is consistent
with the elements of comprehensive apologies, which include an acknowledgment of
responsibility and wrongdoing, and a promise of improvement and repair (Blatz,
Schumann, and Ross 2009).
The second group of responses, considerably smaller than the first, can be described
as “societal or community redress”. This category includes means and approaches by
the society to right the wrongs of the past. In Uganda, there was a common group of
responses, which could be classified as falling between the two categories of
perpetrator attitude change, and the community restoration of order. These are
traditional reconciliation rituals. They play a dual role in the sense that the perpetrator
has to voluntarily participate, which signifies his or her inner change; the will to be
accepted back into the community; acknowledging of wrongdoing; abandonment of
the previously committed acts; and, traditionally, also some form of repair. At the same
time, this should not be done privately but performed by traditional leaders and elders
who can be seen as presiding over this process, lending it authority and, thereby,
contributing to restoring the rules and norms of the society.
Apart from this special category in Uganda, most respondents, in expecting the society
to right the wrongs of the past, mentioned punishment, legal justice or compensation
for the victims. The majority did not appear to insist on heavy punishments or suffering
for the perpetrators (even though, in both countries, some do). They preferred court
proceedings, which would signify that what the perpetrators had done was not
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acceptable. The punishment itself often seemed of secondary importance. In Poland, a
number of respondents even directly pointed to the symbolic value of a prosecution
without expressing an expectation of prison or heavy punishment. Additionally, a
number of victims in Poland also mentioned the issue of removing the perpetrators
from positions of public influence or power along with official condemnation. On the
other hand, they felt that the victims should be remembered and acknowledged for
their role and their sacrifices.
Generally, it appeared that if victims do not expect or believe in a change in the
perpetrator, they wanted the society to "step in" and restore the order. They contended
that this was likely to contribute to a general forgiveness or, if not forgiveness, then it
would enable the victims to come to terms with the past. Alternatively, some people
expected both a change of attitude in the perpetrators and the necessity for society or
the community to acknowledge and address the past in order for the victims to be able
to forgive. It seemed that if people were still suffering the consequences of the past
this made it more difficult for them to forgive. In particular, in Uganda, a number of
respondents mentioned issues relating to a more general support for victims such as
health care or psychosocial support and counselling.
Finally, the last category of responses relates to victims who only consider their
personal internal attitudes or individual motivations as important for forgiveness. They
saw forgiveness (or lack thereof) as an expression of their beliefs and not as a response
to how the perpetrator had behaved or what the society had done. Those forgiving
unconditionally fall into this category as well as those pointing to their religious beliefs.
Similarly, those who declare they would never forgive, no matter the circumstances
can be placed in this group in the sense that their convictions or beliefs (that they
cannot forgive) are not influenced by any external factors. The motivations behind this
un-forgiveness vary. Some might have had expectations in the past but had given up
on perpetrators and society. Some pointed to the issue of time; they lamented that it
was too late for forgiveness. This was more common in Poland, since more time had
passed in Poland since the events targeted in the study than had passed in Uganda.
Another reaction was indifference: people who declared they did not care about
forgiveness while others emphasised that they would rather focus on the future than
think about the past.
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In conclusion, the interpretation of forgiveness and expectations from the perpetrators
and society in both countries bore a striking resemblance. The majority of victims
expected a change in attitude from the offender and a smaller group, either additionally
or instead, expected the society to correct the failures of the past. The smallest group
relied entirely on their internal convictions or beliefs in deciding about forgiveness.
While these categories can be found in both countries and even in the same proportions,
some differences reflected the variations in the two contexts. Reconciliation rituals,
common in Uganda, do not exist in Poland and therefore, have not been mentioned
here. The issue of former perpetrators who are in positions of public office or other
places of influence caused more disquiet in Poland than in Uganda and was therefore
alluded to more often by Polish respondents.
Justice
The justice perceptions also revealed surprising similarities in both countries. In
answer to the question “what would be important to see that justice was done”, the
responses across both countries, and across both components of the studies — the
survey as well as the vignette — showed that

the most common response was an

improvement in the situation of victims. In most cases, compensation was mentioned
directly. Alternatively, some general form of economic support was expected, as well
as improvement in health care facilities for victims or, particularly in Uganda,
psychological help or counselling. In Poland, the improvement of victims' situations
extended to some form of social recognition, acknowledgment or remembrance. This
was occasionally mentioned in Uganda too, but much less so than in Poland. It is one
of the instances in which the different historical backgrounds became apparent. The
Polish victims who participated in the survey had mostly chosen themselves to become
part of the opposition, as opposed to most respondents in Uganda who had been
victims due to circumstance. The Poles had been involved in fighting the regime. They
had sacrificed a great deal for which many expected some form of acknowledgment
and recognition. In Uganda, people were drawn into the conflict and were mostly
passive victims. The recognition they expected was more of an acknowledgment of
their suffering rather than social acclaim.
Next to improving victims’ general situations and wellbeing, the other most frequently
mentioned expectation was some form of accountability directed at the perpetrators.
Though this was again true for both countries, the proportion of people expecting some
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form of legal trial or punishment was higher in Poland. Generally, in both countries,
victims associated legal justice with the notion of accountability. In Poland, some
respondents also expressed expectations about the former perpetrators being removed
from public posts or positions of influence, of lustration or of public condemnation.
Finally, in Uganda traditional reconciliation was mentioned again as an in-between
category, directed at the victim and the perpetrator simultaneously.
To sum up, while forgiveness was, in both countries, mostly dependent on the
behaviour and attitude of the perpetrator, justice was generally expected to be meted
out by the society or community as whole. The most common responses were divided
into two categories, those directed at the victims and those directed at the perpetrators.
In both countries most respondents primarily associated justice with an improvement
in the victims’ circumstances, be they economic conditions, greater access to health
care, or social recognition. Secondly, some form of accountability, demotion or
punishment, was expected for the former perpetrators. In Uganda, the first category
(improvement in circumstances) was noticeably more predominant while in Poland
both were on a par, though by and large the concern for victims still prevailed.
Additionally, a few people in Uganda mentioned apologies, forgiveness or amnesty as
important for justice, which was rarer in Poland. Democracy or a new and more just
system was highlighted by a few Poles; with peace being mentioned by Ugandan
respondents. Some Ugandan respondents also emphasised the involvement or
information of victims about ongoing court proceedings. Some of those responses
again represented the specifics of both settings. The issue of volition or intent was
posed more often in Uganda, where the conflict had been characterised by forced
abductions. Therefore, more people mention amnesty or apologies as important for
justice. In Uganda, where a majority of victims lived in remote villages and many only
speak the local language, the high profile international court involvement left them
feeling excluded. It fostered a perception that they had been excluded from a process
that should have had them as victims at its forefront. Some contended that they had
expected greater involvement in the trial. Finally, a few respondents in both countries
mentioned uncovering the truth as important for justice, though by and large, this
seemed more related to forgiveness than to expectations about justice.
Interviews
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The interviews followed a semi-structured interview guide.37 All have been recorded
and transcribed after having obtained permission from the interviewees. None of the
interviewed people voiced any objections to being recorded, though one interviewee
in Uganda asked to turn off the recorder at a certain point, a request which was granted
immediately. All interviews in Uganda were done by the author in English; and in
Poland in Polish. The interviews in Poland were around one hour long and in Uganda,
the duration ranged from 20-50 minutes, with most interviews lasting around half an
hour.
4.3.5 Cross-cultural challenges
While the benefits and importance of cross-cultural studies in transitional justice have
been highlighted above, research in such diverse settings has a variety of challenges.
In the following section, a number of common cross-cultural biases are outlined,
showing how they were addressed in the present study. Moreover, the specific
characteristics of the two study settings prompted differences in the research procedure,
which is also highlighted and explained.
Even though quantitative research is generally perceived as the most objective
methodology, the questions of reliability or validity in cross-cultural studies are rather
complex. Smith et al (P. K. Smith et al. 2013) point out a number of potential sources
of bias and how to address them to make the study as comparable as possible. One
source of bias described by the authors is construct bias, which refers to the
psychological underlying construct being defined in different ways across cultures. An
example provided is the construct of intelligence, which is understood more broadly
in collectivist cultures as compared to many of the Western societies. The non-Western
collectivist cultures include social competences in their concept of intelligence, in
addition to the cognitive skills that constitute the core of the intelligence definition in
most Western societies. Consequently, an intelligence test constructed from the
Western point of view will not measure intelligence in its entirety as understood in a
different cultural setting. This specific aspect of construct bias has been described as
“domain under-representation” (P. K. Smith et al. 2013, 82).

37

See appendix for details.
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Another source of bias described by the authors is “instrument bias” (P. K. Smith et al.
2013, 86). The challenge of instrument bias begins with the type of test used. For
instance, a written test is likely to cause bias because some groups of people might be
more used to using pens and paper or more familiar with translating their perceptions
and assessments into Likert-scale types of questionnaires. The instruments used must
be locally meaningful and understandable. Therefore, using exactly the same
instruments in different cultural settings for the purpose of psychometric comparability
might, on the contrary, lead to misleading and biased outcomes. Another challenge
with regard to correct understanding in different settings is the question of translation.
The administration of the test may present another possibility for bias (P. K. Smith
et al. 2013, 88). While the level of the standardisation requirements may differ
depending on the measured construct and may be more relevant when, for example,
measuring intelligence, it is still important to pay attention to the way the test is
administered in the different settings.
The final source of bias is constituted by the sampling procedure (P. K. Smith et al.
2013, 90). While it is advisable for meaningful comparisons to sample similar groups
of people, even groups that appear very similar might differ considerably. The example
given here regards student samples frequently used for studies. While these samples
might seem alike this is not necessarily the case. Studying is quite common in some
countries, where a majority of the population attends tertiary education. In countries
where access to university is limited, it is mainly reserved for elites. The "interpretation
paradox" refers to the challenge that differences found between cultural groups might
be a result of very many different conditions. It might, therefore, be difficult to attribute
them to some particular cause. In order to address those potential sources of biases
certain adjustments were made to the tools as well as procedures in executing the study.
This is outlined and explained below.
The construct bias was firstly addressed by conducting a pilot study in both countries.
Participants were asked to give feedback on the questions themselves. The translation
process followed the procedures suggested by Brislin (Brislin 1981). The
questionnaires were translated into Polish and Acholi and then translated back into
English by different translators to find if there were any crucial differences. Further,
in the process of translation, people with expert knowledge about the culture and
languages were consulted extensively to find the most fitting approximation for the
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key constructs in the study. Finally, open-ended questions were introduced to capture
the possible differences in meaning of the core variables for justice and forgiveness.
In order to address the potential instrument and test administration biases a different
procedure was chosen for each of the two countries. While this could constitute a
weakness in a study that is not cross-cultural, adhering to strictly the same procedures
in different cultural settings might instead lead to more, rather than fewer, errors. In
Poland, where all the participants attended primary school at least, and where a
majority were high school or university graduates, the questionnaires were selfadministered. All the participants could read and write and were familiar with answer
options in form of Likert scales.
In Uganda, however, the situation was quite different. Especially among the older
people in villages, there are many who did not have any kind of formal education.
Since the level of education is not very high in most village schools, even those who
did have some education were not necessarily able to read and write without difficulty.
Finally, even though most respondents in this region of Uganda were not completely
unfamiliar with research studies and questions due to various studies having been
conducted on the topic and on the effects of war, many would not have been absolutely
at ease with answering Likert scale type of questions on their own. Therefore, in
Uganda a decision was made to have the questionnaires administered by research
assistants. All the research assistants were from the same ethnic group as the
respondents, were fluent in English and Acholi (the local language in which the
questionnaires have been translated) and had research and field study experience. They
were trained for several days in order for them to thoroughly understand the topic and
tools. Due to their previous experiences with questionnaires and scales in local settings
they were able to contribute valuable ideas on how to make people understand Likert
scale answers. For example, they suggested using water bottles to explain the several
steps on a Likert scale for those who would struggle with the scale.
While using different procedures is obviously a problem, the problems in case of using
the same procedure would have been much more serious. Administering the tests by
research assistants in Poland was well beyond the financial scope and time constraints
of this study. While the victims in Uganda are concentrated in one region of the country,
of which the most affected one was selected, the victims in Poland, as well as victims’
associations, are spread all over the country. Another option would have been to focus
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only on well-educated English speaking victims in Uganda, who could have filled in
the questionnaires themselves. This would, however, have excluded the absolute
majority of people affected by the war while focusing on the least representative group.
This leads to the last type of bias addressed above: the sampling bias. The study
purpose was to explore the perceptions of victims. This limited the selection of
respondents to those affected by the war or regime. As already pointed out above, the
Polish group was different from the Ugandan group. The victims in Poland were
naturally much older, because the regime ended more than 25 years ago. They were
more highly educated and the majority of them were males. One method applied in the
analysis was to use exactly those demographics as control variables.
However, the biases resulting from sampling as well as from differences in test
administration may yet result in an overestimation of cultural differences between the
groups due to the wrongful attribution of effects of test procedure to cultural
differences. The similarities between two groups might, on the other hand, be
underestimated since in addition to the cultural differences there are differences in age,
education and test administration. This is something to be kept in mind for the
discussion of the findings.
4.4 Ethical considerations
The study was conducted among a vulnerable group of people with possible traumatic
experiences and, therefore, necessitated special ethical considerations.
The first page of the questionnaire informed participants about the content of the study
and that only few questions would address the type of experiences they had had during
the war or as a result of the repression of the former regime. They were also informed
that participation was anonymous and voluntary. Moreover, the front page provided
them with contact details they could use if there were any questions they wanted to
ask. This was of particular important for the Polish samples where questionnaires were
self-administered and partly sent by mail.
In Uganda, where the questionnaires were administered by research assistants,
participants were informed about the purpose and content of the study before making
a decision about whether they wanted to participate or not. In a short meeting,
participants had time to ask their questions personally and to obtain whatever kind of
information they needed before in order to make their decisions. Those who decided
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to participate were read the content of the first page and informed that they could stop
and revoke their participation at any time if they so wished.
During these meetings it was discovered that some of the researchers who visited the
area before and had made promises to the respondents which they had not kept. It was
therefore also necessary to clarify that the present research was not part of any
development project and the study was done for research purposes alone. Anyone who
was not comfortable with this explanation was free to leave immediately.
Finally, one of the research assistants had received training and many years of
experience in trauma counselling of people in northern Uganda. In the event that any
person experienced any negative symptoms relating to the trauma the counsellor was
on hand to step in and conduct a short intervention.
Before conducting the study ethical clearance from the Ethical Commission of
Lingnan University was obtained. In Uganda, an additional ethical clearance
certificate constituted part of the research permit application. This application was
successful and the clearance certificate was granted by the Uganda National Council
of Science and Technology specifically for the present study.
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CHAPTER 5. RELATIVE DEPRIVATION, FORGIVENESS AND JUSTICE
PERCEPTIONS: VIGNETTE EXPERIMENT FINDINGS
The following chapter is divided into findings of the vignette experiments in two
studies. The first study examines relative deprivation in connection with economic
status; and the second study, relative deprivation in connection with social
acknowledgement. The two sections describing the findings of the vignette
experiments in the two studies are structured based on the three hypotheses of this
research.
The findings of the Ugandan and Polish samples are first analysed separately, and then
as a joint sample. The two approaches complement each other allowing for a better
and more comprehensive understanding of the similarities and differences between the
two research sites.
5.1 Study 1 – Relative deprivation regarding economic wellbeing
The first study focuses on the effects of economic relative deprivation on victims visá-vis perpetrators. The experimental manipulation is done by randomly distributing
the four different versions of the vignette among the participants. The four scenarios
(also referred to as experimental conditions) describe different levels of economic
wellbeing of the victim and the perpetrator38.
The findings of the first study are organized into sub-sections related to the hypotheses
of the present research. The first section addresses the question of whether the
experimental scenarios resulted in significantly different levels of “experienced
relative deprivation” 39 . Afterwards the assumptions of the first hypothesis are
addressed by testing the question of whether relative deprivation has an effect on
forgiveness. Secondly, the impact of relative deprivation on justice is assessed, and
finally the relationship between justice and forgiveness is examined.40
5.1.1 Social comparison and relative deprivation

38

For details see chapter 4 and the appendix
See chapter 4 for details regarding this variable
40 For alternative analyses with ANOVA and MANOVA see appendix 6
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Relative deprivation is operationalized in two ways. One is the experimental
manipulation conducted through the application of the four scenarios. The scenario
where the victim’s economic situation is worse than the one of the perpetrator in the
vignette story (V3) is considered the “relative deprivation scenario” and thus compared
with the three other experimental conditions. The assumption is that this condition will
lead to significantly increased injustice perceptions and reduced forgiveness compared
with the three other scenarios, where the victim and perpetrator are either equally rich
(V1) or poor (V4) or the one where the victim is better off than the perpetrator (V2).
However, it is important to keep in mind, as pointed out in the previous chapter on
relative deprivation, that the comparison element is only one aspect of relative
deprivation. At the same time, the comparison element is the only part of relative
deprivation captured by the experimental manipulation. Therefore, the variable
“experienced relative deprivation”

41

is introduced as the second means of

operationalizing relative deprivation. It is designed to capture the full cognitive and
emotional range of aspects that are associated with relative deprivation. The variable
can be perceived as a “manipulation check” to assess if the different experimental
conditions result in different levels of experienced relative deprivation in the
participants.
Uganda
The following analysis begins with an examination of whether the vignette scenarios
significantly predict different levels of experienced relative deprivation. The first step
involves a descriptive statistical overview of the results. The following chart 1 and
table 2 show the mean values of experienced relative deprivation in the four
experimental conditions.
The next step consists of a more detailed analysis of the differences between the
scenarios. A series of multiple regression analyses with vignette scenario dummy
variables was performed to assess if the differences between the mean values are
statistically significant (table 3).

41

See chapter 4 for details on operationalization and reliability.
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Table 2: Estimated marginal means of experienced relative deprivation in the four vignette scenarios
(Uganda)

Dependent Variable: Experienced relative deprivation
95% Confidence Interval
Vignette Version

Mean

Std. Error

Lower Bound

Upper Bound

V1 (V.High_P.High)

8.156

.340

7.483

8.830

V2 (V.High_P.Low)

12.303

.335

11.640

12.966

V3 (V.Low_P.High)

6.486

.325

5.842

7.130

V4 (V.Low_P.Low)

7.323

.346

6.638

8.007

n (total)=131
Per cell: V1 n=32; V2 n=33; V1 n=35; V4 n=31
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Chart 1 Experienced relative deprivation in the four vignette scenarios (Uganda)
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Table 3: Differences between the vignette scenarios on experienced relative deprivation (Uganda)

Unstandardized Coefficients
Vignette comparisons
1

2

3

B (s.e.)

t

Sig.

(Constant)

6.486 (.325)

19.931

.000

V3* ->V1

1.671 (.471)

3.548

.001

V3 ->V4

.837 (.475)

1.762

.080

V3-> V2

5.817 (.467)

12.453

.000

(Constant)

12.303 (.335))

36.711

.000

V2-> V1

-4.147 (.478)

-8.682

.000

V2-> V4

-4.980 (.482)

-10.343

.000

(Constant)

8.156 (.340)

23.966

.000

V1 -> V4

-.834 (.485)

-1.718

.088

n (total)=131
Per cell: V1 n=32; V2 n=33; V1 n=35; V4 n=31
* V3 represents the “relative deprivation” scenario
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The results of the descriptive analysis are compatible with the expected sequence. The
condition in which the victim is in a worse economic situation than the perpetrator in
the post-conflict setting (V3) elicits the strongest experienced relative deprivation
result. This is followed by the scenario in which both, the victim and the perpetrator
are poor (V4) and the scenario where the economic situation of both is good (V1).
Only the scenario in which the victim is better off than the perpetrator (V2) does not
result in experienced relative deprivation on average. The four items, which were
combined for the measure of relative deprivation, were operationalized using a 5-point
Likert scale. Value number 3 expresses a neutral opinion. Responses with values lower
than 3 represent relative deprivation and values higher than 3, responses that do not
express relative deprivation. In other words, a combined value of the scale lower than
12 expresses relative deprivation in varying degrees. In the case of the Ugandan
sample all scenarios apart from V2 (i.e., in which the victim is better off) elicited some
level of relative deprivation.
The regression analyses showed that the experimental manipulation of economic
inequalities between the victim and the perpetrator proved to have a highly significant
influence on experienced relative deprivation. The size of the effect was considerable,
with almost 60% of the variation of relative deprivation explained by the experimental
conditions.
While the situation in which the victim is in a better economic situation than the
perpetrator (V2 or advantageous comparison) results in significantly less relative
deprivation compared to all other scenarios, there are no significant differences
between V3 and V4 as well as V1 and V4. This is an interesting outcome. It shows that
the vignette scenarios do have an effect on experienced relative deprivation. However,
it is not, as previously assumed, the situation where the victim is in a worse economic
situation than the perpetrator, which results in particularly extreme relative deprivation.
Rather, it is only the situation in which the victim is better off than the perpetrator that
does not elicit experienced relative deprivation in respondents.
There is no significant difference between the conditions V1 and V4, where the victim
and perpetrator are both rich or both poor, respectively. However, there is a significant
difference between the conditions V1 and V2, in both of which the victim is
economically well off. This shows that there is a social comparison element which
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contributes to experienced relative deprivation beyond the economic situation of the
victim as such.
Poland
The same analysis that was carried out in Uganda was also carried out in the Polish
sample in order to verify if the vignette scenarios predict different levels of
experienced relative deprivation.
The following table 4 and chart 2 show the mean values of experienced relative
deprivation in the four experimental conditions. These are followed by a detailed
analysis of the differences between the experimental scenarios (table 5).

127

Table 4 :Estimated marginal means of experienced relative deprivation in the four vignette scenarios

(Poland)

Dependent Variable: Experienced relative deprivation
95% Confidence Interval
Vignette Version

Mean

Std. Error

Lower Bound

Upper Bound

V1 (V.High_P.High)

10.432

.499

9.444

11.421

V2 (V.High_P.Low)

13.741

.584

12.584

14.898

V3 (V.Low_P.High)

6.483

.564

5.366

7.599

V4 (V.Low_P.Low)

8.000

.633

6.746

9.254

n (total)=116
Per cell: V1 n=37; V2 n=27; V1 n=29; V4 n=23
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Chart 2 Experienced relative deprivation in the four vignette scenarios (Poland)

129

Table 5: Differences between the vignette scenarios on experienced relative deprivation (Poland)

Unstandardized Coefficients
Vignette comparisons
1

2

3

B

(s.e.)

t

Sig.

(Constant)

6.483 (.564)

11.504

.000

V3* ->V1

3.950 (.753)

5.248

.000

V3 ->V4

1.517 (.847)

1.791

.076

V3-> V2

7.258 (.812)

8.943

.000

(Constant)

13.741 (.584)

23.527

.000

V2-> V1

-3.308 (.768)

-4.307

.000

V2-> V4

-5.741 (.861)

-6.667

.000

(Constant)

10.432 (.499)

20.910

.000

V1 -> V4

-2.432 (.806)

-3.019

.003

n (total)=116
Per cell: V1 n=37; V2 n=27; V1 n=29; V4 n=23
* V3 represents the “relative deprivation” scenario
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Chart 2 and table 5 show that only the condition in which the perpetrator is worse off
than the victim (V2) does not result in experienced relative deprivation. The remaining
scenarios all result in different levels of relative deprivation. In them, the condition of
victim and perpetrator both being well off elicits the lowest levels of experienced
relative deprivation, followed by both being poor and the original “relative deprivation”
scenario V3 resulting in highest experienced relative deprivation values.
All the scenarios differ significantly with regard to their effect on relative deprivation,
with the exception of V3 and V4. This means that when the victim is poor the levels
of experienced relative deprivation do not differ regardless of the situation of the
perpetrator. The “relative deprivation” scenario does not singularly affect experienced
relative deprivation. To put it differently, even when the perpetrator in the vignette is
equally poor after the transition the victim’s situation is still considered as being worse
in comparison, is perceived it as undeserved and leads to anger and resentment. The
outcome appears puzzling at first but its meaning is analysed in more detail below.
The fact that there is a difference in experienced relative deprivation levels between
the scenarios V1 and V2, even though in both the victim is doing equally well
economically, shows that the situation of the perpetrator becomes more relevant for
eliciting relative deprivation when the victim’s situation improves.
Uganda and Poland – Experimental manipulation and economic relative
deprivation
In both research sites the experimental manipulation had an effect on experienced
relative deprivation. However, it is not the “relative deprivation scenario” that stands
out as the reason for creating significantly higher levels of experienced relative
deprivation. It is rather the condition in which the victim is better off than the
perpetrator that significantly reduces experienced relative deprivation. This is
unexpected and puzzling.
So what does it mean? Relative deprivation results from feeling deprived as a result of
a comparison. While the focus of the study is on social comparisons, it was pointed
out before that there are other types of comparison, such as temporal comparisons or
comparisons with an envisioned better alternative outcome (Folger 1986; Helson 1964;
de la Sablonnière et al. 2015). The present findings suggest that under certain
conditions, such as a post-conflict situation, these different types of relative
deprivation may become intertwined. While the vignette scenarios depict the current
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status quo of a victim vis-à-vis a perpetrator, the fact that these two are a victim and
perpetrator involved in the same conflict implies a history – both individual and shared.
This is a fundamentally different situation than comparing one’s own salary with
employees of another company. Being a victim implies discrimination in the past,
when the perpetrator was in a better position. The findings suggest that a simple
comparison of the current status quo does not entirely explain the experience of
relative deprivation. The current situations of the victim and perpetrator described in
the vignette cannot be seen separately from their past experiences. To put it differently,
to the simple outcome of a social comparison, an additional ballast of the previous
history is added. This finding highlights the differences between “equality” and
“equity”. Equality, represented by the same status quo of the victim and the perpetrator
in the vignette scenarios, does not lead to equity. Even if the victim and the perpetrator
are equally rich or poor, still the victim has suffered before, while the perpetrator
benefited in the past. The victim’s past suffering is included in the comparison, thereby
creating, yet again, a relative deprivation scenario, where equal conditions appear to
be the case.
Moreover, victims may anticipate an improvement in their own conditions. If this does
not happen, as is the case in two scenarios in which the victim is still poor, this
constitutes another case of relative deprivation, as pointed out above. These different
types of relative deprivation are compounded leading to experienced relative
deprivation in all circumstances, except the one where the victim is well off
economically and simultaneously better off than the perpetrator. This is the only
situation that does not entail any kind of relative deprivation after all factors such as
the victim’s history, the perpetrator’s history, expectations of improvement and a
temporal comparison have been considered.
The similarity between the impacts of the different scenarios on experienced relative
deprivation in both research settings is illustrated below (chart 3).
The present outcomes highlight the importance of measuring experienced relative
deprivation correctly instead of just relying on assumptions about which conditions
are likely to lead to relative deprivation.
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Chart 3 Experienced economic relative deprivation in the four vignettes — Uganda and Poland
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5.1.2 Relative deprivation and forgiveness
The first hypothesis (H1) postulates that relative deprivation has a negative effect on
forgiveness. As transpired from the manipulation check, assessing the impact of the
vignette scenarios on experienced relative deprivation, it was found that all the
scenarios elicited varying levels of experienced relative deprivation, except when the
victim was better off than the perpetrator.
Therefore, in the following analysis both are examined: i.e., the effects of the
experimental conditions and the effects of the variable that captures experienced
relative deprivation.
Uganda
The results of the multivariate regressions are divided into the three different
forgiveness measures. The first two constitute the TRIM-12 revenge and avoidance
sub-scales (McCullough, Worthington Jr., and Rachal 1997)42. Relative deprivation is
hypothesized to increase revenge and avoidance motivations. The third measurement
is the single forgiveness item measuring the directly stated willingness to forgive.
Willingness to forgive is assumed to be reduced by relative deprivation. Firstly, the
effects of the experimental manipulation on the different forgiveness measures are
assessed. Secondly, the effect of experienced relative deprivation on forgiveness is
examined.
The means of each of the forgiveness measures in the four vignette scenarios were
determined as a first step. This was done in order to examine, in particular, if the
“relative deprivation scenario” (V3) does elicit the highest revenge and avoidance
motivation as well as lowest willingness to forgive, as expected. Consistent with the
expectations the “relative deprivation scenario” did exhibit the highest mean values of
revenge and avoidance and the lowest willingness to forgive (table 6). At the next step
the differences between the vignette scenarios for each of the forgiveness measures
were assessed. Very few turned out to be significant (table 7). Finally, the effects of
the experienced relative deprivation variable on all three forgiveness measures were
tested (table 8). It turned out that only the effect on avoidance motivation was

42

See chapter 4 for details and reliability.
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significant. The control variables were age, gender and education. None of them was
significant either.
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Table 6: Estimated marginal means of revenge, avoidance and forgiveness in the four vignette
scenarios (Uganda)

Mean (s.e.)
Vignette Version

Revenge

Avoidance

Forgiveness

V1 (V.High_P.High)

16.625 (.742)

25.188 (1.042)

2.969 (.252)

V2 (V.High_P.Low)

16.303 (.730)

23.455 (1.026)

3.424 (249)

V3 (V.Low_P.High)

17.971 (.709)

26.543(.996)

2.743(.241)

V4 (V.Low_P.Low)

16.226 (.753)

25.484 (1.059)

3.387(.257)

n (total)=131
Per cell: V1 n=32; V2 n=33; V1 n=35; V4 n=31
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Table 7: Differences between the vignette scenarios on revenge, avoidance and forgiveness (Uganda)

Revenge
Vignette comparisons
1

2

3

Avoidance

Forgiveness

B (S.E)

B (S.E)

B (S.E)

(Constant)

17.971 (.709)

26.543 .996

V3* ->V1

-1.346 (1.026)

-1.355 1.442

.226 (.349)

V3 ->V4

-1.746 (1.035)

-1.059 1.454

.644 (.352)

V3-> V2

-1.668 (1.018)

-3.088 (1.430)*

.681 (.347)*

(Constant)

16.303 (.730)

23.455 1.026

3.424 (.249)

2.743 (.241)

V2-> V1

.322 (1.041)

1.733 1.462

-.455 (.354)

V2-> V4

-.077 (1.049)

2.029 1.474

-.037 (.357)

25.484 1.059

3.387 (.257)

-.296 1.485

-.418 (.360)

(Constant)
V1 -> V4

16.226 (.753)
.399 (1.057)
R2= .03

R2= .04

Ad. R2 = .006

Ad. R2 = .01

n (total)=131
Per cell: V1 n=32; V2 n=33; V1 n=35; V4 n=31
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R2= .04
Ad. R2 = .02

Table 8: Experienced relative deprivation (Ex. RD) multivariate regression results on revenge,
avoidance and forgiveness (Uganda)

Revenge

Avoidance

Unstandardized B

Unstandardized B
t

(s.e.)
Cons-

Forgiveness
Unstandardized B
t

(s.e.)

t
(s.e.)

19.834 (2.732)

7.259

31.877 (3.713)

8.586

2.485 (.936)

2.654

-.202 (.125)

-1.615

-.593 (.170)**

-3.486

.076 (.043)

1.776

Age

.014 (.029)

.495

.000 (.039)

-.005

-.005 (.010)

-.471

Sex

-.701 (.796)

-.881

.096 (1.082)

.089

.153 (.273)

.562

Edu-

-.386 (.590)

-.655

-.830 (.802)

-1.035

-.027 (.202)

-.135

tant
Ex.RD

cation
R2= .03;

R2= .10;

R2= .03;

Ad. R2 = -.002

Ad. R2 = .07

Ad. R2 = -.003

ns p > 0.05; *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001
n = 131
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Poland
The same two-part analysis was carried out in Poland, starting with an examination of
the effects of the experimental manipulation on the different forgiveness measures and
followed by an assessment of the effects of experienced relative deprivation on those
same variables.
The mean values of the three forgiveness measures (table 9) showed that the “relative
deprivation scenario” has the highest revenge and avoidance values, however, the
differences appeared to be too low to be significant. The experimental manipulation
directly affected willingness to forgive in the main. The “relative deprivation scenario”
resulted in significantly lower willingness to forgive compared to all the other
scenarios (table 10).
In the next step of the analysis the effects of the experienced relative deprivation
variable on the three forgiveness measures were examined. Experienced relative
deprivation had a significant effect on revenge motivation and willingness to forgive,
but not on avoidance motivation in the Polish sample (table 11).
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Table 9: Estimated marginal means of revenge, avoidance and forgiveness in the four experimental
scenarios (Poland)

Mean (s.e.)
Vignette Version

Revenge

Avoidance

Forgiveness

V1 (V.High_P.High)

13.622 (.746)

25.188 (.819)

2.622 (.194)

V2 (V.High_P.Low)

14.407 (.873)

23.455 (.959)

2.963 (.227)

V3 (V.Low_P.High)

16.034 (.842)

26.543 (.925)

2.069 (.219)

V4 (V.Low_P.Low)

14.739 (.946)

25.484 (1.039)

3.130 (.246)

n (total)=116
Per cell: V1 n=37; V2 n=27; V1 n=29; V4 n=23
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Table 10: Differences between the vignette scenarios on revenge, avoidance and willingness to forgive
(Poland)

Revenge
Vignette comparisons
1

2

3

Avoidance

Forgiveness

B (s.e.)

B (s.e.)

B (s.e.)

(Constant)

16.034 (.842)

29.483 .925

2.069 (.219)

V3* ->V1

-2.413 (1.125)*

-2.158 1.235

.553 (.293)(*)

V3 ->V4

-1.295 (1.267)

-1.265 1.391

1.061 (.330)**

V3-> V2

-1.627 (1.213)

-.520 1.332

.894 (.316)**

(Constant)

14.407 (.873)

28.963 .959

2.963 (.227)

V2-> V1

-.786 (1.148)

-1.639 1.261

-.341 (.299)

V2-> V4

.332 (1.287)

-.746 1.413

.167 (.335)

28.217 1.039

2.622 .(194)

-.893 1.322

.509 (.314)

(Constant)

14.739 (.946)

V1 -> V4

-1.118 (1.204)
R2= .01

R2= .03

Ad. R2 = .01

Ad. R2 = .004

n (total)=116
Per cell: V1 n=37; V2 n=27; V1 n=29; V4 n=23
* V3 represents the “relative deprivation” scenario

141

R2= .10
Ad. R2 = .08

Table 11: Experienced relative deprivation (Ex. RD) multivariate regression results on revenge,
avoidance and forgiveness (Poland)

Revenge

Avoidance

Unstandardized B

Unstandardized B
t

(s.e.)
Cons-

Forgiveness
Unstandardized B
t

(s.e.)

t
(s.e.)

22.324 (4.973)

4.489

28.628 (5.618)

5.095

2.966 (1.346)

2.203

-.220 (.110)*

-1.996

-.171 (.124)

-1.377

.065 (.030)*

2.196

Age

-.064 (.055)

-1.158

.047 (.062)

.754

-.024 (.015)

-1.593

Sex

-1.618 (1.215)

-1.331

1.151 (1.373)

.839

.388 (.329)

1.180

.090 (.686)

.132

-.812 (.775)

-1.048

.056 (.186)

.303

tant
Ex.RD

Education

R2=.05

R2=.05

Ad. R2=.01
Ad. R2=.01
ns p > 0.05; *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001
n = 116
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R2=.10
Ad. R2=.07

Uganda and Poland – Hypothesis 1
The hypothesis that economic relative deprivation affects forgiveness could only be
confirmed to a limited degree.
In Uganda the experimental manipulation did not have much effect on any of the
forgiveness measures. However, experienced relative deprivation did have a negative
effect on avoidance motivation in the Ugandan sample.
In Poland the experimental manipulation did have an effect on willingness to forgive.
In particular, as expected, the “relative deprivation scenario”, which reflected the
situation of the victim who was poorer than the perpetrator resulted in significantly
less willingness to forgive compared to all other scenarios. Experienced relative
deprivation also had a significant effect on willingness to forgive and additionally
increased the revenge motivation.
While relative deprivation did not affect all forgiveness measures it did have an effect
on some forgiveness measures in both countries. Relative deprivation deriving solely
from social comparison (experimental manipulation) had weaker effects, which were
not significant in Uganda and only significant in the case of willingness to forgive in
Poland. In both countries, however, the “relative deprivation scenario” did result in
highest revenge and avoidance motivation values and lowest willingness to forgive
highlighting the similarities between both samples and indicating that the weak effects
might be due to sample size and become significant in a bigger sample. To test this a
joint analysis of both samples (Poland and Uganda) has been performed to assess if
the “relative deprivation scenario” does indeed lead to significantly more revenge and
avoidance and less forgiveness. In this case several control variables have been added
to the analysis. The reason is that the individual country samples are relatively
homogeneous and potential influencing factors are controlled through the
randomization of the experimental conditions. The samples, however, differ
significantly between Poland and Uganda with regard to sex, age and education. These
demographics (including “country”) have been, therefore, added as control variables
in cases of any joint sample analyses. The joint analysis confirms the assumption that
the experimental manipulation did yield significant effects in bigger samples (table
12). In particular, revenge motivation was significantly increased and willingness to
forgive significantly reduced in victims by the “relative deprivation scenario” (V3)
compared to all other scenarios. Willingness to forgive appeared to be particularly
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negatively affected by the condition of a wealthy perpetrator. There is no significant
difference between the influence of V1 and V3 on willingness to forgive – both
scenarios in which the perpetrator is wealthy. The fact that in the scenario V1 the
victim is wealthy too does not increase the victims’ willingness to forgive. To put it
simply, it appears that it is more difficult for victims to forgive a wealthy perpetrator
regardless of their own conditions.
Avoidance motivation differs between Poland and Uganda as indicated by the
significant country effect. The experimental manipulation of relative deprivation did
have an effect on avoidance motivation in Uganda, but not in Poland. These findings
verify the assumption that economic relative deprivation, resulting from social
comparison between victims and perpetrators, does have a negative effect on
forgiveness in victims in both, Poland and Uganda. Experienced relative deprivation
showed some significant effects on forgiveness measures in both countries, even in
separate country analyses.
Finally, an interesting aspect was the difference between the forgiveness measures that
were affected by relative deprivation in both research sites. While relative deprivation
affected avoidance in Uganda, it affected revenge motivation and willingness to
forgive in Poland. This difference was confirmed in an analysis of the two country
samples taken together (table 13). The first model showed the effects of the
independent and control variables on the three forgiveness measures. The second
model introduced an interaction effect between experienced relative deprivation and
country. The comparison showed that country has a highly significant effect on
avoidance motivation. This meant that the avoidance level in Poland was much higher
on average. The significant interaction effect confirmed that while relative deprivation
did not affect the high levels of avoidance in Poland at all, it did increase avoidance
motivation in Uganda.
Obviously, the two samples are different on so many levels that the interpretation of
the differences can only be speculative. However, a possible explanation of these
findings lies in the difference between individualistic and collectivistic cultures with
regard to forgiveness. Avoidance is not a strong expression of un-forgiveness in an
individualistic culture, in particular if there was no close relationship between the
victim and perpetrator before. Avoidance might, however, be perceived as a much
stronger reaction in a collectivistic culture. Therefore, it is a more accessible reaction
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in Poland, which explains the significantly higher levels of avoidance in the Polish
results.
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Table 12: The effects of the economic “relative deprivation scenario” as compared with the other
vignette scenarios on revenge, avoidance and willingness to forgive - Poland and Uganda

V3

(Constant)

Revenge

Avoidance

B (s.e.)

B (s.e.)

Forgiveness
B (s.e.)

19.882 (.752)

27.015 (2.635)

2.536 (.632)

as
contrast V1

-1.714 (.810)*

-1.721 (.965)

.366 (.231)

V4

-1.575 (.778)*

-1.088 (1.039)

.784 (.249)**

V2

-1.561 (1.086)*

-1.939 (.998)*

.747 (.239)**

Country

-2.054 (.026)

4.493 (1.393)***

-.257 (.334)

Age

-.002 (.659)

.008 (.033)

-.007 (.008)

Sex

-.759 (.442)

.508 (.845)

.184 (.203)

Education

-.318 (.752)

-.822 (.567)

.052 (.136)

R2= 10

R2=.11

Ad. R2 = 07

Ad. R2 =.09

n (total)=247
Per cell: V1 n=69; V2 n=60; V1 n=64; V4 n=54
ns p > 0.05; *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001
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R2=.09
Ad. R2 = .06

Table 13: The effects of experienced relative deprivation on revenge, avoidance motivation and
willingness to forgive in a joint sample of Poland and Uganda
Model1

Revenge
Unstandardized
B (s.e.)

Cons-

Avoidance
t

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

Forgiveness
t

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

t

20.342 (2.114)

9.621

29.095 (2.661)

10.932

2.460 (.654)

3.760

-.183 (.080)*

-2.302

-.355 (.100)***

-3.541

.075 (.025)**

3.031

Age

-.002 (.025)

-.068

.003 (.032)

.091

-.009 (.008)

-1.128

Sex

-.883 (.655)

-1.349

.372 (.824)

.451

.245 (.203)

1.211

Country

-1.996 (1.081)

-1.846

4.807 (1.361)***

3.532

-.212 (.335)

-.634

Ed. level

-.272 (.440)

-.617

-.732 (.554)

-1.322

.004 (.136)

.028

tant
Ex.RD

Model2

R2=.10

R2=.14

R2=.07

Ad. R2=.08

Ad. R2=.12

Ad. R2=.05

Avoidance

Forgiveness

Revenge
Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

Cons-

t

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

t

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

t

20.466 (2.239)

9.140

30.834 (2.797)

11.025

2.439 (.693)

3.520

Ex. RD

-.200 (.128)

-1.570

-.594 (.159)***

-3.727

.078 (.039)*

1.965

Age

-.001 (.026)

-.047

.010 (.032)

.318

-.009 (.008)

-1.129

Sex

-.881 (.656)

-1.342

.403 (.820)

.492

.245 (.203)

1.206

Country

-2.259 (1.886)

-1.197

1.099 (2.356)

.467

-.167 (.584)

-.286

Ed. level

-.273 (.441)

-.618

-.746 (.551)

-1.355

.004 (.136)

.029

.028 (.164)

.170

.394 (.205) (*)

1.923

-.005 (.051)

-.094

tant

RD x
Country
R2=.10

R2=.15

R2=.07

Ad. R2=.07

Ad. R2=.13

Ad. R2=.05

ns p > 0.05; *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001
n (total) = 247
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5.1.3 Relative deprivation and injustice perceptions
The second hypothesis (H2) posits that relative deprivation increases injustice
perceptions of the post-conflict environment.
As described in the methods section, the questionnaires included two adapted justice
scales, the Injustice Gap scale (Davis et al. 2015) and an adapted scale consisting of
seven items measuring injustice perceptions, which will be referred to as the Injustice
Perceptions scale (Wenzel and Okimoto 2014). Both scales correlated highly, which
confirmed their construct validity. They were also both based on the same
conceptualization of justice perceptions as an injustice gap, namely, the difference
between ideal and real justice. On average, the Injustice Perceptions scale turned out
to have better reliability and more consistent results and, therefore, this scale has been
used throughout to report the findings.43
The same analyses, described in the previous sections, have been performed to
examine the assumed effects of relative deprivation on injustice perceptions. Firstly,
the impact of the experimental manipulation, representing relative deprivation based
on social comparison, was tested. Secondly, the effect of experienced relative
deprivation on injustice perceptions was assessed.
Uganda
In order to have a general overview at the outset of how the experimental manipulation
in form of the vignette scenarios affected injustice perceptions, the mean values of the
Injustice Perceptions scale in the four vignette scenarios were examined (table 14 and
chart 4). The outcomes revealed a very similar pattern to the one found with regard to
experienced relative deprivation. The scenario in which the victim is poor and the
perpetrator rich (V3) resulted in the highest perceived injustice of the post-conflict
setting and the reverse of the poor/rich situation (V2) in lowest perceived injustice. A
mean of 28 would signify a neutral response where the situation is perceived as neither
just nor unjust. Only V2 was below that point, suggesting that all other conditions were
more or less seen as unjust. While the outcome followed the expected pattern as the
“relative deprivation scenario” elicited the highest injustice perceptions, there also
appeared to be an effect of the victim’s situation. This was indicated by the fact that

43

See chapter 4 for details on both scales and reliability.
148

the two scenarios in which the victim was poor elicited similar injustice perception
values. The next question was, therefore, which scenarios were significantly different
from each other when it came to their effect on injustice perceptions. Indeed, as shown
in Table 15, the two scenarios in which the victim was poor did not result in injustice
perception values that were significantly different from each other. This means that the
fact of the victim being poor leads by itself to a negative justice judgement of the postconflict setting regardless of how the perpetrator is doing. Only when the victim was
doing well economically did the social comparison aspect become salient and affected
injustice perceptions. This was reflected in the significant difference between the two
conditions when the victim was well off. When the victim was doing well
economically than the fact of the perpetrator doing equally well resulted in a more
negative justice judgement of the post-conflict setting than when the perpetrator was
poor.
In addition, experienced relative deprivation was examined as a predictor of injustice
perceptions and turned out to be significant, explaining over 20% of the variance (table
16). None of the demographic control variables had a significant effect on injustice
perceptions.
The findings in the Ugandan sample suggest that relative deprivation does have strong
and highly significant effects on injustice perceptions. It is, however, not the assumed
disadvantageous social comparison, which has the most significant influence on
injustice perception, but rather the scenario, where the victim was better off than the
perpetrator, which significantly reduced injustice perceptions.
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Table 14: Estimated marginal means of the Injustice Perceptions scale (IPS) in the four vignette
versions (Uganda)

Dependent Variable:

Injustice perceptions
95% Confidence Interval

Vignette Version

Mean

Std. Error

Lower Bound

Upper Bound

V1 (V.High_P.High)

31.219

1.375

28.498

33.940

V2 (V.High_P.Low)

26.848

1.354

24.169

29.528

V3 (V.Low_P.High)

40.543

1.315

37.941

43.144

V4 (V.Low_P.Low)

37.677

1.397

34.913

40.442

n (total)=131
Per cell: V1 n=32; V2 n=33; V1 n=35; V4 n=31
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Chart 4 Injustice perceptions in the four vignette scenarios (Uganda)
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Table 15: Differences between the vignette scenarios on the Injustice Perceptions scale (Uganda)

Unstandardized Coefficients
Vignette comparisons
1

2

3

B (S.E.)

T

Sig.

(Constant)

40.543 (1.315)

30.838

.000

V3* ->V1

-9.324 (1.902)

-4.901

.000

V3 ->V4

-2.865 (1.918)

-1.494

.138

V3-> V2

-13.694 (1.887)

-7.256

.000

26.848 (1.354)

19.829

.000

V2-> V1

4.370 (1.930)

2.265

.025

V2-> V4

10.829 (1.945)

5.566

.000

(Constant)

31.219 (1.375)

22.705

.000

V1 -> V4

6.459 (1.960)

3.295

.001

(Constant)

n (total)=131
Per cell: V1 n=32; V2 n=33; V1 n=35; V4 n=31
* V3 represents the “relative deprivation” scenario
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Table 16: Regression results of experienced relative deprivation on Injustice Perception scale
(Uganda)

Unstandardized Coefficients
DV= Injustice Perceptions

B

Std. Error

T

Sig.

(Constant)

48.178 (5.460)

8.824

.000

Experienced
Relative
Deprivation

-1.486 (.250)

-5.940

.000

-.029 (.058)

-.507

.613

.636 (1.591)

.400

.690

-.523 (1.179)

-.444

.658

Age
Sex
Education
R2= .23; Adjusted R2= .20
n = 131
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Poland
An examination of the mean values of injustice perceptions in the four vignette
scenarios was conducted as a first step in the analysis, analogous to the analysis in the
Ugandan sample. The means in the four conditions appear very close to each other
with the exception of the advantageous comparison condition (V2). The advantageous
comparison (the vignette scenario where the victim is better off than the perpetrator)
was the only situation which was not considered unjust (table 17 and chart 5).
An assessment of the differences between the scenarios with regard to their effect on
injustice perceptions confirmed the pattern presented by the mean values in the
experimental conditions. Only the scenario in which the victim was better off than the
perpetrator elicited significantly different (lower) injustice perceptions values, while
the others were all similarly perceived as unjust (table 18).
A multivariate regression analysis conducted with the variable experienced relative
deprivation as predictor verified the expected highly significant influence on injustice
perceptions, which explained 31% of the variance (table 19). The only significant
control variable turned out to be age. The negative effect means that injustice
perceptions decrease with age.
The findings suggest that social comparison between victims and perpetrators is
important for justice judgements. However, it appears, yet again, that victims are
affected by a variety of different types of relative deprivation in their justice
assessments, making the effect of only social disadvantageous comparison on its own
less apparent. If the conditions of the victim do not improve after the conflict, it results
in injustice perceptions as is the case when the economic status of the perpetrator
remains high. Only when all of these relative deprivation sources are addressed and
rectified is this likely to reduce the injustice perceptions of victims significantly.
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Table 17: Estimated marginal means of the Injustice Perceptions scale (IPS) in the four vignette
versions (Poland)

Dependent Variable: Injustice perceptions
95% Confidence Interval
Vignette Version

Mean

Std. Error

Lower Bound

Upper Bound

V1 (V.High_P.High)

30.730

1.804

27.156

34.304

V2 (V.High_P.Low)

22.556

2.112

18.372

26.740

V3 (V.Low_P.High)

34.138

2.038

30.101

38.175

V4 (V.Low_P.Low)

33.957

2.288

29.423

38.490

n (total)=116
Per cell: V1 n=37; V2 n=27; V1 n=29; V4 n=23
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Chart 5 Injustice perceptions in the four vignette scenarios (Poland)
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Table 18: Differences between the vignette scenarios on injustice perceptions (Poland)

Unstandardized Coefficients
Vignette comparisons
1

2

3

B (S.E.)

T

Sig.

(Constant)

34.138 (2.038)

16.754

.000

V3* ->V1

-3.408 (2.721)

-1.252

.213

V3 ->V4

-.181 (3.064)

-.059

.953

V3-> V2

-11.582 (2.934)

-3.947

.000

(Constant)

22.556 (2.112)

10.681

.000

V2-> V1

8.174 (2.777)

2.943

.004

V2-> V4

11.401 (3.113)

3.662

.000

(Constant)

30.730 (1.804)

17.035

.000

V1 -> V4

3.227 (2.914)

1.108

.270

n (total)=116
Per cell: V1 n=37; V2 n=27; V1 n=29; V4 n=23
* V3 represents the “relative deprivation” scenario
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Table 19: Regression results of experienced relative deprivation on Injustice Perceptions scale
(Poland)

Unstandardized Coefficients
DV=Injustice Perceptions

1

B (s.e.)

T

Sig.

(Constant)

72.121 (11.146)

6.471

.000

Experienced
Relative
Deprivation

-1.563 (.247)

-6.334

.000

Age

-.321 (.123)

-2.599

.011

Sex

1.794 (2.723)

.659

.511

-2.162 (1.538)

-1.405

.163

Education
R2= .31; Adjusted R2= .29
n =116
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Uganda and Poland – Hypothesis 2
The “relative deprivation scenario” (V3) did not increase injustice perceptions by itself.
Even in a combined sample of Poland and Uganda together, the difference between
V3 and V4 was still not significant (table 20). However, the experimental condition of
an advantageous comparison, represented by the vignette scenario V2 (the victim is
better off than the perpetrator) was consistently and significantly perceived as more
just than any other scenario in both samples. Similarly, the variable experienced
relative deprivation significantly increased injustice perceptions in both countries.
Thus, the outcomes in both countries reflected a number of similarities (chart 6).
These findings mean that social comparison does have an effect, but not exactly the
effect that was originally assumed would be the outcome. Injustice perceptions seemed
to be receptive to the combined impact of several forms of relative deprivation of the
victims.
While the individual situation of the victim did appear to have a greater impact on
injustice perceptions in Uganda, it did not, by itself, change injustice perceptions in
Poland. This means that in Uganda the improved conditions of the victim himself
significantly reduced injustice perceptions. Although it needs to be pointed out that
even in Uganda the post-conflict setting is still perceived to be unjust when both victim
and perpetrator are economically well off. In Poland, on the other hand, a reduction in
any type of relative deprivation on its own did not matter for injustice perceptions. If
only the victim’s circumstances improved, this did not reduce injustice perceptions.
Similarly, the situation of the perpetrator by itself did not have an effect. When the
victim was poor, the conditions of the perpetrator did not play a role. Only when all
types of relative deprivation were addressed, symbolized by the situation of the victim
being better off than the perpetrator, it did significantly reduce injustice perceptions.
A comparison of both countries in a combined analysis assessing the effects of
experienced relative deprivation on injustice perceptions did not show significant
differences (table 21). Experienced relative deprivation appears to affect the injustice
perceptions of victims in a similar way in both countries.
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Table 20: The effects of the economic “relative deprivation scenario” as compared with the other
vignette scenarios on injustice perceptions - Poland and Uganda

Unstandardized Coefficients
DV= Injustice Perceptions
V3 as
contrast

B (S.E.)

T

Sig.

(Constant)

45.966 (4.440)

10.352

.000

V1

-6.078 (1.626)

-3.738

.000

V4

-1.738 (1.751)

-.992

.322

V2

-12.913 (1.682)

-7.677

.000

Country

1.848 (2.347)

.787

.432

Age

-.091 (.055)

-1.634

.104

.571

.569

-2.121

.035

Sex
Education

.812 (1.424)
-2.027 (.956)

R2= .27; Adjusted R2= .25
n (total)=247
Per cell: V1 n=69; V2 n=60; V1 n=64; V4 n=54
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Chart 6 Injustice perceptions in the four vignette scenarios - Uganda and Poland
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Table 21: The effect of experienced relative deprivation on injustice perceptions in Poland and
Uganda
Unstandardized Coefficients
Model
1

B

(S.E)

T

Sig.

(Constant)

52.575 (4.521)

11.629

.000

Ex. RD

-1.467 (.170)

-8.615

.000

-.105 (.054)

-1.945

.053

.868 (1.400)

.620

.536

Country

2.899 (2.312)

1.254

.211

Ed. level

-1.411 (.941)

-1.500

.135

Age
Sex

R2=.28
Ad. R2=.27

Unstandardized Coefficients
Model
2

B

T

Sig.

Std. Error

(Constant)

52.546 (4.788)

10.975

.000

Ex. RD

-1.463 (.273)

-5.362

.000

-.106 (.055)

-1.930

.055

.867 (1.404)

.618

.537

Country

2.961 (4.033)

.734

.464

Ed. level

-1.411 (.943)

-1.497

.136

-.007 (.351)

-.019

.985

Age
Sex

RDx
Country
R2=.28
Ad. R2=.26
n (total) =247
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5.1.4 Injustice perceptions and forgiveness
Apart from an assumed direct effect of relative deprivation on forgiveness, the last
hypothesis (H3) posits an effect of injustice perceptions on forgiveness. This suggests
an additional indirect effect of relative deprivation on forgiveness via justice
perceptions. This assumption necessitates that injustice perceptions impact forgiveness.
The effects of injustice perceptions, including an exploration of possible mediator
effects, are examined in the following section.
Uganda
A multivariate regression analysis of injustice perceptions on each of the forgiveness
measures confirmed that justice judgements did affect forgiveness in the Ugandan
sample (table 22). The more the post-conflict setting, described in the vignette
scenarios, was perceived as unjust, the more revenge and avoidance motivation were
displayed and the less willingness there was to forgive. None of the control variables
of age, sex or education had any significant effect on any of the forgiveness measures.
Considering the findings in the Ugandan sample so far it does seem that relative
deprivation might affect forgiveness predominantly through injustice perceptions. The
only direct effect of experienced relative deprivation was on avoidance motivation.
This prompted the question of whether even the effect of relative deprivation on
avoidance could be mediated through injustice perceptions. In order to examine if
injustice perceptions constitute a significant mediator in the case of avoidance
motivation, a Sobel test was performed. The Sobel test confirmed the significance of
the mediation (Sobel test statistic -3.27; p<.01). It appears that the biggest part of the
influence of economic relative deprivation on the different forgiveness measures in the
Ugandan sample is, indeed, either indirect via justice perceptions or mediated by them.
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Table 22: Injustice Perception Scale (IPS) multivariate regression results on revenge, avoidance and
forgiveness (Uganda)

Revenge
Unstandardized B

Avoidance
t

Unstandardized B

(s.e.)
Cons-

Forgiveness
t

Unstandardized B

(s.e.)

t

(s.e.)

12.022 (2.715)

4.429

17.631 (3.765)

4.683

4.443 (.979)

4.538

IPS

.171 (.037)***

4.646

.261 (.051)***

5.119

-.037 (.013)**

-2.795

Age

.020 (.027)

.739

.005 (.038)

.131

-.006 (.010)

-.564

Sex

-.818 (.744)

-1.101

-.036 (1.031)

-.035

.173 (.268)

.646

Edu-

-.292 (.551)

-.530

-.711 (.765)

-.930

-.045 (.199)

-.225

tant

cation
R2=.15

R2=.18

R2=.06

Ad. R2=.13
Ad. R2=.17
ns p > 0.05; *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001
n=131
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Ad. R2=.03

Poland
The multivariate regression analysis with the same control variables of age, sex and
education revealed that injustice perceptions were not a significant predictor of any of
the forgiveness measures in the Polish sample. This is a rather surprising result, since
this connection was not only suggested by the literature but also confirmed in the
Ugandan sample.
It is possible that the fictional setting of the vignette scenarios might, to certain extent,
weaken the effects 44 of injustice perceptions on forgiveness measures. The openended questions included in the questionnaires regarding justice and forgiveness
implied that victims in both research sites had been able to put themselves in the
position of the described victim. Also the effects of the vignette scenarios on
experienced relative deprivation strongly suggested that the experimental
manipulation was successful. Nevertheless, it cannot be ruled out that the effects of
justice judgements of a fictional context might produce weaker results than real life
injustice perceptions. If this is the case, then the effects of injustice perceptions on
forgiveness should be significant in the survey.
Uganda and Poland – Hypothesis 3
This is the only assumption which yielded completely different results in both
countries. While the negative effect of injustice perceptions could be fully confirmed
in the Ugandan sample on all forgiveness measures, there were no significant effects
in Poland. To verify the significance of this difference a joint multivariate regression
analysis of the Injustice Perceptions scale on forgiveness in both countries was
performed. As is suggested by the results above the effect of injustice perceptions on
forgiveness measures, in particular on revenge and avoidance motivation was
significantly stronger in Uganda (table 23). Moreover, the significant effect of the
country variable shows that revenge motivation in the context of economic injustices
is stronger in Uganda, while avoidance motivation is higher in Poland. In Uganda
injustice perceptions additionally turned out to mediate the effect of experienced
relative deprivation on avoidance motivation.
It remains to be seen if the lack of significance in the Polish sample can be partly due

44

See section 4.1 for more details on the difference between scenario and recall methodologies.
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to the fact that the fictional setting of the vignette scenarios weakened the effects of
the injustice perceptions, or if there is generally no connection between justice and
forgiveness in the Polish sample.
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Table 23: The effects of injustice perceptions (IPS) on revenge and avoidance motivation and
willingness to forgive in Poland and Uganda
Revenge
Model1

Unstandardized
B (s.e.)

Cons-

Avoidance
t

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

Forgiveness
Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

t

t

14.371 (2.153)

6.676

20.017 (2.739)

7.308

4.130 (.684)

6.041

IPS

.109 (.026)***

4.233

.146 (.033)***

4.459

-.024 (.008)**

-2.988

Age

.010 (.025)

.420

.022 (.031)

.691

-.012 (.008)

-1.577

Sex

-.966 (.639)

-1.513

.317 (.813)

.391

.247 (.203)

1.216

-2.343 (1.050)*

-2.233

4.198 (1.335)**

3.143

-.090 (.333)

-.269

-.122 (.431)

-.284

-.555 (.548)

-1.012

-.023 (.137)

-.165

tant

Country
Edu

2

Model2

2

R =.14

R =.16

2

2

2

R =.07

Ad. R =.12

Ad. R =.15

Ad. R2=.05

Revenge

Avoidance

Forgiveness

Unstandardized
B (s.e.)

t

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

t

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

t

12.330 (2.342)

5.265

16.219 (2.947)

5.503

4.568 (.748)

6.111

IPS

.171 (.039)***

4.417

.262 (.049)***

5.365

-.038 (.012)**

-3.055

Age

.011 (.025)

.435

.022 (.031)

.723

-.012 (.008)

-1.588

Sex

-.965 (.634)

-1.522

.320 (.798)

.401

.246 (.202)

1.217

1.246 (1.982)

.629

10.877
(2.494)***

4.362

-.861 (.633)

-1.361

-.163 (.428)

-.381

-.631 (.539)

-1.171

-.014 (.137)

-.101

-.109 (.051)*

-2.129

-.203 (.064)**

-3.149

.023 (.016)

1.433

Constant

Country
Edu
IPS x
Country

R2=.16

R2=.20

R2=.08

Ad. R2=.13

Ad. R2=.18

Ad. R2=.06

ns p > 0.05; *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001
n(total)=247
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5.2 Study 2 – Relative deprivation regarding social acknowledgement
While relative deprivation is mostly studied with regard to economic status, this is not
the only kind of deprivation people can experience. In particular in post-conflict
settings the issue of social acknowledgement and status after periods of suffering and
discrimination can be assumed to play a role as well. This type of relative deprivation
is also referred to as “social relative deprivation” in the context of the present research
in order to differentiate it from “economic relative deprivation”, which was the subject
of study 1.
The second study focuses on social relative deprivation but otherwise investigates the
same assumptions and employs the same dependent variables of injustice perceptions
and forgiveness.45. The experimental manipulation represented by the four vignette
scenarios concerns the different levels of social acknowledgement of the victim and
the perpetrator after the conflict.
This section presenting the findings of the second study is organized in the same way
as study 1. First the effect of the experimental manipulation on experienced relative
deprivation is examined, followed by a testing of the three hypotheses.46
5.2.1 Social comparison and relative deprivation
This section starts with an examination of the effects of the experimental manipulation
on experienced relative deprivation. In the same way as in study 1, this can be
considered a manipulation check to examine if the vignette scenarios did result in
different levels of experienced relative deprivation, as expected.
Uganda
In an analogous analysis to study 1 the differences between vignette scenarios were
examined firstly through a descriptive analysis comparing the mean values of the
variable experienced relative deprivation in the four experimental conditions. This
preliminary assessment of the mean values revealed the expected pattern. The “relative
deprivation scenario” generated the highest relative deprivation values and the

45
46

See chapter 4 for more details about the variables in study 2.
For alternative analyses with ANOVA and MANOVA see appendix 6
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scenario of the victim being more socially acknowledged than the perpetrator, the
lowest (table 24 and chart 7).
Secondly, the vignette dummy variables were regressed on the experienced relative
deprivation variable to examine if differences appearing in the descriptive analysis are
statistically significant. In other words, the analysis addressed the question of whether
the different levels of social acknowledgement of the victim and perpetrator resulted
in significantly different levels of experienced relative deprivation. It turned out that
all the conditions significantly differed from each other in the generated levels of
relative deprivation (table 25).
A closer look at the values of relative deprivation in the four conditions shows that
while the levels of experienced relative deprivation are significantly different from
each other in each condition, only the one in which the victim is in a socially higher
position did not result in experienced relative deprivation at all. This means that any
condition, apart from the one in which the victim is in a considerably better position
than the perpetrator, generated relative deprivation to a certain degree.
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Table 24: Estimated marginal means of experienced relative deprivation in the four experimental
conditions (Uganda)

Dependent Variable:

Experienced relative Deprivation
95% Confidence Interval

Vignette Version

Mean

Std. Error

Lower Bound

Upper Bound

V1 (V.High_P.High)

9.032

.462

8.118

9.947

V2 (V.High_P.Low)

12.344

.455

11.444

13.244

V3 (V.Low_P.High)

5.063

.455

4.163

5.962

V4 (V.Low_P.Low)

6.677

.462

5.763

7.592

n (total)=126
Per cell: V1 n=31; V2 n=32; V1 n=32; V4 n=31

170

Chart 7 Experienced relative deprivation in the four vignette scenarios (Uganda)
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Table 25: Differences between the vignette scenarios on experienced relative deprivation (Uganda)

Unstandardized Coefficients
Vignette comparisons
1

2

3

B (s.e.)

T

Sig.

(Constant)

5.063 (.455)

11.136

.000

V3* ->V1

3.970 (.648)

6.125

.000

V3 ->V2

7.281 (.643)

11.325

.000

V3-> V4

1.615 (.648)

2.492

.014

(Constant)

12.344 (.455)

27.152

.000

V2-> V1

-3.311 (.648)

-5.110

.000

V2-> V4

-5.666 (.648)

-8.743

.000

(Constant)

6.677 (.462)

14.457

.000

V1 -> V4

2.355 (.653)

3.605

.000

n (total)=126
Per cell: V1 n=31; V2 n=32; V1 n=32; V4 n=31
* V3 represents the “relative deprivation” scenario
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Poland
The descriptive analysis of the mean values of experienced relative deprivation in the
four experimental conditions showed that the scenario in which the victim is in a better
situation than the perpetrator did not result in relative deprivation while all other
scenarios appear to have elicited comparable levels of experienced relative deprivation
(table 26 and chart 8). This was confirmed by the next step in the analysis that was
carried out to establish which of the scenarios are significantly different from the
others with regard to the level of experienced relative deprivation they have generated.
This was done through a series of multiple regressions of the vignette dummy variables
on the experienced relative deprivation variable. As it turned out, indeed, only V2 lead
to significantly different (lower) levels of experienced relative deprivation (table 27).
These results confirm, yet again, the assumption that experienced relative deprivation,
even though strongly influenced by the social comparison factor with the perpetrator
also appears to encompass other forms of relative deprivation of victims. Analogous
to study 1, victims in the Polish sample in the second study experienced comparable
levels of relative deprivation in all scenarios except when the victim enjoyed a higher
social status and acknowledgment than the perpetrator.
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Table 26: Estimated marginal means of experienced relative deprivation in the four experimental
conditions (Poland)

Dependent Variable:

Experienced relative Deprivation
95% Confidence Interval

Vignette Version

Mean

Std. Error

Lower Bound

Upper Bound

V1 (V.High_P.High)

9.565

.867

7.836

11.294

V2 (V.High_P.Low)

13.095

.907

11.286

14.905

V3 (V.Low_P.High)

8.300

.930

6.446

10.154

V4 (V.Low_P.Low)

7.600

1.315

4.978

10.222

n (total)=74
Per cell: V1 n=23; V2 n=21; V1 n=20; V4 n=10
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Chart 8 Experienced relative deprivation in the four vignette scenarios (Poland)
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Table 27: Differences between the vignette scenarios on experienced relative deprivation (Poland)

Unstandardized Coefficients
Vignette comparisons
1

2

3

B (s.e.)

T

Sig.

(Constant)

8.300 (.930)

8.928

.000

V3* ->V1

1.265 (1.271)

.995

.323

V3 ->V2

4.795 (1.299)

3.691

.000

V3-> V4

-.700 (1.610)

-.435

.665

(Constant)

13.095 (.907)

14.433

.000

V2-> V1

-3.530 (1.255)

-2.813

.006

V2-> V4

-5.495 (1.597)

-3.440

.001

(Constant)

7.600 (1.315)

5.780

.000

V1 -> V4

1.965 (1.575)

1.248

.216

n (total)=74
Per cell: V1 n=23; V2 n=21; V1 n=20; V4 n=10
* V3 represents the “relative deprivation” scenario
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Uganda and Poland – Experimental manipulation and social relative deprivation
In both research sites the experimental manipulation significantly impacted on
experienced relative deprivation. Yet again, the condition in which the victim was in a
better situation than the perpetrator (V2) was the only one not resulting in experienced
relative deprivation and significantly different from all the other scenarios (chart 9).
In Uganda, however, all other scenarios also elicited significantly different levels of
experienced relative deprivation. In Poland experienced relative deprivation values in
the remaining three vignette scenarios did not differ significantly from each other. This
outcome supports the previously stated assumption that it appears as if all scenarios
represented some form of relative deprivation to the victims, except for the one where
the victim enjoys higher social acknowledgment (V2).
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Chart 9 Experienced social relative deprivation in the four vignette scenarios - Uganda and Poland
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5.2.2 Relative deprivation and forgiveness
The hypothesized effects of relative deprivation on forgiveness (H1) were examined
by assessing the impact of the experimental manipulation, in particular the “relative
deprivation scenario” but also the experienced relative deprivation variable.
Uganda
The examination of the mean values of revenge motivation, avoidance motivation and
willingness to forgive in the four experimental conditions showed very small
differences between the vignette scenarios (table 28). The differences were so small
that any interpretation, based on the assumption that the outcomes might approach
significance, does not seem to be applicable here. Regression analyses of the vignette
dummy variables on the three forgiveness measures confirmed that the experimental
manipulation did not elicit significantly different levels of forgiveness.
A second analysis tested the effects of the experienced relative deprivation variable on
the three forgiveness measures. The multivariate regression analysis controlled for age,
sex and education (table 29). Experienced relative deprivation turned out to be a
significant predictor of avoidance motivation in the Ugandan sample. There was no
significant effect on either revenge motivation or on willingness to forgive.
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Table 28: Estimated marginal means of revenge, avoidance and forgiveness in the four vignette
versions (Uganda)

Mean (s.e.)
Vignette Version

Revenge

Avoidance

Forgiveness

V1 (V.High_P.High)

13.419 (.737)

19.581 (1.175)

4.065 (.211)

V2 (V.High_P.Low)

14.281 (.725)

21.219 (1.157)

3.781 (.207)

V3 (V.Low_P.High)

13.875 (.725)

20.469 (1.157)

3.906 (.207)

V4 (V.Low_P.Low)

14.677 (737)

22.516 (1.175)

3.581 (.211)

n (total)=126
Per cell: V1 n=31; V2 n=32; V1 n=32; V4 n=31
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Table 29: Experienced relative deprivation multivariate regression results on revenge, avoidance and
forgiveness (Uganda)

Revenge

Avoidance

Unstandardized B

Unstandardized B
t

(s.e.)
Cons-

Forgiveness
Unstandardized B
t

(s.e.)

t
(s.e.)

12.593 (2.779)

4.532

18.976 (4.408)

4.305

3.969 (.804)

4.939

-.162 (.097)

-1.666

-.447 (.155)**

-2.889

.031 (.028)

1.106

Age

.023 (.026)

.889

.030 (.041)

.727

-.007 (.007)

-.933

Sex

.991 (.881)

1.125

2.172 (1.397)

1.554

-.205 (.255)

-.806

Edu-

.089 (.735)

.121

.441 (1.166)

.378

.150 (.213)

.706

tant
Ex.RD

cation
R2= .09;
Ad. R2 = .06
ns p > 0.05; *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001
n =126
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Poland
The descriptive analysis of the mean values of the three forgiveness measures in the
four experimental conditions did not reveal any visible differences (table 30) and
therefore there is no indication that any of the differences could have been significant
by using a bigger sample. The only slight difference was with V4. The number of
respondents in this experimental condition was, however, even smaller than in the
others and, therefore, such slight and statistically insignificant differences should be
treated with caution in this particular case. The regression analyses of the vignette
dummy variables on the forgiveness measures confirmed that the experimental
manipulation did not affect any of the dependent variables significantly.
Another analysis was performed to test if the experienced relative deprivation variable
had any significant effects on forgiveness. Contrary to the assumptions of the first
hypothesis (H1) relative deprivation with regard to social status was not a significant
predictor of any of the forgiveness measures in the Polish sample. The survey might
add some insight to finding an answer to the question of whether this lack of effect
was due to the context of the experiment or if the same pattern will appear in the case
of a real life context.
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Table 30: Estimated marginal means of revenge, avoidance and forgiveness in the four vignette
versions (Poland)

Mean (s.e.)
Vignette Version

Revenge

Avoidance

V1 (V.High_P.High)

14.522 (1.005)

29.478 (.990)

2.476 (.262)

V2 (V.High_P.Low)

14.048 (1.051)

29.762 (1.036)

2.905 (.262)

V3 (V.Low_P.High)

14.250 (1.077)

29.900 (1.062)

2.650 (2.650)

V4 (V.Low_P.Low)

16.400 (1.524)

26.200 (1.502)

3.400 (.380)

n (total)=74
Per cell: V1 n=23; V2 n=21; V1 n=20; V4 n=10
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Forgiveness

Uganda and Poland – Hypothesis 1
Relative deprivation related to social acknowledgement turned out to have only very
limited effect on forgiveness. In the Polish sample neither the operationalization of
relative deprivation deriving from social comparison, and represented by the
experimental scenarios, nor the variable experienced relative deprivation had any
effect on forgiveness. In Uganda only the experienced relative deprivation did increase
avoidance motivation.
Even in a combined analysis of the Ugandan and Polish samples together the “relative
deprivation scenario” (V3) did not significantly increase revenge or avoidance
motivation or decrease willingness to forgive as compared with the three other
scenarios. In other words, the experimental manipulation of relative deprivation
related to social acknowledgement had no direct effect on forgiveness in any of the
two countries. The only significant control variable in case of willingness to forgive
and avoidance motivation was “country”. The outcomes indicated that willingness to
forgive was on average significantly higher in Uganda and avoidance motivation on
average significantly higher in Poland47. There was no significant difference between
the countries in case of revenge motivation.
A comparative analysis of the joint sample of both countries showed a significant
interaction between experienced relative deprivation and country on the dependent
variable of avoidance motivation. Experienced relative deprivation related to social
acknowledgment increased avoidance motivation in Uganda, while it had no effect in
Poland. Moreover, model 1 showed the significant effect of “country” on avoidance
motivation and willingness to forgive. This means that the levels of avoidance
motivation are much higher and the willingness to forgive significantly lower in
Poland (table 31).
Summarizing, it appears that social relative deprivation plays a much less important
role when it comes to direct effects on forgiveness, even though it was not completely
irrelevant in the Ugandan sample.

47

“Country” as control variable on the dependent variables of:
Willingness to forgive (b = -1.418), t(192) = -3.405, p = .001);
Avoidance motivation (b =7.980), t(192) = 3.807, p < .001);
Other control variables were sex, education level and age
184

Table 31:The effects of experienced relative deprivation on revenge and avoidance motivation and
willingness to forgive in Poland and Uganda

Model1

Revenge
Unstandardized
B (s.e.)

Cons-

Avoidance
t

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

Forgiveness
t

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

t

14.950 (2.383)

6.274

17.895 (3.302)

5.420

3.537 (.661)

5.350

-.084 (.075)

-1.124

-.246 (.104)*

-2.359

.025 (.021)

1.195

Age

.013 (.024)

.540

.015 (.033)

.473

-.004 (.007)

-.635

Sex

.181 (.767)

.237

1.999 (1.063)

1.880

-.034 (.212)

-.159

Country

1.402 (1.489)

.941

8.033 (2.064)***

3.892

Ed. level

-.612 (.616)

-.993

.633 (.853)

.742

tant
Ex. RD

Nothing sig

Model2

Revenge
Unstandardized
B (s.e.)

Cons-

t

-1.425 (.413)*** -3.453
.195 (.171)

R2=.34

R2=.19

Ad. R2=.32

Ad. R2=.17

Avoidance

Forgiveness

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

t

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

1.139

t

15.317 (2.416)

6.341

19.041 (3.316)

5.742

3.510 (.671)

5.228

-.150 (.103)

-1.459

-.450 (.141)**

-3.186

.030 (.029)

1.049

Age

.014 (.024)

.587

.019 (.032)

.585

-.004 (.007)

-.646

Sex

.229 (.769)

.298

2.146 (1.056)*

2.033

-.037 (.213)

-.175

Country

.061 (2.068)

.030

3.858 (2.839)

1.359

Ed. level

-.585 (.617)

-.948

.717 (.846)

.847

.192 (171)

1.122

.141 (.151)

.934

.438 (.207)*

2.119

-.011 (.042)

-.255

tant
Ex. RD

RD x

-1.323 (.576)* -2.296

Country
Nothing sig

R2=.35

R2=.19

Ad. R2=.33

Ad. R2=.16

ns p > 0.05; *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001
n (total)=200
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5.2.3 Relative deprivation and injustice perceptions
The second hypothesis (H2) postulates that relative deprivation increases injustice
perceptions. The effects of the experimental manipulation through vignette scenarios
on injustice perceptions are examined together with an analysis of the effects of
experienced relative deprivation.
Uganda
The examination of the mean values of the Injustice Perceptions scale in the four
experimental conditions presented a pattern which suggested that in Uganda it is more
likely the situation of the victim that affects the justice judgements most (table 32 and
chart 10). The mean values also implied that both conditions in which the victim was
socially acknowledged did not lead to relative deprivation. Both conditions have
values below 28, which is the value of an average neutral response indicating neither
perceived justice nor injustice.
An examination of the differences between the vignette scenarios confirmed the
pattern presented by the mean values (table 33). The two conditions in which the
victim was socially acknowledged did not result in significantly different injustice
perceptions. The same was true for the two conditions in which the victim was not
socially acknowledged.
The effects of experienced social relative deprivation on injustice perceptions were
also tested. A multiple regression analysis with the control variables age, sex and
education level confirmed the assumptions of this research (table 34). Experienced
relative deprivation increased injustice perceptions, which accorded with the second
hypothesis. Additionally, the education level had an impact on injustice perceptions. A
higher education level predicted a higher level of perceived injustice in the postconflict setting in the Ugandan sample.
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Table 32: Estimated marginal means of the Injustice Perceptions scale (IPS) in the four experimental
conditions (Uganda)

Dependent Variable:

Injustice perceptions
95% Confidence Interval

Vignette Version

Mean

Std. Error

Lower Bound

Upper Bound

V1 (V.High_P.High)

24.323

1.440

21.471

27.174

V2 (V.High_P.Low)

24.281

1.418

21.475

27.088

V3 (V.Low_P.High)

32.906

1.418

30.100

35.713

V4 (V.Low_P.Low)

34.581

1.440

31.729

37.432

n (total)=126
Per cell: V1 n=31; V2 n=32; V1 n=32; V4 n=31
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Chart 10 Injustice perceptions in the four vignette scenarios (Uganda)
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Table 33: Differences between the vignette scenarios on injustice perceptions (Uganda)

Unstandardized Coefficients
Vignette comparisons
1

2

3

B (S.E.)

T

Sig.

(Constant)

32.906 (1.418)

23.210

.000

V3* ->V1

-8.584 (2.021)

-4.247

.000

V3 ->V4

1.674 (2.021)

.828

.409

V3-> V2

-8.625 (2.005)

-4.302

.000

(Constant)

24.281 (1.418)

17.126

.000

V2-> V1

.041 (2.021)

.020

.984

V2-> V4

10.299 (2.021)

5.096

.000

(Constant)

24.323 (1.440)

16.885

.000

V1 -> V4

10.258 (2.037)

5.036

.000

n (total)=126
Per cell: V1 n=31; V2 n=32; V1 n=32; V4 n=31
* V3 represents the “relative deprivation” scenario
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Table 34: Regression results of experienced relative deprivation on injustice perceptions (Uganda)

Unstandardized Coefficients
DV=Injustice Perceptions

B (s.e.)

T

Sig.

(Constant)

28.161 (5.395)

5.220

.000

Experienced
Relative
Deprivation

-1.347 (.189)

-7.118

.000

Age

.034 (.050)

.674

.502

Sex

2.729 (1.710)

1.596

.113

Education

3.511 (1.427)

2.460

.015

R2= .31; Adjusted R2= .29
n =126
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Poland
The descriptive analysis of the mean values of the Injustice Perceptions scale in the
four experimental conditions showed that V2, the condition in which the victim was
better off than the perpetrator, appeared different (table 35 and chart 11). All in all the
effects of the experimental manipulation of social acknowledgement on injustice
perceptions in the Polish sample appeared less pronounced as compared to the
manipulation of the economic conditions.
An analysis of the differences between the four experimental conditions with regard
to their effect on injustice perceptions showed that, yet again, it is mostly the relative
advantage condition (V2) that differs significantly from the other scenarios (table 36).
The situation in which the victim was more highly regarded socially than the
perpetrator elicited significantly lower injustice perceptions (was perceived as most
just) than all the other scenarios. The fact that the difference between V2 and V4 is not
significant can most probably be attributed to the extremely small sample size in the
V4 condition. All the outcomes in connection with this condition should be viewed
with caution.
Experienced relative deprivation significantly affected injustice perceptions in the
Polish sample (table 37). As expected, the regression analysis verified that experienced
relative deprivation increased injustice perceptions. None of the control variables age,
sex or education had any significant effect.
Summarizing, it appears that different types of relative deprivation add up, as
previously outlined, making only the condition in which the victim was in a better
situation than the perpetrator stand out. To put it differently, victims need to be better
off than the perpetrator to perceive the post-conflict setting as just. If the victim is on
a low level of the social hierarchy, the situation of the perpetrator does not play a very
important role, as the low status of the victim is perceived as unjust as such. When the
victim is highly regarded the comparison with the perpetrator becomes more relevant.
The victims perceive the situation where the perpetrator is equally highly regarded as
less just.
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Table 35: Estimated marginal means of the Injustice Perceptions scale in the four experimental
conditions (Poland)

Dependent Variable: Injustice perceptions
95% Confidence Interval
Vignette Version

Mean

Std. Error

Lower Bound

Upper Bound

V1 (V.High_P.High)

28.913

1.979

24.965

32.861

V2 (V.High_P.Low)

22.619

2.071

18.488

26.750

V3 (V.Low_P.High)

29.300

2.123

25.067

33.533

V4 (V.Low_P.Low)

27.600

3.002

21.613

33.587

n (total) =74
Per cell: V1 n=23; V2 n=21; V1 n=20; V4 n=10
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Chart 11 Injustice perceptions in the four vignette scenarios (Poland)
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Table 36: Differences between the vignette scenarios on injustice perceptions (Poland)

Unstandardized Coefficients
Vignette comparisons
1

2

3

B (s.e.)

t

Sig.

13.804

.000

(Constant)

29.300 (2.123)

V3* ->V1

-.387 (2.902)

-.133

.894

V3 ->V4

-1.700 (3.676)

-.462

.645

V3-> V2

-6.681 (2.966)

-2.253

.027

(Constant)

22.619 (2.071)

10.920

.000

V2-> V1

6.294 (2.865)

2.197

.031

V2-> V4

4.981 (3.647)

1.366

.176

(Constant)

27.600 (3.002)

9.195

.000

V1 -> V4

1.313 (3.596)

.365

.716

n (total)=74
Per cell: V1 n=23; V2 n=21; V1 n=20; V4 n=10
* V3 represents the “relative deprivation” scenario
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Table 37: Regression results of experienced relative deprivation on injustice perceptions (Poland)

Unstandardized Coefficients
DV=Injustice Perceptions
1

t

Sig.

46.510 (11.963)

3.888

.000

-.921 (.226)

-4.083

.000

Age

.078 (.099)

.782

.437

Sex

-1.425 (3.130)

-.455

.650

Education

-3.856 (2.161)

-1.784

.079

(Constant)
Experienced
Relative
Deprivation

B (s.e.)

R2= .26; Adjusted R2= .22
n=74

195

Uganda and Poland – Hypothesis 2
The findings regarding hypothesis 2 in the second study showed an interesting picture.
While experienced relative deprivation had a highly significant effect on injustice
perceptions in both research sites, the sources of the relative deprivation affecting
justice judgments appeared to differ. In both cases the injustice perceptions did not
seem to be predominantly derived from an upward comparison of social
acknowledgement with that of the perpetrator (chart 12).
In Uganda, relative deprivation related to the before and after comparison of victim’s
conditions, which in two scenarios improved post-conflict and in two did not, had the
strongest effect on injustice perceptions in study 2.
In Poland, the comparison with the perpetrator became relevant when the victim
himself was highly socially acknowledged. In that case victims perceived a situation
where the perpetrator was on a low level of social hierarchy as more just than when he
was as highly regarded as the victim, which resulted in an assessment of the postconflict setting as less just. The post-conflict context was generally perceived as unjust
when the victim was on a low level of the social hierarchy regardless of how the social
status of the perpetrator was.
An analysis of the joint sample of Poland and Uganda did not contribute any new
insights (table 38). When the “relative deprivation scenario” (V3) was compared with
the other scenarios, a similar picture emerged. When it comes to injustice perceptions,
a low social status of the victim outweighs other comparison factors, which might only
become relevant when the victim is better off. Experienced relative deprivation had a
highly significant effect on injustice perceptions in both country samples. However, it
did not appear to result predominantly from an upward social comparison with the
perpetrator.
A comparative analysis of the joint Ugandan and Polish samples did not reveal
significant differences between the two countries in study 2 (table 39) It showed that
also experienced relative deprivation related to social acknowledgement did have a
highly negative effect on justice perceptions of both victim groups in Uganda and
Poland. .
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Chart 12 Injustice perceptions in the four vignette scenarios
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- Uganda and Poland

Table 38: The effects of the social “relative deprivation scenario” as compared with the other vignette
scenarios on injustice perceptions - Poland and Uganda

DV=Injustice Perceptions
V3 as
contrast

B (s.e.)

T

Sig.

(Constant)

29.406 (4.939)

5.954

.000

V1

-5.374 (1.741)

-3.086

.002

V4

1.512 (1.867)

.810

.419

V2

-7.825 (1.722)

-4.543

.000

Country

-3.152 (3.066)

-1.028

.305

Age

.019 (.048)

.388

.699

Sex

.418 (1.581)

.264

.792

Education

.670 (1.271)

.527

.599

R2= .17; Adjusted R2= .14
Per cell: V1 n=54; V2 n=53; V1 n=52; V4 n=41
n (total)=200
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Table 39: The effects of social experienced relative deprivation on injustice perceptions - Poland and
Uganda
Unstandardized Coefficients
Model
1

B

(S.E)

T

Sig.

(Constant)

35.423 (4.613)

7.679

.000

Ex. RD

-1.148 (.146)

-7.890

.000

Age

.029 (.046)

.637

.525

Sex

.317 (1.485)

.213

.831

-2.415( (2.884)

-.838

.403

.79(0 (1.192)

.663

.508

T

Sig.

Country
Education level
R2=.26;
Ad R2=.24

Unstandardized Coefficients
Model
2

B

(S.E.)

(Constant)

36.291 (4.672)

7.768

.000

Ex. RD

-1.303 (.199)

-6.550

.000

Age

.032 (.046)

.695

.488

Sex

.429 (1.487)

.288

.773

-1.394

.165

Country

-5.578 (4.000)

Education level

.854 (1.192)

.716

.475

RDx

.332 (.291)

1.140

.256

Country
R2=.27;
Ad R2=.24
n(total)=200
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5.2.4 Injustice perceptions and forgiveness
The third hypothesis (H3) assumes a negative relation between injustice perceptions
and forgiveness and, thus, an additional indirect effect of relative deprivation on
forgiveness via justice. Injustice perceptions, in case of study 2 triggered by social
inequality, are postulated to increase revenge and avoidance motivation and reduce the
willingness to forgive. In order to test the hypothesis a multivariate regression analysis
of the Injustice Perceptions Scale on the three forgiveness measures was carried out in
both research sites. The findings are reported below.
Uganda
The assumed relationship between injustice perceptions and forgiveness could be
verified in study 2 in the Ugandan sample. A multivariate regression analysis
confirmed that injustice perceptions increased revenge and avoidance motivation and
reduced willingness to forgive (table 40). The control variables included age, sex and
education and none of them had any significant effect on any of the forgiveness
measures.
In order to test if the direct effect of the experienced relative deprivation variable on
avoidance is mediated by injustice perceptions a Sobel test was performed. The test
confirmed that injustice perceptions constitute a significant mediator between relative
deprivation and avoidance (Sobel test statistic -2.83; p<.01). The effect of experienced
relative deprivation on avoidance motivation became insignificant when the Injustice
Perceptions scale was added into the regression analysis, indicating a full mediation.
This means that all effects of relative deprivation on forgiveness in the Ugandan
sample are via justice perceptions.
Poland
The assumptions of the third hypothesis could also be confirmed by the Polish sample.
The multivariate regression analysis revealed significant effects of injustice
perceptions on all three forgiveness measures, increasing, as expected revenge and
avoidance motivation and reducing the willingness to forgive (table 41). Age, sex and
education level were controlled for and education had a significant effect on avoidance
motivation in the Polish sample. A higher level of education contributed to more
avoidance motivation.
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Table 40: Injustice Perception Scale (IPS) multivariate regression results on revenge, avoidance and
forgiveness (Uganda)

Revenge

Avoidance

Unstandardized B

Unstandardized B
t

(s.e.)
Cons-

Forgiveness
Unstandardized B
t

t
(s.e.)

(s.e.)

8.556 (2.723)

3.142

11.247 (4.385)

2.565

5.003 (.788)

6.350

IPS

.150 (.038)***

3.991

.257 (.061)***

4.236

-.041 (.011)***

-3.752

Age

.018 (.024)

.753

.020 (.039)

.499

-.006 (.007)

-.836

Sex

.607 (.837)

.725

1.405 (1.348)

1.042

-.109 (.242)

-.451

Edu-

-.400 (.697)

-.574

-.557 (1.123)

-.496

.271 (.202)

1.342

tant

cation
R2= .14;

R2= .15;

R2= .14;

Ad. R2 = .11

Ad. R2 = .13

Ad. R2 = .11

ns p > 0.05; *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001
n(total)=126
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Table 41: Injustice Perception Scale (IPS) multivariate regression results on revenge, avoidance and
forgiveness (Poland)

Revenge

Avoidance

Unstandardized B

Unstandardized B
t

(s.e.)
Cons-

Forgiveness
Unstandardized B
t

t
(s.e.)

(s.e.)

15.812 (6.221)

2.542

16.635 (6.204)

2.682

2.866 (1.626)

1.763

IPS

.176 (.055)**

3.175

.223 (.055)***

4.036

-.048 (.014)**

3.310

Age

-.037 (.051)

-.737

-.067 (.050)

-1.320

.015 (.013)

1.175

Sex

-1.438 (1.568)

-.917

.717(1.563)

.459

.617 (.406)

1.520

Edu-

-.577 (1.122)

-.514

2.751 (1.119)*

2.459

-.151 (.294)

-.515

tant

cation
R2= .16;

R2= .23;

R2= .17;

Ad. R2 = .11

Ad. R2 = .18

Ad. R2 = .12

ns p > 0.05; *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001
n=74
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Uganda and Poland – Hypothesis 3
The hypothesis that injustice perceptions triggered by social inequality have a negative
effect on forgiveness was verified in both countries. Injustice perceptions increased
revenge and avoidance motivation and reduced the willingness to forgive in Uganda
as well as in Poland. This indicates a significant similarity between these very different
settings, which supports the assumption that justice and forgiveness are closely related.
A comparative analysis of both country samples together confirmed the assumed
similarity. None of the interaction effects between country and injustice perceptions
on any of the forgiveness measures turned out to be significant (table 42). Injustice
perceptions triggered by social inequality had similar effects on forgiveness in both
countries. The significant effect of the country variable in model 1 showed that, as
discovered previously, avoidance motivation was generally higher and willingness to
forgive lower in the Polish sample.
Finally, it turned out that injustice perceptions mediated the effect of relative
deprivation on avoidance motivation in the Ugandan sample. This makes injustice
perceptions a central factor in the relationship between social relative deprivation and
forgiveness in both countries.
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Table 42: The effect of injustice perceptions (IPS) on revenge motivation, avoidance motivation and
willingness to forgive in Poland and Uganda
Model1

Revenge
Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

Cons-

Avoidance
t

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

Forgiveness
t

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)
4.837 (.658)

t

10.000 (2.345)

4.265

10.040 (3.281)

3.060

7.351

IPS

.158 (.031)***

5.171

.224 (.043)***

5.229

Age

.008 (.022)

.379

.009 (.031)

.290

-.003 (.006)

-.509

Sex

.137 (.720)

.190

1.928 (1.008)

1.913

-.022 (.202)

-.107

1.802 (1.401)

1.286

8.576 (1.960)***

4.374

.464 (.806)

.576

tant

Country
Edu

-.664 (.576) -1.153
2

Model2

2

-1.524 (.392)*** -3.886
.207 (.161)

R =.40

R =.27

Ad. R2=.11

Ad. R2=.39

Ad. R2=.25

Revenge

Avoidance

Forgiveness

t

1.282

2

R =.14

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)
Cons-

-.040 (.009)*** -4.715

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

t

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)
4.839 (.673)

t

10.117 (2.400)

4.215

9.511 (3.354)

2.835

7.192

IPS

.152 (.039)***

3.866

.251 (.055)***

4.556

Age

.008 (.022)

.373

.009 (.031)

.305

-.003 (.006)

-.508

Sex

.151 (.724)

.208

1.865 (1.012)

1.843

-.021 (.203)

-.105

1.344 (2.363)

.569

10.640 (3.301)***

3.223

-.642 (.584) -1.099

.366 (.816)

.449

.208 (.164)

1.265

-.069 (.089)

-.778

.000 (.018)

.022

tant

Country
Edu

.015 (.064)

IPS x

.241

-.041 (.011)*** -3.684

-1.536 (.664)* -2.315

Country
R2=.14

R2=.41

R2=.27

Ad. R2=.11

Ad. R2=.39

Ad. R2=.24

ns p > 0.05; *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001
n(total)=200
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5.3 Conclusion of both experimental studies in Uganda and Poland
The experimental study revealed a number of interesting findings that could not have
been discovered without the experimental manipulation of scenarios. The initial focus
of the experiment and the whole present study was on relative deprivation, which
derives from a disadvantageous social comparison. The central assumption was that if
victims are in a worse situation than the perpetrators, even after the conflict or regime
has ended, this will lead to relative deprivation and further to a reduced willingness to
forgive the perpetrator group.
The conceptualization and design of the study was challenging since relative
deprivation has not been studied before in the context of transitional justice and there
have also been no studies on the relationship between relative deprivation and
forgiveness. The four vignette scenarios were developed to represent all possible social
comparison situations between victim and perpetrator. In study 1, the scenario of the
victim being worse off than the perpetrator in economic terms represented the “relative
deprivation” condition; and in study 2 the relative deprivation related to a disparity in
social acknowledgment of victim vis-à-vis perpetrator. This scenario was assumed to
generate relative deprivation according to theory, while the others would not.
The experienced relative deprivation variable, consisting of the comparison,
deservingness, anger and resentment elements of relative deprivation, constituted a
manipulation check to see if the vignette scenarios elicited different levels of
experienced relative deprivation as assumed. To put it simply, the group of victims in
the “relative deprivation” condition (the vignette scenario where the victim was worse
off than the perpetrator) was expected to display the highest level of experienced
relative deprivation.
The finding, puzzling at first, but consistent throughout both research sites and both
studies, showed that the experimental manipulation had a highly significant effect on
experienced relative deprivation, but not quite as expected. Firstly, the most consistent
finding was that the condition of the victim’s privileged situation vis-à-vis the
perpetrator (or downward comparison of the victim with the perpetrator) stood out as
the one being consistently different from all the other conditions. The condition in
which the victim was better off than the perpetrator was also the only one that did not
elicit experienced relative deprivation. The other scenarios were sometimes
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significantly different from each other with regard to the level of relative deprivation
they educed and sometimes not. For example, in the first study the difference between
the two scenarios in which the victim was poor did not differ in the strengths of
resulting relative deprivation. The situation of the perpetrator seemed less relevant. It
means that when the victim is poor, he is still perceived to be worse off than the
perpetrator even when the perpetrator is equally poor.
While the pattern was generally as expected with the “relative deprivation scenario”
condition resulting in the highest experienced relative deprivation, the situation of the
victim being poor (in study 1) or on a low social hierarchy level (in study 2) had such
a strong effect that the fact of perpetrator being poor too was not registered. Victims
still perceived him as being in a better situation and experienced relative deprivation
similar to the one they felt when the perpetrator was truly better off.
However, it was also clear that not only the situation of the victim played a role. There
was a consistently significant difference between the levels of experienced relative
deprivation in the two conditions in which the victim was well off, socially and
economically. The condition in which the perpetrator was worse off than the victim
consistently generated less experienced relative deprivation and this consistence was
significantly found in both studies and both countries. It appears that the situation of
the perpetrator becomes more relevant when the conditions of the victims, social or
economic, are good. A possible explanation is “cumulative” perspective on the
perpetrator’s conditions. Even when the perpetrator is poor now, he used to be wealthy
and therefore, is still considered better off than the victim, who was and still is poor.
Similarly, when both, victim and perpetrator, are well off economically the victims still
suffered before while nothing changed for the perpetrator. This makes victims
experience relative deprivation even when the victim and perpetrator in the vignette
story are both doing equally well after the conflict.
The experienced relative deprivation variable had strong and consistent effects
increasing injustice perceptions across studies and samples. The direct effects of the
experimental manipulation on injustice perceptions showed that it is mostly the
comparatively privileged condition of the victim, which leads to less perceived
injustice while the differences between the three other scenarios are less pronounced.
In particular, when the victim is poor or on a low level of social hierarchy this leads
on average to strong injustice perceptions that are not lessened by the perpetrator being
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equally badly off. Only when the victim is doing well the downward comparison with
the perpetrator becomes significant in reducing injustice perceptions of the postconflict setting
A possible interpretation was that there is an element of social comparison between
the victim and perpetrator, which strongly impacts experienced relative deprivation
and injustice perceptions. But it is not the whole story. Experienced relative
deprivation is apparently influenced by other factors too. The theory of relative
deprivation offers an explanation. While much of literature has focused, as with this
study initially, on relative deprivation deriving from social comparisons of the present
status quo (i. e. comparison between ingroup and outgroup at one particular point in
time), there are other types of relative deprivation. These other types might be
particularly relevant for victims in a post-conflict setting. Temporal relative
deprivation, for instance, involves a comparison of the ingroups’s before and after
conditions or relative deprivation can arise out of a comparison with an imagined better
alternative outcome (Helson 1964; Folger 1986; de la Sablonnière et al. 2015).
All of these types of relative deprivation might be applicable to victims in a postconflict setting. Victims might compare their own situations over time and they are
also likely to have expectations that their situations will improve when the conflict or
regime ends. Moreover, they might also compare the situation of the perpetrators over
time and have expectations about how the perpetrators’ circumstances should evolve
as well. If any of those comparisons turns out to be negative it may contribute to
experienced relative deprivation overall. Depending on the context and the targeted
comparison (e.g. economic conditions, social status etc.) the dominance of the one
type or another of relative deprivation may differ. However, one clearly emerging
finding appears to be that “punishing” the perpetrator economically or socially,
without simultaneously improving the conditions of the victims might not have much
effect on neither the victims’ experienced relative deprivation nor on their justice
assessments of the post-conflict setting. At the same time improving victims’
conditions while leaving the perpetrators in a privileged position (in particular in
economic terms) also results in a certain degree of relative deprivation and injustice
perceptions. Both relative deprivation and injustice perceptions are significantly
reduced by improving the conditions of victims but are still present if the perpetrators
are not demoted – economically or socially.
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The consideration of the different types of relative deprivation experienced by victims
and described above contributes to a better understanding of the findings. It explains
the different outcomes between the effects of the experimental “relative deprivation
scenario” and the effects of the experienced relative deprivation variable. It appears
that, contrary to the assumptions, all vignette scenarios constitute different levels of
experienced relative deprivation except the one where the victim is better off. This
explanation also helps interpret the finding that vignette scenarios, which described
conditions of apparent equality between victim and perpetrator, still generated relative
deprivation. And finally it explains why the comparatively privileged situation of the
victim (and downward comparison with the perpetrator) was the only condition which
did not result in relative deprivation and was always significantly different from all
scenarios. It is the only condition which comes close to addressing and reversing
several possible types of relative deprivation that victims might experience.
The experimental scenarios offer some additional clues as to what type of relative
deprivation might play a more important role depending on the research site and the
object of comparison. When it comes to economic wellbeing the comparison with the
perpetrator only becomes relevant in the Ugandan sample when the victim’s economic
conditions are good. In Poland, only the scenario where the victim is better off
economically significantly reduces injustice perceptions of the post-conflict setting.
The other three scenarios do not differ significantly from each in their effects on
injustice perceptions. Neither the victim’s improved economic conditions nor the
decline of the perpetrator’s economic situation on their own is significant enough to
affect injustice perceptions of the post-conflict setting.
When it comes to social acknowledgment, in Uganda the victims’ improvement in his
own circumstances appeared to affect justice judgements more heavily. In Poland it
was again the different types of social relative deprivation that added up and
contributed to injustice perceptions. If the victim is not higher in the social hierarchy
than the perpetrator this leads to a perception of the post-conflict setting as unjust.
The experienced relative deprivation variable affected injustice perceptions
consistently in both countries and both studies. The general average level of injustice
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perceptions, though, was higher in study 1 in both countries48. This seems to indicate
that economic conditions have overall more power to trigger injustice perceptions than
a lack of social acknowledgement.
The effects on forgiveness, considering the multidimensional and complex nature of
this concept, were more mixed. Relative deprivation did appear to affect forgiveness,
but it affected the different measures slightly differently. In the Ugandan sample a part
of the effects, in particular of social relative deprivation, on the different forgiveness
measures was indirect or mediated by injustice perceptions. In Poland there are some
direct effects of economic relative deprivation on forgiveness.
Economic relative deprivation turned out to have more pronounced effects on
forgiveness than social relative deprivation. Moreover, in case of forgiveness the
disadvantageous comparison (or upward comparison of the victim with the perpetrator)
did play the most important role for the victims. In a combined sample of Poland and
Uganda the victims in the “relative deprivation scenario” displayed the highest revenge
motivation compared with all other scenarios. Moreover, when it comes to willingness
to forgive the economic conditions of the perpetrator seemed to be of utmost
importance, more so than the conditions of the victim. The scenarios where the
perpetrator was rich resulted in significantly less forgiveness than the scenarios where
the perpetrator was poor.
A mostly consistent picture was presented by the findings regarding the effects of
injustice perceptions on forgiveness. Those effects were generally present in the
expected direction in both countries and studies. The only exception was the Polish
sample in study 1.
A comparative analysis of the two research sites revealed, moreover, some significant
country effects. The avoidance level towards the perpetrator was generally higher in
Poland across studies. When economic injustices were salient there was a higher level
of revenge motivation in Uganda compared to Poland. When social inequalities were
salient there was less forgiveness in the Polish sample.

48

Study 1:Uganda (mean 34.1; median 36; mode 42); Poland (mean 30.3; median 31; mode 49)
Study 2: Uganda (mean 29; median 30; mode 27); Poland (mean 27; median 28.5; mode 35)
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To sum up, it appears that different comparisons affect different aspects of injustice
perceptions and forgiveness. When it comes to injustice perceptions, if the victim’s
conditions are low (economic or social) or the perpetrator’s conditions are high it both
contributes to increasing injustice perceptions of the post-conflict setting among
victims. To reduce injustice perceptions the victims need to be better off. When it
comes to forgiveness it is mostly the “relative deprivation scenario”, which leads to
revenge motivation. The willingness to forgive, finally, is influenced mostly by the
conditions of the perpetrator. The victims seem more willing to forgive a poor
perpetrator than a rich one.
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CHAPTER 6. RELATIVE DEPRIVATION EFFECTS ON FORGIVENESS
AND JUSTICE PERCEPTIONS – SURVEY
The hypotheses that were tested by means of an experiment involving different
versions (or scenarios) of a vignette were also tested using a survey methodology. The
results of the latter are reported in this chapter. The two approaches are intended to
complement each other as each has their own strengths and weaknesses as experiments
tend to have greater internal and surveys a better external validity.
The purpose of the experimental design with its separate conditions (or versions) of
the same vignette was to introduce variance and allow for causality verification. The
experiment also enabled a more nuanced understanding of relative deprivation, which
would not have been possible by means of the survey methodology alone.
In contrast with hypothetical situations provided by the experiment,, real life situations
and own experiences are likely to produce stronger opinions and emotions. Victims
may be opposed to revenge on an abstract level and declare their willingness to forgive
when presented with a fictional story; however, when it comes to their own history and
the perpetrators who actually had a negative effect on their lives, their attitudes may
differ. The survey can, therefore, corroborate the experiment findings in a real life
context enabling a more reliable interpretation of the results.
This chapter is organized in the same way as the previous chapter 5 was. First the
findings of study 1, which explored the effects of economic relative deprivation, are
described. Study 2, which followed, focused on social relative deprivation. Within
these two studies, subsections dealt with the three hypotheses, namely the effects of
relative deprivation on forgiveness (H1) and on injustice perceptions (H2) and finally,
the effects of injustice perceptions on forgiveness (H3) including the testing of possible
mediation effects. The findings from the two research sites alternated for each
hypothesis.
The country samples are first analyzed separately, followed by a comparative section
for each of the hypotheses.
6.1 Study 1 - Relative deprivation related to economic wellbeing
In the following sections the findings regarding the three hypotheses are presented in
the Ugandan and Polish samples. The same measurement tools and scales have been
211

applied as in the experimental study to enable comparisons49. A number of additional
control variables have been included that relate to the real life experiences and attitudes
of the interviewees and might, therefore, have an impact in a non-fictional setting.
6.1.1 Relative deprivation and forgiveness
The first hypothesis (H1) assumes a negative impact of relative deprivation on
forgiveness. To assess the potential effects of relative deprivation on the different
forgiveness measures, the same tools were applied as in the experiments. Relative
deprivation was operationalized through the same four items as the experienced
relative deprivation variable in the experiment.

50

The dependent variable of

forgiveness was measured with the TRIM-12 questionnaire, consisting of revenge and
avoidance motivation sub-scales, and the added forgiveness item.
Additionally, some control variables were included, which might influence forgiveness,
such as religiosity, victimization experience and victim identification. The outcomes
of the analyses are divided into two models. Adding more control variables can reduce
the statistical significance of the predictor variable. Therefore, the first model only
includes relative deprivation and the demographic variables, while in the second model
religiosity, victimization experience and victim identification are added. Religiosity
has been theorized to affect forgiveness. 51 Identification with other victims is
significant for group relative deprivation52 and might negatively affect forgiveness if
the suffering of others is added to own painful experiences. Victimization experience,
finally, obviously differs in Uganda and Poland. In Uganda it was operationalized as
abduction and in Poland as arrest or detention. Abduction, in Uganda, can be seen as
representing one of the most pronounced forms of victimization experiences and may
also have a negative effect on forgiving the perpetrators. In Poland the political
prisoners are differentiated from those who had not spent time in prison.
Victim identification and victimization (i. e. abduction/arrest) experience are both
single items. Victim identification is measured with a 5-point Likert scale and

49

The reliability of all scales applied in the survey is described in chapter 4.
See chapter 4 for details.
51
See chapter 2.3.2.
52
See chapter 2.2.2
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victimization is a dummy variable. Religiosity is measured in the form of a short 3item scale.53
Originally, in the survey, two measures of relative deprivation were included. The
differences between the two scales are described in the methodology section. The
reason for the two measures was that the case of an individual comparison with
outgroup individuals was considered ambiguous as it could either constitute group or
individual relative deprivation (H. J. Smith and Pettigrew 2014). In the present study,
even though respondents were asked to compare their individual situation with that of
the perpetrators’, it was their identity of being a victim, which was triggered and which
made the victim group membership salient. It can, therefore, be assumed that the
individual comparison with perpetrators in this research is more likely to represent
group relative deprivation. However, in order to be sure that it does, both measures of
relative deprivation were included, one focusing on the individual comparison
(personal economic situation compared with the economic conditions of the
perpetrators) and one focusing on the comparison of the ingroup of victims with the
outgroup of perpetrators.
The result was that both scales had, indeed, very similar effects across both studies and
countries. In order to simplify the following section only the outcomes of one of the
scales are presented, namely the one where the victims are asked to compare their
personal situation with the perpetrators (and not the whole group of victims). While
both measurements are similar, this scale yielded more consistent results and had on
average a better reliability. The reason is most probably that it is easier for people to
compare their own situation, which they know very well, with the circumstances of a
group of perpetrators, than compare the conditions of their whole group with that of
perpetrators.
Uganda
The first hypothesis was fully verified in the Ugandan sample. Relative deprivation
turned out to be the most significant predictor of revenge and avoidance motivation,
as well as willingness to forgive in both models (table 43). Other significant predictors
include victim identification, which increases revenge and avoidance motivation;

53

See chapter 4 for details.
213

religiosity, which reduces avoidance motivation and increases willingness to forgive;
and finally, the experience of abduction, which reduces the willingness to forgive.
Poland
The first hypothesis was partly verified in the Polish sample. Relative deprivation is a
significant predictor of revenge motivation and willingness to forgive (in model 2). It
has no effect on avoidance motivation for which the only significant predictor is
education level, which decreases avoidance motivation (table 44). This supports the
findings of Azar and Mullet (2002), who found that willingness to forgive increases
with higher levels of education. Other significant control variables include victim
identification, increasing revenge motivation and religiosity, increasing willingness to
forgive.
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Table 43: Multivariate regression results of economic relative deprivation on revenge, avoidance and
willingness to forgive (Uganda)
Model1

Revenge
Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

Constant
RD
Age
Sex
Edu-

Avoidance
t

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

Forgiveness
t

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

t

23.014 (2.887)

7.973

31.253 (3.605)

8.669

1.597 (.940)

1.699

-.522 (.133)***
-.016 (.031)
-.699 (.861)
-1.021 (.639)

-3.925
-.512
-.812
-1.596

-.618 (.166)***
-.025 (.039)
.388 (1.076)
-.684 (.799)

-3.724
-.643
.361
-.856

.134 (.043)**
.004 (.010)
.211 (.282)
.149 (.208)

3.091
.364
.750
.717

cation

Model2

Constant
RD
Age
Sex
Edu-

R2=.13
Ad. R2=.10

R2=.11
Ad. R2=.08

Revenge

Avoidance

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)
20.387 (3.551)

Unstandardized B
t
(s.e.)
5.741
32.347 (4.721)

R2=.08
Ad. R2=.05

Forgiveness
Unstandardized B
t
(s.e.)
6.851
1.756 (1.151)

t
1.525

-.402 (.144)**
-.023 (.031)
.146 (.900)
-.869 (.632)

-2.791
-.755
.162
-1.374

-.775 (.192)***
-.038 (.041)
1.803 (1.196)
-1.376 (.841)

-4.041
-.940
1.507
-1.637

.117 (.047)**
.006 (.010)
-.145 (.292)
.050 (.205)

2.503
.611
-.495
.243

-.277 (.177)

-1.562

-.502 (.236)*

-2.129

.129 (.058)*

2.236

1.416 (.841)

1.684

.786 (1.118)

.703

-.626 (.274)*

-2.289

.797 (.373)*

2.138

1.093 (.496)*

2.205

-.138 (.121)

-1.146

cation
Religiosity
Abduction
Victim
Id.

R2=.21

R2=.28

R2=.17

Ad. R2=.16
Ad. R2=.24
ns p > 0.05; *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001
n=131
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Ad. R2=.12

Table 44: Multivariate regression results of economic relative deprivation on revenge, avoidance and
willingness to forgive (Poland)
Model1

Revenge
Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

Avoidance
t

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

Forgiveness
t

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

t

20.405 (4.371)

4.668

28.832 (5.141)

5.608

3.087 (1.222)

2.527

tant
RD

-.395 (.107)***

-3.683

.179 (.126)

1.420

.046 (.030)

1.546

Age

-.011 (.051)

-.223

.085 (.060)

1.414

-.006 (.014)

-.421

Sex

-.237 (1.186)

-.200

1.234 (1.395)

.885

-.315 (.327)

-.966

Edu-

-.241 (.788)

-.306

-2.765 (.926)**

-2.985

.017 (.219)

.080

Cons-

cation
R2=.17
Ad. R2=.14
Model2

Revenge

Avoidance

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

t

Forgiveness
t

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

t

14.333 (4.970)

2.884

27.923 (6.047)

4.618

2.485 (1.420)

1.751

RD

-.328 (.111)**

-2.952

.188 (.135)

1.387

.066 (.031)*

2.135

Age

-.016 (.051)

-.310

.091 (.062)

1.469

-.012 (.014)

-.832

Sex

-.509 (1.285)

-.396

.926 (1.563)

.592

-.437 (.359)

-1.216

.139 (.779)

.178

-2.621 (.948)**

-2.765

.038 (.220)

.174

.027 (.115)

.231

-.058 (.140)

-.415

.072 (.032)*

2.226

-.444 (1.048)

-.423

-.800 (1.276)

-.627

-.003 (.293)

-.010

1.146 (.405)**

2.831

.365 (492)

.740

.029 (.114)

.255

Constant

Education
Religiosity
Arrest/
Detentio
n
Victim
Id.

R2=.23

R2=.10

Ad. R2=.18
ns p > 0.05; *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001
n=116

Ad. R2=.04
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Uganda and Poland – Hypothesis 1
The first hypothesis was fully verified in the Ugandan, and partly in the Polish, sample.
The main difference is the fact that there is no significant effect on avoidance
motivation in the Polish sample. This resembles the findings from the experiment,
where the suggested possible explanation was that it might reflect some differences
between individualistic and collectivistic cultures. The assumption was that avoidance
might constitute a much stronger reaction in a collectivistic culture, while it might
have little meaning in an individualistic culture, especially if there had been no
previous close relationship between the victim and perpetrator. This finding was
corroborated by a comparative analysis of both research sites, which showed a
significant interaction between the effects of the country and relative deprivation on
avoidance. Moreover, model 1 displayed the highly significant influence of country on
avoidance motivation, which means that in the real-life conditions the level of
avoidance towards the perpetrators is on general much higher in Poland as well (table
45).
Another interesting outcome is the positive correlation between religiosity and selfdeclared willingness to forgive in both samples, while there is no significant effect of
religiosity on revenge motivation. As described earlier the connection between
religiosity and forgiveness is not a simple one. While a positive connection is generally
assumed, forgiveness researches have pointed out that this connection is likely to be
superficial. In other words, while forgiveness is valued by religious people and while
they perceive and declare themselves as being more forgiving, this might not
necessarily be the case in reality (McCullough 2001).
A strong identification with the victim group increased revenge motivation in both
samples and constituted another similarity between the two countries.
Finally, while the experience of abduction in Uganda does have a negative effect on
forgiveness, arrest in Poland has no effect at all. A more nuanced explanation might be
provided by the qualitative data. It is possible, however, that for oppositionists the risk
of arrest and detention was taken consciously and perceived as an integral part of the
struggle. It might, therefore, have a lesser impact on forgiveness.
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Table 45: Relative deprivation and revenge motivation, avoidance motivation and willingness to
forgive - Poland and Uganda
Model1 Revenge
Unstandardized B
(s.e.)
Constant

Avoidance
t

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

Forgiveness
t

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

t

16.773 (2.498)

6.716

25.079 (3.345)

7.498

2.548 (.772)

3.299

RD

-.346 (.084)***

-4.124

-.215 (.112) (*)

-1.913

.094 (.026)***

3.647

Age

-.014 (.025)

-.563

.008 (.034)

.239

.000 (.008)

.015

Sex

.024 (.693)

.034

1.201 (.928)

1.294

-.233 (.213) -1.092

Countr
y

.550 (1.099)

.500

5.738 (1.471)***

3.900

-.560 (.338) -1.657

Edu

-.601 (.462)

-1.302

-1.315 (.619)*

-2.126

.975 (.264)***

3.687

1.107 (.354)**

3.126

Rel

-.082 (.095)

-.864

-.280 (.127)*

-2.204

Arr./
Abd.

.754 (.635)

1.189

.391 (.850)

.461

Victim
Id.

Model2

.095 (.029)***

R2=.14
Ad. R2=.11

Revenge

Avoidance

Forgiveness

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

t

3.245

-.408 (.195) -2.089

R2=.21
Ad. R2=.19

t

-.141

-.101 (.081) -1.240

R2=.21
Ad. R2=.18

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)
Cons-

-.020 (.142)

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

t

16.994 (2.676)

6.351

30.309 (3.450)

8.785

2.273 (.827)

2.749

RD

-.370 (.133)**

-2.784

-.783 (.171)***

-4.573

.124 (.041)**

3.025

Age

-.015 (.026)

-.584

-.007 (.033)

-.200

.001 (.008)

.116

Sex

.020 (.695)

.029

1.113 (.896)

1.242

-.229 (.213) -1.074

Country

.304 (1.525)

.199

-.091 (1.966)

-.046

-.257 (.468)

-.549

Edu

-.620 (.470)

-1.320

-1.754 (.606)**

-2.896

.003 (.144)

.020

.965 (.269)***

3.591

.862 (.346)*

2.489

Rel

-.078 (.097)

-.801

-.176 (.125)

-1.409

Arr./
Abd.

.750 (.636)

1.179

.290 (.820)

.353

RD x
Country

.037 (.160)

.233

.884 (.206)***

4.285

tant

Victim
Id.

R2=.21
R2=.27
2
Ad. R =.18
Ad. R2=.24
ns p > 0.05; *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001
n=247
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-.088 (.083) -1.067
.090 (.030)**

3.006

-.402 (.196)* -2.055
-.046 (.049)
R2=.14
Ad. R2=.11

-.934

6.1.2 Relative deprivation and injustice perceptions
The second hypothesis (H2) postulates that relative deprivation increases injustice
perceptions of the post-conflict setting.
As in the experiment, justice perceptions were measured with items adapted from
Wenzel and Okimoto (2014). The items, called here Injustice Perceptions scale (IPS),
have been adapted in the survey by removing one item (item nr 6) in order to improve
the reliability. The Injustice Gap scale (IGS) was additionally included in the
questionnaires in order to assess the construct validity of both scales and corroborate
the findings. As expected the two scales are highly correlated (r=-.71; p<.01). Both
scales yielded very similar results and since the Injustice Gap scale has on average,
across the studies and samples, a lower reliability and proved less consistent, only the
findings of the Injustice Perceptions scale are reported below.
The control variables used in testing the second hypothesis are the demographic
variables. As opposed to forgiveness, there was no particular theoretical background
to assume that the additional control variables, used in the models predicting
forgiveness, would have any effect on injustice perceptions.
Uganda
The second hypothesis was verified by the Ugandan sample. Relative deprivation does
have a significant effect on injustice perceptions. The assessment of the post-conflict
setting as unjust increased with more experienced relative deprivation (table 46).
Poland
The second hypothesis was also verified by the Polish sample. The multivariate
regression of relative deprivation on the Injustice Perceptions scale yielded highly
significant results, with the model explaining a considerable amount of variance of
injustice perceptions, namely 38% (table 47).
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Table 46: Regression results of economic relative deprivation on Injustice Perception scale (Uganda)

Unstandardized Coefficients
DV=Injustice Perceptions

t

Sig.

33.442 (4.869)

6.868

.000

RD

-.692 (.224)

-3.086

.002

Age

.032 (.053)

.598

.551

Sex

-.926 (1.453)

-.637

.525

.502 (1.079)

.465

.642

(Constant)

Education

B

(s.e.)

R2 = .08; Adjusted R2 = .05
n=131
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Table 47: Regression results of economic relative deprivation on Injustice Perception scale (Poland)

Unstandardized Coefficients
DV=Injustice Perceptions
1

B

(s.e.)

t

Sig.

(Constant)

47.304 7.774

6.085

.000

RD

-1.219 .191

-6.387

.000

Age

-.113 .091

-1.245

.216

Sex

-.167 2.110

-.079

.937

Education

-.361 1.401

-.258

.797

R2= .38; Adjusted R2= .35
n=116
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Uganda and Poland – Hypothesis 2
Economic relative deprivation is a highly significant predictor of injustice perceptions
of the post-conflict setting in both countries. The second hypothesis was therefore
clearly verified in study 1. The only difference was that relative deprivation explains
more variance of injustice perceptions in the Polish than in the Ugandan sample.
A comparative analysis of both research sites confirmed that while the hypothesis was
verified in both samples, there are some differences (table 48). As indicated by the
significant interaction of the relative deprivation and country variables, relative
deprivation has a significantly stronger effect on increasing injustice perceptions in
Poland than it does in Uganda.
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Table 48: The effect of relative deprivation on injustice perceptions in Poland and Uganda
Unstandardized Coefficients
Model
1

B

(s.e.)

T

Sig.

(Constant)

38.877

3.547

10.961

.000

RD

-1.060

.136

-7.810

.000

Age

-.017

.045

-.372

.710

Sex

-.697

1.169

-.596

.552

.306

1.933

.158

.874

-.134

.825

-.162

.871

Country
Education
2

R =.26
Ad. R2=.24
Unstandardized Coefficients
Model
2

B
(Constant)

.

(s.e.)

T

Sig

35.732

3.862

9.251

.000

RD

-.710

.222

-3.203

.002

Age

-.008

.045

-.176

.861

Sex

-.785

1.162

-.675

.500

Country

4.088

2.701

1.514

.131

.125

.830

.150

.881

-.549

.275

-1.992

.048

Education
RD x
Country
R2=.27
Ad. R2=.25
n=247
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Relative deprivation and low economic status
The results of the previous sections confirm that relative deprivation does have an
effect on justice perceptions and forgiveness. The question to be addressed here is, to
what extent are these effects similar or different from effects that a low economic status
might have on the dependent variables? This is important, especially taking into
account that in many studies relative deprivation has only been measured by an
assessment of the own economic wellbeing. When this was low and the assessment of
others’ conditions was higher, relative deprivation was automatically assumed (H. J.
Smith et al. 2012). Obviously, an assessment of own financial situation as low is
related to relative deprivation. If someone believes himself to be economically
privileged, it is less likely that he will experience relative deprivation. On the other
hand, if someone perceives his economic status as low, relative deprivation is more
probable. At the same time a low economic status by no means always leads to relative
deprivation.
The following findings in both research sites reveal whether relative deprivation is a
poorer, similar or better predictor of injustice perceptions and forgiveness.
Own economic wellbeing was measured with an adapted short 3-item scale.54
Uganda
Relative deprivation and an assessment of own economic wellbeing are significantly
correlated in the Ugandan sample (r= .29, p<.01). It means that victims who struggle
financially in Uganda are also more likely to experience relative deprivation.
The predictive power of economic wellbeing was tested by including it in the models
with the dependent variables of injustice perceptions and the forgiveness measures
instead of relative deprivation.55
It turns out that the outcomes of relative deprivation and economic wellbeing do indeed
differ, even though economic wellbeing is a significant predictor on some of the
dependent variables assessed in this study. Economic wellbeing is not a significant
predictor of injustice perceptions in the Ugandan sample. It does significantly predict
revenge motivation (ß=-.874, t(126)= -4.162, p<.000) and does explain a similar

54
55

See chapter 4 for details
Control variables age, sex and education
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amount of variance as relative deprivation (R2 = .14, F(4, 126)=5.267, p<.001).
Economic wellbeing is also a significant predictor of avoidance motivation
(ß=-.888, t(126)=-2.961, p <.01) with a similar amount of variance explained as
relative deprivation (R2=.10, F(4, 126) = 3.596, p <.01) and finally, also of willingness
to forgive (ß=.306, t(126)= 4.613, p <.000) with slightly more variance explained
(R2 =.15, F(4, 125) = 5.674, p < .001).
To summarize, economic wellbeing in the Ugandan sample is as effective as a
predictor of the forgiveness measures as relative deprivation is. However, it has no
effect on injustice perceptions.
Poland
The same analyses were carried out in the Polish sample. First the relation between the
relative deprivation and the economic wellbeing scales were examined. Both variables
correlated highly (r=.72; p<.01) indicating that also in the Polish sample those victims
who perceive their economic status as low are more likely to experience relative
deprivation.
Economic wellbeing is a significant predictor of injustice perceptions (ß=1.190, t(111)=-5.237, p<.001) but explains less variance (R2 =.32, F(4,108)= 12.524,
p <.001) than relative deprivation. The same is true for revenge motivation
(ß=-.350, t(111)=-2.797, p <.01) and (R2 =.13, F(4,107)=3.936, p<.01). It is not a
significant predictor of avoidance motivation or willingness to forgive.
In conclusion, while economic wellbeing is a significant predictor of the same
dependent variables as relative deprivation, which is to be expected considering the
highly significant correlation, it does explain less variance.
6.1.3 Injustice perceptions and forgiveness
The third hypothesis (H3) postulates that injustice perceptions have a negative effect
on forgiveness by increasing revenge and avoidance motivation and reducing the
willingness to forgive. This assumption suggests an additional indirect effect of
relative deprivation on forgiveness via justice. The findings for the two samples are
presented below. The multivariate regression analyses were again done in two steps.
The first model controlled only for the demographic variables of age, sex and
education. In the second model religiosity, the experience of abduction (in Uganda) or
arrest/detention (in Poland) and victims’ identification were added.
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Uganda
In the Ugandan sample the third hypothesis was confirmed. Regardless of the number
of control variables, injustice perceptions are a highly significant predictor of all
forgiveness measures (table 49). The only significant demographic variable is level of
education, which reduces avoidance and revenge motivation.
In the second model victim identification turns out to be highly significant increasing
revenge and avoidance motivation, and reducing the willingness to forgive. The
experience of abduction has a negative effect on the willingness to forgive. Both
models explain a considerable amount of variance of all three forgiveness measure.
Injustice perceptions were tested for their potential role as mediator between relative
deprivation and forgiveness measures. When injustice perceptions are added into the
regression on forgiveness measures together with relative deprivation, relative
deprivation remains significant but the significance decreases in the case of revenge
motivation and willingness to forgive, suggesting a partial mediation. The Sobel test
confirmed that injustice perceptions are a significant mediator between relative
deprivation and willingness to forgive (Sobel statistic 2.65 and one-tail p=.004) as well
as revenge (Sobel statistic -2.71 and one-tailed p= 0.003) and avoidance motivation
(Sobel statistic -2.73 and one-tailed p=.003).
Those findings show that while there always remains a direct significant effect of
relative deprivation on all forgiveness measures in the Ugandan sample, part of all the
effects is via injustice perceptions.
Poland
The third hypothesis was also confirmed in the Polish sample. However, it turns out
that injustice perceptions do not affect all forgiveness measures. While they increase
revenge motivation and reduce the willingness to forgive, they have no effect on
avoidance motivation (table 50). The only variable to affect avoidance motivation is
education level, which decreases it.
The control variables present a more varied picture. Religiosity increases the
willingness to forgive; victim identification increases revenge motivation, while the
experience of arrest or detention has no effect at all.
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Also in the Polish sample potential mediator effects were tested. There is no mediator
effect in case of willingness to forgive. Neither injustice perceptions nor relative
deprivation have any effect on avoidance motivation. In the case of revenge motivation,
there appears to be a mediator effect from relative deprivation instead. When both
relative deprivation and injustice perceptions are regressed on revenge motivation, the
significance of both effects is reduced. Relative deprivation is, however, still
significant at p=.033, while injustice perceptions are not significant anymore at p=.057.
Therefore, the Sobel test was performed to test relative deprivation as mediator
between injustice perceptions and revenge. It turned out to be significant (Sobel
statistic 3.20 and p=.001).
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Table 49: Multivariate regression results of Injustice Perceptions Scale (IPS) on revenge, avoidance
and willingness to forgive (Uganda)
Model1

Revenge

Avoidance

Forgiveness

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

t

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

11.662 (2.942)

3.963

16.266 (4.044)

4.022

4.860 (.951)

5.109

IPS

.272 (.048)***

5.639

.388 (.066)***

5.864

-.082 (.016)***

-5.262

Age

-.015 (.030)

-.512

-.026 (.041)

-.627

.004 (.010)

.427

Sex

-.552 (.816)

-.676

.839 (1.122)

.748

.164 (.265)

.618

-1.264 (.604)*

-2.093

-1.955 (.830)*

-2.354

.216 (.195)

1.107

Cons-

Unstandardized
B (s.e.)

t

t

tant

Education

Model2

R2=.22
Ad. R2=.20

R2=.25
Ad. R2=.22

R2=.19
Ad. R2=.16

Revenge

Avoidance

Forgiveness

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)
Cons-

t

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

t

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

t

7.402 (3.385)

2.187

12.021 (4.614)

2.605

5.535 (1.117)

4.956

IPS

.263 (.046)***

5.672

.370 (.063)***

5.856

-.076 (.015)***

-5.005

Age

-.028 (.028)

-.988

-.040 (.038)

-1.051

.007 (.009)

.800

Sex

-.045 (.825)

-.055

1.464 (1.124)

1.302

-.089 (.272)

-.325

-1.247 (.577)*

-2.159

-2.012 (.787)**

-2.556

.160 (.190)

.839

-.067 (.167)

-.399

-.204 (.227)

-.897

.067 (.055)

1.224

1.033 (.763)

1.353

.068 (1.041)

.066

-.516 (.253)*

-2.037

1.218 (.306)***

3.987

1.929 (.417)***

4.630

-.261 (.101)**

-2.587

tant

Education
Religiosity
Abduction
Victim
Id.

2

2

R =.33
R =.36
Ad. R2=.30
Ad. R2=.33
ns p > 0.05; *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001
n=131
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2

R =.28
Ad. R2=.23

Table 50: Multivariate regression results of Injustice Perceptions Scale (IPS) on revenge, avoidance
and willingness to forgive (Poland)
Model1

Cons-

Revenge
Unstandardized B
(s.e.)
12.266 (4.858)

Avoidance
Unstandardized B
(s.e.)
2.525
27.291 (5.726)
t

Forgiveness
Unstandardized B
(s.e.)
4.766
4.324 (1.337)
t

t
3.235

tant
IPS

.164 (.046)***

3.533

.042 (.055)

.766

-.027 (.013)*

-2.063

.017 (.051)

.327

.078 (.060)

1.302

-.009 (.014)

-.632

.252 (1.171)

.215

.696 (1.380)

.504

-.349 (.318)

-1.096

-.966 (.706) -1.369

-1.823 (.832)*

-2.192

.060 (.193)

.312

Age
Sex
Education

Model2

Cons-

R2=.16

R2=.08

R2=.07

Ad. R2=.13

Ad. R2=.04

Ad. R2=.03

Revenge

Avoidance

Forgiveness

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)
7.618 (5.220)

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)
1.459
27.102 (6.367)
t

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)
4.257
4.071 (1.469)
t

t
2.772

tant
IPS

.136 (.048)**

2.849

.054 (.058)

.931

-.035 (.013)**

-2.659

.007 (.051)

.140

.094 (.062)

1.501

-.016 (.014)

-1.150

-.187 (1.281)

-.146

.652 (1.562)

.417

-.491 (.353)

-1.392

-.442 (.710)

-.623

-1.788 (.866)*

-2.064

.122 (.198)

.616

.033 (.115)

.288

-.148 (.141)

-1.054

.075 (.032)*

2.353

-.578 (1.049)

-.551

-.615 (1.279)

-.481

.016 (.289)

.055

1.158 (.406)**

2.856

.191 (.495)

.386

.036 (.113)

.317

Age
Sex
Education
Religiosity
Arrest/
Detention
Victim Id.

R2=.23

R2=.09

R2=.12

Ad. R2=.18
Ad. R2=.03
ns p > 0.05; *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001
n=116
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Ad. R2=.06

Uganda and Poland – Hypothesis 3
The third hypothesis was fully verified in the Ugandan and partly in the Polish samples.
Injustice perceptions increased revenge and avoidance motivation and reduced the
willingness to forgive in Uganda. In Poland there was no effect on avoidance
motivation, which is similar to the findings of the effects of relative deprivation on the
forgiveness measures. Avoidance does appear to be less relevant as a measure of
forgiveness in the Polish sample.
A comparative analysis of both countries revealed that even though the injustice
perceptions negatively affect forgiveness in both countries, there are some differences
(table 51). The effect of injustice perceptions on all three forgiveness measures is much
stronger in Uganda. Injustices in the context of salient economic inequalities increase
revenge and avoidance motivation and reduce willingness to forgive to a greater degree
in the Ugandan, compared to the Polish, sample. Consistent with previous findings the
general level of avoidance motivation towards the perpetrators turned out to be
significantly higher in Poland than in Uganda.
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Table 51: The effects of injustice perceptions on revenge and avoidance motivation as well as
willingness to forgive in Poland and Uganda
Revenge
Model1

Unstandardized
B (s.e.)

Constant

Avoidance
t

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

Forgiveness
t

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

t

7.761 (2.464)

3.149

17.460 (3.330)

5.243

5.025 (.769)

6.533

IPS

.197 (.031)***

6.259

.190 (.042)***

4.474

-.054 (.010)***

-5.549

Age

-.009 (.024)

-.385

.011 (.033)

.349

-.001 (.008)

-.109

Sex

.088 (.664)

.132

1.330 (.897)

1.482

-.249 (.206)

-1.208

Country

.227 (1.045)

.217

5.628 (1.412)***

3.985

-.486 (.324)

-1.498

Edu

-.794 (.427)

-1.860

-1.306 (.577)*

-2.264

1.170 (.240)***

4.887

1.165 (.324)***

-.052 (.089)

-.579

.569 (.602)

.944

Victim Id.
Rel
Arr./
Abd.

2

Model2

.221

3.600

-.154 (.074)*

-2.071

-.281 (.121)*

-2.330

.086 (.028)**

3.107

.347 (.814)

.427

-.363 (.187)

-1.939

2

R =.28
Ad. R2=.25

R =.27
Ad. R2=.24

R =.20
Ad. R2=.17

Revenge

Avoidance

Forgiveness

Unstandardized
B (s.e.)
Constant

(.133)

2

.029

t

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

t

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

t

5.610 (2.658)

2.110

11.899 (3.503)

3.397

5.721 (.827)

6.920

IPS

.266 (.046)***

5.816

.369 (.060)***

6.126

-.077 (.014)***

-5.434

Age

-.015 (.024)

-.622

-.003 (.032)

-.105

.001 (.008)

.122

Sex

.059 (.660)

.089

1.254 (.869)

1.443

-.240 (.204)

-1.175

1.943 16.403 (2.982)***

5.501

-1.849 (.702)**

-2.635

Country
Edu

4.396 (2.263)*
-.941 (.430)*

-2.189

-1.685 (.566)**

-2.976

.079 (.133)

.589

1.207 (.238)***

5.061

1.259 (.314)***

4.007

-.166 (.074)*

-2.244

Rel

-.001 (.092)

-.015

-.151 (.121)

-1.246

.070 (.028)*

2.454

Arr./
Abd.

.500 (.599)

.835

.171 (.790)

.216

-.338 (.186)

-1.819

-.135 (.065)*

-2.074

-.349 (.086)***

-4.067

.044 (.020)*

2.185

Victim Id.

IPS x
Country

R2=.29
R2=.31
Ad. R2=.26
Ad. R2=.29
ns p > 0.05; *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001
n=247
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R2=.21
Ad. R2=.18

6.2 Study 2 - Relative deprivation related to social acknowledgement
The second study tested the same hypotheses as study 1, namely that relative
deprivation has a negative effect on forgiveness and increases injustice perceptions
while injustice perceptions have a negative effect on forgiveness.
The difference in the second study was that it did not focus on economic relative
deprivation but on relative deprivation regarding social status or acknowledgement.
The question was whether this type of relative deprivation had similar effects on
victims as the economic one did. The variables were the same as in study 1.56
6.2.1 Relative deprivation and forgiveness
This section presents the findings resulting from testing the first hypothesis (H1) in
Uganda and Poland that social relative deprivation increases revenge and avoidance
motivation and reduces willingness to forgive.
Uganda
The first hypothesis was fully verified in the Ugandan sample. Social relative
deprivation is a significant predictor of all forgiveness measures, increasing revenge
and avoidance motivation and reducing willingness to forgive (table 52). Though the
effect was less pronounced in the case of willingness to forgive, the result was
approaching significance at p=.069 in model 1 and p= .075 in model 2. None of the
control variables, which include demographics (age, sex and education level),
religiosity, victimization experience and victim identification had any effect on the
forgiveness measures.
Poland
The hypothesis was not verified in the Polish sample. Social relative deprivation had
no effect on any of the forgiveness measures. None of the control variables had any
effect either, the exception being religiosity which increased the willingness to forgive.

56

See chapter 4 for details on the operationalization and reliability.
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Uganda and Poland - Hypothesis 1
The testing of the first hypothesis (H1), which posited that relative deprivation has a
negative effect on forgiveness, revealed different outcomes for the two research sites.
While the hypothesis was confirmed in Uganda, social relative deprivation had no
effect on forgiveness in Poland.
The comparative analysis of both countries showed the significant effect of the
research site on willingness to forgive and avoidance motivation (table 53). This
confirms previous findings about the generally significantly higher levels of avoidance
motivation in Poland and lower willingness to forgive. Even though social relative
deprivation did have a significant effect on revenge motivation in the Ugandan sample
but not in the Polish sample, the comparative analysis did not reveal a country effect
or significant interaction effect. This suggests that the lack of effect in Poland is more
likely due to a small sample; while the direction and influence of social relative
deprivation in increasing revenge motivation is similar in both countries.
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Table 52: Multivariate regression results of social relative deprivation on revenge, avoidance and
willingness to forgive (Uganda)
Model1

Revenge
Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

Cons-

Avoidance
t

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

Forgiveness
t

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

t

14.177 (2.929)

4.840

22.231 (4.241)

5.241

3.325 (.944)

3.523

RD

-.270 (.088)**

-3.082

-.352 (.127)**

-2.772

.052 (.028)

1.832

Age

.002 (.026)

.086

.022 (.037)

.581

-.001 (.008)

-.101

Sex

1.111 (.885)

1.255

.956 (1.282)

.746

-.060 (.285)

-.211

Edu-

-.068 (.725)

-.094

-1.056 (1.049)

-1.007

.146 (.233)

.626

tant

cation

Model2

R2=.11

R2=.10

Ad. R2=.07

Ad. R2=.07

Revenge

Avoidance

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)
Cons-

t

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

Forgiveness
t

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

t

17.377 (3.723)

4.668

25.963 (5.405)

4.804

2.438 (1.207)

2.020

RD

-.268 (.089)**

-3.006

-.344 (.129)**

-2.658

.052 (.029)

1.794

Age

.003 (.026)

.121

.024 (.038)

.646

-.001 (.008)

-.117

Sex

1.627 (.918)

1.772

1.647 (1.333)

1.236

-.193 (.298)

-.647

Edu-

-.234 (.732)

-.320

-1.273 (1.062)

-1.199

.191 (.237)

.804

-.339 (.178)

-1.900

-.452 (.259)

-1.746

.088 (.058)

1.527

-.441 (.801)

-.550

-.455 (1.163)

-.391

.112 (.260)

.432

.132 (.307)

.429

.265 (.446)

.594

-.023 (.100)

-.234

tant

cation
Religiosity
Abduction
Victim
Id.
R2=.14

R2=.13

Ad. R2=.08

Ad. R2=.08

ns p > 0.05; *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001
n=126
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Table 53: Multivariate regression results of social relative deprivation on revenge, avoidance and
willingness to forgive in Poland and Uganda
Model1

Revenge
Unstandardized
B (s.e.)

Constant

Avoidance
t

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

Forgiveness
t

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

t

16.173 (2.965)

5.455

19.039 (4.268)

4.461

2.403 (.903)

2.663

RD

-.261 (.072)***

-3.598

-.221 (.104)*

-2.118

.050 (.023)*

2.218

Age

-.004 (.023)

-.173

-.002 (.033)

-.067

.001 (.007)

.087

Sex

1.026 (.761)

1.347

2.083 (1.096)

1.900

-.231 (.235)

-.981

1.136 (1.464)

.776

9.257 (2.108)***

4.392

-1.344 (.446)**

-3.011

-.297 (.594)

-.500

-.015 (.855)

-.017

.186 (.182)

1.019

.096 (.270)

.354

.251 (.389)

.644

-.042 (.082)

-.506

Rel

-.100 (.110)

-.912

-.071 (.158)

-.446

.099 (.034)**

2.952

Arr./
Abd.

-.624 (.682)

-.914

-.981 (.982)

-1.000

.095 (.210)

.453

Country
Edu
Victim Id.

Model2

R2=.11
Ad. R2=.07

R2=.33
Ad. R2=.30

R2=.16
Ad. R2=.13

Revenge

Avoidance

Forgiveness

Unstandardized
B (s.e.)

t

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

t

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

t

Constant

16.251 (3.010)

5.399

19.946 (4.313)

4.625

2.397 (.918)

2.612

RD

-.269 (.090)**

-3.001

-.322 (.129)*

-2.502

.051 (.027)

1.851

Age

-.004 (.023)

-.173

-.002 (.033)

-.067

.001 (.007)

.087

Sex

1.014 (.767)

1.322

1.948 (1.099)

1.773

-.229 (.238)

-.964

Country

.895 (2.069)

.433

6.465 (2.965)*

2.181

Edu

-.307 (.599)

-.512

-.128 (.858)

-.149

.187 (.185)

1.013

.097 (.271)

.359

.271 (.389)

.696

-.042 (.083)

-.506

Rel

-.097 (.112)

-.871

-.037 (.160)

-.229

.099 (.034)**

2.881

Arr./
Abd.

-.628 (.684)

-.917

-1.028 (.980)

-1.048

.095 (.210)

.452

.024 (.143)

.165

.275 (.206)

1.336

-.002 (.046)

-.042

Victim Id.

RD x
Country

R2=.11
R2=.34
2
Ad. R =.06
Ad. R2=.30
ns p > 0.05; *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001
n=200
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-1.324 (.647)* -2.045

R2=.16
Ad. R2=.12

6.2.2 Relative deprivation and injustice perceptions
The second hypothesis (H2) addresses the question of the effect of social relative
deprivation on injustice perceptions. The assumption of the present study is that any
type of relative deprivation, including the one related to social acknowledgement,
increases injustice perceptions. The same control variables (age, sex and education
level) have been included in the models as was the case in study 1. The outcomes at
both research sites are reported below.
Uganda
The second hypothesis was verified in the Ugandan sample. Social relative deprivation
did have a significant effect on injustice perceptions. As expected, it increased injustice
perceptions of the post-conflict setting. None of the control variables had any
significant effect (table 54).
Poland
The second hypothesis was also verified in the Polish sample. Social relative
deprivation is a highly significant predictor and the model explains almost 50% of the
variance of injustice perceptions. None of the demographic control variables had any
significant effect (table 55).
Uganda and Poland – Hypothesis 2
The second hypothesis was verified in both research sites. As expected, social relative
deprivation significantly increased perceptions that the post-conflict or post-regime
setting is unjust. None of the demographic control variables had any significant effect
on the injustice perceptions. Relative deprivation did, however, appear to explain
considerably more variance of injustice perceptions in the Polish than in the Ugandan
sample.
A comparative analysis of both countries confirmed that there is indeed a significant
interaction effect between country and relative deprivation, meaning that social
relative deprivation increased injustice perceptions significantly more in Poland than
in Uganda (table 56).
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Table 54: Regression results of social relative deprivation on Injustice Perception scale (Uganda)

Unstandardized Coefficients
DV=Injustice Perceptions

t

Sig.

33.702 (5.571)

6.050

.000

RD

-.828 (.167)

-4.973

.000

Age:

.008 (.049)

.172

.863

Sex

-.184 (1.684)

-.109

.913

.732 (1.378)

.531

.596

(Constant)

Education level

B (S.E.)

R2 = .18; Adjusted R2 = .15
n=126
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Table 55: Regression results of social relative deprivation on Injustice Perception scale (Poland)

Unstandardized Coefficients
DV=Injustice Perceptions

B (S.E.)

t

Sig.

(Constant)

52.097 (9.691)

5.376

.000

RD

-1.432 (.190)

-7.516

.000

Age:

-.111 (.080)

-1.393

.168

Sex

-1.775 (2.643)

-.672

.504

-.382 (1.742)

-.219

.827

Education level
R2 = .49; Adjusted R2 = .46
n=74
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Table 56: Regression results of social relative deprivation on Injustice Perception scale in Poland and
Uganda
Unstandardized Coefficients
Model
1

B

(S.E)

t

Sig.

(Constant)

38.912 (4.307)

9.034

.000

RD

-1.056 (.124)

-8.488

.000

Age

-.015 (.041)

-.375

.708

Sex

-.656 (1.355)

-.484

.629

Country

-.164 (2.570)

-.064

.949

Ed. level

-.014 (1.064)

-.013

.990

R2=.30
Ad. R2=.28
Unstandardized Coefficients
Model
2

B
(Constant)

Std. Error

.
t

Sig

36.311 (4.414)

8.226

.000

RD

-.831 (.158)

-5.247

.000

Age

-.019 (.040)

-.467

.641

Sex

-.468 (1.343)

-.348

.728

Country

5.611 (3.606)

1.556

.121

Ed. level

.206 (1.057)

.195

.846

-2.258

.025

RD x

-.562 (.249)

Country
R2=.32
Ad. R2=.30
n=200
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Relative deprivation and individual low social acknowledgement
The effects of relative deprivation were compared with those of low social status. In
order to do this, an assessment of own social status was used as a predictor instead of
relative deprivation. Own social status was measured on a 10-rung ladder of
community standing in which respondents were requested to place themselves
according to how they estimated their social positions.57 The findings for Uganda and
Poland are reported below.
Uganda
Social relative deprivation was significantly correlated with the assessment of own
social status (r=.69; p<.01) in the Ugandan sample. This means that for victims in
Uganda a perception of own social status as low is strongly linked to an experience of
relative deprivation.
The question examined here was whether the assessment of own social status would
yield the same results as relative deprivation. In the Ugandan sample the assessment
of own social status was a significant predictor of injustice perceptions
(b =-.697, t(121) =-2.368, p < .05). Victims, who perceived their social status as high,
considered the Ugandan environment after the conflict as being more just compared
to those who perceived their social status as low.

However, it is a less significant

predictor than relative deprivation and explains much less variance (R2 = .05, F(4, 116)
= 1.556, n.s).
When it came to the forgiveness measures the difference was even more pronounced.
The assessment of own social status significantly predicted revenge motivation only
(b =-.296, t(121) =-2.039, p < .05) as opposed to relative deprivation, which was a
significant predictor of all three measures. The amount of variance explained by the
assessment of own social status was also much smaller (R2 = .08, F(4, 116) =
2.422, p = .05)58.
In the Ugandan sample relative deprivation was a much more significant and better
predictor of injustice perceptions and forgiveness than the assessment of own social
status.

57
58

See chapter 4 for more details on the variable and operationalization.
Control variables: age, sex and education.
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Poland
The same analysis was conducted in the Polish sample to compare relative deprivation
as a predictor with an assessment of own social status. The same variables were used
with social status measured on a 10-rung ladder representing the levels of societal
hierarchy. The correlation between individual relative deprivation and own social
status assessment was highly significant similarly to the Ugandan sample (r=.62;
p<.01).
The assessment of own social status was a significant predictor of justice perceptions
(b =-1.881, t(69)=-4.441, p <.01). However, it explained considerably less variance
than relative deprivation, namely (R2 = .28, F(4, 64) = 6.354, p < .000) 59 . Neither
relative deprivation nor individual social status had any significant effect on any of the
forgiveness measures.
6.2.3 Injustice perceptions and forgiveness
The third hypothesis (H3), stipulating that injustice perceptions increase revenge and
avoidance motivation and reduce willingness to forgive, was also tested in study 2.
The findings of the Ugandan and Polish samples are presented below.
Uganda
The third hypothesis was fully verified in study 2 in the Ugandan sample. Injustice
perceptions significantly predicted all forgiveness measures, increasing revenge and
avoidance motivation and reducing the willingness to forgive (table 57). None of the
control variables was a significant predictor of forgiveness.
Considering the strong and significant effects of injustice perceptions on all
forgiveness measures, the Sobel test was carried out to test if injustice perceptions
might be a significant mediator between relative deprivation and forgiveness. The
mediator effect was only tested for revenge and avoidance motivation because relative
deprivation had only a marginal effect on willingness to forgive. When relative
deprivation and injustice perceptions were both included as predictors, relative
deprivation became insignificant in the cases of both revenge and avoidance
motivation, while injustice perceptions remained highly significant. The Sobel test

59

Control variables: age, sex and education.
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confirmed the significance of the mediation in the Ugandan sample for revenge (Sobel
statistic -3.45; p<.001) as well as avoidance motivation (Sobel statistic -3.25; p<.001).
Poland
As was the case with the Ugandan sample, the second hypothesis was verified in the
Polish sample (table 58). Injustice perceptions increased revenge and avoidance
motivation and were marginally significant reducing willingness to forgive in the
second model at p=.057. The only significant control variable was religiosity which
increased willingness to forgive.
Uganda and Poland – Hypothesis 3
The predictions of the third hypothesis were verified in both countries. Injustice
perceptions proved to be a significant predictor of forgiveness in study 2 as well. Even
though the effect on willingness to forgive in the Polish sample was only marginal, the
small size of the sample and the fact that willingness to forgive was measured by only
one item, was sufficient to warrant the assumption that this was a relevant relationship.
In both countries the effect of social relative deprivation on forgiveness turned out to
be indirect via injustice perceptions. While in Poland relative deprivation had no direct
effect on forgiveness at all, in the Ugandan sample the existing direct effects were fully
mediated by injustice perceptions.
A comparative analysis of both country samples revealed no significant interactions
between country and injustice perceptions on the forgiveness measures which
indicated that injustice perceptions affected the forgiveness measures in a similar way
at both research sites (table 59). There is, however, a strong country effect, which
means, in accordance with previous findings, that avoidance motivation levels are
much higher and willingness to forgive much lower in Poland compared to Uganda.
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Table 57: Multivariate regression results of Injustice Perceptions Scale (IPS) on revenge, avoidance
and willingness to forgive (Uganda)
Model1

Revenge
Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

Cons-

Avoidance
t

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

Forgiveness
Unstandardized
B (s.e.)

t

t

6.073 (2.756)

2.204

11.703 (4.035)

2.900

5.195 (.893)

5.815

IPS

.202 (.042)***

4.845

.263 (.061)***

4.292

-.052 (.014)***

-3.871

Age

.000 (.024)

-.011

.018 (.036)

.515

.000 (.008)

-.042

Sex

1.329 (.829)

1.603

1.241 (1.214)

1.022

-.084 (.269)

-.314

Edu-

-.169 (.688)

-.246

-1.186 (1.008)

-1.177

.181 (.223)

.810

tant

cation

Model2

R2=.19

R2=.17

R2=.12

Ad. R2=.17

Ad. R2=.15

Ad. R2=.09

Revenge

Avoidance

Forgiveness

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)
Cons-

t

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

t

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

t

7.983 (3.493)

2.285

13.876 (5.120)

2.710

4.602 (1.137)

4.046

IPS

.193 (.043)***

4.539

.249 (.062)***

3.992

-.050 (.014)***

-3.627

Age

.000 (.025)

-.004

.020 (.037)

.554

.000 (.008)

-.025

Sex

1.687 (.870)

1.939

1.722 (1.275)

1.350

-.177 (.283)

-.623

Edu-

-.236 (.699)

-.338

-1.277 (1.024)

-1.246

.202 (.228)

.886

-.210 (.173)

-1.216

-.286 (.253)

-1.131

.056 (.056)

.988

-.535 (.765)

-.699

-.576 (1.122)

-.514

.130 (.249)

.523

.200 (.289)

.692

.352 (.423)

.831

-.029 (.094)

-.305

tant

cation
Religiosity
Abduction
Victim
Id.
R2=.21

R2=.19

R2=.13

Ad. R2=.16

Ad. R2=.14

Ad. R2=.08

ns p > 0.05; *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001
n=126
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Table 58: Multivariate regression results of Injustice Perceptions Scale (IPS) on revenge, avoidance
and willingness to forgive (Poland)
Model1

Revenge
Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

Cons-

Avoidance
t

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

Forgiveness
t

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

t

13.011 (6.063)

2.146

20.666 (8.653)

2.388

2.077 (1.819)

1.142

IPS

.148 (.055)**

2.677

.189 (.079)*

2.382

-.017 (.016)

-1.029

Age

-.026 (.048)

-.542

-.122 (.068)

-1.786

.012 (.014)

.824

Sex

.739 (1.583)

.467

2.152 (2.259)

.952

-.100 (.485)

-.207

Edu-

-.822 (1.055)

-.779

2.007 (1.506)

1.332

.203 (.311)

.651

tant

cation

Model2

R2=.13

R2=.16

Ad. R2=.08

Ad. R2=.11

Revenge

Avoidance

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)
Cons-

t

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

Forgiveness
t

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

t

13.138 (6.753)

1.946

19.184 (8.939)

2.146

2.419 (1.919)

1.261

IPS

.175 (.066)*

2.661

.188 (.087)*

2.150

-.036 (.019)

-1.945

Age

-.005 (.051)

-.091

-.094 (.067)

-1.400

.004 (.014)

.269

Sex

-.099 (1.763)

-.056

.714 (2.334)

.306

-.241 (.510)

-.473

Edu-

-.486 (1.095)

-.444

2.488 (1.449)

1.717

.146 (.311)

.471

-.068 (.156)

-.433

.054 (.207)

.258

.125 (.044)**

2.835

-1.754 (1.477)

-1.188

-2.123 (1.955)

-1.086

.094 (.420)

.223

-.053 (.567)

-.094

.247 (.750)

.329

-.090 (.160)

-.565

tant

cation
Religiosity
Abduction
Victim
Id.

R2=.16

R2=.19

Ad. R2=.06

Ad. R2=.10

ns p > 0.05; *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001
n=74
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Table 59: Multivariate regression results of Injustice Perceptions Scale (IPS) on revenge, avoidance
and willingness to forgive - Poland and Uganda
Revenge
Model1
Cons-

Unstandardized
B (s.e.)

Avoidance
t

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

Forgiveness
t

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

t

8.414 (2.675)

3.145

11.249 (3.859)

2.915

3.989 (.830)

4.805

IPS

.188 (.033)***

5.639

.224 (.048)***

4.657

-.042 (.010)***

-4.106

Age

-.001 (.022)

-.061

.001 (.031)

.035

4.687E-5 (.007)

.007

Sex

1.278 (.722)

1.769

2.270 (1.042)*

2.179

-.267 (.227)

-1.179

1.086 (1.394)

.779

9.372 (2.011)***

4.660

-1.350 (.431)**

-3.131

-.329 (.567)

-.580

-.037 (.818)

-.045

.197 (.176)

1.117

.129 (.253)

.510

.208 (.365)

.570

-.040 (.078)

-.514

Rel

-.126 (.105)

-1.203

-.120 (.152)

-.790

.106 (.033)***

3.268

Arr./

-.742 (.651)

-1.140

-1.093 (.939) -1.164

.114 (.203)

.562

tant

Country
Edu
Victim Id.

Abd.
R2=.19
Ad. R2=.15
Model2

Revenge
Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

Cons-

t

R2=.39
Ad. R2=.36

R2=.21
Ad. R2=.18

Avoidance

Forgiveness

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

t

Unstandardized B
(s.e.)

t

8.061 (2.846)

2.833

10.255 (4.101)

2.501

4.201 (.880)

4.774

IPS

.198 (.043)***

4.628

.252 (.062)***

4.086

-.048 (.013)***

-3.665

Age

-.002 (.022)

-.083

.000 (.032)

-.009

.000 (.007)

.053

Sex

1.254 (.727)

1.725

2.203 (1.047)*

2.103

-.251 (.228)

-1.099

1.802 (2.387)

.755

11.389 (3.440)***

3.311

-1.790 (.739)*

-2.422

-.347 (.571)

-.608

-.087 (.822)

-.106

.209 (.177)

1.179

Victim
Id.

.135 (.254)

.532

.225 (.366)

.615

-.044 (.078)

-.557

Rel

-.114 (.111)

-1.025

-.084 (.160)

-.523

.098 (.034)**

2.862

Arr./

-.739 (.653)

-1.133

-1.086 (.940) -1.155

.111 (.203)

.548

.026 (.071)

-.370

.016 (.022)

.733

tant

Country
Edu

Abd.
IPS x

-.074 (.102)

-.723

Country
R2=.19
R2=.39
2
Ad. R =.15
Ad. R2=.36
ns p > 0.05; *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001
n=200
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R2=.22
Ad. R2=.18

6.3 Comparison of both survey studies in Poland and Uganda
The hypotheses were largely confirmed in both studies and both samples. Besides all
the similarities there were, however, also some differences between the studies on
economic versus social relative deprivation as well as between the two research sites
that are worth pointing out.
The effects of both types of relative deprivation on injustice perceptions were
consistent in both studies and countries. While the hypothesis was confirmed, which
signified a relevant relationship between these variables in the very different settings
of Poland and Uganda, there were also some differences that became apparent in the
comparative analysis of a joint sample. Economic as well as social relative deprivation
affected injustice perceptions more in Poland than in Uganda. A possible explanation
is that when it comes to comparisons with perpetrators, victims in Uganda have more
limited access to information due to less media coverage. This only enables them to
make comparisons in their immediate environment. These comparisons in turn depend
on whether there is a high ranking perpetrator who is better off in their immediate
proximity.
Other comparisons, which are assumed to possibly influence relative deprivation, such
as a comparison with an envisioned better alternative, may also differ due to context.
Polish victims may have had more grounds to expect considerable improvements after
fighting for a better and more just system, and finally achieving a regime change.
When their expectations did not materialize, this might have contributed strongly to
relative deprivation and consequently a perception of injustice in the post-regime
setting. Victims in Uganda, on the other hand, had probably less grounds for high
expectations. Moreover, the conflict was, and possibly still is, looming in the
background, since the LRA rebel group continues to exist, even though they have not
been active in Uganda for over ten years. For Ugandan victims the envisioned
alternative is more likely to be renewed conflict, which would make their current status
quo comparatively better. Even though victims in Uganda do see their situation as
unjust the element of relative deprivation apparently plays a slightly smaller role in
this assessment than in Poland.
The effects of injustice perceptions on forgiveness also proved to be mostly present
and significant. Apart from the non-existing effect on avoidance motivation in study 1
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in the Polish sample, these effects were consistent in both studies and countries. Justice
perceptions do appear to strongly influence forgiveness of diverse groups of victims
in different post-conflict settings. The comparative analyses revealed some additional
insights showing consistently higher avoidance levels and partly, in study 2, lower
forgiveness levels in Poland compared with Uganda. This outcome was addressed
previously with the tentative explanation that avoidance does not constitute unforgiveness in a more individualistic society in a similar way to what it does in a
collectivistic society. Avoidance is more accessible in Poland, while at the same time
there is no social need or pressure for greater co-existence and cooperation. In other
words, avoidance of the perpetrators is more easily executed and has much less, if any,
social costs in Poland as compared to a collectivistic communal lifestyle and culture
in Uganda.
More willingness to forgive in Uganda, on the other hand, may be due to extensive
awareness-raising and NGO intervention in peace-building as well as strong advocacy
of the churches reinforcing the need to forgive. While victims might feel the social
pressure to declare forgiveness, indicated by the higher forgiveness levels in Uganda,
this is likely to be superficial to a certain extent. This assumption is based on the fact
that there are no significant differences between Poland and Uganda when it comes to
revenge motivation. It means that the higher declared forgiveness does not necessarily
lead to equally reduced revenge motivation. Moreover, injustice perceptions triggered
by economic inequalities had a stronger negative impact on all forgiveness measures
in Uganda. This would again suggest that while victims in Uganda might express their
willingness to forgive when economic injustices are present, it nevertheless hinders
forgiveness significantly and significantly more so than in Poland. The stronger effect
of injustice perceptions on forgiveness in Uganda in the context of economic
inequalities might reflect the time factor. The regime change in Poland happened
further back than the end of conflict in Uganda. The emotional impact created by the
perceived injustices and associated with un-forgiveness might have reduced to certain
degree over time in Poland as compared to Uganda.
Finally, the most complex relation in which the question of hypothesis verification,
cannot be answered in a simple, straightforward way is the relation between relative
deprivation and forgiveness. Economic relative deprivation does appear to have a
direct effect on most of the forgiveness measures. While the effect on willingness to
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forgive in the Ugandan sample was only marginal and there was no effect on avoidance
among the Polish victims, all other effects were significant. Even though injustice
perceptions mediated part of the relationship in the Ugandan sample, economic
relative deprivation continued to retain a partly direct influence on the forgiveness
measures. In the Polish sample, moreover, it appeared that it was more likely relative
deprivation that mediated the relationship between injustice perceptions and
forgiveness. The picture looked slightly different in the case of social relative
deprivation. In the second study all the influences on forgiveness seemed to be via
justice. In the Polish sample there was no direct effect of social relative deprivation on
forgiveness at all, while in the Ugandan sample the existing effects were all fully
mediated through injustice perceptions.
These findings seem to indicate that the question of social status elicits in general
weaker reactions across victim groups than economic wellbeing. This assumption is
supported by a comparison of the effects of the additional variables, which represent
the assessments of own economic wellbeing in study 1 or own social status in study 2.
While not unimportant, social status does seem to have weaker and less consistent
effects in particular on forgiveness measures than economic wellbeing in both
countries. There are different possible explanations. One is related to Maslow’s
hierarchy of needs.60 Economic wellbeing is related to survival and basic needs at the
bottom of Maslow’s need pyramid. These needs are considered to be the most
important ones. Another possibility is that a high economic status is frequently related
to a higher social status, while the opposite is not necessarily the case.
The control variables, though not of primary interest, also revealed some relevant
additional information worth considering briefly. The control variable with a largely
significant effect on revenge motivation in both countries was victim identification. In
Uganda as well as in Poland, the more victims felt a strong bond with other victims
the more this increased their revenge motivation. To analyze this outcome in detail is
beyond the scope of this study, which focuses on other topics. But there are various
indications in literature of, for example, biased collective memories, in which the past
trauma becomes embedded in the identity or that, in addition, victimhood bolsters

60

See also chapter 2.4.1.
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group cohesiveness (Noor et al. 2012). Relative deprivation theory also suggests that
social identification does play a role (e.g. Ellemers 2002) and that interpreting relative
deprivation in group terms affects the reactions and consequences. In other words,
strong identification with the ingroup reinforces the interpretation of relative
deprivation in group terms, which results in more active responses and outgroup
prejudices (H. J. Smith and Pettigrew 2014). The present findings, showing the impact
of victim identification on revenge motivation, confirm this.
Religiosity shows effects on willingness to forgive in both countries. It is, however,
not a significant predictor of revenge motivation. This fact can be interpreted in the
sense that religiosity possibly leads to self-declared forgiveness while not really
reducing “un-forgiveness”. This is in accordance with the literature on religion and
forgiveness (McCullough 2001). It can also be explained with the concepts of
decisional versus emotional forgiveness (Worthington et al. 2012). Religious people
might decide to forgive, possibly due to pressure created by values attached to
forgiveness in Christianity,61 while at the same time not forgiving on the emotional
level, and still experiencing revenge or avoidance motivation.
In conclusion, it has to be pointed out that due to the nature of the analyses in most of
these cases a reverse relationship cannot be ruled out. In other words, while the
hypotheses assume that injustice perceptions affect forgiveness, which is based on
theory and literature, the possibility that it might be forgiveness affecting justice
perceptions cannot be dismissed. This applies to most of the relationships described in
this chapter, which include attitudes or feelings.

61

There might be similar effects with regard to other religions too. The reason why Christianity was
singled out in this context is that it is the predominant religion at both research sites. The study cannot
make any assumptions regarding the effects of other religious denominations.
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CHAPTER 7. QUALITATIVE FINDINGS
This chapter describes the findings obtained from the qualitative data collected through
interviews with victims in Poland and Uganda as well as open-ended questions
included in the questionnaires. There are several reasons for choosing a mixed-method
design that combines quantitative with qualitative data. While hypotheses can be tested
through statistical methodologies, a deeper understanding of complex concepts such
as justice and forgiveness might elude a purely quantitative analysis. In particular,
when it comes to grasping the differences and similarities between the two diverse
victim groups that might emerge from the quantitative analysis, qualitative data is
important to explain and interpret these findings. Moreover, there is a variety of factors
influencing justice perceptions and forgiveness beyond those defined and measured
through quantitative tools. Qualitative data enables a more nuanced examination
contributing to a better understanding of victims’ attitudes and motivations and placing
them in context.
The interviews were all started by asking about the personal history of the participants
during the conflict or regime. The question was formulated generally, encouraging the
interviewees to tell a little about themselves and their life during the conflict or regime,
while emphasizing that they should only speak about issues they felt comfortable
discussing. Though the personal history was not part of the research this was included
in the interviews for two reasons. Firstly, it created an environment conducive to an
interview about difficult topics and to provide room for telling own stories. Beginning
immediately with a list of questions was likely to make the interviewees feel like
“study objects”. While a comfortable and secure interview setting is generally
important, it is even more so in the case of a vulnerable group of people such as victims.
Emphasizing that they should only speak about topics they felt comfortable talking
about was intended to limit the risk of provoking unwanted memories. The wish to
speak about the past or be heard is as diverse as the victims. The question about the
history of the victim’s personal experience of the conflict was intended to
accommodate the broad range of those who wanted to tell more and those who
preferred to only stick to general facts. This turned out to be a successful strategy to
achieve these requirements because, for one, it did leave the interviewees feeling
comfortable while none reported any distress during or after the interview.
250

Secondly, this general question was the equivalent of an item from the survey assessing
the nature of victimization and ensured that all interviewees fell into the victim
definition as applied in this study.
The analysis of the interviews was done with NVivo with a focus on the topics in
question, namely justice perceptions, forgiveness and relative deprivation. Because the
comparison objects that this study is focusing on are economic wellbeing and social
acknowledgement, victims’ assessments of their own conditions as well as those of the
perpetrator group constituted another important element of the interviews.
The chapter is organized into sections dealing with these topics, firstly in Poland and
then in Uganda. The final section is a comparison of the similarities and differences
between the responses in the two countries.
7.1 Poland
Of the seven interviewees in Poland, five had been political prisoners in the 1980s
while the two others suffered prolonged repression in their workplaces leading to
severe economic losses and psychological suffering. Of those arrested three reported
beatings, which in two cases were so severe that the wounds left them permanently
disabled. The interviewees were from different regions of Poland including Warsaw,
Siedlce, Czestochowa, and Bialystok. Since the situation of people in the large urban
centres, Warsaw in particular, is often quite different from those in the provinces, it
was imperative to include both. For the sake of anonymity the interviewees were
numbered from 1 to 7 and no other information is provided. The quotations below are
translations from Polish, the language in which the interviews were conducted.
7.1.1 Assessment of the situation of victims and former perpetrators
Economic conditions
All the interviewees agreed that the financial situation of many victims is
unsatisfactory. Some assumed that the majority were poorly off while others were not
sure if this was true for the majority of victims as a group nationwide. However, all
were of the opinion that there is a considerable number of people who could be
considered to live in poverty. One person (INT6) described the situation outright as
"tragic" and another one even stated that it is worse now than it was during the
communist regime (INT7). The examples given by many of the interviewees,
especially those more politically engaged and informed, presented a rather desolate
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picture with a significant nationwide group of victims receiving less than 1000 zl (ca.
280 USD) per month. Some still have families to support and others, who are older,
struggle to pay for medicine.
This was not only a subjective perception of victims. A recent Act, which was only
introduced in 2015, provided limited help to those former oppositionists in the most
difficult financial conditions (who received not more than 120% of the minimum
pension) of 400 zl per month for one year, with an option to extend to five years (Sejm
RP 2015).62 As the threshold was set so low, many victims in very difficult conditions,
but whose incomes were above the set amount, received no assistance at all.
As explained by the interviewees, the reason many received extremely low pensions
was that, even though the length of time they had spent in detention itself was
recognized for the pension fund, other acts of repression, which had severely impacted
on their employment circumstances, were not. Many people were dismissed from one
job after another when their political engagement surfaced; others were not able to
complete their education or find work at all. These circumstances, which left many
people with drastically diminished career and subsequent pension eligibility, were not
accounted for.
Those, who were younger at the time of the transition, better educated and healthier
managed to adapt to the new political environment and make a living for themselves.
But many others, in particular the older victims, were unprepared for a capitalist
system after decades of communism (INT2, INT4 and INT 5). This left many people
on the margins of the new societal order, unable to cope or adjust without some
external support.
Social acknowledgement
It became apparent during the interviews that social status is difficult to separate from
economic status, especially when many people suffer from poverty. This came up
repeatedly during the interviews. Several pointed out that not having any money
prevents people from “living in dignity" (INT1, INT7). Even the opinion on the

-62 This has been changed since the interviews were conducted. The act has been amended including
changes that, among others, remove the time limitation and make all oppositionists eligible regardless
of their income (Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2017)
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financial support described above is divided. While some declared they receive
support which they appreciated (INT2 and INT 4), others described the amount, or the
process of applying for it, as embarrassing or humiliating (INT5 and INT7). One of
the interviewees even described this financial assistance as an insult.
“For the state this 1 600 000 zl63 for us, this, this is charity, this is a spit in the
face. This is discrimination until death. Personally, answering your question, I
don’t believe that any government of any party will give us some compensation
(…). This is impossible. Because these are people from the same group.” (INT6)
The element of having to ask or, as some called it, beg for this little amount after having
sacrificed so much for the country and the lack of satisfactory acknowledgement for
their efforts to change the system were recurring themes. Some pointed out that
applying for additional financial support in a queue with “homeless drunkards” (INT5)
was degrading in itself, and that many victims are too proud to ask for help (INT3).
Though most of the interviewees received some form of recognition or
acknowledgment in the form of medals, opinions about those rewards were also
divided. INT4 described the celebration at the presidential palace as deeply satisfying.
“We didn’t even get a cent, but this is about honour (…). For me this honour is
more important than money. It is very important that I have a signature of such
a wonderful man [note: the president], who was in the presidential palace. Then
one year later he invited all those awarded again. That for those like us there was
a ‘thank you’, this is what is important” (INT4).
Others, however, felt differently. They saw the recognition and acknowledgment as
cheap, as a pat on the back without any practical ramifications (INT 6 and INT7). As
one put it:
"You see, this is such hypocrisy (…). On the one hand, they give medals and so
on, they speak of heroes on television, but those heroes are only for medals and

63

The calculation done by the interviewee is based on the promised 400 zl (monthly) for each person
with a valid “combatant card” that oppositionists could obtain. This amount was contrasted with the
amount the state would save through the reduction of the pensions of the former security service
agents, which the interviewee estimated at 11 000 000 zl (monthly).
253

TV. (…) While in reality there is tightening the belts and hunger, in other words,
discrimination. This is an incredible hypocrisy.” (INT6).
“No beautiful words will help anyone. Twenty-six years have passed and each
year on the 31st of August and 13th of December 64 , sejm and senat 65 show
ceremonial gratitude to such people like us. There have already been over 50 of
those official acknowledgments. And so what? Nothing! They feel good about
themselves and the rest lives just as before." (INT7).
Taking into account that it is difficult to separate social from economic status, it is
understandable that the words, speeches, and gratitude, even if expressed publically,
feel empty to many who struggle to survive on a daily basis. Social recognition goes
hand-in-hand with the financial situation.
“Even the status of those people is very low, because who wants to talk to a
beggar, who has nothing?” (INT7).
"Those people feel abandoned, completely. (…) No one cares if they have
something to eat, if they have money for medicine, if they can or cannot work."
(INT1).
Finally, most of the interviewees, when asked about social recognition, pointed to the
lack of knowledge of the youth and the general public about this period in the country’s
history (INT1, INT2, INT4, INT5 & INT7). Most felt this indifference came from
ignorance. In the same way as people in Poland were proud to have someone in the
family who had fought in AK (Polish underground army during WWII) they would be
proud of those who were in the opposition during the communist regime (INT7) if they
knew more about this historical period.
"To show people there was a group who fought for something, for them. (…)
People were never made aware that this did cost something, that someone paid
a price for it" (INT5).

64

August 31st is the Day of Solidarity and Freedom, a public holiday; and 13 th of December is the
day martial law was introduced in 1981.
65
Lower and upper house of the Polish Parliament.
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The interviewees were mostly of the opinion that the majority knew vaguely that
communism had existed and that there had been a period of martial law, but they do
not know what it meant, how people suffered or what they had sacrificed. If they knew,
they would have a very different attitude.
“The youth (…) they do not know about those times, they did not know what
situations people were confronted with and they think: They just fight for money
and money. But this is not about money. Of course, it is, because we need to live
(…). The youth don't understand that we just want minimal amounts to live in
dignity from month to month” (INT1).
All these aspects, including a lack of financial support and the feeling that there was a
low level of knowledge and information about the former regime, contributed to the
majority of the victims’ feelings that they had been forgotten and abandoned. They
perceived that current Polish society is not interested in this historical period and their
experiences as victims. This lack of interest leads, in turn, to a lack of recognition and
acknowledgment of the victims’ achievements and is exacerbated by their low
economic status.
Situation of former perpetrators
Regarding the situation of perpetrators, viz., the former agents of służba
bezpieczeństwa (SB), all the interviewees agreed that many of these perpetrators in
particular were doing relatively well financially. However, some victims pointed out
that it also depended on the level of each perpetrator’s previous social connections and
position in society (INT3). The amounts mentioned by the interviewees regarding the
pensions of the former SB officials ranged from several thousand up to twenty
thousand zl66. Several interviewees also pointed to the financial benefits and personal
connections of many former communist officials. This had given them a head start in
the early period of capitalism (INT1, INT5 & INT7). One of the interviewees gave
specific examples of former SB officials who started big and successful private
companies after the transition and called the former communist security agents the
“richest layer of society in Poland”(INT7).

66

According to official statistics only 5.8% of pensioners receive pensions of 4000 zl or above (ZUS
2017)
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While it is clearly difficult to obtain statistics in this regard, the perception of victims
was in line with the assessment of various scholars describing how the communist
“nomenklatura” transferred political into economic power (Los and Zybertowicz 2000,
111; Staniszkis 1990), with various newspaper and magazine publications (Dziennik.pl
2016; Fakt.Pl 2015; WPROST 2016) and supported by several rounds of attempts to
reduce the pensions of former communists. Most of the cuts were, however,
insignificant (INT6 & INT 7)67. Apart from the pensions, some interviewees pointed
out that most of the security agents had at least “something” when they left SB, like a
car or an apartment (INT3). Moreover, they had already benefitted from these high
pensions for many years or decades, so even a serious cut would not really change
much in their privileged situations (INT1 & INT4). Several interviewed victims used
the term that the state “cares for” the former perpetrators (INT5 & INT6).
Regarding the social status of the former perpetrators, several interviewees stated that
they did not suffer from social ostracism or condemnation at that time because many
people simply were not aware of their past (INT2 & INT4). They enjoyed a high social
status, which was the privilege of most rich people.
“No one looks down on them [the former perpetrators|. Most don’t look down
on them simply because the majority do not know who they are. They were not
publically condemned, only if the neighbour knows who he is. They go, drive
fancy cars; they are looked at as people who have money. They are treated well.”
(INT4)
7.1.2 Relative deprivation
The question of the existence and effects of relative deprivation of victims in vis-à-vis
former perpetrators is the main topic of this study. The interviewees were asked, as
described above, to assess their circumstances and those of the group of victims as a
whole, as well as make an assessment of the living conditions and social status of the
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The perception of inadequate pension reductions expressed by the interviewees has been
confirmed by the actions of the Polish government. The latest pension reduction of former security
service employees was announced in November 2016, after the data had been collected for this study.
According to the information provided by the Ministry of the Interior website some pensions of
former security service employees indeed reached up to 19 000 zl (MSWiA 2016). This new law
stipulates that the pensions cannot be higher than the national average of 2053 zl. The Ministry of the
Interior has described this measure as reinstating social justice (MSWiA 2017).
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former perpetrators. In line with the theory of relative deprivation, which is defined as
a situation of disadvantageous comparison, un-deservingness, anger and resentment
(H. J. Smith and Pettigrew 2015), the interviewees were also asked about their
thoughts and feelings regarding these assessments.
Additionally, in the analysis of the interviews, a surprising and unexpected finding
emerged. While there were clear indications of relative deprivation towards
perpetrators, there was also relative deprivation towards a different group of people,
the high profile former members of the resistance, who had benefitted from the
transformation. As there were a vast number of oppositionists during the communist
regime, the post-transition living conditions, economic and social status, differed
significantly within the group of these former victims. For example, many members
of the current ruling party had been active oppositionists and political prisoners in the
1980s. From the point of view of the interviewees there was a sharp division between
these former oppositionists, who established careers for themselves after the end of the
communist regime, and those who ended up in poverty, even though previously they
all had been on the same side of the struggle. As will be explained in more detail below,
this finding was important, as it added to the sense of betrayal and hopelessness of
many victims, who were less fortunate.
Relative deprivation in relation to former perpetrators
It has already been indicated above that many victims perceived the economic
conditions of their group, as well as social acknowledgement to some extent, as
unsatisfactory. They also assessed the conditions of former perpetrators as much better.
The perpetrators, working for the regime’s security services, had an uninterrupted
work history and many had a successful career ascending to positions of higher
authority within the communist system. When this kind of work is counted for the
purpose of pension benefits in a similar way as any other job, the retirement benefits
of the perpetrators result in obviously higher amounts than those of many of the
victims. This was so particularly because the act of repression often consisted of being
dismissed, preventing the victims from working, giving them only the worst possible
jobs or thwarting their education. The question that arises from this was, do victims
make these comparisons and how do they feel about the results?
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Most of the interviewees did make the comparisons themselves, often unprompted.
Two of them specifically used the phrase that the former SB agents “laugh in their
faces” (INT1 & INT4). INT1 described the trial of a former female security official
who finally got a suspended sentence. She told the victims present in court that if she
went back in time now, she would treat them even more harshly than she had done.
“[She said, she would be] even worse than she was. During the trial, she laughed
and said: At least I have a pension, and you? What do you have?”
"During the trial, she retired and she got 100% pension because they have 100%
that means she had around 4000 zl, while our people got 700-800 zl. So she
could laugh, right?" (INT1)
While relative deprivation theory focuses on the perception that the ingroup deserves
more or better, in the case of victims and perpetrators an additional dimension is added.
Victims in Poland not only think that their ingroup deserves better but also that the
outgroup, in this case the former perpetrators, deserve less. The views regarding what
the perpetrators should actually get are divided. While all agreed that their pensions
should be reduced, the opinions differed on by how much. Some of the interviewed
victims acknowledged that even the perpetrators should have something to live on but
their pensions should have been reduced to the national average or the minimum
amount (INT1, INT3, INT5, & INT6). Others, on the other hand, stated that the
perpetrators should not receive anything at all (INT2 & INT7). One of the interviewees
compared the work of the security agents with the activity of common criminals.
“No [pension]! Absolutely! Why?! (…) For what?! For being criminals? Just
imagine if a political criminal like an SB agent has a guaranteed legal pension,
then every common criminal should also apply. He is also a criminal, also
worked, had a dangerous job and has proof from prosecutor and courts, from
those who accused him (…). He had a dangerous job because when he was
breaking into a house, he could fall out of a window or someone could have
beaten him. This is discrimination of the citizen criminal!" (INT7)
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INT1, when was asked how much the former perpetrators should get in comparison
with the victims, recalled a media report about the wife of general Kiszczak68. Mrs
Kiszczak expressed outrage at the planned pension cuts stating that she could not
survive on 2000 zl (Dziennik.pl 2016).
“[If they should be] worse? Yes, maybe worse! They should try how it is to have
a worse situation! (…) They should try how to live with 2000 zl or 1500 or 1000,
like others. The wife of Kiszczak now says that she can’t, that she won’t survive
on 2000 zl. (…) And here some people have 800, 900 or 1000 zl, right?” (INT1)
Several of the interviewees, when speaking about comparing the situation of victims
and perpetrators, stated that "there is no comparison" (INT2) or described it as "an
abyss" (INT6). INT1 also pointed out that when younger people ask why the victims
wanted higher pensions instead of being satisfied with what they had, the problem was
that "the perpetrators have much higher pensions!".
The quotes cited above provide an example of the different layers or dimensions of
relative deprivation among victims in Poland. While the improvement in their own
economic conditions was important for the victims, in particular as economic
conditions appeared to be closely intertwined with social status, this would not have
been enough. The perpetrators should also have received less. These findings support
the tentative explanations described in the previous chapters that victims might
experience several forms of relative deprivation. In most cases relative deprivation
research focuses either on social comparison (e.g. Pettigrew 2015; Smith et al. 2012),
on temporal comparisons (de la Sablonnière et al. 2015; Davies 1962) or on
comparisons with an envisioned better alternative (Folger 1986), to name some
examples. In cases of a pronounced history of discrimination, such as victims in postconflict settings have, these different types of relative deprivation may all emerge.
Victims might anticipate that their own situation may improve, foresee a better
alternative on how their life should be after the end of conflict or regime, expect to be
in a better condition than those who caused their suffering and, finally, perceive it as
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A Polish general, an interior minister and a prime minister during the communist regime. Next to
general Jaruzelski he played a key role in the suppression of the oppositionists, the Solidarity
movement and in imposing martial law
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warranted that the conditions of the perpetrators should be significantly worse. Having
less money has, therefore, a symbolic meaning beyond economic hardship. It
communicates to the victims that after decades of suffering, even in this new system
they have been fighting for, they are still "worth less". This is communicated through
comments such as that the perpetrators are "laughing in their faces". The perception
that the state "cares for" the perpetrators was juxtaposed with the victims’ sense of
themselves as being forgotten, abandoned and not cared for.
The expectation of balance and “getting equal”, as described by David & Choi (2009),
not only did not materialize from the point of view of the interviewees, but turned into
an almost greater inequality exacerbated by disappointed expectations. Asked how he
felt about the current situation, one interviewee described it as follows:
“The situation is not normal in this country because the criminals are cherished,
because these are criminals and not people who worked for the good of the
Republic. These relations should be turned upside down!” (INT7)
This phrase “upside down” expressed the expectations of “getting equal” while the
reality, as perceived by many victims, reflected the opposite. The assumption that this
was not an isolated view of the interviewed group was supported for example by a
recent campaign of one of the former oppositionists’ groups the “Free Word
Association”. They demanded that the pensions of the victims should be higher by at
least the symbolic amount of 1 zl 69 (Czuchnowski 2013). This demonstrated that
campaigns to reduce the pensions of former SB agents or increase the benefits of
victims had an additional dimension beyond the material one.
While the core elements of relative deprivation — comparison, and deservingness —
are present in the accounts of the interviewed victims, the final question was what did
they feel about it? Most of the feelings described by the victims fell into the category
of emotions typically associated with relative deprivation. Several interviewees
expressed anger (INT1, INT2, INT3 & INT7) or bitterness (INT1 & INT5). INT6
stated that he felt indifference, resignation, and apathy; while INT4 admitted to feeling
nothing having worked very hard for a long time to not feel hatred towards his
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Roughly equivalent to 0.25 USD.
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perpetrators. These two interviewees were, interestingly, also the ones who spoke
about religion and its role in their thoughts and feelings most often. This will be
discussed in greater detail in the section dealing with forgiveness.
In conclusion, it is obvious from the interviews that all the elements of relative
deprivation were present throughout the interviews. The victims saw the perpetrators
as being in much better financial situations than they were themselves. While the
former agents were not necessarily highly regarded, they often enjoyed high statuses
due to their economic wellbeing. In most cases the perpetrators’ past as security agents
does not impact their social acknowledgement negatively as many people in their
immediate environment are not aware of who they were during the communist regime.
The victims clearly saw their group as deserving better and, moreover, the perpetrators
as deserving less, both financially and with regard to social recognition. Finally, the
feelings predominantly associated with relative deprivation (H. J. Smith and Pettigrew
2015; H. J. Smith et al. 2012), such as anger, bitterness and resentment, were also
present in most of the victims’ accounts.
Relative deprivation towards high profile oppositionists
Apart from relative deprivation directed towards perpetrators, interestingly and
surprisingly, another type of relative deprivation emerged as a recurring theme during
the interviews. The interviewees, even though mostly active in various victims’
associations, some as chairpersons, were not highly influential people. As briefly
outlined in the beginning of this section, the victims appeared to perceive their group
as split post-transition along economic and social status lines. Some of the former
political prisoners and victims established political or other careers after the end of the
communist regime. Others —those who were healthy, younger and well educated —
settled into middle class life. Finally, another group of victims —the older ones, often
with physical and health problems —continued to suffer economic hardships,
frequently comparable to the conditions they had experienced under the communist
regime. A sense of betrayal permeated through many interviews, sometimes implicitly
suggested and sometimes explicitly expressed. At the time of the communist regime
the victims felt as one group and now they felt abandoned by their former colleagues.
This was especially so as they felt that those in power or in the government were well
placed to address the inequalities they perceived they still suffered.
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Interestingly, from the memories of these victims, who had been imprisoned, it became
apparent that this categorization of first and second class opposition was already
present during the communist regime. The perception of a united and egalitarian group
may have been due to a romanticized image of the past, further highlighted by the
name “Solidarity”, but which looked quite different in reality. This division was not
only internal but also arose from the way the communist officials treated the political
prisoners. One could conceivably assume that the more influential the oppositionists
were, and the more leadership positions they occupied, the more they would suffer
abuse and repression. However, according to one of the interviewees, who had been
imprisoned in different places, it was just the opposite.
“There in [name of prison] the conditions were very good. (…) [They] had there
everything. People were baking cake, fruits were there, everything (…) rugs and
so on. On the wall, there were tiles, which for us at this time, because it was 35
years ago, it was unimaginable! We have never seen tiles like this. (…) There
the elite of Solidarity were detained" (INT1).
INT1 also described the relative freedom in this detention centre compared to all the
other detention centres she has been imprisoned in. This particular detention centre
was at that time referred to as the “golden cage” and presented to foreign delegations
to show how well imprisoned oppositionists were treated. Meanwhile, others had been
beaten and tortured so much that they became permanently disabled (INT 6 & INT7).
A common perception among the interviewees was that those who were influential
during the opposition struggle, the leadership figures, betrayed their colleagues during
the roundtable negotiations and then forgot about them completely.
“Those MPs, most of those from PiS or PO70, because there are many former
activists in PO (…) who… I don’t know if they are more meritorious than others
(…). They treat us as if we have exaggerated demands (…). And they treat us
harshly, and yet, yet alone they would not have achieved anything. Someone like
Wałęsa says that he, that it was only him, right? This is not true! What could he
have done all by himself? Nothing!" (INT1)
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The two biggest political parties in Poland: PiS (Law and Justice) and PO (Civic Platform).
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Another interviewee described a situation in which his colleagues were kept waiting
for hours by one of the former oppositionists turned politician when they came for a
meeting.
“Such disregard, even though they began together with us. They are now in a
different world, they don’t remember what was. It’s clear, such people like
Wałęsa and others, who were prominent, they got a lot of support and now they
are politicians, so they don’t have to worry about anything. And this common
one, who suffered the most in prison and in general, he continues to be
discriminated, because no one would even help him to get a job.” (INT2)
And speaking about applying for social support:
“Not one of us will humiliate himself to go there [social support centre]. I don't
think this is ambition, but we did something! Some got into the government on
our backs. They could care a little bit!" (INT2)
Another interviewee, lamenting the bad conditions, which many victims endure today
said:
“And these are people from the front row of the fight with communism, front
row! Not from somewhere in the back, but from the front! They carried the
biggest weight of the fight with communism, because they lost their health, their
money. But those, whose names we heard constantly for 27 years on television,
they never suffered poverty, not then and not now. They have forgotten about
their colleagues, if you can call them colleagues. I always ask when they say that
they were in the Solidarność, I ask, what for? For your own private benefit only!"
(INT7)
The roundtable negotiations, often celebrated as an example of a non-violent power
transfer, appeared to many victims as a betrayal. One of the interviewees described the
negotiations and the transition as "sharing of the spoils" (INT4). This seemed to be the
prevalent picture among those who felt left behind. They saw their more prominent
colleagues as those who had betrayed them; they had made a deal with communists.
The result was that the communists were protected in the new dispensation and even
benefitted financially, while the high profile oppositionists gained the political power.
The rest of normal common people, who had sacrificed years of their lives, were
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forgotten and abandoned in poverty. When asked about his perception of the situation
since the transition, one of the interviewees expressed it in the following words:
„I think there is a great deal of disappointment. This is not what people fought
for. We have been, in my opinion, betrayed.” (INT2)
This aspect, the comparison with better off former victims, might appear less relevant
for the present study, as the focus is on comparison with the outgroup, namely, the
perpetrators. It illustrates, however, the different types or layers of relative deprivation,
mentioned previously, of which social comparison with perpetrators is only one. The
comparison with better off former victims is also relevant for relative deprivation
theory, since ingroup and outgroup comparisons have been found to have different
consequences. While outgroup comparisons lead to intergroup attitudes (prejudices
against outgrup for instance), ingroup comparisons affect internal states such as
sadness, hopelessness or depression (H. J. Smith and Pettigrew 2014). From the
gathered data it was difficult to clearly identify whether these former victims, who
succeeded post-transition, were still regarded as members of the ingroup. A
combination of anger and resentment resulting from outgroup comparisons, combined
with sadness or depression, resulting from ingroup comparisons, was also possible in
this situation. In any case, it was likely to exacerbate the negative effects of other types
of relative deprivation that existed in the post-conflict context.
7.1.3 Justice perceptions
All the interviewees were adamant that there was no justice at all. Almost all of the
interviewees, when asked about what would be needed for them to feel that justice had
been done, mentioned an improvement in their economic wellbeing. Some called it
social justice (INT1), or described it as a moral duty of a state to reward those who
had contributed (INT5). Others mentioned restoration when asked about what would
be important for justice.
“Material repair of loss. Because when someone’s life and health was destroyed,
if it was destroyed then this needs to be repaired, this is obvious!” (INT7)
INT7, moreover, did not see the state as being responsible for the recompense. He felt
that the perpetrators should be the ones who eventually paid.
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“There is not a single case where the state treasury demanded a repair payment
from the perpetrators. Not a single case! (…) And yet, when I steal from
someone, who pays?! The state or me? The perpetrator pays!” (INT7)
This statement constituted the expectation of some form of economic redistribution. It
symbolized restoration of balance between victims and perpetrators by taking from the
guilty group and giving to those who had suffered. Balance or equality appeared to be
important for justice perceptions. The victims felt they have given everything, years
of their life, money, emotional distress and some also health, and had received nothing
in return. These findings are in accordance with the open questions in the survey in
which, in both studies, the majority of respondents, when asked about justice,
mentioned compensation or economic support for the victims. Moreover, the fact that
the perpetrators enjoyed high economic status was also an issue strongly related to
justice. INT4, for example, highlighted this fact as a “great injustice”.
Another topic mentioned repeatedly in relation to justice was some kind of moral
acknowledgment for the victims. However, while this was important, it was
simultaneously perceived as cheap and hypocritical if the praise came without
compensation. It was felt that both were important, but that they needed to be met
together. Words do not count without deeds and the praise was otherwise seen as being
just for show and not sincere. The type of acknowledgment that was expected was
mostly not specified. One aspect mentioned repeatedly, and which appeared to be
painful for many victims, was the lack of knowledge of the general public and
especially the youth about the time of communism, the opposition struggle and the
sacrifices of many (INT1, INT2, INT4, INT5 & INT7).
Punishment of the former perpetrators was a rather ambiguous issue. While courts,
trials, punishment or accountability were mentioned by almost all the interviewees,
most emphasized that they did not need to see these “old men” actually going to prison.
If trials or sentences were demanded by interviewees, it was rather for their symbolic
value, to clarify publically what was right and what was wrong. The trials were
expected to serve as an official statement about who had been on the right side of
history.
“No, not prison but symbolically, if at all… sentencing, but it is not necessary to
actually put them in prison” (INT2)
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"It is not important for us that he [a former communist official, they have sued]
goes to prison. It won't change anything for us. But this should be condemned,
that this is not right!" (INT2)
“Yes, punishment, but not in the sense that they go to prison. Demotion,
dismissal, like what they have been doing (…). A moral, yes some moral
punishment.” (INT3)
“Main point [when asked about justice] that people like Jaruzelski should face
the court of the free country of Poland. And no one says to lock up this old man,
but for posterity, for the historians, the betrayal of the Polish nation… (…)
condemnation and accountability for their past.” (INT6)
The perception of the victims was mainly that not much had changed in the sense of
who the winners and the losers were, even though the political order they had been
fighting for came into being. And this clarification, through a justice system, would
signify the righting of an historical wrong for the victims.
A final issue, stressed by several interviewees (INT1, INT2 & INT3) was that many of
the judges were still the same people as they were under the former regime. The
interviewees asserted that in many cases there had been no personnel changes in the
judicial system.
"They behave as if nothing has happened. They were positively verified and
continue working. Nothing changes for them. This is for me a lack of justice. It
can't be that the judge, who sentenced us to prison during martial law when we
now apply for compensation (…) he is the one to decide." (INT2)
In conclusion, these perceptions are in accordance with the answers to the questions
about justice in the survey. The victims needed an improvement in their own situations,
in financial terms and also with regard to acknowledgment and recognition of their
contributions. It was felt that the perpetrators should not be better off and it should be
clear who was the victim and who the perpetrator, who was right and who was wrong.
The qualitative findings also illustrated and explained the impact of relative
deprivation on justice perceptions, since the reasons for perceived injustice among
Polish victims are rooted in the same views, opinions and attitudes that constituted
relative deprivation.
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7.1.4 Forgiveness
Several of the interviewed victims verified the connection between forgiveness and
relative deprivation, declaring that it would be difficult or impossible for them to
forgive if the current situation remained the same, i.e. the perpetrators continued to
receive high pensions and benefit financially (INT1, INT2, INT4 & INT5). All four
victims also mentioned acknowledgment, remorse, and apologies as very important
for them. However, words without actions appeared to be insincere. INT2 explained
that murder could never be forgiven but other cases would depend on the
circumstances.
"If they acknowledged what they did, apologized, then I would be able to show
understanding. Yes, I would be able to. If they acknowledged it, showed remorse.
Of course, it depends on what exactly they did at the time, because this is also
important." (INT2)
Asked if apologies would suffice and forgiveness would be possible if the current
conditions did not change, the interviewee explained:
"No, that would not be enough. (…) Of course not. Especially, since they do not
deserve this money. For what?! For beating us?! Of course, I am simplifying
everything on purpose but, what should they be paid for?!(…) Of course, it is
clear they would not give the money back voluntarily, only a law could make
them do it. If someone were to give up the money voluntarily and would pay for
one of his victims, he would go up a lot in my estimation!" (INT2)
Two of the interviewees made an explicit connection to religiosity when asked about
forgiveness (INT4 & INT6). In particular, INT6 emphasized that social justice and
forgiveness are two separate issues and that forgiveness is a personal decision, which
is unconditional and rooted in religious beliefs. INT7 also perceived forgiveness as
unconditional, explaining that waiting for another person to do something or to
apologize would result in the past “eating one up inside”. INT3 could not imagine
forgiving at all, regardless of the circumstances. INT4 expected some kind of public
demonstration of remorse, arguing that the crimes committed were also public.
Most victims expected acknowledgment and remorse, followed by some form of
compensation. From their point of view, however, they felt that they received the
267

opposite, namely ignorance and arrogance. Former agents ridiculed them or looked
down on them. Statements, such as the one of Kiszczak's wife, mentioned by INT4,
that survival on 2000 zl was impossible, while many victims lived for decades on half
of this amount, represented a level of arrogance and condescension to the victims that
was hard to stomach. The implicit reaction, probably the only one left for them without
a change of external circumstances, was an attitude of moral superiority. Asked about
their perception or attitude towards the perpetrators they mentioned contempt (INT5)
or pity (INT4 & INT7). INT4 expressed satisfaction about not feeling ashamed of their
own behaviour during communist rule. INT7 narrated a story of meeting a former
perpetrator and how, according to the interviewee, his behaviour showed clear signs
of a bad conscience.
“He knew what he did. So what that he has power? That he is rich? So what?
But he is not able to sleep peacefully” (INT7)
The interviews represented the multidimensional nature of forgiveness and the
different subjective understandings and perspectives that reflect the debates in the
literature described in detail in the second chapter. Most victims fell into the category
described in the comprehensive apology approach (Blatz, Schumann, and Ross 2009)
that emphasises acknowledgment, remorse, and repair. The repair part, in particular, is
supposed to signify a genuine inner change and demonstrate that the remorse is not
superficial. Giving up the unethically obtained wealth, the riches amassed as result of
their crimes, would represent for the victims a form of atonement. For most victims,
therefore, a situation where the perpetrator is still “on top”, a situation of relative
deprivation is incompatible with forgiveness. Interestingly, this is often an implicit
understanding, rather than something expressed directly. While many victims
mentioned remorse or apologies straightaway when asked about forgiveness, the role
of social comparison with perpetrators or relative deprivation was implied, rather than
explicitly mentioned. Only when asked if they could contemplate forgiveness if the
financial conditions of the victims and perpetrators remained the same, most reacted
by vehemently rejecting the idea as if it was something that was obvious.
Only two of the interviewees subscribed to the idea of unconditional forgiveness, an
idea controversially debated in the literature. Their attitudes and reasoning can be
understood by using the forgiveness typology of Fehr et al (2010). Most other
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interviewees referred to cognitive or affective factors when asked about if and when
they could forgive. To find an answer they made an assessment of the situation —a
comparison between themselves and the perpetrators. When assessing the level of
perpetrator guilt, some victims included considerations about intent and force. If their
assessment implied relative deprivation with feelings of anger and resentment,
forgiveness was rejected. For the two other interviewees, the focus with regard to
forgiveness lay in the third category of the typology that addresses issues of moral and
ethical standards and constraints.
In conclusion, the findings suggest that for the majority a balancing of the scales
between themselves and the perpetrators, accompanied by apologies and remorse is
critical. There was, however, also a group of victims who decided to forgive
unconditionally out of ethical or moral imperatives, or for their own emotional and
psychological wellbeing. Conversely, there will always be a group of people, who will
not forgive regardless of the circumstances.
7.1.5 Conclusions of the qualitative findings in the Polish sample
The interviews conducted with the Polish victims supported and explained some of the
outcomes of the quantitative part of the study. Relative deprivation towards
perpetrators was an issue for the victims in Poland because they saw the perpetrators
as better off. They considered themselves to deserve more and were angry, bitter or
resentful about it. These perceptions were in turn strongly related to a sense of injustice.
It has to be pointed out for clarification that these perceptions and attitudes were
generally expressed with regard to the group rather than individual perpetrators. Group
relative deprivation deals with ingroup-outgroup attitudes. It was the perception that
the outgroup were better off than the ingroup that generated these attitudes and
emotions. Individual factors came in when expectations about apologies were
expressed, for example. Economic and social inequality, studied by applying the
theory of relative deprivation, can be perceived as creating conditions that hinder
forgiveness, despite or beyond the effect of apologies.
While relative deprivation does seem to influence forgiveness of victims, the
relationship appeared more complex than the one between injustice perceptions and
relative deprivation. The perception that the perpetrators enjoyed better economic
conditions than the victims post-transition affected and tainted the justice judgments
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of the post-conflict environment for the victims. Certainly, justice perceptions are also
influenced by more factors than relative deprivation alone. However, it did appear to
be a strong and prevalent factor in the Polish sample. When it came to forgiveness,
various additional, often individual, elements played an important role. Most victims
have conditions for forgiveness. Remorse and apologies were very important, in
accordance with literature and empirical studies (e.g. Azar and Mullet 2002; Blatz,
Schumann, and Ross 2009; Chapman 2007; David 2018; David and Choi 2009; Gibson
2002; Scher and Darley 1997). On the other hand, words did not seem to be enough.
Without some form of repair or restoration of balance, there could be no forgiveness.
The implication was that the remorse and inner change of the perpetrators were not
seen as sincere. Reparations are likely to have the most effect when provided
voluntarily by the perpetrator. Otherwise the society was expected to “step in” and
restore balance and moral order, confirming what was right and wrong, and what was
acceptable and what was not. While these appeared to be the predominant views, some
victims decided to forgive out of religious imperatives or because they perceived
forgiveness as beneficial for their own mental and emotional wellbeing. This seemed
to reflect the literature on decisional and emotional forgiveness (Worthington et al.
2012). Finally, some victims did not forgive under any circumstances or conditions.
While relative deprivation generally focuses on the ingroup's feeling of deserving
better, in this case, there is an additional aspect less researched within relative
deprivation literature. Not only do the victims feel they deserve better, but most also
see the outgroup, in this case, the perpetrators, as deserving less. This finding was
linked to the previously mentioned diverse types of relative deprivation experienced
by victims. They simultaneously experienced temporal relative deprivation, a sense of
being betrayed by not achieving the expected positive outcome after the transition, as
well as relative deprivation resulting from a disadvantageous comparison with the
perpetrator group. This disadvantageous comparison in turn resulted, not only from
the victims having less than they felt they should but, also from the outgroup having
more than they should. This finding complemented and explained the surprising
outcome of the experiment that the respondents did not display relative deprivation
only in response to the one vignette scenario where the victim was better off than the
perpetrator. This was the only condition in which all types of relative deprivation were
addressed and rectified.
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Finally, the qualitative data revealed that the interviewed victims appeared to also
experience relative deprivation in comparison with some members of their ingroup.
The interviewees compared those former oppositionists who succeeded in economic
and social terms with the many victims, mostly including themselves, who were less
fortunate after the transition. While studies focusing on victims’ attitudes, such as the
rather recent concept of competitive victimhood (Noor et al. 2012) focus on
comparisons between two different groups of victims (for example two ethnic groups
involved in a conflict) the present case constitutes an intragroup comparison. These
people have seen each other as colleagues, struggling for the same cause. Even the
name of movement Solidarność (solidarity) speaks for itself. After the transition, a gap
opened (or a previously existing gap became apparent) between those "who made it"
and those who did not, revealing a split into a two-class victim group.
7.2 Uganda
In Uganda 13 interviews were conducted. All were recorded and all were carried out
in the Acholi sub-region in the northern part of Uganda. All interviewees were
members of victims’ associations around massacre sites, except for one person. The
locations of interviews were as follows: Atiak, Odek, Lukodi, Lamogi, and Parabongo.
The one interviewee, who was not a member of victims associations, turned out to be
a son of one of the highest ranking rebel commanders and one of the five against whom
the ICC arrest warrants were issued. Though not a perpetrator himself and not a direct
victim as defined in this study, his account can nevertheless contribute a different
perspective and has, therefore, also been included. However, he only admitted his
heritage after asking to switch off the recorder. Most of the relevant contributions made
by him have been recorded through notes.
All interviews were carried out in English. This was a difficult decision, since it limited
the potential interviewees to those who were relatively fluent in English. However,
considering all the factors, the disadvantages of obstructing the interview process
through translation was found to outweigh the advantages. Much gets lost in
translation and professional translators are rather difficult to find in such regions.
Moreover, in case of potentially difficult and personal topics, such as this one, a more
intimate setting of just two people was perceived as more beneficial. Further, the
quantitative study as well as the open-ended questions that constituted part of the
questionnaires were translated into the local language and contributed to the qualitative
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findings. This ensured that the qualitative data does not only reflect the views of the
English speaking group of victims.
Finally, it turned out that in each place there have been a number of people able to
speak English fluently enough so that language was not a difficult issue after all.
7.2.1 Assessment of the situation of victims and former perpetrators
Economic conditions
All the interviewees were of the opinion that the victims were not doing well
economically. Some particularly mention the difficult situation of old women who lost
children during the war and were now left alone to survive and too weak to support
themselves; or of children who were left alone after their parents were killed or
abducted. In a country, where there is no institutionalized state support for poor people,
families are usually all there is when the weak, poor or elderly need help. In that sense
the pain of losing loved ones in a conflict was amplified by what families mean for
survival.
“Your only son whom you think would be in the best position to help you in
future is killed. And an old useless woman remains without a son. There are
some women whose children are murdered up to the number of three or even
more, so many people. So you find that level of poverty because of the age (…)
“
“(…) you would see some mothers, you would really weep. Some of them are
really…they are very weak, but they have to work so that they can continue
living because the people who are supposed to support them are all not there
now. Some are the husbands killed, the children, all killed” (INT 11)
Apart from the fact that properties were looted, animals stolen or houses burnt and
people had to start from scratch, several respondents also mentioned the lack of
education that resulted from the situation during the war, where regular schooling was
often not possible.
“Most of the women in our group here they are widows. And they don’t have
any strength to support their children. That’s why most of the children, they are
not educated.” (INT 3)
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A number of respondents also emphasized mental problems such as trauma, depression
and general hopelessness, which can often result in alcoholism.
The situation of the returnees71 was mostly assessed as being similar to that of the
rest. Though some respondents acknowledged that, initially, the returnees did get more
support, they mostly saw it as justified owing to their difficult situations and the
initially prevalent stigma. By now, however, many of the NGOs supporting the
returnees or victims in general, had left, while most of the challenges remained.
“Well, with those ones who have been abducted, they're almost at the same level.
By the time they have been just from the bush, their level of living was a little
bit raised. Why do I say this: NGOs were supporting them, but this time, it is not
there.” (INT 9)
The role of the government was severely criticized by all the interviewees. A few
acknowledged that the government was at least trying to help, or that it had tried to do
so during the war by offering some protection. Most, however, place the greater part
of the responsibility for their situation on the government and felt completely
neglected and abandoned.
This was not the only subjective perception of the victims. The north-south divide in
Uganda is obvious and visible, with the river Nile as a dividing line between the more
prosperous south and the marginalized and war-ravaged north. Even though there had
been some improvement since the end of the war it had been slow, insufficient and
many programmes designed to help were riddled with corruption-related problems72.
Social acknowledgment
Social recognition and standing in the community are to a certain degree, also in
northern Uganda, linked to economic wellbeing. However, there are other ways of
showing recognition and acknowledgment of the plight of victims on the side of the
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The returnees are those who have been forcefully abducted, sometimes as children, by the rebels
and return from the “bush” to their communities.
72
. For example, a programme particularly designed to rebuild the north after the war, the Peace,
Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP), implemented through the Office of the Prime Minister in
Uganda, has been at the centre of a major corruption scandal with millions of Euros of donor funds
misappropriated (Irish Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2012). The same applies to other
programmes such as Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF), which at some point has even
been suspended due to corruption claims (Batre 2012).
273

government. Thus, the interviewees did not only emphasize the lack of financial
support, but also highlighted the governments’ lack of interest in their annual
commemoration of the massacres committed in their villages. Most of the respondents
bemoaned the low turnout of political leaders, while others implied that those who
came, did so for their own political benefit.
“I could say they are paying a deaf ear to our cry. For us here we normally
organize an annual memorial prayer. (…) We expect, we normally expect, the
local leaders, like the district leaders, the sub-county leaders, even the people
from national level to attend. But you rarely see them.” (INT 12)
“(…) the people who come, they come on political grounds. Especially the
political leaders, who are in position there, they come just to show themselves
that they are with the people, and during the times of politics, they... so that they
can (…) get votes, during the times of politics. But the real local government
officials, their turn-up is really very low, yes, it is really low. And that's why I
can say even (…) the government are not bothered by it.” (INT 5)
At most of the massacre sites, the victims have constructed memorial monuments
bearing the names of those who were killed. These monuments were mostly erected
with the help of NGOs. It can be argued that memorial monument construction is not
part of the culture or tradition of the Acholi and, therefore, perhaps a lack of
participation by political leaders in commemorations is not surprising. However,
rituals for various events are very common and important in the Acholi culture. The
lack of appropriate burial ceremonies, common during the war, is believed to provoke
the wrath of spirits who haunt the living until they are appeased (Baines 2010). In
many cases, burials are impossible as the remains cannot be found or are scattered.
While traditional cleansing ceremonies are performed to enable people to return to
their homes where atrocities have been committed, memorial sites and
commemoration ceremonies can form another way of appeasing the spirits and
restoring the moral order.
The scale and level of violence of the LRA war were unprecedented and, therefore,
new forms of dealing with the past are likely to have and have actually been adopted
by the victims. These new forms were not originally part of their traditions.
Remembrance appears to be important to a number of people, as one of the respondents
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in the questionnaires also suggested a school to be constructed in memory of those
who died. The lack of participation or interest of political leaders in the annual
commemorations, therefore, demonstrates to the victims that the leaders do not
consider the past suffering of the victims as important.
Situation of former perpetrators
As explained previously, perpetrator and victim categorization can be difficult in
Uganda due to the forced abductions. Thus, a distinction was made in the
questionnaires as well as in the interviews between the forcefully abducted ex-rebels
(also described as returnees or abductees) and higher level perpetrators, i.e., those who
gave the orders and were most responsible for the atrocities that were inflicted on the
victims. Generally, the interviewees, some of whom had also been forcefully abducted,
made this differentiation themselves.
The situation of these “low-ranking” returnees has generally been acknowledged to be
as difficult and challenging as the situations of other victims, possibly even worse,
owing to the prolonged stigma attached to them. The status and living conditions of
the high-ranking ex-rebel commanders and main perpetrators have, however, been
assessed differently. Several of the respondents stated that many of the higher-level
ex-rebels joined the army (UPDF)73 and were, therefore, catered for and paid; and
were living relatively comfortably compared to the victims.
“There are some who came from the bush at the rank of lieutenant and when
they, when they come out they joined UPDF again. So they were what? They
were admitted in UPDF to work as soldiers. So they were also what? Been added
the rank. So they are doing well. Others even, they have constructed their houses,
yes.” (INT5)
With regard to the commanders, several respondents also stated that people are afraid
to say anything against them because they are now in the army. A number of
respondents provided examples of high-ranking ex-rebel commanders they know who
are in high positions or get support from the government. INT 9, for instance, gave the
example of his uncle, a former rebel commander, who receives support from the
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Uganda People’s Defence Force
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government for his sons. The special support given to high-ranking commanders or
their families has also been verified by a son of one of the highest-ranking former LRA
rebels (INT 13), who described the attention from the international community, but
also the financial support for school and university studies he has received from
members of government. This difference is significant, considering that most
respondents complained in particular about the lack of means to continue their
education; and many of the younger interviewees stated that they had to drop out of
school owing to a lack of financial resources. Some interviewees, such as INT4, used
expressions such as “cared” and “catered for” when speaking about the former
perpetrators’ situations. This perception of victims is supported by the literature
describing the post-conflict situation in northern Uganda (Borzello 2009)74.
Another theme that emerged repeatedly, probably due to the simultaneous trial at The
Hague of one of the top five LRA commanders, was the perception that the
international trial and, possible prison sentence, was preferential treatment and not a
punishment at all. Several interviewees pointed out that the current circumstances of
Dominic Ongwen, the arrested LRA commander, were much better than the situation
of the victims. While they live in poverty and struggled daily for survival, Dominic
Ongwen has all his needs taken care of at the international court and in the prison.
“In fact like Dominic Ongwen, for instance, Dominic Ongwen he's (not)
suffering, he's just living happily. (…) on the day he was arrested, he was like
somebody who is like poor, malnourished, badly off, but now if you're to look
at the living conditions because the costs there provide everything necessary
for...for his living.” (INT 5)
The respondents considered being taken to The Hague as favouritism and highlighted
the clothes, the number of lawyers and the general conditions of the ex-rebel leader
they could see on television. It needs to be clarified that it was not the fact of being
tried and imprisoned as such that was perceived as preferential treatment, but rather
the trial and imprisonment at an international court and in a European prison. As the
court hearings were broadcast publically the victims in Uganda had the chance to see
the proceedings as well as the conditions provided for the ex-rebel leader on television.
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See chapter 3 for more details.
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Particularly in comparison with the local courts and prisons in Uganda these
circumstances certainly appeared more than conducive.
7.2.2 Relative deprivation
The victims in northern Uganda made social comparisons that lead to anger or
resentment when the outgroup (here: the perpetrators) was perceived to be in a better
economic position. Regarding the categorization of perpetrators, many drew
distinctions between the different groups of rebels, the high-ranking commanders and
the rest, while others focused on the atrocities committed by the whole group and
differentiated less. However, the stigma attached to the forcefully abducted returnees
appeared to have abated after many efforts to sensitize the public to the issue and since
so many families had been affected. Asked about the resettlement packages given to
ex-rebels, INT3 described the past situation:
“Other people they were jealous about it. But for us others, we also said, no.
These children they were, they have been grabbed without their needs and they
suffered a lot. Many of them disappeared. Many of them were dead. So when
God helped these few ones that are back there is no need to make jealousy on
them, yes.
- So for you, it was ok but some other people were jealous?
- Some other people they abuse you… them with bitter words.
- Because of what they got?
- Yes, yes. That you have been torturing us, now again they are supporting you
in, in very terrible words, yes. (INT3)
So, while the apportionment of blame differed, victims drew social comparisons with
those they saw as perpetrators.
As was emphasized before, most interviewees, however, recognised the formerly
abducted returnees as victims and perceived their situations as similar. Some
acknowledged that the returnees received more assistance in the beginning, but, at the
same time, many of them also suffered more and now the conditions were similar
(INT3). The ex-rebel leaders, on the other hand, were mostly seen as being better off
than the rest. Some interviewees (INT7) assumed that it could have been because they
were perceived as having more influence. As mentioned before, the European prisons
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were perceived as luxury accommodation, understandably from the perspective of
rural African conditions. When speaking about Joseph Kony, the main rebel leader,
INT3 stated:
“I want him also to suffer like we have suffered. He needs to stay with the
community (…) I want him also to suffer like that. Because old men and women
they are suffering alone like that. For him also, I want him to stay in a community,
to see those physically. When he is in prison whatever ... ah. He will be in a good
life.
- So you think the life in prison is better?
- Is better, because everything is free for you, you can go and swim in a pool, do
everything.” (INT3)
The interviewees drew a comparison between the life of the average victim living in
the post-conflict community and a rebel leader who might go, like Dominic Ongwen,
to a prison in Europe following the ICC trial. The prison was seen as providing a better
quality of living and the rebel leaders as undeserving of this. Many of the victims who
expected punishment would, therefore, have preferred trials of the high-ranking exrebels to take place in Uganda.
Another interviewee explained the feelings and reactions of many victims when they
saw that former rebel commanders were, for example, embedded in the army or
otherwise catered for, while victims were left out.
“It is really bad and it can trigger out peoples mindset, yes. Because it is
unbelievable that the person who did all these to you is being supported and you
are being left out, yes. So people are not happy” (INT4)
Another interviewee described the particular case of a commander who returned from
the bush and joined the army, and was now in a better economic situation.
“Some people are not happy. Because they are saying, we…we…we …we lost
a number of people in Lukodi here, but for him, he is back, and he is doing well
and he has two motorbikes what… They are saying that, but not openly. “
- And why do they not say it openly?
- Maybe because of fear.” (INT5)
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The element of fear came up repeatedly (e.g. also INT4). It appeared that people who
made comparisons got angry, but were often afraid to show their feelings. Not only did
the former rebels instigate fear as such but, in addition, they joined another powerful
and feared institution, the army. It also seemed that the anger was vented more
vehemently against those who were seen as more accessible. Another interviewee
described prevailing suspicions that the ICC supported the perpetrators more than it
supported the victims.
“In fact I'm very angry with this thing, because these people should have been
tried in Uganda, or maybe if they're being tried there, the thing, the process
should like be increased, so that by the time these...these victims will die, most
of them would have got their benefit. Because this court has a lot of money, and
the money, I don't know how they get it, but if they use lump sum of it to cut off
for perpetrators it means it is not helping what? It is not helping the victims, yes.
(…) because these benefits even some of it are also given to the families of those
perpetrators.” (INT6)
INT6 explained how these suspicions and anger provoked people into burning down
the house of the wife of Dominic Ongwen.
“And this wife of his [Dominic Ongwen| is no longer in Gulu here. Because
people knew of it and one day someone went like to burn the house of that wife.
-Why were they angry?
(…)
- It is because she's getting even better and better and better, and the money...she,
ok, no one knew where the money was coming from, yes. But the money is just
why, maybe in their account, I don't know, but the...the rate of improvement in
the level of standard is increasing very rapidly, yes. So people, like, say maybe
if not the thing they looted from the... from the bush, is the one she is using, then
it is automatic that is the ICC is providing for her, yes.” (INT6)
This is an example of how the anger aroused through relative deprivation is released
when the true culprits are not available. Dominic Ongwen is in The Hague, former
high-ranking ex-rebels, who joined the army are feared, but the wife of one of the
leaders provided an easier target. Moreover, in the communal culture of the Acholi in
northern Uganda, responsibilities for crimes extend to the families and clans of the
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culprits. If the clan or the family does not accept this responsibility, the anger is
directed at them.
Some highlighted the undeserved recognition and social status awarded to the highest
rebels. INT9 recalled the burial of Joseph Kony’s mother, which appeared like one “of
a president”. This showed, according to INT9, that Kony was actually enjoying the
war, which had provided him with resources and high status. This was likely to have
been painful for many victims whose loved ones had been killed and their remains
scattered in unknown locations, while the mother of the main perpetrator received an
official burial, which included a large public ceremony. INT9 expressed bitterness at
this by declaring that, should Kony die, this would be a cause for celebration.
To sum up, many victims were angry and resentful when they saw cases of perpetrators
doing better than they were. At the same time, fear of the ex-rebels as well as army
soldiers remained. When former rebels joined the army, victims felt particularly
uncomfortable in expressing their feelings. This showed that, even though the war had
ended, Uganda was not a free and democratic country where people felt free to speak
their minds and express their opinions. The suppressed anger was then sometimes
directed at easier targets, especially since other legal avenues are not easily accessible.
Victims in rural areas of northern Uganda were often uninformed about the living
conditions or situations of some ex-rebel commanders, except those in their immediate
proximity. Access to the media is limited and local news are not widely reported. This
leads to suspicions and assumptions replacing facts, especially when it came to
questions of economic wellbeing and the sources from which money was alleged to
have been received. Nevertheless, the mechanisms were similar as those in Poland.
The wealth of perpetrators, whether known about or observed, was frequently
compared to the poverty of victims. The wealth of the perpetrators was perceived as
undeserved and triggered resentment and anger, which in some cases, as shown in the
story of Ongwen’s wife, even lead to acts of revenge.
7.2.3 Justice perceptions
The perception that justice had not been done after the conflict was expressed by most
of the interviewees, though some acknowledged that the government tried to address
some issues during and after the war, or that some steps were being taken, such as the
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ICC arrest warrants and the ongoing trial. However, in the main, the government was
criticized for not doing enough, even though it also bore responsibility.
Prosecution by the ICC, on the other hand, was not seen as much of a punishment by
many, as already mentioned above. The neglect of victims in comparison with the
treatment metered out to the perpetrators was highlighted by some interviewees and
this had an impact on their justice perceptions.
“ It is not ok. Because it is... it should have been the victims who should be
benefiting from this thing [the ICC trial]. Yes, because if you're to look this court
has been instituted to like improve the lives of people and to prevent like crimes
on people and their property. But if the court division itself provides more better
living conditions to the perpetrator than to the victims it means the court is in
support of like the perpetrators, yes. It is...it is supportive to perpetrators.
Because that money which the institution has should have (…) for these people,
should have been used to what? To improve the lives of the victims” (INT 5)
The needs and expectations expressed by the interviewees with regard to justice were
largely similar to the answers given in the open-ended questions included in the
questionnaires 75 , with most references being made to compensation followed by
punishment. When it came to compensation it was generally expected that the
government would provide compensation, though some interviewees acknowledged
the positive effect that symbolic compensation given by the perpetrators to the victims
would have. This is especially so because compensation is usually part of the
traditional reconciliation ceremonies. But most respondents adopted a pragmatic
approach and explained that expecting compensation for all the victims from a few
perpetrators was not realistic.
“So even, like, even if I killed like a 100 people, I (…) cannot pay all those things.
Maybe you bring 200.000 [Uganda Shilling], just in human heart, or as a symbol
that this thing is now in progress. In fact, just (…) as a symbol that this is
something for us the family of perpetrators we are presenting to this team as a
compensation for lives lost or property lost (…)” (INT 5)
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See chapter 4
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"Because it is the government to compensate the people, but not the perpetrators.
Because like, for instance, this one here, Dominic Ongwen, he cannot
compensate all the people in northern Uganda. Not even in northern Uganda
alone, even in eastern Uganda, even in West Nile. So he cannot." (INT 6)
Most interviewees considered that an improvement in victims’ circumstances was an
important prerequisite for justice. While ideally, and traditionally, compensation by
perpetrator follows transgressions in order to restore social and moral order, victims
acknowledged the scale of atrocities and the impossibility of satisfying the needs of
all the individuals to an extent that would really improve their circumstances. Here the
government was expected to restore balance because it was seen as the only body with
sufficient resources to make a difference in the lives of the victims.
The question of punishment appeared ambiguous to a certain extent. On the one hand,
many victims expected the perpetrators to pay in some way for what they had done.
On the other hand, they also acknowledged that the provision of amnesty helped to
end the conflict. Some opted to look forward and focus on the future since the victims
would not benefit from any form of punishment. Asked if the commanders should be
punished one interviewee answered:
"They should be punished. But all the same I think it would also be useless
because when they started coming home, the government of Uganda were
receiving them warmly, others also were eager to come because they [knew]
when you go home you would not be killed. And people started escaping coming
home. So, all the same I think there is nothing to be done. If there is justice I
think, government should get a way of supporting the victims, just only
supporting the victims. Because we cannot bring those lives again on board. The
people were killed are already dead. And the property looted are now not there.
So if they really can bring maybe things like resettlement packages to the people
so that we continue living our normal lives." (INT 11)
Yet again, the ideal was juxtaposed with the reality. Ideally the perpetrators should
have been punished but it would not help anyone so the most important requirement
was to improve victims’ living conditions. This is in accordance with the previously

282

described Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. 76 Poverty threatens the basic needs of
survival and this takes precedence over the just desert principle, which would fall into
the category of psychological needs. The higher level needs become more relevant
when the lower level needs have been satisfied.
Finally, the issue of some perpetrators being in a better situation than the victims was
also regarded as unjust. One interviewee, who was asked about their thoughts
regarding the situation of former LRA commanders who had been embedded in the
army and were living comfortably, responded:
“Probably it is not fair. Because if you see they are the one to victimize these
ones and then now they are given more attention and they are better than these
ones. This is a very clear sign of encouragement that next time if there is any
kind of insurgency these people who are victimized and they are left they are
also going to what? To join with the aim that next time when they are returning
home they will also be catered for the way these ones are catered for. “ (INT4)
INT4 emphasized the symbolic meaning for future generations of a situation in which
right and wrong are not clearly differentiated and treated accordingly. What would
there be to ensure the moral order and explain why people should follow any rules if
the actions that should be condemned appear instead to be rewarded?
Another interviewee, suspecting that government might be supporting some of the
high ranking commanders was asked about their perceptions if this was true and
responded:
"It would be worst! (…) So if they are benefiting out of the bad things they have
been doing then the government is doing the worst. (…) And I think they are
doing so. Because there is one I know the name but this is a man who is really
doing very well. He is…he is really very well." (INT 11)
To sum up, the interviewees generally did not perceive that justice had been done after
the war. Many were grateful merely for the fact that the war was over and the atrocities
had ended. In order to see that justice was done victims need, firstly, an improvement
in their own circumstances. Secondly, a situation in which the perpetrators are better
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off, or some funds are spent on them instead of the victims, is associated with
supporting injustice. This corroborates the assumed relationship between relative
deprivation and injustice perceptions.
Finally, although some victims ideally expected punishment of or compensation from
the perpetrators, they saw it as unrealistic and assumed the pragmatic approach of
accepting the unavoidable. Compensation of this magnitude could only come from the
government and possibly from international institutions like the ICC, which does have
a fund for victims.
7.2.4 Forgiveness
There are various themes emerging from the interviews, which can foster a deeper
understanding of the victims’ attitudes towards forgiveness. In many cases, the
willingness to forgive seemingly unforgivable atrocities may appear astonishing. The
war in northern Uganda was full of the most unimaginable cruelties, yet many rebels
returned and lived side-by-side with the victims, while the victims declared that they
had forgiven the perpetrators. This is something that also appeared in part of the
quantitative and qualitative data presented above. So how is this possible? The
interviews provided some answers regarding the underlying motivation and
understanding of forgiveness by the victims as well as its sometimes ambiguous nature.
In the last section of this chapter these findings will also be compared with those in
Poland to obtain a fuller picture of the understanding of this concept at both research
sites.
One defining characteristic of the war in northern Uganda were the abductions,
frequently of children, who would then be forced to kill and torture, sometimes even
their relatives. Many victims knew people who had been abducted, had been abducted
themselves, or lived in families in which a family member or members had been
abducted. Most, therefore, stressed the issue of responsibility and agency when it came
to the committed crimes.
"What I can say is because they were also abducted, they were been taken there
on order. (…) because like I'm a teacher if I say please, you lie down and I send
someone to …to cane that person. It means (…) I'm behind that. It is not that
very child who caned the other, the colleague. But is my order." (INT 6)
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While interviewees apportioned responsibility differently, some included the top five
commanders indicted by the ICC; some mentioned only Kony; and others included
various high ranking rebels who joined voluntarily, most victims made a distinction
along these lines. Even though stigmatization of all returnees was not uncommon, it
appeared that it had reduced over time. This differentiated view was displayed also in
connection with punishment. While many people said they would support the
punishment of those responsible, they did not expect all the ex-rebels to be punished.
The opinions regarding punishment were found to vary over time and depended on
current circumstances of the victims. During conflicts the most critical and urgent issue
for most victims was peace and whatever was required to achieve it was viewed
positively, even at the cost of impunity (Pham and Vinck 2007). But with the changing
context people’s needs or expectations also change. Now, that the immediate threat of
war had subsided some victims pointed out that the rebels had been given ample
opportunities and possibilities to retreat from their stance, atone and give up but had
refused to do so.
“(…) there is time for everything. Government opened the way for forgiveness,
for so long, I could not now remember, (…) we are going, to have our children
who are in the bush, begging them. And government opened the way, and they
have closed now the way. ICC came here, and International Criminal Court, (…)
that is now the world court, it means, the time of forgiveness has had end[ed].”
(INT 8)
Another interviewee (INT 7) also emphasized the question of time in relation to
apologies and stated that the more time passed the less apologies would be perceived
as sincere.
This view is connected to the topic of the perceived sincerity of apologies as well as
“true forgiveness”. Some victims referred to their faiths and explained that forgiveness
is part of their religion or part of the Acholi culture. Others, however, expressed the
need for some deeds on the side of the perpetrators instead of only words to
symbolically substantiate the sincerity of the remorse at the very least.
“Forgiveness? Oh yes, forgiveness comes during the reconciliation. But it starts
with what? that payment of, we call it paying of kwor, that compensation. We
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call it culu kwor,
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that compensation. So after compensation, we do

reconciliation. (…) Because if I have paid for the lives I lost on your side, then
we reconciled. (…) So it is... it takes a process.” (INT5)
That forgiveness was difficult when perpetrators were benefitting and victims were in
a poorer economic situation also became apparent in the story described above of
people burning down the house of the wife of one of the perpetrators, Dominic
Ongwen. This perception was shared by several interviewees. Asked if forgiveness
was easier if the perpetrators were poor, or on a similar level to the victims, one
interviewee stated:
“Yes, because when he is better, he is moving with the Prado, how can I feel?
(…) Yet, you have destroyed everything I have. Again, you are the one in a good
life. That can bring jealousy.” (INT 3)
While a disadvantageous comparison that resulted in the experience of relative
deprivation did affect willingness to forgive negatively, as evidenced in the quote
above, this was only one side of the story. Some victims displayed an attitude that
could be described as “resigning into forgiveness”. Some felt that they were still in the
weaker position and therefore there was no option for them other than to forgive.
“If you have to ask yourself what do you think you can do about that, ever since
they're being back. They're the one in the high rank of the government, and you
from the grassroot… what do you think you can do for them? There's nothing,
you better forgive other than causing more chaos again.” (INT 10)
Forgiveness promoted by a feeling that there was nothing left to do, that there was no
other option, was an emerging theme in several interviews.
“Most of us (…) even the… the cultural leaders the traditional leaders have been
saying the same. That let us now forgive those people. There is nothing we can
do. Our local chiefs, they were saying that let us forgive those people. We don’t
want (…) blood again to shed in our land. (…) There’s nothing we can do.
Because if we…we…we are to retaliate, where are we going to go and fight?
Who are we going to…to retaliate on? There is nobody. So the only thing we can
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Paying for life.
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do is just to forgive. Nothing apart from the forgiveness we can really do, yes.”
(INT 11)
The perception of “having to forgive” resembles the responses given by victims in a
study done by OHCHR in Uganda, where this formulation was repeatedly used by
interviewees (OHCHR 2007, 29–30). It was also in accordance with a study conducted
in Rwanda after the genocide, where the authors found that unconditional forgiveness
was common in the face of a situation where other options were simply not available
(Mukashema and Mullet 2013). This does not mean that victims do not have
expectations, they might simply not see them as realistic. How do these findings relate
to relative deprivation theory?
As mentioned previously in the context of quantitative findings as well as qualitative
findings in Poland, when it came to post-conflict settings there seemed to be different
types of relative deprivation at play. Some of the empirical findings related to those
different types of relative deprivation can contribute to a better understanding of this
attitude of “resigned forgiveness”. Relative deprivation scholars found that resentment
increased if there was a conceivable alternative that was potentially achievable, and
that would yield a better outcome (Folger and Martin 1986). Conversely, the strong
emotions of anger and resentment, which are assumed to negatively affect forgiveness,
may be reduced if such an alternative scenario cannot be imagined or is not perceived
as achievable and realistic. This might just be the case in Uganda and might possibly
also apply to the study in Rwanda. To put it differently, the hopelessness of a situation
might dampen the effects of relative deprivation and compel people to focus on what
they have instead of what they do not have and cannot realistically achieve. Moreover,
many of the victims in Uganda are, instead, very able to imagine a worse outcome than
the one they have. Renewed conflict is the worst possible alternative. Forgiving
appears as a much better option under such circumstances.
Another example that contributes to the above discussion about realistically
conceivable alternatives is the expectation of compensation from perpetrators.
Compensation paid after the commission of a transgression has substantive but also
symbolic meaning. Compensations are traditionally part of reconciliation rituals, such
as mato oput, in northern Uganda. They improve the situation of the victim by trying
to restore balance after the victim has suffered a loss. At the same time, the perpetrator
pays, which constitutes a form of punishment. This ensures that transgressions are
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unlikely to happen again in future. A perpetrator undergoing such a reconciliation ritual
shows the will to be included in the community again, and symbolically and materially
atones for his sins. However, in the face of mass atrocities, such expectations are
difficult to fulfil.
"If I have power, if at all, I would request them to compensate. They don't have
anything to compensate. They are also very poor like me. (…) Unless otherwise,
they have hidden their wealth in another country, because they have gone as far
as to Central African Republic. (…) I don't know that much. But if at all they
have the capacity… in fact people are too many to be compensated. They are too
many. Greater North, West Nile, Acholi sub-region, Lango, and Teso. There are
very many people." (INT 12)
Apart from the expediency of large-scale compensation by perpetrators, the above
statement also implies a certain powerlessness expressed in the use of the term "if I
have power".
All these above statements indicate that there are different types of forgiveness. There
is forgiveness that takes place under ideal conditions, when expectations of the victims
have been fulfilled and the perpetrator shows a genuine willingness to change, to
improve and be accepted back into the community. The social order is restored by the
perpetrator paying for the transgression and the victim is compensated. But there is
also another type of forgiveness, which can be described as forgiveness out of
resignation, when a victim recognises that there is no other option. In the words of one
of the interviewees:
"In fact, in fact, forgiveness is when I do something wrong on your side, then I
come to you, I apologize for the wrong, then you take your time, you think
through, then you forgive me. From your heart, not just the words. Because this
normal forgiveness we see around, it is just from the mouth, it is not from the
heart, yes." (INT 5)
The concept of a “wholehearted” forgiveness was also reiterated by another
interviewee:
"I cannot forget. Ok, I could say I can forget, but I still can remember. Let me,
let me reframe again yet. In case you have done something wrong to me and you
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have apologized to me…., if you accept it, my request, wholeheartedly, then I
will be free." (INT 12)
The difference between these types of forgiveness becomes apparent in the words of
another interviewee describing the attitude of many victims in northern Uganda
towards the perpetrators:
“They forgive, but sometimes when any slight mistake happen, they recognize”
(INT3)
In other words, what is termed “forgiveness” can have widely different meanings for
people. This relates to the literature on forgiveness and the attempt of many authors to
differentiate between emotional and decisional or cognitive forgiveness (Worthington
et al. 2012; Saunders 2011). The responses reflect the theories about the
multidimensional nature of forgiveness which encompasses cognition and emotions
(Fehr, Gelfand, and Nag 2010) by making a distinction between normal and
wholehearted forgiveness, or forgiveness “from the mouth and from the heart”.
The question is, why would people forgive at all if it is not “wholehearted”, if they do
not really mean it or feel it? The improvement of individual psychological wellbeing
emphasized by Western psychologists also appears in the interviews with the Ugandan
victims, as in the expression of INT12 above “then I will be free”. But there is another
element. African rural communities have in the past always, and still do, heavily relied
on a sense of belonging to the group and society as an entity crucial for wellbeing and
survival. This relates back to the differentiation between individualistic and
collectivistic cultures.78 An individual is lost without the community. And without
forgiveness, the community will fall apart.
“You must forgive because if not, if many people have wronged you (…) and
you don't forgive, that means you're going to live alone, and a person cannot live
alone. You have to live with the people. And that's why I'm saying you must
forgive.” (INT 7)
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See chapter 2.3.2.
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To sum up, victims in northern Uganda expressed the expectations typically associated
with forgiveness. Apart from an improvement in their circumstances, remorse,
acknowledgment and apologies on the side of the perpetrator played an important role.
Payment by the perpetrator was not only part of traditional reconciliation rituals but
also fulfils the function of making up for the losses of the victim. Consequently, a
situation of relative deprivation in which the victims live in poorer circumstances than
their former perpetrators are considered to be a hindrance to forgiveness.
However, many victims did not foresee their expectations as being realistically
fulfilled in the future. There seems, therefore, to be a different type of “resigned
forgiveness” that victims resort to if “wholehearted” forgiveness is not possible. This
is perceived as important in collectivistic societies to prevent communities from falling
apart. It is, however, also less stable since any minor transgression may trigger the
suppressed feelings of un-forgiveness, possibly resulting in vengeful actions in future.
7.2.5 Conclusion of the qualitative findings in the Ugandan sample
The interviewed victims generally assessed the economic situations of most victims
negatively. There is poverty, little or no support and a feeling of being forgotten or
abandoned by the government, which appeared to care more about the perpetrators.
Not only was there no financial help but there was also little social recognition of the
plight of the victims as commemorations of massacres are mostly ignored by political
leaders.
In particular, the higher ranking, former perpetrators were mostly perceived as being
in better circumstances with many holding positions in the Ugandan army. Even the
ICC indictments were seen as beneficial, as victims watched the court proceedings on
television and acknowledged the higher standard of living in a European prison
compared to village life in a poor community. The general perception amongst victims
was that the most criminally liable rebel leaders, instead of being tried in Uganda, were
sent abroad where they were surrounded by an army of lawyers and were generally
well catered for, while victims struggled to survive.
These views resulted in relative deprivation in the case of several interviewees, who
saw the situation in which perpetrators were better off than victims as an impediment
to justice and forgiveness. Many victims in Uganda, however, do not necessarily have
access to comprehensive information about the situation of perpetrators. If there was
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no higher ranking ex-rebel commander resettled in their immediate proximity, they
would not be aware about the living conditions of the perpetrators. It seemed that for
many the issue of social comparison was, therefore, not the most salient aspect of the
post-conflict setting and often not mentioned, unless asked. If it did become salient,
however, it appeared to affect victims strongly as examples of perpetrators being better
off, benefitting from what they had done or being “rewarded” for their crimes were
described and perceived as extremely unjust. This injustice, triggered by social
comparisons, could even result in acts of revenge.
While victims in northern Uganda mentioned various expectations before being able
to forgive “wholeheartedly”, they generally did not see them as likely to be fulfilled in
future. The lack of a realistically imaginable better alternative, while the poorer
alternative of a violent war was still very present in their mind, resulted in many
victims “resigning into forgiveness”. Forgiveness was perceived by many as highly
important for the cohesiveness of the societal structure. Forgiveness in collectivistic
cultures, has been described by scholars as a means of restoring social harmony (Hook,
Worthington, and Utsey 2009). Declaring forgiveness can sometimes even be
perceived as a form of social duty. At the same time, such forgiveness may be
superficial. Despite declaring forgiveness, revenge or avoidance motivations may still
be present; and social harmony may be vulnerable to further transgressions in the
future.
7.3 Comparison – Poland and Uganda
The accounts of the victims in Poland and northern Uganda revealed a number of
similarities despite the different contexts and histories.
Apart from the fact that in both places many victims still suffered the consequences of
the past, especially in economic terms, in both countries the perception prevailed that
perpetrators were better off, in particular, those, who used be in high-ranking positions.
This fact sent out a particularly strong message regarding justice perceptions as well
as relative deprivation. Those who were most responsible and who least deserved it,
benefitted the most, while many victims continued to struggle economically and often
felt unacknowledged and forgotten. In both countries, relative deprivation did appear
to have a negative impact on justice perceptions and forgiveness.
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In addition to this, in both countries different types of relative deprivation come into
play. Victims not only compare themselves with perpetrators, their assessments appear
to include the situation of perpetrators before and after, the change of their own
situation over time and finally, imagined alternative outcomes. Their justice
perceptions and willingness to forgive resulted, among other factors, from all these
assessments.
Some of these assessments differ due to the context in which they were experienced.
Generally, the advantageous situation of former perpetrators seemed to be more salient
for the victims in Poland. The disadvantageous comparisons with perpetrators played
a significant role in justice judgments of the post-regime environment. In Uganda,
these comparisons were mostly limited to those that were observable in the immediate
proximity and were, therefore, frequently less salient. When they became salient,
however, the perceived injustice of perpetrators benefitting more juxtaposed with
widespread poverty prompted drastic reactions and revenge in some cases. This may
have been exacerbated by the fact that other avenues, such as legal means, to address
perceived injustice are mostly not accessible to victims in northern Uganda. In other
words, while the experiences of relative deprivation and its negative effects on victims’
attitudes are similar in both countries, these attitudes and perceptions are to a certain
degree dependent on the available information. The subsequent behavioural responses
depend in turn on options victims have in reacting to the perceived injustice.
Furthermore, there is a difference between the two countries that can possibly be traced
back to relative deprivation as a result of a comparison with an envisioned alternative
outcome. There is a group of victims in Poland who experienced a sense of bitterness
and betrayal. People did not get caught up in a conflict, as was the case in Uganda.
The interviewees actively chose to fight an unjust system. They had foreseen and
expected a better outcome. It did not materialize due to a betrayal that took place, in
the perception of many victims, during the roundtable negotiations. A disadvantageous
comparison with a possible alternative outcome was found to increase a sense of
resentment and relative deprivation (Folger 1986). A better outcome was within grasp
but the victims felt they had been cheated out of it. Some even described their
situations as worse than before.
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This was very different in Uganda. The conflict was characterized by countless
atrocities for decades and when it ended, the victims did not necessarily have grounds
for envisioning improvements in their circumstances from a government that failed to
protect them or was even complicit in some of the suffering that had happened to them.
It does not mean that victims in Uganda do not have expectations for improved life
conditions. Nevertheless, for many peace was the best outcome they could realistically
have hoped for and the only conceivable alternative seemed to be renewed conflict.
This possibly reduced feelings of resentment and resulted in what has been described
before as “resigned forgiveness” out of a feeling that there are no other options.
Moreover, forgiveness could be seen as a necessity to restore social harmony in a
collectivistic culture (Hook, Worthington, and Utsey 2009; Sandage and Williamson
2005). This forgiveness, which appears to be more cognitive than affective
(Worthington et al. 2012), and arise out of societal and cultural constraints (Fehr,
Gelfand, and Nag 2010) does, however, seem to be more superficial and therefore less
stable and more prone to being revoked in the case of new transgressions.
While in both countries social recognition does play a role, in Poland it is more likely
to take the shape of awards for individual accomplishments, and in Uganda of
recognizing and acknowledging victims and their plight during commemorations.
Some victims in Uganda pointed out the need to be involved in, or at least informed
about, court proceedings against the perpetrators. While social recognition is important
for all, the specific expectations were more dependent on context, history, and culture.
In conclusion, it appears that the factors investigated in this study are present in both
countries and do shape and influence victims’ attitudes and perceptions in the
directions that were expected. Relative deprivation as a result of a disadvantageous
comparison with former perpetrators is an obstacle for forgiveness and is connected
with perceptions of injustice. Injustice perceptions of the post-conflict setting make a
“wholehearted” forgiveness, which includes affective components, more difficult,
even though victims might take a decision to forgive for various individual and societal
reasons. Even though forgiveness is declared, revenge or avoidance motivations may
still be present.
While the qualitative findings support the experiment and survey results and add a
more nuanced understanding of the reasoning, motivations and perceptions of victims
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in both settings, there are also differences grounded in the diverging contexts. These
contextual differences shape the salience of the respective studied factors and
consequently influence the strength of their relationships.
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS
The research questions this thesis set out to investigate focused on the role of economic
and social inequalities of the post-conflict setting in victim’s justice perceptions and
forgiveness. The assumption was that these inequalities trigger the experience of
relative deprivation that contributes to: 1) negative justice judgments of the postconflict environment; 2) an increase in revenge and avoidance motivation; and 3) a
reduced willingness to forgive. Moreover, the effect of relative deprivation on
forgiveness was presumed to be partly channelled through perceptions of injustice that
were also presumed to affect forgiveness negatively.
The concepts of justice, forgiveness and relative deprivation, which are believed to be
universally applicable, were studied in two post-conflict settings, which were
specifically chosen for their differences. The question to be addressed through the
selection of such diverse settings was to what extent the above stated assumptions of
the present research are applicable to and valid in different contexts and among various
victim groups.
This final chapter provides a short overview of the main findings. The conclusions
address the research question posed at the beginning and highlight the similarities as
well as differences between the two victim groups regarding the main topic of this
study. The second section addresses the contributions and theoretical implications of
the present study in the relevant fields of forgiveness, relative deprivation, justice and
transitional justice research. The findings offer some answers but at the same time also
provide a variety of new questions to be addressed by future studies, which are also
highlighted in this section.
Finally, a mixed-method cross-cultural study, which includes an experimental
methodology, is constrained by a variety of limitations. These limitations are addressed
in detail in the final section of this chapter.
8.1 Overview of main findings
The main topic of this study was to investigate the potential effects of economic and
social inequalities in a post-conflict setting on victims’ perceptions of justice and
forgiveness. The research framework was derived from the theory of relative
deprivation, which describes the consequences of an experience of deprivation that
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results from a comparison. The main focus of the present study was on the comparison
between victims and perpetrators in terms of economic wellbeing and social
acknowledgement. This form of a comparison did prove to play a role in victims’
attitudes. However, the study also provided some evidence for the potential
significance of other forms of relative deprivation. At the outset it was assumed that
the experimental condition of the victim being in a worse post-conflict situation than
the perpetrator represented relative deprivation;

and the three other situations (viz. 1.

victim and perpetrator are equally well off; 2. victim and perpetrator are equally poor
and 3. victim is better off than the perpetrator) did not. The findings, however, suggest
a different interpretation. Only the situation in which the victim was better off than the
perpetrator did not give rise to the experience of relative deprivation while all others
did, but to different degrees. Even as victims do compare their circumstances with
those of the perpetrators, they also appear to conduct temporal comparisons and
comparisons with an imagined alternative outcome. The latter two types of relative
deprivation, ie, based on temporal and imagined alternative outcome comparisons,
have been studied before and were found to influence perceptions and attitudes (Folger
1986; Folger and Martin 1986; de la Sablonnière et al. 2015; Davies 1962; H. J. Smith
and Pettigrew 2015).
Economic relative deprivation resulted on average in more pronounced negative
effects on forgiveness in both countries. While relative deprivation regarding social
acknowledgement cannot be described as meaningless based on the findings, as it still
affects justice perceptions, it clearly appears to be less relevant. One reason is possibly
that in most cases a high economic status contributes to a higher social status and
acknowledgement, while the reverse is not necessarily true. This became clear in the
qualitative data in the Polish sample. Moreover, the victims in Poland frequently
perceived social acknowledgement, without adequate economic compensation, as
cheap, just for show and hypocritical. For the victims in Uganda the economic
struggles were generally the predominant challenge. Referring back to Maslow’s need
hierarchy (1954) and the assumptions drawn from it at the beginning, it appears that
in conditions of scarcity the focus of victims on economic circumstances prevails over
other injustices, which might become more apparent once economic inequality has
been addressed.
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While the quantitative findings supported the initial assumption that relative
deprivation affects justice perceptions and forgiveness in the expected directions, the
qualitative findings provided some additional insight regarding victims’ perceptions.
The qualitative data indicated that different types of comparisons conducted by the
victims depend on the context and their personal assessment of the situation. These
comparisons pertain to other kinds of relative deprivation, besides the social
comparison with the perpetrators, such as temporal comparisons or comparisons with
an imagined alternative outcome.
The issues relevant for temporal relative deprivation, for instance, are the assessment
of the trajectory of the ingroup’s conditions over time. Do the victims perceive their
situation as improved? Do they expect it to improve further? In particular in times of
social change the expectation of own groups’ improvement over time has been
associated, for example, with higher psychological wellbeing (de la Sablonnière et al.
2015). Moreover, an additional question, particularly relevant in the context of
transitional justice, is how the victims perceive the trajectory of the perpetrator groups’
conditions? These elements emerged in particular in the Polish sample, when victims
pointed out how nothing changed for the perpetrators, or some even assessed the
perpetrators’ situation as improved.
The other type of relative deprivation, is relative deprivation resulting from a
comparison with an imagined alternative outcome (Folger 1986; Folger and Martin
1986). While the qualitative data in both countries suggested that this type of
comparison is made by victims, the imagined alternative outcomes appear to differ in
Poland and Uganda. At some point in the past around the time of the transition, Polish
victims imagined a better outcome. When it failed to meet their expectations, they felt
cheated and betrayed. For Ugandan victims, at least currently, the possibility of
renewed conflict still looms. While a better outcome, including some form of
compensation, is not inconceivable, the threat of conflict and, therefore, a worse
alternative outcome is, for many, more tangible.
Adding to the complexity of the relationship between relative deprivation and
forgiveness are the different dimensions of forgiveness. The findings confirmed the
multi-dimensional nature of forgiveness and reaffirmed the necessity of more nuanced
measures. The findings suggested that, in particular, economic relative deprivation
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does affect revenge motivation and willingness to forgive in the same way in both
countries. The effects on avoidance motivation, however, differ. A mostly consistent
result was the lack of any effects on avoidance motivation in the Polish sample. At the
same time, the level of avoidance motivation turned out to be generally much higher
in the Polish samples.
The effects of both economic and social relative deprivation on justice perceptions
were the most consistent across the studies, samples and methodologies. Since relative
deprivation has been classified as a justice related theory, this was to be expected
(Tyler et al. 1997). In other words, the more victims experience relative deprivation,
the more they assess the transition and the post-conflict setting as unjust. This is an
important element to emphasise. The injustice perceptions scale measures the injustice
gap, which relates to the whole post-conflict scenario. Relative deprivation, therefore,
does not only result in a negative justice judgement regarding the disadvantageous
comparison; it also influences the justice assessment of the transition and the time
afterwards. While, as mentioned above, this result was consistent in both countries a
moderation analysis revealed that relative deprivation has a stronger influence on
injustice perceptions in Poland.
The qualitative data provided some clues to explain this finding. It appears that the
information necessary to make comparisons with former perpetrators in particular is
more salient in Poland. There is public as well as political debate about the pensions
of former security agents (SB) or high ranking former communist leaders, and when
asked about justice several interviewees spontaneously offered these comparisons to
explain their perceptions of injustice. In Uganda this kind of information is only
accessible in the immediate vicinity of the victims. Only in cases where there is a
former perpetrator thriving economically in their neighbourhood does this aspect
become salient. The other case is the trial of Dominic Ongwen, one of the highest
ranking former LRA rebels at The Hague, which was broadcast on television in
Uganda. This prompted several interviewees to compare his living conditions (as they
appeared on television); the highly qualified international lawyers; and other visible
factors, with their own circumstances in which they were struggling to survive and
concluded that he was better off. Those who made this comparison perceived it as
unjust and some pointed out that the finance for these ICC prosecutions could better
be spent on the victims. This suggests that when information is available, the
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comparison mechanism in both settings; the conclusions drawn from it; and the effects
on justice perceptions are similar in Poland and Uganda. This interpretation is in
accordance with the assumptions derived from justice heuristics. They suggest that as
people are motivated to make justice judgements in a new and uncertain context, they
will use whatever information is available (Proudfoot and Lind 2015).
The relationships between relative deprivation and the dependent variables of
forgiveness and justice appeared stronger in the survey as compared to the experiment.
Some effects only emerged during the survey. Fehr et al. (2010) found that scenario
methodologies have more effect on cognition, while recalling real life events has
greater impact on emotions. They concluded, therefore, that these methodologies
should be treated as complementary. Since forgiveness and justice perceptions both
have affective components, this might contribute to the weaker experiment results on
average.
The more victims perceived the post-conflict environment as unjust the less they were
motivated and willing to forgive the former perpetrators. This result was mostly
consistent across the studies, samples and research sites. In particular in Uganda
injustice perceptions turned out to be a significant mediator between relative
deprivation and forgiveness. Injustice perceptions triggered by economic inequalities
have also been found to contribute stronger to un-forgiveness in Uganda than they did
in Poland. These strong reactions in cases of perceived economic relative deprivation
and the resulting injustice in Uganda were supported by the qualitative data in which
revenge activity was reported, such as burning the house of the wife of one high
ranking perpetrator who was perceived to be thriving economically. A possible
explanation for this difference between Poland and Uganda with regard to the intensity
of the reactions to perceived injustice may be that the conflict in Uganda is more recent,
which might contribute to stronger emotional reactions. Moreover, other avenues of
redress, such as legal remedies, are much less accessible for the victims in Uganda
compared to Poland. This lack of alternative remedies may lead to a build-up of anger
and frustration which result, in some cases, in revenge actions.
To sum up, the main assumptions were generally verified in both countries and the
studies confirmed the existence of the relationships between the variables and the
hypothesized positive or negative values of those connections. However, the contexts
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influenced and shaped the relative importance of each factor as well as the strength of
the connections. Moreover, it appeared that various types of relative deprivation, not
only the one resulting from a disadvantageous social comparison, played a role for
victims. The meaning of these findings for the respective theoretical fields as well as
for the field of transitional justice is outlined below.
8.2 Contributions and theoretical implications
The relationship between relative deprivation and forgiveness has not been studied to
date, which makes this study a contribution to the advancement of knowledge in this
theoretical field. The findings do suggest that relative deprivation in a post-conflict
setting has a negative effect on forgiveness, though some of the results were mixed.
Economic relative deprivation appears to have stronger effects on forgiveness than
social relative deprivation does. This difference might be explained by referring back
to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (Maslow 1954), in which economic needs, which are
related to survival, are perceived to be more pressing in case of scarcity than
psychological needs. Economic factors were also found to be more prominent among
poorer populations in transitional justice studies supporting this interpretation of the
findings (Robins 2012b). Moreover, the fact that social acknowledgement is perceived
as hypocritical in the absence of economic compensation and support, as was
highlighted by various victims in Poland, implies that when economic factors are not
an issue, social acknowledgement may become more important.
The findings suggest that relative deprivation may be a useful theoretical framework
for studying victims’ perceptions and attitudes in a post-conflict setting. In particular,
exploring the effects of the previously described types of relative deprivation on
victims can contribute to an explanation of the differences between victim groups. For
example, social or temporal relative deprivation as well as relative deprivation
resulting from comparisons with imagined alternative outcomes might differ in the
strength and quality of their impact on victims’ attitudes and perceptions. Future
studies might also focus on those different types of relative deprivation experienced
by victims in an attempt to explain or explore the time trajectory and resilience of
relative deprivation.
Relative deprivation may also complement other findings in the field of transitional
justice. The type of relative deprivation studied here refers to group processes and
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perceptions. The relationship between the specific victims and perpetrators was not
the subject matter of the investigation in this context, but rather the role of victims and
perpetrators as representatives of their respective groups. A collective approach, or
collectivist thinking, in dealing with the past has been criticized for suppressing
individual stories with detrimental effects for the whole transition process (David
2018). However, individual measures such as apologies, while highly important for
forgiveness (as emerged from the qualitative data of this study), take place in a social
context. The qualitative data also suggests that those apologies, which happen in a
context of relative deprivation for victims, are perceived as less genuine. The positive
effect of apologies, which is the presumed transformation of the perpetrator, appears
weakened or possibly annulled if victims perceive the perpetrators as economically
privileged.
Moreover, while perpetrators were not the subject of this study it became apparent that
in conditions of continued relative economic privilege, it is possible that perpetrators
may feel less compelled to apologize. The acknowledgment of guilt and the admission
of having done something wrong appear less likely to take place when perpetrators
continue to experience relative economic advantage. This is suggested, for example,
by the recollection of one of the Polish interviewees about the trial of a former
communist official who reportedly laughed at the victims and pointed to her better
economic conditions and higher pension. She showed no sign of remorse. Group and
individual processes in transitional justice are intertwined by the nature of the crimes
committed and, therefore, shape, inform and influence each other.
Injustice perceptions have been defined in the present study as the “injustice gap”,
which indicates the gap between ideal justice and the reality (Davis et al. 2015).
According to Davis et al an increase in this gap impacts negatively on forgiveness.
Conversely, a reduction in the injustice gap should contribute to forgiveness. A
verification of this assumption is highly significant in the context of transitional justice
since it confirms that justice is important for victims and also appears important for
reconciliation. Studying the injustice gap by itself without simultaneously considering
the influencing factors, however, leaves open the question of what this ideal justice
looks like?
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Studies in the field of transitional justice have shown that a variety of measures can
contribute to more forgiveness (David and Choi 2009). While the authors did not use
the framework of the injustice gap but explained their findings as a restoration of
balance or “getting equal” as contributing to forgiveness, the concept is essentially
similar.
The present study put forward relative deprivation as another factor that can influence
the injustice gap of victims. Clearly, the expectations of victims are diverse and relative
deprivation constitutes only one aspect among many that can affect the size of the
injustice gap. At this point it is also important to keep in mind the above-mentioned
individual and group level factors, as both influence individual injustice perceptions.
However, the present findings do suggest that in particular injustice perceptions
triggered through economic relative deprivation have significant effect on revenge and
avoidance motivation as well as willingness to forgive. This confirms the assertions of
several scholars that economic inequality fuels the danger of renewed conflict
(Laplante 2008; Z. Miller 2008). The example cited above of burning the house of the
family of a high-ranking perpetrator, who was perceived as relatively privileged as
compared to the victims, reflected this danger in a very explicit way.
The injustice gap represents another useful theoretical framework for the assessment
of justice perceptions and their effects on forgiveness in a post-conflict setting. Further
studies could contribute more insight into other factors affecting the size of the
injustice gap for different victim groups. Related to the present study topic, the effects
of other types of relative deprivation on the injustice gap could be examined. To put it
differently, future studies could address the question if temporal, social or comparisons
with an imagined alternative outcome affect the injustice gap in similar or different
ways.
Finally, the combination of the different methodologies in the present study also
allowed for some insight into the multi-dimensional construct of forgiveness. Not only
can forgiveness be defined in a positive as well as negative sense as “un-forgiveness”
but the elements that constitute it can, moreover, have different connotations in
different contexts. This was briefly pointed out above in relation to avoidance
motivation in Poland and Uganda. Declaring forgiveness can also have different
meanings depending on whether the forgiveness is cognitive (decisional) or emotional
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(Worthington et al. 2012). As such, it can either be “true forgiveness” or more likely
represent a superficial statement susceptible to revocation.
Here, the typology provided by Fehr et al (2010) can provide additional insight. The
authors of this extensive meta-analysis of forgiveness studies tried to answer the
question of why and how people forgive. Apart from individual cognitive and affective
assessments, the social context plays a role in providing incentives, pressures and
constraints. The social factor is summarized by the question people might ask
themselves: What happens if I do not forgive? Considering the example of avoidance
in the present study, the answer to this question would have been quite different in the
context of Poland and Uganda. In most cases, avoidance of perpetrators would not
have had significant consequences in Poland. In a collectivistic and communal culture,
such as the context of northern Uganda, where in the words of one interviewee “a
person cannot live alone”, this is quite different. Social pressure that creates an
environment which favours forgiveness might also contribute to decisional yet
superficial forgiveness, as was predominantly the case in Uganda. These factors
highlight the need to consider the complex nature of forgiveness as well as the various
differing motivations for expressing forgiveness in studies focusing on this topic. A
simple statement of forgiveness might not reveal much while, on the contrary,
suppressing some substantial differences.
In conclusion, the present study also confirmed the claim made at the beginning that
social psychology has much to offer the field of transitional justice. Mass human rights
violations happen in a social context between groups of people. Therefore, a field that
strives to explain human behaviour in a social context can also contribute solutions to
the problem of how to deal with and interpret the aftermath of regime change or social
upheaval.
8.3 Limitations of the study
A research design involving experimental procedures, a survey, and qualitative
interviews, carried out in two different cultural settings, involving three languages and,
moreover, on some largely unexplored topics, is bound to incorporate various
challenges and difficult decisions, which did have implications for the studies at hand.
Often, vignette experiments on similar topics attempt to be as close to the original
setting as possible to enable the respondents to relate to the stories as closely as
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possible (David 2011; Gibson 2002). In conducting a vignette experiment in two very
diverse settings, there were only two choices, both of which bore specific challenges.
One possibility was to devise two different vignettes that would each be close to its
context. While this would probably have made the stories more relatable for the
respondents, it would have, at the same time, prevented any direct comparisons.
Therefore, the decision was taken to develop a vignette set in a fictional country, which
would include some elements familiar to either one of the countries. The responses in
the open-ended questions revealed that respondents did, in fact, relate to the story,
confirming that it was valid to use the same vignette for both countries. In addition, in
order to triangulate the outcomes from the fictional setting of the vignette, a survey
part was added with similar questions. As pointed out previously, forgiveness scholars
have emphasized that scenario and recall studies

complement each other since they

each tend to affect cognition or emotion, respectively (Fehr, Gelfand, and Nag 2010).
Moreover, if the respondents had not been able to relate to the vignette story, the
consequence would probably have been that the effects were likely to be reduced.
Relative deprivation does include emotional elements as do forgiveness or justice
perceptions. The less the respondents had been able to relate to the victim in the
vignette story, the weaker their emotional response would have been. Therefore, it is
reasonable to assume that a more realistic setting would have made the effects stronger,
if at all. This is supported by the survey findings in which some effects did appear
more significant than the largely similar findings of the experiment.
Another challenge was the administration of the questionnaires. Usually, experiments
demand an identical administration. However, as pointed out by cross-cultural scholars,
what is commonly considered ideal conditions can, in a cross-cultural study easily lead
to instrument bias (P. K. Smith et al. 2013, 86). For example, a self-administered pen
and paper questionnaire, a widespread and unproblematic test administration in many
countries, can constitute a challenge for people not used to this type of testing and not
fluent in reading and writing. A design supposed to make comparisons easier can easily
end up creating more differences between the populations than just adapting to the
context differences. In view of these anticipated challenges in a rural African setting
where many people are not able to read and write at all, two different questionnaire
administration techniques were chosen. In Poland, the questionnaires were selfadministered while in Uganda, they were administered by research assistants. Bearing
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in mind these differences between the two settings, the analyses in the present study
were done on two different levels. First, the hypotheses were tested in separate samples.
In the second step comparative moderation analyses were carried out by joining the
samples in order to assess their similarities and differences. Obviously, this approach
is not ideal. However, the various potential research biases are more likely to result in
overestimating differences between the samples, as they might be attributable to the
test bias and not to true variance between the populations. In other words, the
similarities found in Poland and Uganda in the present study are likely to be even
greater if the study had been carried out under ideally comparable conditions.
Further, it has to be stated, as already emphasized in the finding section, that in cases
of variables designed to measure attitudes and perceptions a reverse causality cannot
be ruled out. The assumed directions are based on the existing theoretical background
in the respective fields as well as on previous studies. However, it is possible that it is
forgiveness that affects justice perceptions or that justice perceptions affect the
experience of relative deprivation. With regard to the relationship between the variable
experienced relative deprivation and the forgiveness measures, while reverse causality
is also an option, the experiment findings support the claim that in the case of economic
comparisons it is, indeed, economic relative deprivation that affects forgiveness.
Studies conducted with victims in post-conflict or post-regime settings are by nature
extremely difficult. The participant selection is narrow, adding to the time and financial
constraints. A number of the assumed effects, insignificant in the analyses conducted
separately in the two country samples, turned out to be significant in the combined
analysis of the two samples suggesting that some of the effect sizes might have been
underestimated. It would, therefore, be worthwhile to conduct further similar studies
on the connection between relative deprivation, justice, and forgiveness in other
cultural settings and with bigger samples to assess the applicability of the findings of
the present study to other contexts and with different victim groups.
Finally, longitudinal studies could provide insight into the effect of temporal relative
deprivation on justice perceptions and forgiveness of victims based on trajectories of
victims’ and perpetrators’ economic conditions over time.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1: Consent page
This study is part of a PhD project by Kamila Krygier, of the department of sociology and
social policy at Lingnan University, Hong Kong.
The purpose is to assess opinions of victims of conflicts or regimes in different countries.
Some people might not feel comfortable in describing their experiences during the conflict or
regime. There is, however, only one short questions asking about this and you do not need to
describe any details.
Your participation will be greatly appreciated and this study will be not possible without your
help!
The questionnaire has 2 parts and should take between 30-45 minutes.
The first part consists of a short fictional story about a post-conflict country describing
situations and experiences of people during and after the conflict. You will be asked questions
about the story and how you think some persons in the story might react or feel. The second
part of this questionnaire will ask questions about yourself and your opinions on various issues.
The participation in this study is voluntary. If you do not feel comfortable with the topic
or the questions, please do not hesitate to decline participation.
If you choose to participate it is very important that you answer ALL questions.
Otherwise the questionnaire cannot be included in the study. If you are not sure about
an answer, please select the one that is closest to your opinion!
All contents of this questionnaire will be anonymous and strictly confidential. No one will
know if you participated and how you answered the questions.
For any further information about this study, please feel free to contact me at
kamilaannakrygier@ln.hk
Thank you very much for your participation!
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Appendix 2: Vignette scenarios
STUDY 1
Vignette version1 (V1)
This is a fictional story about a situation in a post-conflict country. Please read it carefully.
On the next page you will find questions about this story.
In country B. a 20-year civil war between various rebel groups and a military regime ended 5
years ago. All fighting groups negotiated a peace agreement and elections brought a new
democratic government.
Daniel is one of many victims. 10 years ago he has been randomly arrested by the military
on his way from work. After torturing and beating him for days, they drove him out of the
city severely injured and left him to die in a forest. He was lucky to survive. Upon his return
he found his house has been burned and he lost everything. He still suffers from severe pain
from those injuries.
Daniel got a generous compensation for his suffering and receives an above average pension.
This enables him a comfortable life in a big house with a garden and even making savings.
He could also afford an expensive surgery, which considerably reduced his health problems
that persisted due to the torture.
Robert was a high-ranking official during the military dictatorship. He joined the military
for career reasons and was responsible for most of the detentions and brutal interrogations in
the area where Daniel was living.
Robert got a generous compensation after leaving his position and now receives an above
average pension. During the peace negotiations it was agreed to give high compensations for
officials, who have to leave their former jobs. Robert lives in a big house with a garden.
Vignette version 2 (V2)
In country B. a 20-year civil war between various rebel groups and a military regime ended 5
years ago. All fighting groups negotiated a peace agreement and elections brought a new
democratic government.
Daniel is one of many victims. 10 years ago he has been randomly arrested by the military on
his way from work. After torturing and beating him for days, they drove him out of the city
severely injured and left him to die in a forest. He was lucky to survive. Upon his return he
found his house has been burned and he lost everything. He still suffers from severe pain from
those injuries.
Daniel got a generous compensation for his suffering and receives an above average pension.
This enables him a comfortable life in a big house with a garden and even making savings. He
could also afford an expensive surgery, which considerably reduced his health problems that
persisted due to the torture.
Robert was a high-ranking official during the military dictatorship. He joined the military
for career reasons and was responsible for most of the detentions and brutal interrogations in
the area where Daniel was living.
Robert lost his position in the military after the democratic elections. His pension was removed
and now he has no source of income. He lives in a very poor neighborhood in miserable
conditions. Though he has a number of health problems because of old age he cannot afford
good healthcare.
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Vignette version 3 (V3)
In country B. a 20-year civil war between various rebel groups and a military regime ended 5
years ago. All fighting groups negotiated a peace agreement and elections brought a new
democratic government.
Daniel is one of many victims. 10 years ago he has been randomly arrested by the military on
his way from work. After torturing and beating him for days, they drove him out of the city
severely injured and left him to die in a forest. He was lucky to survive. Upon his return he
found his house has been burned and he lost everything. He still suffers from severe pain from
those injuries.
Daniel never got any compensation for his suffering. He was left without any source of income
and now lives in a miserable room in a very poor neighborhood. He cannot afford good medical
care for his health problems, which persist since the detention and torture.
Robert was a high-ranking official during the military dictatorship. He joined the military
for career reasons and was responsible for ordering and overseeing most of the detentions and
brutal interrogations in the area where Daniel was living.
Robert got a generous compensation after leaving his position and now receives an above
average pension. During the peace negotiations it was agreed to give high compensations for
officials, who have to leave their former jobs. Robert lives in a big house with a garden.

Vignette version 4 (V4)
In country B. a 20-year civil war between various rebel groups and a military regime ended 5
years ago. All fighting groups negotiated a peace agreement and elections brought a new
democratic government.
Daniel is one of many victims. 10 years ago he has been randomly arrested by the military on
his way from work. After torturing and beating him for days, they drove him out of the city
severely injured and left him to die in a forest. He was lucky to survive. Upon his return he
found his house has been burned and he lost everything. He still suffers from severe pain from
those injuries.
Daniel never got any compensation for his suffering. He was left without any source of income
and now lives in a miserable room in a very poor neighborhood. He cannot afford good medical
care for his health problems, which persist since the detention and torture.
Robert was a high-ranking official during the military dictatorship. He joined the military
for career reasons and was responsible for most of the detentions and brutal interrogations in
the area where Daniel was living.
Robert lost his position in the military after the democratic elections. His pension was removed
and now he has no source of income. He lives in a very poor neighborhood in miserable
conditions. Though he has a number of health problems because of old age he cannot afford
good healthcare.
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STUDY 2
Vignette version 1 (V1)
In country B. a 20-year civil war between various rebel groups and a military regime ended 5
years ago. All fighting groups negotiated a peace agreement and elections brought a new
democratic government.
Daniel is one of many victims. 10 years ago he has been randomly arrested by the military on
his way from work. After torturing and beating him for days, they drove him out of the city
severely injured and left him to die in a forest. He was lucky to survive. Upon his return he
found his house has been burned and he lost everything. He still suffers from severe pain from
those injuries.
Daniel is very much liked and admired in his neighborhood. His neighbors look up to him as
someone who went through a lot. Many people want to know about the past and his
experiences. He has been asked to share his story with school and university students, has
given interviews on TV and for newspapers and is frequently invited as a guest of honor to
official state events or for big church festivities by the bishop.
Robert was a high-ranking official during the military dictatorship. He joined the military for
career reasons and was responsible for most of the detentions and brutal interrogations in the
area where Daniel was living.
Robert is respected in his neighborhood as someone who held an influential position and is
often invited to give speeches at universities or interviews on TV and in newspapers about
political matters. He is also often invited to official state or church events, often as a guest of
honor.

Vignette version 2 (V2)
In country B. a 20-year civil war between various rebel groups and a military regime ended 5
years ago. All fighting groups negotiated a peace agreement and elections brought a new
democratic government.
Daniel is one of many victims. 10 years ago he has been randomly arrested by the military on
his way from work. After torturing and beating him for days, they drove him out of the city
severely injured and left him to die in a forest. He was lucky to survive. Upon his return he
found his house has been burned and he lost everything. He still suffers from severe pain from
those injuries.
Daniel is very much liked and admired in his neighborhood. His neighbors look up to him as
someone who went through a lot. Many people want to know about the past and his
experiences. He has been asked to share his story with school and university students, has
given interviews on TV and for newspapers and is frequently invited as a guest of honor to
official state events or for big church festivities by the bishop.
Robert was a high-ranking official during the military dictatorship. He joined the military for
career reasons and was responsible for most of the detentions and brutal interrogations in the
area where Daniel was living.
Robert is avoided by people in his neighborhood. Many see the former regime officials as
criminals they want nothing to do with. Since Robert does not have the high-ranking position
anymore he also lost his old friends. He is mostly alone.

Vignette version 3 (V3)
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In country B. a 20-year civil war between various rebel groups and a military regime ended 5
years ago. All fighting groups negotiated a peace agreement and elections brought a new
democratic government.
Daniel is one of many victims. 10 years ago he has been randomly arrested by the military on
his way from work. After torturing and beating him for days, they drove him out of the city
severely injured and left him to die in a forest. He was lucky to survive. Upon his return he
found his house has been burned and he lost everything. He still suffers from severe pain from
those injuries.
Daniel is mostly alone. He feels his neighbors look down on him. Many say the former victims
just complain all the time. No one was ever interested in hearing his story and he feels most
people just want to forget about the past and want nothing to do with those who suffered.
Robert was a high-ranking official during the military dictatorship. He joined the military
for career reasons and was responsible for most of the detentions and brutal interrogations in
the area where Daniel was living.
Robert is respected in his neighborhood as someone who held an influential position and is
often invited to give speeches at universities or interviews on TV and in newspapers about
political matters. He is also often invited to official state or church events, often as a guest of
honor.

Vignette version 4 (V4)
In country B. a 20-year civil war between various rebel groups and a military regime ended 5
years ago. All fighting groups negotiated a peace agreement and elections brought a new
democratic government.
Daniel is one of many victims. 10 years ago he has been randomly arrested by the military
on his way from work. After torturing and beating him for days, they drove him out of the
city severely injured and left him to die in a forest. He was lucky to survive. Upon his return
he found his house has been burned and he lost everything. He still suffers from severe pain
from those injuries.
Daniel is mostly alone. He feels his neighbors look down on him. Many say the former
victims just complain all the time. No one was ever interested in hearing his story and he
feels most people just want to leave the past behind and want nothing to do with those who
suffered.
Robert was a high-ranking official during the military dictatorship. He joined the military
for career reasons and was responsible for most of the detentions and brutal interrogations in
the area where Daniel was living.
Robert is avoided by people in his neighborhood. Many see the former regime officials as
criminals they want nothing to do with. Since Robert does not have the high-ranking position
anymore he also lost his old friends. He is mostly alone.
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Appendix 3: Study 1 - Questionnaire
You have just read the story about Daniel and Robert. The following questions are about this story. In
some you will be asked to imagine you are Daniel or ask your opinion about Daniel’s situation. Please
pay close attention to the instructions.

1. Compared to Robert,
Daniel’s financial
situation is…

2. Do you think
Daniels’s financial
situation is…

Significantly
worse
1

Much worse
than he
deserves
1

Slightly
worse
2

Somewhat
worse than
he deserves
2

More or less
the same
3

Exactly what
he deserves
3

Slightly
better
4

Significantly
better
5

Slightly
Much better
better than he than he
deserves
deserves
4
5

3. What would you feel, if you were Daniel? Please select for EACH feeling a number between 1 (you
would not feel this at all) and 5 (this is absolutely what you would feel)
If you were Daniel, to what extent would you feel…?
Not at all
Resentful
1
2
Sad or depressed
1
2
Angry
1
2
Fearful or anxious
1
2
Grateful
1
2
Other emotion (please
describe):_______________

3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4

Absolutely
5
5
5
5
5

4. Please think about the story and imagine you were Daniel. How would you feel about Robert?
Strongly
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly
disagree
agree
I’ll make him pay
1
2
3
4
5
I would keep as much
1
2
3
4
5
distance between me and him
as possible
I would wish that something
1
2
3
4
5
bad would happen to him
I would live as if he doesn’t
1
2
3
4
5
exist, is not around
I would not trust him
1
2
3
4
5
I would wish him to get what
1
2
3
4
5
he deserves
I would find it difficult to act
1
2
3
4
5
warmly toward him
I would avoid him
1
2
3
4
5
I’m going to get even
1
2
3
4
5
I would cut off any
1
2
3
4
5
relationship with him
I would want to see him hurt
1
2
3
4
5
and miserable
I would withdraw from him
1
2
3
4
5
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I would forgive him

1

2

3

4

5

5. Think about the situation in country B described in the story. As Daniel would you agree or disagree
with the following statements? Place an X anywhere on the line between 0 (strongly disagree) and 100
(strongly agree)
True justice was done
0
Strongly
disagree

100
Strongly
agree

It fell short of true justice
0
Strongly
disagree

100
Strongly
agree

Everything was done to repair the crimes
0
Strongly
disagree

100
Strongly
agree

The situation was handled fairly
0
Strongly
disagree

100
Strongly
agree

6. Please think about the described situation in country B. from the point of view of Daniel and
indicate your agreement with the following statements
Strongly
Strongly
disagree
agree
I am very dissatisfied with
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
the situation as it now
stands.
I feel the situation as it now
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
stands is totally unfair.
Overall, the transition and
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
the time afterwards have
been very negative.
The situation, as it unfolded,
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
is very unjust.
All in all, the transition and
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
the time afterwards have
been a positive experience.
Overall, this situation has not
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
been a very fair.
I am pleased with the
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
development of events
7. How much would you agree with the next statement?
Strongly
Disagree
disagree
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Neutral

Agree

Strongly
agree

I think victims like Daniel should be in a
1
2
3
4
5
better financial situation than former
perpetrators
The next two questions are open ended. They are very important for the study in order to better
understand opinions and attitudes, which are not covered by the previous questions.
Please kindly take your time to answer them!
8. As Daniel, what would be important for you in order to feel that justice was done?

9. As Daniel, what would be important for you in order to forgive Robert?
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PART 2
1. Personal Information
Age
Sex
Country

__________Years
☐Male

☐Female

____________

Marital Status

☐Single

☐Married

☐Divorced

☐Widowed

Education

☐No formal
education

☐Primary

☐Secondary

☐University

2. Please check the answer options below that describe you best
I am a religious ☐Strongly
☐Disagree
☐Neutral
person
Disagree

☐Agree

☐Strongly
Agree

Apart from
weddings and
funerals I visit
the church

☐Never

☐Rarely/on
major holiday
like Christmas
or Easter

☐Once every
1-2 months

☐Every
Sunday

☐Every day or
almost every
day

I pray

☐Practically
never

☐Rarely

☐Several times
a month

☐Several times
a week

☐Daily

3. Please indicate the kind of victimization you have experienced during the LRA war:
☐None

☐Economic loss ☐Physical
harm

☐Abduction*

☐Death of a
close relative

☐Other:
____________
____________

How long ago did this happen?: __________________years

* If yes, please indicate below the duration the abduction
☐Less than 48
hours

☐48 hours – 1
week

☐More than a
week – 1 month

☐More than 1
month – 1 year

☐More than 1 year

4.How often do you acknowledge or think about the fact that you are a victim?
☐Never

☐Rarely

☐Sometimes

☐Often

Please indicate if you agree or disagree with the following statements
Strongly
Disagree
Neutral
disagree

☐All the time
Agree

I consider myself a victim
I feel a strong bond with other
victims of LRA war
I meet with other victims
regularly

5. Please indicate how well the statements below describe you or apply to you
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Strongly
agree

This statement describes me:

Completely

Very well

Somewhat

Very little

Not at all

Rarely

Never

Because of my money
situation I feel like I will never
have the things I want in life
I am just getting by financially
I am concerned that the money
I have or will save won’t last
Always

This statement applies to
me:
I have money left over at the
end of the month

Often

Sometimes

My finances control my life
6. The next questions ask you to compare your own situation and the situation of victims in general
with the situation of the former LRA rebels. Probably you do not have all the information to know this
for sure. Please still answer what you think!
Significantly Slightly
More or less Slightly
Significantly
worse
worse
the same
better
better
Compared to most former
1
2
3
4
5
LRA rebels my personal
financial situation is…
Compared to most of the
former LRA rebels the
financial situation of most
victims is…

1

2

3

4

5

7. Above you have assessed the financial situation of yourself and the group of victims compared to
former LRA rebels. To what extent, in your opinion, you and the group of victims have the financial
situation you deserve?
Much worse
than I/they
deserve

Somewhat
Exactly what
worse than
I/they
I/they deserve deserve

Slightly
better than
what I/they
deserve

Much better
than what
I/they
deserve

My personal financial
situation is…

1

2

3

4

5

The financial situation
of most victims is…

1

2

3

4

5

8. How do you feel when you think about your financial situation or the situation of the other victims?
Please indicate for EACH of the feelings a number between 1 (you do not feel this at all) and 5 (this is
absolutely what you feel)
WhenI think about my own financial situation I feel…
Not at all

Absolutely

Resentful

1

2

3

4

5

Sad or depressed

1

2

3

4

5

Angry

1

2

3

4

5

Grateful

1

2

3

4

5
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Other emotion (please
describe):__________

1

2

3

4

5

When I think about the financial situation of most victims I feel…
Not at all

Absolutely

Resentful

1

2

3

4

5

Sad or depressed

1

2

3

4

5

Angry

1

2

3

4

5

Grateful

1

2

3

4

5

Other emotion:
_______________

1

2

3

4

5

9. What do you think about the following situations?
Definitely not Probably not
willing
willing

Probably
willing

Definitely
willing

How would you feel about having a
former LRA rebel as a neighbour?

1

2

3

4

How about being on the same job
as with someone who was an LRA
rebel?

1

2

3

4

How about having one of your
children marry a former LRA
rebel?

1

2

3

4

10. For the following questions think about the former LRA rebels you have met and indicate how
much you agree or disagree with the following statements.
Strongly
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly
disagree
agree
I’ll make them pay

1

2

3

4

5

I would keep as much distance
between me and them as possible

1

2

3

4

5

I would wish that something bad
would happen to them

1

2

3

4

5

I would live as if they don’t exist, are
not around

1

2

3

4

5

I would not trust any of them

1

2

3

4

5

I would wish them to get what they
deserve

1

2

3

4

5

I would find it difficult to act warmly
toward any of them

1

2

3

4

5

I would avoid them

1

2

3

4

5

I’m going to get even

1

2

3

4

5

I would cut off any relationship with
them

1

2

3

4

5

I would want to see them hurt and
miserable

1

2

3

4

5
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Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly
agree

I would withdraw from them

1

2

3

4

5

I would forgive them

1

2

3

4

5

11. When I think about the situation in Northern Uganda since the peace process up to now I think
that:
True justice was done
0
Strongly
disagree

100
Strongly
agree

It fell short of true justice
0
Strongly
disagree
d

100
Strongly
agree

Everything was done to repair the crimes
0
Strongly
disagree

100
Strongly
agree

The situation was handled fairly
0
Strongly
disagree

100
Strongly
agree

12. Please indicate your agreement with the following statements
Strongly
disagree
I am very dissatisfied with
1
2
3
the situation as it now
stands.
I feel the situation as it now
1
2
3
stands is totally unfair.
Overall, the peace process
1
2
3
and the time afterwards have
been very negative.
The situation, as it unfolded
1
2
3
since the end of the war, is
very unjust.
All in all, the peace process
1
2
3
has been a positive
experience.
Overall, the situation since
1
2
3
the end of the war has not
been a very fair.
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Strongly
agree
4

5

6

7

4

5

6

7

4

5

6

7

4

5

6

7

4

5

6

7

4

5

6

7

Strongly
disagree
I am pleased with the
development of events

1

Strongly
agree
2

3

4

5

6

7

The next questions are open ended. They are very important for the study! Please take your time to
answer!
13. What would be important for you personally in order to feel that justice was done for the victims
in Northern Uganda

14. What would be important for you personally in order to forgive former LRA rebels?

15. Do you have any thoughts you would like to add?
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Appendix 4: Study 2 - Questionnaire
You have just read the story about Daniel and Robert. The following questions are about this story. In
some you will be asked to imagine you are Daniel or ask your opinion about Daniel’s situation. Please
pay close attention to the instructions.
Significantly Slightly
More or less Slightly
Significantly
worse
worse
the same
better
better
1. Compared to Robert,
1
2
3
4
5
Daniel’s social status
is…

2. Do you think
Daniels’s social status
is…

Much worse
than he
deserves
1

Somewhat
worse than
he deserves
2

Exactly what
he deserves
3

Slightly
Much better
better than he than he
deserves
deserves
4
5

3. What would you feel, if you were Daniel? Please select for EACH feeling a number between 1 (you
would not feel this at all) and 5 (this is absolutely what you would feel)
If you were Daniel, to what extent would you feel…?
Not at all
Resentful
1
2
Sad or depressed
1
2
Angry
1
2
Fearful or anxious
1
2
Grateful
1
2
Other emotion (please
describe):_______________

3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4

Absolutely
5
5
5
5
5

4. Please think about the story and imagine you were Daniel. How would you feel about Robert?
Strongly
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly
disagree
agree
I’ll make him pay
1
2
3
4
5
I would keep as much
1
2
3
4
5
distance between me and him
as possible
I would wish that something
1
2
3
4
5
bad would happen to him
I would live as if he doesn’t
1
2
3
4
5
exist, is not around
I would not trust him
1
2
3
4
5
I would wish him to get what
1
2
3
4
5
he deserves
I would find it difficult to act
1
2
3
4
5
warmly toward him
I would avoid him
1
2
3
4
5
I’m going to get even
1
2
3
4
5
I would cut off any
1
2
3
4
5
relationship with him
I would want to see him hurt
1
2
3
4
5
and miserable
I would withdraw from him
1
2
3
4
5
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I would forgive him

1

2

3

4

5

5. Think about the situation in country B described in the story. As Daniel would you agree or disagree
with the following statements? Place an X anywhere on the line between 0 (strongly disagree) and 100
(strongly agree)
True justice was done
0
Strongly
disagree

100
Strongly
agree

It fell short of true justice
0
Strongly
disagree

100
Strongly
agree

Everything was done to repair the crimes
0
Strongly
disagree

100
Strongly
agree

The situation was handled fairly
0
Strongly
disagree

100
Strongly
agree

6. Please think about the described situation in country B. from the point of view of Daniel and
indicate your agreement with the following statements
Strongly
Strongly
disagree
agree
I am very dissatisfied with
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
the situation as it now
stands.
I feel the situation as it now
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
stands is totally unfair.
Overall, the transition and
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
the time afterwards have
been very negative.
The situation, as it unfolded,
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
is very unjust.
All in all, the transition and
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
the time afterwards have
been a positive experience.
Overall, this situation has not
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
been a very fair.
I am pleased with the
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
development of events
7. How much would you agree with the next statement?
Strongly
Disagree
disagree
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Neutral

Agree

Strongly
agree

I think victims like Daniel should have a
1
2
3
4
5
higher social status than former
perpetrators
The next two questions are open ended. They are very important for the study in order to better
understand opinions and attitudes, which are not covered by the previous questions.
Please kindly take your time to answer them!
8. As Daniel, what would be important for you in order to feel that justice was done?

9. As Daniel, what would be important for you in order to forgive Robert?
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PART 2
1. Personal Information
Age
Sex
Country

__________Years
☐Male

☐Female

____________

Marital Status

☐Single

☐Married

☐Divorced

☐Widowed

Education

☐No formal
education

☐Primary

☐Secondary

☐University

2. Please select the answer options below that describe you best
I am a religious ☐Strongly
☐Disagree
☐Neutral
person
Disagree

☐Agree

☐Strongly
Agree

Apart from
weddings and
funerals I visit
the church

☐Never

☐Rarely/on
major holiday
like Christmas
or Easter

☐Once every
1-2 months

☐Every
Sunday

☐Every day or
almost every
day

I pray

☐Practically
never

☐Rarely

☐Several times
a month

☐Several times
a week

☐Daily

3. Please indicate the kind of victimization you have experienced during the LRA war:
☐None

☐Economic loss ☐Physical
harm

☐Abduction*

☐Death of a
close relative

☐Other:
____________
____________

How long ago did this happen?: __________________years

* If yes, please indicate below the duration the abduction
☐Less than 48
hours

☐48 hours – 1
week

☐More than a
week – 1 month

☐More than 1
month – 1 year

☐More than 1 year

4.How often do you acknowledge or think about the fact that you are a victim?
☐Never

☐Rarely

☐Sometimes

☐Often

Please indicate if you agree or disagree with the following statements
Strongly
Disagree
Neutral
disagree

☐All the time
Agree

Strongly
agree

I consider myself a victim
I feel a strong bond with other
victims of LRA war
I meet with other victims
regularly
The following questions will ask you to make an assessment of your own situation or the situation of
the victims as a group compared to the group of the former LRA rebels. You might feel that you do not
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have all the information to answer these questions. Please just answer what you think! And please
answer ALL questions!
5. Assessment of social status
10.

People define community in different ways. Please define it in whatever way is
most meaningful to you.
At the top of the ladder are the people who have the highest standing in their
community. At the bottom are the people who have the lowest standing in their
community

9.
8.
7.

Where would you place yourself?
Please place a large X on the rung where you think you stand at this time
in your life relative to other people in your community.

6.
5.

Where would you place most former LRA rebels?
Place a large O where you think most of the former LRA rebels stand
today.

4.
3.

And where would you place most victims of the LRA war as a group?

2.

Please place a big V on the rung where you place most victims in the
country today.

1.

6. Please, like above, answer what you personally think, even if you are not sure!
Significantly Slightly
More or less Slightly
worse
worse
the same
better
Compared to most former
1
2
3
4
LRA rebels my personal
social status is…
Compared to most of the
former LRA rebels the social
status of most victims is…

1

2

3

Significantly
better
5

4

5

7. Above you have assessed the social status of yourself and the group of victims compared to former
LRA rebels. To what extent, in your opinion, you and other victims have the social status you deserve?
Much worse
than I/they
deserve

Somewhat
Exactly what
worse than
I/they
I/they deserve deserve

Slightly
better than
what I/they
deserve

Much better
than what
I/they
deserve

My personal social
status is…

1

2

3

4

5

The social status of
most victims is…

1

2

3

4

5

8. How do you feel when you think about your social status or the status of the other victims?
Please indicate for EACH of the feelings a number between 1 (you do not feel this at all) and 5 (this is
absolutely what you feel)
When I think about my own social status I feel…..
Not at all
Resentful

1

Absolutely
2
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3

4

5

Sad or depressed

1

2

3

4

5

Angry

1

2

3

4

5

Grateful

1

2

3

4

5

Other emotion (please
describe):__________

1

2

3

4

5

When I think about the social status of most victims I feel…..
Not at all

Absolutely

Resentful

1

2

3

4

5

Sad or depressed

1

2

3

4

5

Angry

1

2

3

4

5

Grateful

1

2

3

4

5

Other emotion:
_______________

1

2

3

4

5

9. What do you think about the following situations?
Definitely not Probably not
willing
willing

Probably
willing

Definitely
willing

How would you feel about having a
former LRA rebel as a neighbour?

1

2

3

4

How about being on the same job
with a former LRA rebel?

1

2

3

4

How about having one of your
children marry a former LRA
rebel?

1

2

3

4

10. For the following questions think about the former LRA rebels you have met and indicate how
much you agree or disagree with the following statements.
Strongly
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly
disagree
agree
I’ll make them pay

1

2

3

4

5

I would keep as much distance
between me and them as possible

1

2

3

4

5

I would wish that something bad
would happen to them

1

2

3

4

5

I would live as if they don’t exist, are
not around

1

2

3

4

5

I would not trust any of them

1

2

3

4

5

I would wish them to get what they
deserve

1

2

3

4

5

I would find it difficult to act warmly
toward any of them

1

2

3

4

5

I would avoid them

1

2

3

4

5

I’m going to get even

1

2

3

4

5

I would cut off any relationship with
them

1

2

3

4

5
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Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly
agree

I would want to see them hurt and
miserable

1

2

3

4

5

I would withdraw from them

1

2

3

4

5

I would forgive them

1

2

3

4

5

11. When I think about the situation in Northern Uganda since the peace process up to now I think
that:
True justice was done
0
Strongly
disagree

100
Strongly
agree

It fell short of true justice
0
Strongly
disagree

100
Strongly
agree

Everything was done to repair the crimes
0
Strongly
disagree

100
Strongly
agree

The situation was handled fairly
0
Strongly
disagree

100
Strongly
agree

12. Please indicate your agreement with the following statements
Strongly
disagree
I am very dissatisfied with
1
2
3
the situation as it now
stands.
I feel the situation as it now
1
2
3
stands is totally unfair.
Overall, the peace process
1
2
3
and the time afterwards have
been very negative.
The situation, as it unfolded
1
2
3
since the end of the war, is
very unjust.
All in all, the peace process
1
2
3
has been a positive
experience.
Overall, the situation since
1
2
3
the end of the war has not
been a very fair.
325

Strongly
agree
4

5

6

7

4

5

6

7

4

5

6

7

4

5

6

7

4

5

6

7

4

5

6

7

Strongly
disagree
I am pleased with the
development of events

1

Strongly
agree
2

3

4

5

6

7

The next questions are open ended. They are very important for the study! Please take your time to
answer!
13. What would be important for you personally in order to feel that justice was done for the victims
in Northern Uganda?

14. What would be important for you personally in order to forgive former LRA rebels?

15. Do you have any thoughts you would like to add?
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Appendix 5: Semi-structured Interview Guide

1. Could you tell me a little bit about your experiences during the
regime/conflict
2. How would you describe the situation of victims today in terms of
economic wellbeing and social status?
3. How do you see your own situation?
4. How do you see the financial status and economic wellbeing of former
perpetrators?
5. What do you think when you make this comparison?
6. Would you say that justice was done in Poland/Uganda and why yes/no?
7. What would justice mean for you?
8. What do you feel towards the group of former perpetrators?
9. How do you understand forgiveness in general?
10. What would be important for you if you were to forgive the former
perpetrators?
11. Is there anything you would like to add?
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Appendix 6: Alternative data analysis – ANOVA
The following tables present the results of data analysis conducted with univariate
and multivariate analysis of variance.
Appendix table 1: Uganda Study 1 (Economic wellbeing)
Vignette Versions
Mean (SD)

V1

V2

V3

V4

F

Experienced
Relative
Deprivation

8.1563
(2.096)a

12.303
(2.567)b

6.4857
(1.121)c

7.3226
(1.640)ac

59.863

Injustice
Perception
Scale

31.219
(8.830)ab

26.848
(9.304)ab

40.543
(6.213)c

37.677
(6.279)c

21.215

25.188
(6.087)
16.625
(4.513)
2.969
(1.534)

23.455
(6.717)
16.30
(4.759)
3.424
(1.324)

26.543
(5.792)
17.971
(4.076)
2.743
(1.540)

25.484
(4.753)
16.226
(3.232)
3.387
(1.283)

Avoidance
Revenge
Forgiveness

df1 df2 p
3

127 .000

3

127 .000

3

127 .194

3

127 .285

3

127 .152

1.594
1.276
1.794

n
32
33
35
31
a,b,c: Post-hoc test (Bonferroni) of differences between the experimental conditions. Same letter in
the groups indicates no statistically significant difference.
Appendix table 2: Poland Study 1 (Economic wellbeing)
Vignette Versions
Mean (SD)

V1

V2

V3

V4

F

df1 df2 p

Experienced
Relative
Deprivation

10.4324
(3.3955)a

13.7407
(3.87886)b

6.4828
(1.7448)c

8.000 (2.522)c 29.939

3

112 .000

Injustice
Perception
Scale

30.729
(9.779)ac

22.556
(10.028)b

34.138
(13.034)ac

33.957
(11.014)ac

6.536

3

112 .000

27.324
(0.819)
13.622
(4.912)
2.622
(1.210)abc

28.963
(0.959)
14.407
(3.815)
2.963
(1.192)ab

29.483
(0.925)
16.034
(4.739)
2.069
(1.193)ac

28.217
(1.039)
14.739
(4.412)

1.157

3

112 .330

1.562

3

112 .203

3.13 (1.100)ab 4.245

3

112 .007

Avoidance
Revenge
Forgiveness

n
37
27
29
23
a,b,c: Post-hoc test (Bonferroni) of differences between the experimental conditions. Same letter in
the groups indicates no statistically significant difference
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25.933
(6.324)
15.450
(4.428)
3.22
(1.277)ab

26.333
(6.009)
15.015
(4.933)
2.78
(1.371)abc

27.875
(5.423)
17.094
(4.460)
2.44
(1.424)ac

37.641
(10.329)c

6.484
(1.425)c

V3

26.648
(4.926)
15.593
(3.814)
3.28
(1.204)ab

36.093
(10.721)c

7.611
(2.069)c

V4

df1

3
3
3

1.662
2.545
5.278

22.221 3

75.282 3

F

242

242

242

242

242

df2

.002

.057

.176

.000

.000

p

df1

1

6.873

1

14.695 1

21.995 1

9.167

12.285 1

F

242

242

242

242

242

df2

Country

.009

.000

.000

.003

.001

p

329

n
69
60
64
54
a,b,c: Comparison of main effects (Bonferroni) between the experimental conditions. Same letter in the groups indicates no
statistically significant difference

Forgiveness

Revenge

Avoidance

24.917
(9.793)b

30.957
(9.287)a

Injustice
Perception
Scale

12.950
(3.275)b

V2

9.377
(3.067)a

V1

Experienced
Relative
Deprivation

Mean (SD)

Vignette Versions

Appendix table 3: Uganda and Poland Study 1 (Economic wellbeing)

Appendix table 4: Uganda Study 2 (Social acknowledgement)
Vignette Versions
Mean (SD)
V1

V2

V3

V4

F

df1 df2

Experienced
Relative
Deprivation

9.0323
(2.880)a

12.3438
(3.054)b

5.0625
(1.644)c

6.6774
(2.481)c

48.229

3

122 .000

Injustice
Perception
Scale

24.3226
(8.780)ab

24.2813
(7.265)ab

32.9063
(9.274)c

34.5806
(6.407)c

14.740

3

122 .000

22.516
(6.536)
14.677
(3.884)
3.581
(1.232)

122 .344

.538

3

122 .657

4.065(.964)

20.469
(6.806)
13.875
(4.323)
3.906
(1.201)

3

Forgiveness

21.219
(6.823)
14.281
(4.259)
3.781
(1.263)

1.120

Revenge

19.581
(5.954)
13.419
(3.913)

.945

3

122 .421

Avoidance

p

n
31
32
32
31
a,b,c: Post-hoc test (Bonferroni) of differences between the experimental conditions. Same letter in
the groups indicates no statistically significant difference.
Appendix table 5: Poland Study 2 (Social acknowledgment)
Vignette Versions
Mean (SD)

V1

V2

V3

V4

F

Experienced
Relative
Deprivation

9.5652
(3.395)ac

13.0952
(5.485)b

8.3000
(3.657)ac

7.6000
(3.339)ac

6.186

Injustice
Perception
Scale

28.9130
(8.943)

22.6190
(10.384)

29.3000
(9.044)

27.6000
(9.724)

2.206

29.810
(5.372)
14.571
(6.265)
2.476
(1.209)

29.762
(3.491)
14.048
(3.485)
2.905
(1.091)

29.900
(4.666)
14.250
(4.505)
2.650
(1.182)

26.200
(5.865)
16.400
(4.742)
3.400
(1.430)

Avoidance
Revenge
Forgiveness

df1 df2 p
3

70

.001

3

70

.095

1.661

3

68

.184

.579

3

68

.631

1.491

3

68

.225

n
21
21
20
10
a,b,c: Post-hoc test (Bonferroni) of differences between the experimental conditions. Same letter in
the groups indicates no statistically significant difference.
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24.604
(7.088)
14.1888
(3.937)
3.43
(1.264)

23.7115
(7.606)
13.885
(4.973)
3.42
(1.319)

24.0962
(7.598)
14.019
(4.354)
3.42
(1.334)

31.519
(9.268)c

6.308
(3.026)c

V3

23.415
(6.508)
15.098
(4.116)
3.54
(1.267)

32.878
(7.804)

6.902
(2.700)c

V4

df1

3
3
3

.311
.797
.023

11.636 3

38.183 3

F

193

193

193

195

195

df2

.995

.497

.818

.000

.000

p

1

1

df1

1

35.509 1

.982

88.580 1

.948

8.251

F

193

193

193

195

195

df2

Country

.000

.323

.000

.331

.005

p

331

n
52
53
52
41
a,b,c: Comparison of main effects (Bonferroni) between the experimental conditions. Same letter in the groups indicates no
statistically significant difference.

Forgiveness

Revenge

Avoidance

23.623
(8.580)ab

26.278
(9.060)ab

Injustice
Perception
Scale

12.641
(4.156)b

V2

9.259
(3.091)a

V1

Experienced
Relative
Deprivation

Mean (SD)

Vignette Versions

Appendix table 6: Uganda and Poland Study 2 (Social acknowledgment)
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